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EDOUARD- RICHARD

ACADIA

MISSING LINKS OF A LOST CHAPTER

IN AMERICAN’ HISTORY

BY
AN aoa dcpegt

BX-MEMBER OF THE HOUSE OF COMMON F CANADA

VoL. I,

NEW YORK
HOME BOOK COMPANY

MONTREAL
JOHN LOVELL & SON

sya

Entered according to Act of Parliament, in the year one thousand eight
hundred and ninety-five, by EDOUARD RicHarD, in the office of
the Minister of Agriculture and Statistics, at Ottawa.

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*.

¢

INTRODUCTORY REMARKS.

_ THE work I am now undertaking has never been done
before. This sweeping assertion may astonish the

reader; but there is this very good reason for making

it: the archives of the most important part of this
history have been either carried off, or destroyed, or

- simply lost. Which of these alternatives.is the most

likely will appear later on.

An American writer, Philip H. Smith, treating of

the: same subject, gave his book this title: ‘ Acadia—

A Lost Chapter in American History.” Though he had

not the documents needed for a complete reconstruction,
yet, with his sound judgment and great impartiality, by
making good use of what he had in hand, he has man-
aged to hit upon a line of development that affords
a glimpse of what was hidden in the missing docu-
ments. _ 7

That lost chapter I believe I have reconstructed in its

essential parts. The reader will judge if the title I
have chosen suits the work I lay before him. Have I,
then, found the missing portion of the archives? Yes
and no. A considerable part of them will, probably,
never be found ; but good luck has put in my way frag-

ments of them, which are amply sufficient to throw.
light, if not upon the secret details of this history, a*

2 INTRODUCTORY REMARKS. \

least upon its main outlines. Close and continued
thought has done the rest.

It is easy to understand what lively interest these
events excite in a great grandson of the transported
Acadians. That which for others was only a matter of
curiosity became for me an intense attraction, urging me
to undertake researches and meditations that seem to
have disheartened those who have hitherto approached
the question. The very mystery that enshrouds it has
drawn to it many writers ; but labor that is continually
running against all sorts of difficulties soon becomes
wearisome, and so it has happened that all these writers
have ended either by leaving a blank here or by copying
the shadowy sketch found in authors who had opened the
way.

All the importance of this history of Acadia, from
the English conquest in 1710 until 1768, was centered
in the events that brought about the transportation,
in the transportation itself and in its consequences ;
that, is to say, in the period that extends from 1745
to 1763, or even to 1766. Before that, there is noth-
ing but unimportant facts. No one will tarry to de-
scribe a river peacefully flowing through a valley
where the landscape on all sides is monotonous in its
sameness ; but, once this tiresome, monotony is past, if
we reach mighty and fantastic cliffs, overhanging rocks,
foaming surges dashing from chasm to chasm, we
stop, we are thrilled with wonder at the wild wreck
wrought by the ceaseless buffeting of the waters. This
is the aspect of the story I am about to tell. It is
the only part of Acadian history that presents a real
and varied interest, it ought therefore to have been
related in detail; and yet, all we have of it so far is

INTRODUCTORY REMARKS. 3

a rough sketch that leaves out the palpitating pity of
it all.

How comes it that the documents. of so important a
period have disappeared?. Was this the result of ac-
cident or design?» Many writers have asked this
question before. Those who have answered it have all
done so in the same way. Others have ignored it,
giving the reader no hint of this strange disappearance.
Granting that these latter did not share the suspicions
of the former, it seems evident that they ought at least
to have combated those suspicions, or at all events to
have mentioned the disappearance of the documents, were
it only to let the reader know why they were so brief in
their treatment of so important an epoch. Did they
think that obvious inferences unpalatable to them were
easy to draw? Perhaps.

However this may be, few writers have bestowed on —
this “* Lost Chapter” as much as one-sixth of the space
I am giving to it. Now, unless I be despairingly
prolix, this fact suffices to show that I must have under-
gone serious labor and: have found much information
that is new. On this score I may assure the reader
that he will not be disappointed. What opinion soever
he may form of my work, he will not be able to deny
that he has been interested by a mass of unedited docu-
ments, by novel views, and by inferences from which it
is hard to escape. Most of my readers, I am sure, will
readily admit that this book is quite a revelation, that it
solves a problem over which the world has been puz-
zling for more than a century.

Every one knows how deep are the impressions pro-
duced on a child by the tales he has heard at the fire-
side, especially when their very character is full of dra-

4 INTRODUCTORY REMARKS.

matie interest; and, if these events are personal to the
authors of our being, then they take on portentous pro-
portions and become ineradicably riveted in our minds.
So it has been for me with the events that preceded,
accompanied and followed the deportation. Sitting on
my mother’s knee, I have heard them repeated a hundred
times, and the tears they often drew from me would
alone suffice to perpetuate the remembrance of them.
The whole of my childhood was spent in the midst of
an Acadian settlement. Then were still alive the sons
of those who had been deported, facts were still fresh in
their memories, and each family could reconstruct the
series of its misfortunes from the time it left Grand Pré,
Beaubassin or Port Royal till its final settlement in
Canada.*

Since that time the generation that was dying out
has made way fora new onc. I have myself long left
my childhoad’s home, and those memories, persistent
though they be, have lost the precision that was needed
to give them the weight of carefully collected traditions.
_ Besides, as my recollections bear only on the purely
material facts of the deportation and of the misfortunes
that followed in its train, they would afford but slender
interest to my readers. This only will I say, that the
invariable answer of all whom I questioned as to the
cause of this deportation was: the refusal to take the
oath of allegiance unless it were stipulated that they
should not bear arms against the French.

“ But,” I used often to reply, “that cannot be; your
fathers must have been guilty of some act of hostility,

*T still have by me an aged uncle—Raphael Richard—who remembers .-
very distinctly having heard his grandfather relate the incidents of the de-
portation, of which he had been himself a victim at the age of eleven.

INTRODUCTORY REMARKS. §

_in one way or another, which forced the Government
to act with rigor; the punishment was too severe, and
yet the choice of means alone seems blameworthy.”
And there came back always the precise and formal
answer—that never, at any time, did the people dwelling
in the peninsula on English territory, take up or even
threaten to take up arms.

In spite of their affirmations I had always thought
that they were mistaken ; and, strange .as it may seem,
my only wish had been to convince myself that they
were wrong. Thus at least would the bitterness evoked
by these memories have been lessened by the certainty
that the cause of all this woe was to some extent a
righteous one. I would then have likened, or, at any
rate, tried to liken these sad events to so many other
calamities that have, in bygone ages, befallen all other
nations indiscriminately. Whatever may be the cruelty
of a chastisement, it is some consolation to know with
certainty that it was partly deserved; forgiveness and
oblivion become possible, nay, perhaps a duty. —

No such consolation has issued from my conscientious
researches. [ am convinced, beyond all’ doubt, that
tradition faithfully reproduced historic truth; but
—eagerly do I proclaim it, incredible though it may
seem—the Home Government had nothing to do with
either the resolving upon or the carrying out of this act
of barbarity that has left upon the civilized world an
impression of ineradicable and unassuageable pain.

_ There are events and men that fill a large place in
the eyes of their contemporaries. They bid fair to be
long held in remembrance and perhaps to be immortal-
ized in history; yet, hardly have they disappeared, when
every trace of them is forgotten. Others again there

6 INTRODUCTORY REMARKS.

are, apparently less important, less noticed at the time,
which never seem to lose the interest that clings to them.
_ Finally, there are other events and men that may be
said to grow in magnitude with the very growth of the
distance that separates us from them. To this last
category belong, in ancient history, the siege of Troy,
the battle of Thermopyle; men like Homer, Plato,
Socrates; and, in modern history, the signing of the
Magna Charta, the massacre of St. Bartholemew,
Columbus, Shakespeare, Washington. So will it be, I
venture to think, with the deportation of the Acadians.
This unique fact of the dispersion of a people will grow
as time grows. The very effort made to blot out all
trace of it, by suppressing both the documents and the
names that should engrave it on the memory, will
contribute more than anything else to make the
recollection of it lasting. Where the historian cannot
penetrate the poet enters. These mutilated or lost
chapters of history then beeome a field from which
the poet gleans the golden grain that has escaped
destruction, and gives to grateful humanity those
touching poems for which he is repaid by immortality.
And, indeed, what field can offer him a richer harvest
than this one? A happy and prosperous people rudely
snatched from its home, dispersed on every shore ; families
rent asunder, so that scattered members seek each other
during many long years; the melancholy monotony of
lives consecrated to sorrow and suffering,—all this is so
charged with “the slings and arrows of outrageous
fortune ” as to produce in him who ponders it all, after
more than a century, an indefinable feeling of sadness.
The victims of this dismal drama still tug at your heart
strings like the wailings of some hero of ancient trag-

INTRODUCTORY REMARKS. T

edy. The consequences of this dispersion cannot be
measured ; they have reached out into every family and ~
to each member of every family; each heart has felt the
torture, each nerve the cruel twinge.

If I have not been able to find in these events that
comfort which the certitude of a merited chastisement
might have afforded me, I must admit that the non-partici-
pation of the Home Government has been a great relief
from the sinister thoughts that haunted my brain. No;
the English Government never ordered this deportation,
nor ever did anything that might imply it; quite the
contrary. This work will give indisputable proof that,
at the very moment when Governor Lawrence, falsely
taking His Majesty’s name, was executing the project
he had long entertained, orders were addressed to him
condemning, in energetic terms, the mitigated project he
had submitted to the Lords of Trade. It is a strange
thing—which shows how superficially history is some-
times written—that not one of the documents establish-
ing so important a fact has been cited by any English
historian. For some, the motive of their silence will
appear in the course of this narrative. For others, it
was a question of following the beaten path rather than
facing the labor of cutting through a jungle.

It is not my intention to indicate even briefly, in
these preliminary remarks, the important data on which
this book rests. That would cause unnecessary delay.
Suffice if to assure those who take a deep interest in
matters of history, that they will find in this volume
ample satisfaction for their curiosity, and, probably, the
solution of the riddle that has long teased them. Per-
haps they will be still better pleased to follow gradually,
without further explanations, the connected series of

8 : INTRODUCTORY REMARKS.

facts brought to light by many hitherto unpublished
documents to be found here.

I am fully aware of the prejudices that may arise in
the minds of my readers, prejudices whose name very
likely is legion; but I am also aware that they will
disappear one by one, till the last of them, I hope, will
evaporate long before the reading of my last chapter.
Far from wondering at these prejudices, I should be
liable to them myself, were I in the reader’s place ; I
could not, at first blush, shake off the impression that
he who relates events with which his ancestors have
been so painfully connected, cannot view them with
that calm impartiality which is a requisite of history. I
unhesitatingly confess that these events have produced
on me the keenest of impressions, that my heart has
bled at the recital of the woe that crushed my forefathers.
Still, despite all this, I hope to convince the reader that I
have not been biassed. No doubt education has a mighty
influence in giving, from childhood, a fixedness to the
opinions of one’s whole life. For most men early educa-
tion is everything, they are its slaves from the cradle to
the grave; it has equipped them with spectacles, green
or blue, through which they look at and pronounce with-
out appeal on the most varied colors. But, there are
others who, thanks to a more elastic temperament, are able
to make a clean sweep of whatever is cumbrous in their
past, to begin’ to examine anew whatever is not certain,
and thusto break through the narrow horizon that shut
them in. For better or for worse, this is, in a very
marked degree, my own disposition.

This work’ was first intended for my Frénch com-
patriots; but, om second thoughts, I decided to present
it‘also to my English-speaking fellow-countrymen.

INTRODUCTORY REMARKS. §

Albeit historians are not wont to dilate on their own
personality, I will, nevertheless, make bold to say that, as
far as I may judge, my chief characteristic is kindliness.
Wherever I could, without too greatly jeopardizing the
truth, I have been delighted to lean to the cide of indul-
gence. When I might have called in question the sin-
cerity of several historians, I refrained from doing so ;
nay, I have sometimes been so indulgent as to suppose,
against my plain convictions, honorable intentions, on
the principle that it was better to sin by excess of silence
and mercy rather than by too great severity. But, when
brought face to face with systematic attempts, unmistak-
able and continually renewed, to falsify history, I have
thought that silence became a fault, and that the finger
of scorn must be laid on these dishonest practices, and
on those who perpetrated them with malice prepense.

The exception I have just hinted at bears on the
compiler of the volume of Archives of Nova Scotia and
on Mr. Parkman. Regretfully do I say this; but the
evidence leaves no possibility of doubt.

As I advance nothing without proof, the public will
be in a position to judge whether or not my motives are
solidly grounded. I know that Iam laying myself open
to reprisals; but I believe that I can successfully face
them, and that I can defend my position still more
strongly than I have done here. However, despite my -
efforts to master the question, I may have made some
mistakes; some secondary or even important facts may
have escaped my knowledge ; this would not be surpris-
ing, since I am engaged in reconstructing, in a lost
chapter, the fragments that have not been destroyed.
If there are mistakes, I will willingly acknowledge
them ; but it is one thing to be ignorant of unpublished

10 INTRODUCTORY REMARKS.

facts, and quite another to distort or sHppreRs what one
cannot but know.

However, my conclusions agree in the main with
those of most historians. During more than a hundred
years all that was written on the subject was pretty
much from the same standpoint. First, comes Raynal,.
who wrote about 1780, shortly after the deportation.
His work might possess some value, if he had lived
in the country, or if, at least, he had visited it and col-
lected information on the spot. Being a contemporary
of the events—he was born in 1713—he might have
written a work of much weight. Unfortunately he did
not avail himself of his opportunities. So, without ques-
tioning his sincerity, I attach so little value to his say-
ings and his opinions that I do not quote him even
once. His views have no importance except as a reflec-
tion of the ideas and sentiments that then were current
in France. Besides, Raynal does not strike me as a
serious writer; at best, he is a superfine story-teller in
the pompous and turgid style of the epoch. The flat-
tering picture he draws of Acadian manners is, I admit,
too ideal not to have been soniewhat embellished by his
imagination. And yet we have numerous proofs that,
in Halifax itself, a goodly portion of the citizens did not
think him very unreal. Haliburton, who wrote forty
years later, quotes Raynal’s appreciations, and points
out that he was notso far from the truth as people might
imagine.

After Raynal comes Haliburton himself (Thomas
Chandler Haliburton). Here we have no longer a for-
eigner, nor a superfine story-teller, but a son of the soil,
whose grandfather, a Loyalist, had immigrated to the
country after the American war of Independence; a

INTRODUCTORY REMARKS. 11

man, moreover, who rose to the Supreme Court Bench
of his province, a remarkable author, who enjoyed the
respect of his fellow-countrymen, and was honored by
his Sovereign. His position, his character, his judicial
nind, his great and varied talents mark him out as the
noblest representative of the eminent men this highly
favored province has produced.

His History of Nova Scotia does not give us the full
measure of his literary ability ; but it does of his noble
character, of his rectitude, and of the efforts he made to
wcquire a mastery of his subject, so as to guide the public
along the path his conscience showed him. He founded
the history of his province, for which he received a vote
of thanks from the Legislature. To this day his work
is continually consulted as an authority, and is a founda-
tion for most of those who treat of local history. This
look was published in 1829. As it was in preparation
for many years previous to that date, and as he was then
a middle-aged man, he may be said to have been a con-
temporary of some of the men who figured at. the time
of the deportation. Thus, besides his researches in his-
torical documents, he could take advantage of much
oral information on matters that were still fresh in men’s
memories. The sequel will show that his conclusions
do not differ materially from mine.

Thirty years later (1859), Rameau published “ La
Franee aux Colonies ” and, in 1889, “Une Colonie Féodale
en Amérique.” In 1865 appeared the “ History of Nova
Scotia”’ by Beamish Murdoch. The volume of “ Nova
Scotia Archives,” begun in 1857, was completed in 1869.
Campbell’s “ History of Nova Scotia” came out in 1873,
which yearalso gave us Moreau’s “ Histoire de l’ Acadie.”
Hannay’s “ History of Acadia” is dated 1879; Philip

12 INTRODUCTORY REMARKS.

H. Smith’s “ Acadia—A Lost Chapter in American His-
tory,” 1884; Casgrain’s “ Pélerinage au Pays d’Evangé-
line,” 1888; and Parkman’s *“ Montcalm and Wolfe,”
which contains a good deal about Acadia, 1884.

With the exception of Hannay and Parkman, and
perhaps of Murdoch, who, however, hardly expresses.
any opinion on the events he describes, all the other
writers named above hold nearly the same view as Hali-
burton. | he

Of late years history has been enriched by an exceed-
ingly precious collection of documents, which throw a
flood of light on the very darkest part of the period. It
is really unfortunate that men like Murdoch and Hannay,
who seem to have been sincere, had not access to this
collection. As to Parkman, I have the positive proof
that he knew of it but chose to ignore it.

This voluminous collection is due to the Rev. Andrew
Brown, Presbyterian minister, who died at Edinburgh,
when he was Professor of Rhetoric in the university.
While living at Halifax, from 1787 to 1795, he collected
materials with the intention of writing a history of
Nova Scotia. This history, incomplete and in manu-
script, was found with all the original and other docu-
ments that accompanied it, in a grocer’s' shop, and
bought, Nov. 13th, 1852, by Mr. Grosart, who sold it to
the British Museum in London. Some years ago it was
copied, in whole or in part, by the Historical Society of
Halifax, in whose archives it is now. Iam particularly
indebted to this collection, from which numerous extracts
have been published in “ Le Canada Frangais,” if I am
in a position to recompose, almost entirely, this lost
chapter. The importance of this MS. is obvious. An
historian was needed who should be a closer contemporary

INTRODUCTORY REMARKS. 13

of the obscure period than Haliburton. This want is
now supplied, and all the more effectually because
Brown’s position and character would satisfy the most
fastidious critic. .

The volume of Archives, published in 1869 by order
of the Legislature, was edited by Thomas B. Akins,
Commissioner of the Public Archives of the Province.
I do not hesitate to affirm that the documents have been
selected with the greatest partiality, and with the pur-
- pose, poorly disguised in the very preface, of getting
together such papers as might justify the deportation of
the Acadians. This accusation I have not deliberately
striven to support by hunting up examples, and yet the
proofs of it have incidentally accumulated in such pro-
fusion as to open the eyes of those who are not wilfully
blind. It iseasy tosee that this compiler aimed at start-
ing a reaction against the opinions and sentiments that
had been current for more than acentury. His intention, 7
evidently, was to make this volume an arsenal for all
who wanted weapons, for he was fully aware that few
writers would give themselves the trouble to go behind
his compilation.

A mere summary of documents will not do duty for
the history of this period. He who should accomplish
no more than this would have written nothing that even.
remotely resembled history ; first, because of the scarcity
of materials, and then because, up to 1758, we are face
to face with the omnipotent authority of the governor
and of a soldier at that. Inured to military discipline,
these governors knew only how to command and imperi-
ously to enforce passive obedience. Will any one pre-
tend that, under such conditions, history can be written
solely with the orders of this potentate, and his letters

Ye Ee INTRODUCTORY REMARKS.

to the Secretary of State, whose representatives in this
case were the Lords of Trade? Such a pretension
were absurd. Clearly, these letters exhibit one side
only of the question, the governor’s; they are sure to
contain nothing that is unfavorable to him, nothing that
could militate against him and in favor of those who,
most of the time, silently obeyed his unjust orders, or
whose recriminations are not recorded, had they plucked
up enough courage to contradict him or to utter a mur-
mur. And yet these are the only documents we possess
for this period; nay, even these one-sided statements
have, in great part, disappeared. The only thing a man
can do who undertakes to give the public a somewhat
faithful picture of the reality is—for the satisfaction of
his readers as well as his own—to make the best use of
these wretched remnants, to piece them together, to try
to penetrate their hidden meaning, the motives by
which this despot may have been actuated; in a word,
to get hold of some evidence from which an opinion may
be formed of his character and his acts. If, in the teeth
of these difficulties, the historian sueceeds in explaining
the governor’s acts by means of the latter’s own docu-
ments, in which he has said only what he chose to say ;
if, moreover, the historian detects the motives which he
had every reason to hide with every facility for hiding
them, so as to convict him of this or that evil design
_ against those who have left nothing in their own defence ;
such a result is indeed surprising.

Yet that is what I have done, and more particularly
for Lawrence and his accomplices. All, or almost all
previous writers seemed to have perceived that the con-
duct of the Acadians, even as represented by Lawrence
himself, had not justified their deportation. For a hun-

INTRODUCTORY REMARKS. 15

dred years there has been scarcely a dissentient voice on
this point. Such being the _ case, if itis true that the
English Government never ordered the deportation, Law-
rence must have had some motive for acting as he did.
This motive I had some inkling of directly I began to
study the question. Soon I understood clearly what it
was. That was not the difficulty. The great, the im-
mense difficulty, lay altogether in proving the motive,
when all helpful documents had disappeared. It has
been said, with more wit than truth, that, if you want to
ferret out acrime, you must “ find the woman in the case.”
Though this may sometimes hold for a crime in the singu-
lar, it cannot be true of a crime in the plural, as this one is.
Here I should say: “ Find what profit the criminal got.”
This profit I have found and the proof thereof, clear
énough to satisfy any court of justice, though it were
absurd to require the evidence of law courts for events
that took place almost 140 years ago.

It is comparatively easy to write the history of a
country enjoying representative institutions, or of a long-
settled nation like France or England. The State papers
are confirmed or contradicted by so many other docu-
ments that there is not much need of commentary in quot-
ing authorities. But, in this case, nothing like history can
be written without meditating, weighing probabilities,
and drawing legitimate inferences. I should have
found it much easier to be a mere compiler ; but then, I
might as well have done like so many others and copied
right and left, or, better still, have written nothing at
all. Others, possibly, may have examined more docu-
ments ; but perhaps no one has brought to bear on the
question so much of the deep consideration needed for
grasping the dominant purpose of the interested parties,

16 INTRODUCTORY REMARKS.

the intentions and feelings lurking between the lines of
official or other documents.

Addressing myself to the subject with all the impar-
tiality at my command, I thought I should find at least
a partial justification of the deportation, and that thus I
should free my soul from a burden that weighed heavily
upon it. This justification I did not discover ; [reached
a contrary conclusion ; but I have at all events the con-
solation of knowing that the guilt does not bear directly
upon a nation, but upon individuals whom history has
not yet properly branded. This book will, in my judg-
ment, effectually clear England’s Home Government’s
honor of the deepest historic stain ever attached to it.
Let the stigma be obliterated which England has hitherto
borne ; burn it into the foreheads of Lawrence, Belcher,
Wilmot, Morris, and their accomplices. | .

If it is true, on the one hand, that the policy of Eng-
land has always been one of self-interest, rather than of
sentiment, it may be held that, as far as the Home
Government is concerned, its policy has been in general
honorable and compares favorably with that of any
other nation. England owes its high standing to the
wisdom and tpianastndetines of its statesmen. Minis-
tries rose and fell but the main lines of its policy were
unchanged: Impervious alike to sudden enthusiasm, to
oradual apathy, and to unexpected reversals, England
: svenbd its ends with unyarying resolution and change-
less tenacity of purpose. Obstacles seemed only to
whet its ambition, and to strengthen its determination,

The policy of France, on the other hand, may be
described in nearly opposite terms. Colonies were
founded with enthusiasm, only to be left to themselves
a few years later. This is precisely what took -place in

INTRODUCTORY REMARKS. 4%:

Acadia. About a hundred families were settled there,
and then left without adequate assistance to carry on
heroic struggles against a much more powerful enemy.
When this handful of colonists became a happy and pros-
perous embryo nation, whenit was seen what store
England set by keeping its hold on them, France begamr
again to covet what she had neglected or forsaken.

Instead of founding colonies by multiplying the colo-
nists, she thought she could found them with fortresses.
One single million out of the thirty millions spent on
the rock of Louisburg would have peopled Acadia in a
way to insure its permanent possession by France.
Whilst Canada, with its sixty thousand souls, was check-
mating New England’s twelve hundred thousand,
France, the prey of courtiers, was making merry. Vol-
taire, leader of the high court of witlings, declared that
Canada was only “afew acres of snow;” and Canada
was lost.

These colonies had duties towards France, and they
fulfilled them nobly. Can she in her turn say as much?
Has the father of a family no duties beyond the beget-
ting of children? Does he not owe them also education
and protection ?

After more than a century of forgetfulness, that same
France has recollected that that child, conceived in a
burst of love and carelessly cast off, is now grown up
and keeps a fond remembrance of his mother. She has
likewise perceived that those acres of snow are an
empire, the possession of which enriches herrival. Vain
regrets! England has long since appropriated all the
desirable lands of our planet. Its tongue, its institu-
tions, its capital accumulated through the colonies

themselves, now encircle the entire globe. In these are
2 ;

18 INTRODUCTORY REMARKS.

its might and its wealth. While France was making
merry, England was attending to business; which was
surely worth Voltaire’s witty saying, which people
laughed at one day, and would have forgotten the next,
had not France been mourning over it cver since.

- Poor France! In order ever to retain a firm hold of
your sceptre, you had invented the Salic law. You
- would not be governed by queens, ang you have been
ruled by harlots. You were rich and honored; those
women squandered your coins and your honor. What
havoc has wrought in you the wit of your madcaps?
You are now striving to retain the privilege of drying
your fish on a corner of this continent that once be-
longed to you, or at least might have been cntirely
yours; it would still be yours, with all the wealth
hidden under its acres of snow, if you had had less of
the wit that evaporates and more of the wit that bears
fruit.

You are getting wiser ; you tardily acknowledge the
folly of your wit; you perceive that England has
become strong and wealthy just because of a wiser
appreciation of what you despised. But it is too late !
A few acres of sand in the Sahara, where your people
cannot live, a few thousand negroes in Senegal,
Dahomey or Congo, will never make up for the loss to
you of those French hearts that would have throbbed in
the vast and healthy plains of this marvellous conti-
nent.

O France! Forgive to ason of those unfortunate
Acadians the recalling of these cruel memories . .
our sufferings have been so bitter.

Forsaken, forgotten, the Canadians have always kept
their love for France. They changed their allegiance,

- INTRODUCTORY REMARKS. ; 19

but only to become ere long the masters of their own
destiny. Their fate, except inasmuch as they were for-_
gotten by France, was not otherwise acruel one. Not
so with the Acadians. Can they forget the woes
wr ought by: that abandonment?

~ However, though we* cannot forget the incalculable
wrongs inflicted on us, we now can, with a juster ap-
preciation of facts, forgive the English Government the
share it may have had in them. But we cannot acquit
the true culprits; we cannot absolve those who, without
any cause, without orders or against the orders of the
Home Government, impelled solely by sordid motives,
despoiled us and cast us on foreign shores. No; such
injustices, such wrongs cannot be forgotten. So long
as our children shall be able to retrace their origin, they
will recall and bemoan the sufferings of their fathers.
Tt is not in our power to blot out from our hearts these
poignant recollections. We may still cherish and bless
the flag that floats above our heads; we may excuse
and eondeas whatever share England may have had in
these events; but we cry enough! to those who. throw
dirt at us in order to whitewash a dozen miscreants
whom all the waters of Niagara could not cleanse. Let
honest men join in restoring the historic truth which
certain historians of most recent date have done their
best to pervert. British fellow-countrymen! show us
that British fair play is not an empty word. Brand the
culprits with the stigma they deserve. Then, will
Acadians forgive, bless, nay, perhaps forget .. . . pro-
vided that be possible after so many misfortunes.

A very natural curiosity impelled me to study this
period of history ; deep convictions led me on to write.
I regret this curiosity; it has flung upon my life a

20 INTRODUCTORY REMARKS. »

cloud of sadness which nothing can remove. I[ have
doomed myself to climb again unceasingly this Calvary
of suffering, humiliation and ignominy, to which my
forefathers were condemned. My mind _ has fastened
itself upon this mournful epic as Pygmalion, of ancient
fable, riveted his soul upon the statue he had made ;
with this essential difference that he fell in love with
the work of his hands, whereas I am haunted by a cease-
less and merciless nightmare. I have wished to see;
I have seen; I recoiled with horror, but the die was
cast. Like the lover who could not resist his longing
to behold once more the dead face of her who had
charmed away his heart, I drew back horrified ; and yet
I must needs bear the pangs my rashness has provoked.

A thoughtful writer—Thucydides—has said, “Happy
the people whose annals are vacant.” This saying has a
paradoxical sound to us who behold onall sides nations,
whether mighty or feeble, whether lowly or haughty,
glorying in their past, viewing it over and over again
with complacency, as if to renew in themselves the joy
they taste in contemplating the features of their ances-
tors magnified by the enchanting distance and by the
illusions of love. Butcan this be the case for Acadians?
To recall the contentment and the virtues of their
fathers, the joys of the century that preceded their depor-
tation, is to recall the deportation itself and the century

that followed. Their evil fortune is inseparable from
~ their good fortune ; to look at the one is to look at the
other; to magnify the one is to magnify the other. Their
history is a Janus with two faces, of which the more
recent, the fresher to their memory, the hideous one, is
ever staringat them. Gladly would they turn him round
to view his other face, on which their eyes would rest

INTRODUCTORY REMARKS. 21

with delight. But, whenever they conjure up the past,
the sad, the hideous face will always eclipse the sweet
and agreeable one; the nearer will absorb the farther.
Woe will ever be a mightier reality than weal; the
former is the positive element, the latter is merely, so to
speak, a negative quantity. For Acadians the paradox,
“Happy the people whose annals are vacant,” will bear
repeating.

MISSING LINKS OF A LOST CHAPTER IN AMERICAN HISTORY.

CHAPTER I.

Discovery of Acadia (1604).—Foundation of Port Royal (1605).—
Brief Summary of the Colony’s History under the French
Régime until its Cession to England in 1710.

WIrH the discovery of a new continent a new era had
begun for the civilized world. Columbus had been that
providential man who, braving prejudices, breaking
through obstacles, had dowered the Old World with
these unknown lands. |

The horizon opened out by this discovery to the eyes
of wondering Europe was too immense, too dazzling in
its novelty to be clearly pictured in the mind. Great
must have been the sensation produced; but it were
difficult to realize how far the consequences that should
flow therefrom were understood. It is possible that the
enthusiasm of the moment gave a glimpse of the pro-
digious development we are witnessing to day. That
enthusiasm, which suddenly bursts forth from a great
discovery, is often the best guide to the grasping of the
remote consequences it implies. All at once, under its
influence, the mind is illumined like the horizon aflame
with the lightning flash that cleaves the clouds of a
summer’s night. In that brief moment, swifter than

24 VAIN EFFORTS AT COLONIZATION.

thought, the eye has followed the line of light tearing
through space: it has seen clouds heaped up, strange
forms, contours vividly outlined; yet, the mind has
retained scarcely anything of this magnificent panorama,
for the view was too sudden and too rapid to engrave
on the retina the multitudinous details. The back-
ground alone of this dazzling scene was visible for a
moment; all the foreground was overlooked. Such,
likely, was the case with Columbus’s discovery, The
enthusiasm of the moment afforded a glimpse of the far-
off scene which the new Continent was to lay before
Europe. It was a scene of treasures heaped up, of
numberless ships ploughing the main to bring to Europe .
the wealth of this unknown world, of new gatherings of
men, of cities springing up in the wilderness. Kings
foresaw empires to found, men of wealth and station
domains to acquire, the poor man a plot of land to
live on.

That was, perhaps. the background of the picture;
but the eye had caught nothing of the vague space be-
tween. That space must soon be crossed by whoever
longed to reach what was promised by the iridescent
vision of the transient scene. Then were to arise
difficulties unnumbered and ever-recurring, unforeseen
obstacles which would cast doubts on the reality of that
vision. Nevertheless, the eye had not deceived, enthu-
siasm had not warped the judgment. Only, four cen-
turies will barely suffice to reach the brilliant future of
“which that scene had afforded a glimpse.

We marvel ,to-day that more than a century was
needed to take final possession of the beautiful con-
tinent we inhabit. To understand this fact, we must
take into account the numberless difficulties encoun-

VAIN EFFORTS AT COLONIZATION. 25

tered by the firstexplorers. Not less then sixteen regular
expeditions were organized by England, France and
Portugal in the course of a century, either to discover a
northwest passage to China, or to explore the North
American continent itself, or for purposes of immediate
settlement. Not one of these attempts had any: prac-
tical result. Some of them, rather more fortunate than
the others, first gave rise to great hopes; but they were
invariably followed by some other expeditions so disas-
trous as to remove, for several years, from the nation
that had suffered, all idea of founding a colony. Then,
again, a little later, some other nation had its turn.
One, two, and sometimes even three expeditions followed
in quick succession, to end in a new disaster, and the
game was given up. Disgust took the place of enthu-
siasm; but as often also, enthusiasm, sharpened by
greed, ambition or jealousy, was rekindled only to issue
in disheartening results. Each nation hoped to do better
than its rival, each expedition hoped to avoid the faults
of its predecessors ; and the sum total of them all was
uniform failure. ‘Tempting, indeed, must have been the
prize, since men were not utterly repelled by the danger
and sterility of so many efforts.

Of these numerous expeditions four were lost in the
depths of the ocean, some others were scattered by
storms and partly destroyed, and almost all were deci-
mated by disease and destitution, so that any fresh
attempt was discouraged for a time.

The expedition which came nearest to lasting success
was undertaken in 1541 by Roberval, whom Franéis I.
had appointed Viceroy of New France, with Jacques
Cartier as Captain General of the fleet. The enterprise
was on a larger scale than any of those which had _pre-

20 VAIN EFFORTS AT COLONIZATION.

ceded it; but it failed because the ships did not start
together and because of misunderstandings.' Roberval
was to perish with his entire fleet in a fresh attempt ;
and thus success was delayed for sixty-three years more.

It would be a mistake, however, to imagine that,
besides these official expeditions, America was not at
all, or was not often visited. As early as 1504 its coasts
were frequented by Basque, Breton and Norman fisher-
men very regularly. ‘ Sometimes,” says Hackluyt,
“there were not less than a hundred boats fishing
there.” Lescarbot mentions a man called Savalet who
had made forty-two voyages to the coasts of the Gulf of
St. Lawrence,

These annual and regular voyages, repeated during a
whole century, had made the public of the maritime
towns both in France and England familiar with this
part of America. France was the first to resume, in
the beginning of the seventeenth century, the projects
of colonization formed and so often abandoned in the
preceding century. This time, if the success was not yet
equal to the hopes entertained, the founding of a colony
was to be definitive ; and the example was soon to be
followed by England and other nations.

De Monts, a nobleman of Henry IV.’s court, organized
this expedition. He set out from Havre de Grace
March 7, 1604, accompanied by de Pontgravé, the Baron
de Poutrincourt, de Champlain, d’Orville, Champdore,
and others. Their destination was the peninsula of
Nova Scotia, then called la Cadie or l’Acadie, and the
place definitively chosen for the colony was Port Royal,
of which, with the adjacent territory, de Monts made a
grant to his friend Poutrincourt. In the course of the
following summer a few dwelling-houses, a store, and a

FOUNDATION OF PORT ROYAL. | 27

pulisade enclosing the whole, were put up. Thus was
Port Royal founded on the very site now oceupied by
the city of Annapoliss This ‘was the first permanent
settlement by Europeans in these northern climes.

As I have undertaken that epoch only which begins
in 1710, when Port Royal was taken and Acadia was
definitively ceded to England by the treaty of Utrecht,
I have no intention of dwelling at any length on the
events that marked the stormy beginnings of Acadia’s
history. I will merely sum up in a few pages a whole
century of facts, so as to make it easier to understand
what followed the cession of the country to England.
Not that the earlier history is uninteresting,—far from it ;
it were impossible to find on this continent any other
spot so interesting, at that very time, as Acadia was.
The most thrilling dramas of America in the seventeenth
century were played in the waters of the Bay of Fundy
(Baie Frangaise). )

Exposed as was this feeble colony, separated from
Canada by vast distances and impenetrable forests, left
to its own resources, without immigration, without
assistance proportionate to the dangers of its situation,
it was the theatre of perhaps greater vicissitudes of war
than have fallen to the lot of any other country in the
world. While, on the one hand, it was, or might have
been, highly useful to France; on the other, it was a
constant menace to the commerce and tranquillity of
the English colonies. It is there that expeditions of
adventurers were organized against the New England
colonies ; there, too, attacks were made upon the French.
If it was a fine field for organizing, it was equally open
to attack. Whether the two nations were at war or in
peace, it was often war anyhow in these parts. A

28 FOUNDATION OF PORT ROYAL.

grievance or a mere pretext was enough to determine
disastrous , hostilities. Boston and Acadia sometimes
waged war on each other on their own account, in spite
of temporary peace and amity between the two crowns;
and, what is more, on certain occasions, Acadia was the
scene of prolonged hostilities between Frenchmen who
claimed the right to govern the country.

Nothing, to my mind, is more captivating than the
story of this province from 1604 to 1710. It is to
America what Greece once was to Europe, and the Bay
of Fundy evokes almost as many memories as the AZgean
Sea. The scenes there enacted have been so various and
so dramatic, the actors thereof give one such an impres-
sion of heroism and of half-savage grandeur, that one
can hardly refrain from treating-them as legendary, as
if they belonged to an epoch that is lost in the mists of
antiquity. Biencourt, d’Aulnay, the two de la Tours, .
Saint-Castin, Denys, Subercase, Morpain, are so many
legendary heroes whose names are still re-echoed by
forest and rock from New Hampshire to the inmost
recesses of the Bay of Fundy.

To the many difficulties which Poutrincourt and his
son Biencourt experienced in solidly founding their
colony of Port Royal, there was added another of a far
more serious kind. During the whole of the sixteenth
century, inexperience, stress of weather and disease had
been the principal causes of the failure of colonization
in the New World; now came the turn of human.
passions, ambition, jealousy, cupidity. This continent
was not vast enough to satisfy the covetousness of many
nations. To Samuel Argall, whose record in Virginia
was so bad, belongs the honor of haying begun the
conflict for this immense territory, if, indeed, the acts of

FRENCH REGIME. 29

piracy which he committed can be ranked as warfare.
His first attempt was the destruction of the colony of
Saint-Sauveur in Mount Desert Island, on the coast of
Maine ; the pretext of this outrage was Cabot’s voyage,
one hundred and sixteen years before, and priority of
discovery on that account. Emboldened by this easy
victory, he made another attempt and this time destroyed
Port Royal.

By this one fell stroke was annihilated all Poutrin-
court’s outlay of time and money; and France must
have been strangely careless of her colony,-to say nothing
of her honor, since she made no move to demand repa-
ration for the outrage committed by Argall. And,
indeed, for twenty years afterwards, Acadia is hardly
mentioned at all, so little, in fact, that, in 1621, it was
ceded by the King of England to Sir William Alexander,
Earl of Stirling. And yet the colonists whom Poutrin-
court had brought with him were still in the country ;
some of them contrived to till the soil of the upper
reaches of the river, a few miles from the old fort;
others had sought employment from Biencourt and de
la Tour.

Seeing their hopes ruined by the destruction of Port
Royal, Biencourt and his companions, taking advantage
of the friendship of the Indians, had become wood-
rangers (courew's de bois), hunters, trappers. This
state of things continued till the treaty of St. Germain-
en-Laye in 1632, by which Acadia was restored to
France. Of the Scotch colony founded by Sir William
at Port Royal, there remained only three or four fami-
lies which were soon merged in the French population :
for instance, the Colsons, the Paisleys, and the Mellanson
family, which became very numerous and important

30 FRENCH REGIME,

“inthe Acadian colony under the French form of
“Melangon. | :

After this retrocession, France once more turned her
attention to Acadia. A company was formed having at
its head Isaac de Razilly, his kinsman d’Aulnay de
Charnisay, and Nicolas Denys dela Ronde. As their
object was trade rather than colonization, they settled
with their immigrants at La Héve, which was con-
sidered more suitable for traffic than Port Royal. As
Governor, Razilly bestowed upon Denys in fief all the
Gulf coast from the Bay des Chaleurs to Canso, and
upon La Tour the old post of Cape Sable and the river
St. John. In this latter place, at a spot called Jemsek,
La Tour built a fort to which he gave his own name.
Thanks to his long experience and his activity, thanks
also to the sense of security then pervading the country,
he made this a most important trading post.

De Razilly died in 1636 without having been able
to ‘accomplish all the great projects he-had in view.
D’Aulnay and de la Tour were both named Lieutenant-
Governors; but the limits of their respective territories
and jurisdiction were so badly defined as to lead to
hostilities that long paralyzed the development of the
colony. Whatever may have been @’ Aulnay’s faults, it
seems certain that he projected a great agricultural
establishment and the progress of the colony. With
this object he abandoned La Héve to settle at Port
Royal, which was much better suited for a colonial set-
tlement. After gathering about him the people that
had first settled at La Héve, he went to France, whence
he returned with a score of colonists. It was he also
who inaugurated that system of dikes which was after-
wards to become so widespread. Unfortunately, the

FRENCH REGIME. 31

incessant quarrels provoked by his pugnacious humor
made his efforts well-nigh fruitless.

When France made no protest against the destruction
of Port Royal, when she refrained from putting a stop to
the armed contentions of La Tour and d’ Aulnay, of
La Tour and Le Borgne, of Le Borgne and Denys, all
fighting for the possession of the country, she showed
so little care for her honor that Cromwell, in spite of
the peaceful relations between the two kingdoms, con-
ceived the idea of seizing Acadia. As war was then
waging between England and Holland, he gave instruc-
tions for the capture of New Holland, and, the fleet
being in these waters, for the subsequent. capture of
Acadia. Peace was signed before New Holland could
be taken ; but Acadia, unable to offer serious resistance,
was seized (1654).

In 1667, it was again returned ‘0 France by the
treaty of Breda, and in: 1670 M. de Grandfontaine came
to assume official possession.

As may be supposed, these dissensions, these repeated
attacks, the indifference of France, all this put together
scarcely favored the establishment of a colony on a firm
basis ; and so the census of the following year, under
M. de Grandfontaine, tells asad tale. After so many _
sacrifices of time and money, the population showed
only about 400 souls, more than three-fourths of whom
were at Port Royal. There must have been, in various
places, a nomadic population proportionately pretty
numerous, which does not enter into this census; but
it was made up chiefly of a few half-breed families set-
tled on the coast, especially at La Héve, and of those
families which, having intermarried with the Indians,
had adopted their mode of life. This census, as well

32 FRENCH REGIME.

as the following ones, is confined to the population of
purely French origin; and it is chiefly from this little
group of 47 families that the Acadians spring. Here
are the names: Bourgeois, Gaudet, Kessy, de Forét,
Hébert, Babin, Daigle, Blanchard, Aucoin, Dupeux, Ter-
riau, Savoie, Corporon, Martin, Pellerin, Morin, Brun,
Gauterot, Trahan, Cyr, Thibaudeau, Petitpas, Bourg,
Boudreau, Guilbaut, Granger, Landry, Doucet, Gir-
ouard, Vincent, Bréau, Le Blane, Poirier, Comeau,
Pitre, Belliveau, Cormier, Rimbaut, Dugas, Richard,
Melangon, Robichau, Lanoue, @ Entremont, dela Tour,
Bertrand, de Bellisle. These are the main heads of
branches, “and several of these families were already
divided into two or more branches, as was the case for
those whose names are subjoined: Boudrot, Girouard,
Gaudet, Hébert, Bourg, Martin, Terriau, Blanchard,
Aucoin, Brun, Commeaux, de la Tour. Each family
averaged six children, and the descendants of each of
them now run up into the thousands.

The census of 1686 exhibits a population of about 800
souls, of whom 461 were at Port Royal, 164 at Mines,
78 at Beaubassin, 90 in other places mentioned, and the
remainder scattered here and there on the coast; thus
the population had about doubled in 15 years. In 1671
60 persons, 5 of whom were women, had arrived ; but, as
the census of 1686 registers only 36 new names, some
_of these persons may have either gone to Canada or
taken service in the garrison and gone back to France
afterwards. ‘These are the new names: Le Prince,
Brassard, Douaron, Levron, Lort, Arsenaut, Bergeron,
Bellefontaine, Tourangeau, Barillot, Godin dit Chatillon,
Benoit, Préjean, Bastarache, Fardel, Henry, Gareau,
Laperriére, Michel, Gourdeau, La Bauve, La Pierre dit

FRENCH REGIME. 33

Laroche, Pinet, Rivet, Mirande, La Barre, Aubin-Mig-
nault, Cochu, Cottard, Mercier, Lavallée, Lagassé, Blou,
Desorcis, Martel, Dubrewil. The three last named, I
think, must have gone to Canada, and Cochu, Cottard
and Fardel to France; at any rate their names do not
appear in any subsequent census. From 1686 to 1710,
85 new colonists, at most, came, and these were, to a
great extent, soldiers disbanded from the small garrison
which the Government maintained at Port Royal. *
From 1671 the agricultural population confined itself
more and more to its land; every immigrant, every dis-
banded soldier became a farmer. When, after a few
years’ growth, families found themselves pinched for
room at Port Royal, they sought settlements else-
where for their children. Thus it is that, one after the
other, Beaubassin (Amherst), les Mines (Horton,
Wolfeville, Windsor, etc.), Cobequid (Truro), Chipody,
Peticodiac, Memramcook sprang up. Frequently, whole
families migrated to these new settlements, which had
the double advantage of being freer from the vexations
of a government that was often too troublesome, and
safer from the oft-repeated attacks of the English.
From the treaty of Breda till 1710, a space of 40
years, Port Royal was besieged no less than five times,

* The last general list of names, dated 1714, shows 77 new names: Le
Basque, Moyse, Ollivier, Parisien, Dubois, Bernard, Thibeau, Rossette, Le
Breton, Lyonnais, Lafont, Allard, Le Marquis, Emmanuel, Dupuis, Denis,
Barnabé, Beaumont, Le Maistre, Allain, Cadet, Lessoile, Raymond, Donat,
Maillard, Vilatte, Surette, Savary, Dumont, Lavergne, Lalande, Simon, Bab-
ineau, Paris, Cosse, Saint-Scéne, l’Espérance, Manceau, Pothier, Damboue,
Laliberté, Laurier, Yvon, Samson, Blondin, Bideau, Gentil, Gousille, Lang-
lois, Vigneau dit Maurice, Champagne, Clémenceau, La Montagne, Mouton,.
Jasmin, Voyer, Toussaint, Boutin, Roy, Chauvert, Boucher, Darois, De
Saulniers, Boisseau, Herpin, Guérin, Longuépée, Haché, Lambert, Chias-
son, —o Carré, De Vaux, Ondy, Nuirat, Véco, Leger.

34 FRENCH REGIME.

whereas, barring a raid on Beaubassin and Mires by
Church in 1696, the settlers in these latter places were
fairly sheltered from the perils that beset Port Royal.

All the names that figure at Beaubassin and Mines
(Grand Pré, Riviére aux Canards, Pigiguit, etc.) aré
the same as at Port Royal. So it was, somewhat later,
at Cobequid, Peticodiac, Chipody and Memramcook to
the north of the Bay of Fundy.

As the census was taken many times during the
French period, it is easy to follow up the development
of these different groups, and to get a pretty fair idea of
the number of new colonists that came to swell the
original stock. These were, for by far the most part,
unmairied men who were obliged by force of circum:
stances to marry the daughters of the oldest settlers, of
the 47 heads of families that had settled in the country
before 1671. Thus we see that there were only five
- women among the 60 immigrants that arrived at Port
Royal in 1671. Whence we conclude that, 30 or 40
years later, the entire population was linked together in
bonds of kinship that must have powerfully contributed
to remove dissensions and to produce that social condi-
tion‘ with which we are familiar.

Some modern writers have treated the picture of
Acadian manners as a creation of the fervid fancy. It
_ has been held that the imagination was author of much.
of it, that this ideal society was incompatible with what
we know of human nature. I am willing to grant,
indeed, I have no doubt, that the conventional picture
has been embellished by fancy; yet I hold that a close
study of the circumstances of this people makes one
understand better how a state of things clearly proven
to have existed was possible. The defects common to

FRENCH REGIME. 35

all Frenchmen, particularly those which spring from
their too great sociability, such as jealousy, backbiting,
idle gossip, existed there as everywhere else, but toned
down by the exceptional status of the people. Nor was
their condition always enviable; it certainly was not so in
the early days of the colony, when these families were
strangers to each other, and probably also during the
greater part of the French occupation.

The destruction of Port Royal by Argall, France’s
neglect, the frequent raids of Anglo-Americans had —
forced a certain number of the first colonists to become
adventurers, forest rangers (coureurs de bois), fishermen
in the train of Biencourt, Denys, La Tour. + This roving
element could not be expected to show as high morality
as the first followers of Poutrincourt, or as the society
that was afterward formed when all these separate
units coalesced. But here, as in all other lands, given
the time to form new habits of order and economy,
given a sedentary life in the midst of a sober and hard-
working people, given a comfortable competence drawn
from a most fertile soil, a gradual purification of morals
was sure to result. At the same time, an adventurous
life had steeled many men for the ceaseless struggles
they had to face before the final conquest of the country.
On the other hand, the abandonment in which France
had so long left them, the habit of living beyond the
sphere of action and the regulations of a government
jealous of its authority, bred in the Acadians a spirit of
independence that would ill consort with the restrictions
put upon them in after years by the French governors.
In fact, when, after the treaty of Breda, France took
firm hold of the administration in Acadia, there arose
much grumbling and murmuring against a government

36 FRENCH REGIME.

that took pleasure in throwing around the people the
complicated net-work of Old World formalism. Of
this we find proofs in the correspondence of the gov-
ernors: M. de Brouillan, in one of his letters, calls the
Acadians half-republicans. However, these difficulties
were very rare among them, and were as nothing com-
pared to the troubles that arose among the sharers of
authority.

Necessity had taught the people to govern them-
selves, to hold meetings, to consult together, to settle
their differences amicably or according to simple rules
quite sufficient for their local needs. They had thus
acquired a habit of liberty and a taste therefor. They
knew by experience that they could dispense with an
authority that was only irksome, that did not improve
their condition, that ensured them no additional security
‘in their relations with one another. Hence it was that,
under English rule, they got rid, as much as _ possible,
of official regulations and ruled themselves.

Certain it is that, in their special situation, better
results could be hoped for from this method, from the
laisser faire, than from the vexatious interference of an
uncontrolled authority. Matters of public interest were
decided at public meetings; men worked all together at
works of public utility, as when they completed a vast
system of dikes, which were built in so short a time as
to point to unusual harmony and good-will among the
workers. Their reward came in an abundance of all that
could meet their needs and their simple tastes, beyond
which they had no ambition and were therefore easily satis-
fied. Nor had they any anxiety about the future of their
children : the custom had been early established that the
community was to provide them with all things necés-

FRENCH REGIME. 37

sary for a homestead, and a few years sufficed to make
them as well off as their parents. The good understand-
ing must, surely, have been remarkable, since, even
under English rule, there is not on record a single case
in which the people disagreed in their decisions upon
matters of general interest; whatever the decision
might be, it was always, as far as can be gathered,
unanimous.

When all these exceptional circumstances are under-
stood and taken into account, the familiar picture
of their simplicity of life, morality, abundance, har-
mony, and social happiness has nothing, it seems,
that should provoke wonder; the same circumstances
would, I believe, have brought about elsewhere some-
what similar results. For a century they were strangers
to France and Canada; they had formed habits and
built up traditions that made them a separate people.
They were Acadians. And, if the increase by immigra-
tion was almost nil, quite otherwise was it with the
multiplication of families, since, eighty years later, this
‘small nation counted 18,000 souls. *

From 1690 to 1710 was one uninterrupted series of
hostilities between New England on the one hand
and Canada and Acadia on the other, the object being
either to capture vessels fishing in French waters, or to
destroy some fort on the badly defined frontier between
Acadia and Maine. In 1690 Port Royal was taken and
sacked by Admiral Phips; M. de Menneval, Governor

of Acadia, was carried off a prisoner to Boston, together
with his garrison; but Phips, too much engrossed with

* The census of 1714 gives 2,100
« Bt RE ARO 7,598
se aan Mase WC Sei 12,500 or thereabouts,

38 FRENCH REGIME.

the expedition he was preparing against Quebec, neg-
lected to establish himself solidly in Port Royal, which
was, accordingly, soon reoccupied by the French.
This period, from 1690 to 1710, was probably the
darkest in the annals of these colonies, and the most dis-
astrous for British colonization. For twenty years, with-
out truce or respite, on sea as well as on land, there was,
in these parts of America, nothing but devastation,
pillage, ambushes and surprises. Sometimes a fort was
attacked by France’s Indian allies, and, if it was taken,
the inmates were massacred ; most frequently, some de-
fenceless settlement was raided by night, and, if any were
made prisoners, they were held for exchange or ransom.
By seductive advantages offered to fillibusters and al-
luring bounties on Indian scalps, the greed of gain was so
keenly excited that organizations sprang up in the border-
ing settlements of New England for the sole purpose of
marauding, plundering and butchery. It was a life of
danger, often ending in terrible reprisals ; still, bold men
were never wanting to replace those who disappeared.
In such conditions, civilized man often surpasses in
cruelty the most cruel savages; there were acts of base
treachery and barbarity that have never been exceeded
nor perhaps equalled by any savage tribe in America.
Very great, no doubt, must have been the provocation for
the English colonists : all the Indians in these parts were
allied to the French, so that retaliation, if any, had to
come from the colonists themselves. A violent im-
pulse born of anger, grief, pecuniary loss and insecurity,
may have shaped itself, with many, into the misconceived
idea that adopting the cruel methods of those barbarians
would inspire such terror, such fear of annihilation,
that they would relent from their bloody raids. At

FRENCH REGIME. 39

the same time it was hard not to make those answerable
who urged them to their bloody raids; nevertheless,
though these barbarous allies were acknowledged to be
necessary in the struggle between the two nations, both
of whom made use of them when they could, yet nothing
could justify the use of their cruel methods and the
infringement of all the laws of honor. |

This state of affairs could not last long. Acadia was
too weak to be thus left as a perpetual menace to the
trade and the security of the New England settlements.
Driven to extremities by the disasters inflicted on their
commerce, the- Anglo-Americans resolved upon the
greatest efforts to emerge from a situation that was
daily becoming intolerable. The final issue was not
doubtful. The disparity in the numbers was enormous ;
France was too careless or too busy elsewhere to succor
hercolony; yet, the conflict was longer and more des-
perate, successes and réverses more evenly balanced than
might have been expected. No less than four expedi-
tions were required before Port Royal was taken, and
there the intrepid Subercase, powerfully seconded by
the Baron de Saint-Castin and by other Captains at the
head of Indian troops, wrought prodigies of valor. The
first of these ences was undertaken by Church, the
famous ‘“Squaw-killer;” but, moved by the desire of
plunder and of easy exploits, he made no serious attack
on Port Royal, and was satisfied with invading Mines
and Beaubassin, where he carried off all the cattle he
could seize, after opening the dikes, burning houses and
doing all the damage he could.

A second expedition under Colonel March was much
more serious. Rhode Island and New Hampshire had
united with Massachusetts for this decisive onslaught ;

*

40 FRENCH REGIME.

but, after a seige of eleven days, March, repulsed at
every point, had to re-embark, and, instead of returning
to Boston, where he dreaded censure, he took refuge at
Casco. Thence he wrote of his failure to Governor
Dudley, attributing it to his officers and soldiers, who,
he said, had refused to second him. Immense was the
chagrin of Boston ; so little was: this resylt anticipated
that preparations had actually been made for a pompous
celebration of the taking of Port Royal.

Humbled but not discouraged, Governor Dudley, who
could not resign himself to disband the troops he had
organized with such fine hopes, sent orders to March to
keep on board the ships his soldiers, willing or unwill-
ing, and to return immediately to Port Royal with the
reinforcement now setting sail. At the same time
Dudley appointed three commissioners to superintend
the operations of the siege. March, unable to overcome
the sadness and dejection to which he was a prey, de-
clined the honor of commanding this new expedition.
Wainwright, second in command, had to take charge of
it; but, after another siege and a long one, he also re-
embarked without effecting anything. This was in
August, 1707.

Thus far, at least, Port Royal had been revictualled

and assisted by France, though inadequately. Suber-

ease had been able to satisfy the Indians by some gifts
and still more by promises. His kindliness to all had
sufficed to inspire the courage and ardor that were abso-
lutely necessary in the situation of inferiority in which
he was left. All the Captains of Indians, d’Amours
d’Echauffours, Saint Aubin, Bellefontaine, de Saillan,
Denys de la Ronde, de Saint Castin, de la Tour; the
French corsairs, Francis Guyon, Pierre Maisonnat, de

SURRENDER OF PORT ROYAL. ’

Morpain, had gathered under him and had helped him
- with a ‘will. With these and the inhabitants he had
enough men to mancuvre outside, to harass the enemy
without weakening his garrison, which numbered only
about 160 soldiers, three fourths of whom were un-
disciplined young men picked up on the quays of
Paris.

Having heard that a fresh attack was preparing, still
more formidable than the preceding ones, Subercase re-
peatedly urged the Home Government to send reinforce-
ments ; but nothing could rouse the apathy of France’s
tulers. For three long years the colony, destitute of
everything, subsisted almost entirely on the booty of
the corsairs. As a crowning misfortune, in 1710 the
harvest failed, and the corsairs, so numerous the preced-
ing year, were driven from Acadia by an epidemic; so,
when in September a large fleet with 8,400 landing
forces appeared before’ Port Royal, there was but one
voice in the garrison and colony in favor of immediate
surrender.

Though fully aware of his weakness and feeling that
he could not come out once more victorious from a con-
flict in which all the odds were against him, Subercase
resolved to tempt fortune, and, without hearkening to
the proposals of General Nicholson, commander of the
fleet, he prepared to withstand theenemy. The English,
on their part, taught circumspection by the unexpected
and repeated defeats of past years, set to work with
extreme prudence. Several times they were repulsed or
had to desist from their investing operations ; but Suber-
case no longer had a body of troops to sally forth from
the fortifications and worry the besiegers. The fleet
had arrived before Port Royal September 24th, and it

42 SURRENDER OF PORT ROYAL. |

was not till October 12th that the capitulation was
signed on quite honorable terms, so honorable indeed, that
Nicholson expressed his regret at having accepted them,
when he beheld the destitution of the garrison. Pro- |
visions were so scarce that Nicholson had to provide the
French soldiers with rations before they embarked for
France.

Port Royal had become, and this time for good and
all, an English town; the destiny of the whole of
Acadia was soon to be the same. In the course of a
century Port Royal had gone through more vicissitudes
than any other American town, more even, than any
other from its foundation to our own day. It had been.
taken, sacked, destroyed, abandoned, retaken ; and mean-
while France, seemingly unaware of its importance, un-
taught by the lessons of experience, unmoved by its
hazardous position or by the unjust and cruel fate of its
faithful subjects, never thought of ensuring its per-
manent possession by making such efforts as were called
for by the risks and advantages of this stronghold.

Such criminal neglect might seem astounding, were it
not repeated elsewhere, and everywhere. This bit of
exposed territory had only 2,000 inhabitants when the
provinees of New England alone had 150,000. Was it
because the sovereigns that governed France, the gov-
ernors that represented them in Canada or Acadia, did
not realize the importance of the colonies they owned?
Was it because, as has been said, Frenchmen are not
colonizers? No; this is not the true answer. We have
plenty of documents proving that the governors of these
provinces generally realized, with great perspicacity,
the value of these colonies and the way to make them
prosperous, powerful and useful to the Home Govern-

BLUNDERS OF FRANCE. 45
ment. . We have also some proof, though rarer,. that,
the sovereigns or their ministers saw things in the
same light. We have likewise proofs that the spirit of
enterprise, boldness and activity were not at all lacking
in the French colonist. We know that, in spite of the
way in which he was forsaken by France, his activity
had familiarized him with the whole interior of the
continent, at a time when the English had not yet lost
sight of the Atlantic coast. But the colonists needed
backing, at least by numbers; they needed a helping
hand from the mother country. In an absolute govern-
ment, which claims all powers and all initiative, which
rules and regulates everything, even the peopling of its
colonies must be initiated by authority. The expression
of a wish or instructions from the throne would have
been enough to create an unflagging movement of
emigration that would have compared favorably with
the emigration from the British Isles. The entire blame
lies, I believe, with the throne ; not so much because it did
not understand the importance of colonizing this country,
as because of forgetfulness and neglect begotten of that
thoughtlessness and inconstancy that marked all its
acts.

“ When I compare the result of European wars in the
last fifty years,” wrote M. d’Avaugour in 1663, “ and
the progress that may be made in ten years here, not only
does my duty oblige me, but it urges me to speak out
boldly. ... . France can, in ten years and with less
outlay, secure more real power in America than all its
European wars could win for it.”

“ Who can undertake,” said Vauban, “ anything
greater and more useful than a colony? Is it not by
this means, rather than by any other, that one can ob-

44 BLUNDERS OF FRANCE.

tain, with all possible justice, aggrandizement and in-
erease ?”

And Louis XIV. himself, who for a time seemed to
take a serious interest in his colonies, entirely con-
curred in this view, when he so wisely wrote in 1676
to M. de Champigny, “Intendant” of Canada: “ Be
thoroughly convinced of this maxim, that it is better to
occupy less territory and to people it entirely, than to
spread out indefinitely and to have weak colonies at the
mercy of the slightest accident.”

That was, perhaps, for the great monarch, only a pass-
ing thought between two pleasures. Successfully to
carry out these fine projects, France was in need of calm
and peace; but, ever carried away by the pride, ambi-
tion or caprice of her sovereigns, she always lacked the
-restfulness that alone would have enabled her to give
to these designs the sustained attention they demanded.
She must dazzle, she must have glory, and, assuredly, not
in those lowly hamlets lost in the forests of America could
Louis XIV. attain this end. And yet there, more than
in aught else, was the future of France. True, it was
slow, plodding work, the fruits of which were far dis-
tant; but in return what a rich haryest, what solid
glory, what lasting greatness was thus cheaply to be
earned by France!

There is no more striking proof of her carelessness
than the way in which she deserted Acadia. In the
course of an entire century this province received barely
two hundred colonists, whereas its dangerous situation
and its importance would have called for fifty times as
many. This was less immigration in a century than
_the smallest English colony received in one year. In
the single summer of 1620 the colony of Virginia wel-

BLUNDERS OF FRANCE. 45

comed 1261 colonists, and it already had 600. In 1625
there came another thousand, and as early as 1646 it
had a population of 20,000 souls. Before 1640, 298
ships crowded with immigrants had cast anchor in the
port of Boston. On the other hand, it is clear that,
unassisted and unencouraged, immigration must have
been a negative quantity in a country so helplessly
exposed as was Acadia. That it possessed natural
advantages was not enough; over and above this there
was needed, at the outset, vigorous encouragement to a
body of colonists immigrating all together in sufficient
numbers to ensure their being able to protect them-
selves, and thus make up by their multitude for the
insecurity of their position. This province, which
would thus have been a source of strength to France,
really became, on the contrary, a cause of weakness, an
ever menacing danger. Very different, indeed, was
the reality from the wise maxims which Louis XIV.
recommended to his Intendant in Canada. |

But what is more inconceivable still, is that, at the
very time when Acadia was fighting heroic battles
decisive of its fate, Louis XIV., easily seduced by great
projects, was seized with a new infatuation for Louisiana
and the inland regions leading up to the Great Lakes
and to Canada: a great and noble project in truth, |
which his habitual inconstancy was to reduce to a
costly chimera, furnishing fuel for jealousy and _ hasten-
ing the ruin of his colonial empire.

If France can find in the study of her history, as she
undoubtedly can, matter for self-glorification, it is
surely not in her colonial policy. The wonder is, not
that her colonies ended in misfortune, but that they
held out so long against such fearful odds. Courage,

46 BLUNDERS OF FRANCE.

energy and well-directed efforts were not lacking in the
colonists themselves; this is proved to evidence by their
struggles, both in the direction of self-development
and extension of French power, and in the way of resist-
ance for so long a time and with such marked success
against an enemy that outnumbered them sixteen to one.
Here is cause for naught but glorification and astonish-
ment. ‘The shame of failure falls entirely upon that
unskilful administration, that witty incapacity, that
proud impotence which stamped the policy of France.

The national character, in its good qualities as well as
in its defects, had already become well-nigh fixed, and
Louis XIV. was its most brilliant expression. Gen-
erally speaking, the character of a nation is the result_of
apparently insignificant circumstances, scarcely noticed
when first they appear. Later on, however, and some-
times much later, they make themselves felt. Fora long
time, and especially during all the middle ages, the most
salient points of divergence in the respective character-
istics of the nations of Western Europe were, after all,
only shades of difference. England differed little from
France, France from Spain ; all three had acquired the
germs of liberty, and it was the expansion or contrac-
tion of that liberty which was to have a dominant influ-
ence in fixing the special character of each nation, and
in stamping each with its essential differentiation.
These distinctive qualities were also to influence the
future destiny of each nation. :

At that remote period France and England were like
two streamlets lazily meandering on the same table-land,
coming near to each other, then winding further apart,
then winding in again; their general trend seems the
same ; are they going to unite? Perhaps; but, at any

BLUNDERS OF FRANCE. 47

rate, when they have grown by the tribute of many
affluents into mighty rivers, they will surely empty into
the same ocean. Yet facts belie this forecast: a very
slight rise in the land will be enough to change their
course and make them flow in opposite directions ; one to
the east, the other to the west; this one toward one ocean,
that one toward another. One was to keep on majesti-
cally and peacefully flowing through rich meadows; thie
other was to leap wildly through narrow gorges, then
spread out into a lake, then again narrow into a torrent,
crossing now enchanting scenery, now desolate burning
deserts. A little bit of a hill had been the insurmount-
able wall that had decided their respective fates and the
flow of their waters. The expansion of the liberties of
England, the contraction of those of France was that
little hill that sent them in opposite directions through
experiences so dissimilar. Had it not been for a seem-
ing trifle, the course followed by the one might have
been followed by the other with reversed results. —

While the English nobility shut themselves up in
‘their demesnes, thus preserving a certain independence
in respect of the sovereign, and some interest in consort-
ing with the people for the conservation and increase of
their common liberties, in France all the nobles rushed
to court, drawn thither by royal favor and the fascina-
tion of pleasure. However insignificant this slender
historic detail may seem, it prepared France for the
abandonment of the germs of liberty it then possessed ;
this was the little hill that altered its course and its
destiny.

These men, who had become courtiers in quest of
honors and favors, athirst for pleasure, held their peace
before the encroachments of the king. Deprived of its

48 GROWTH OF LIBERTY.

defenders, the people could not withstand the clipping
of their hard-won privileges. Thus it was that, one
after another, the conquests of liberty, both for nobles
and commoners, disappeared. When Louis XIV.
decided to be his own prime minister; when, waited
upon, after the death of Cardinal Mazarin, by the func-
tionaries of state, and asked to whom they must in
future apply on questions of public business, he replied,
much to their astonishment, “To myself,” then was
liberty undone. There remained only the precarious
splendor of the throne and the doubtful prestige of the
past, until the day should come when the state would
be the Pompadour or any other favorite courtesan,
until, sinking still lower, Louis XV. should be shameless
enough to say, “After me the deluge.” Nor was this
deluge long delayed; adeluge of blood, the prelude of
frequent fruitless efforts and violent reactions, of scenes
of anger and hatred, glory and humiliation.

England alone escaped the wreck of her liberties. If
she was saved from disaster, it was probably not because
she had acquired, in that seventeenth century, more
wisdom and maturity than other nations, but because of
her insular position, because of some insignificant de-
tails resulting rather from an apparently fortuitous com-
bination of circumstances than from her own foresight.
“England,” says Macaulay, “escaped from absolutism,
but she escaped very narrowly.” Itis well for mankind
that this exception arose. Those liberties, preserved
and increased, constitute England’s greatness; her ex-
ample has set her up as a beacon light to guide the
nations in the proper channel.

Viewing the results, men have ascended to the cause
thereof and traced out the methods that produced them.

GROWTH OF LIBERTY. 49

They fae imitated England ; they have also imitated
the nation that sprang from England, built up by her
on this continent out of suitable elements, conditions,
tastes and tendencies, in a new land freed from Old
‘World ties. Instead of one model now there are two.
With regard to England, the evolution was the work of
seeming chance, in answer to the necessities of the
moment, in order to escape from the ruinous caprice of
a despot, to satisfy that desire of liberty which we all
feel more or less ; but by little and little the mists were
lifted, the consequences, if not of the future, at least of
the past and the present, were better and better under-
stood. Itsoon became evident that thé growth of liberty
must be accompanied by the growth of education, that
the one was the reason of the other, and that the two,
working together, were the fountain-head of all the
material progress which our century enjoys.

To study the effects of liberty one must not stop at
abstract theory, but must go on to examine methods and
facts. Excellent as liberty is in itself, it may be the
source of many evils. The study of actual methods
teaches that solid results are obtained, only by agitation,
i. €., by a continual, thoughtful, calm effort leaning on
public opinion which it first creates, advancing method-
ically step by step, by legitimate means on what we
might call an easy upward gradient. One reform, one
new franchise, becomes a solid and permanent acquisi-
tion, as well as a step to other reforms. It is a process
of building up and consolidating rather than of de-
struction.

_This method, more even than the liberty it won, is
what gives to British institutions that progressive. sta-
ese which all the world admires. The most important

50 GROWTH OF LIBERTY.

effect of this method is the moulding of the nation’s
character. It is this “ broadening from precedent to
precedent ” that has imparted to the English character
that calmness, moderation, firmness and dignity which
insure its superiority in great undertakings and in its
differences with other nations. It is this, too, that has
made respect for law and authority almost an instinct
with Englishmen. What has been acquired by dint of
patient effort is loved and revered; nor are such con-
quests any longer open to attack. Rulers themselves
will respect what is only one step more, one slight sac-
rifice to the will of the nation freely expressed by its
legitimate representatives.

However tardy was sometimes the advent of long-
looked-for reforms, no one ever dreamt of imposing
them by force against the will of the majority, when
experience showed that constitutional agitation and ar-
gument gave tlie best.chance of success and the most
solid guarantees, provided one were on the side of right
and justice. Under these circumstances it was to be
expected that the debates of contending parties would
necessarily be stamped with calmness and dignity, which
were, besides, conducive to success.

One of the results of this well-ordered march from
liberty to liberty, from reform to reform, was that parties
were generally separated only by shades of difference ;
essential harmony was rarely marred. When a scarcely
perceptible line of demarcation parts us from an adversary,
_ it is possible to come to an understanding with him.
The separation was, so to speak, a movable fence that
might be shoved back and forth. Instead of living i in two
distinet camps, quite estranged from one another, there
was a certain amount of intercourse, proposals and con-

GROWTH OF LIBERTY. OL

cessions were in order. Self-possession, moderation,
peaceful and courteous discussion were obviously called
for in order to husband or to increase one’s strength.
The distance between one party and the other was some-
times so slight that a little cautious diplomacy was often
enough to secure either consent or a majority.

Because she was deprived of these liberties and thrown
violently backward, France rushed into revolution. Not
being allowed legitimate freedom of evolution, she went
into revolution, and overthrew law and order. Perhaps
it was her only way out of the chaos and ruin that
threatened her. When Louis XIV. confiscated the
liberties of France and thus threw her back, he little
dreamt that he was preparing the ruin of his dynasty
and the death of his second successor. He had himself
charged the mine that was to blow up his throne. He
was called great because he knew how to dazzle; but,
if greatness be measured by the solidity of one’s struct-
ures and the clear view of consequences, he was very
small and very fatal to his country.

This confiscation of the liberties of France is responsible
for the momentous events of which she has since been
the scene, and these events in their turn have intensified
both her own native defects and those which she shared
with other nations governed as she was. Had she slowly
developed along the lines of freedom, she would, by the
very force of circumstances, have not only kept her own
good qualities, but also acquired most of those which
have accrued to England. For want of this wisdom,
she has rushed into a series of revolutions of which the
end is probably not yet. Freedom forced upon people

by bloodshed cannot be true freedom ; it will always be
odious to many and therefore of uncertain tenure. If

lo

ay GROWTH OF LIBERTY.

imposed by revolution, the same means will be empioyed
to destroy it; hence contempt of law and of one’s
adversaries, rancor, injustices, conspiracies ; hence a
special tendency of the national character that stiffens
into a fixed habit of mind. Between the man _ that
desires a republic and the man that desires a return to
the old order of things yawns a gulf that is very hard to
bridge. They have no points of contact; even socially,
they are strangers, and if they have any knowledge of
each other, it will be mostly founded on slander. Their
natural weapons will be violence and insult.

Thus the slight divergences of three or four centuries
ago have become strong contrasts through the choice of
different methods. This we realize to-day; but our
forefathers did not. It was not in view of an ideal
dream or according to a preconceived plan that liberty
gradually was introduced into England. Men acted
merely according to the exigencies of the moment in
order to supply fresh wants. Yet. experience has set
great store by these liberties thus acquired. People
were gradually educated up to an intelligent compre-
hension of what is called the theory of social evolution,
a theory which, in France, has recently been styled oppor-
tunism. Thus it is that we are ever advancing toward
new horizons that should be studied and, if possible;
foreseen ; thus it is that events are ever occurring the
tendency and ultimate significance of which we cannot’
so much as conjecture. | :

Whilst England, by her steady progress in the widen-
ing field of liberty, grew greater and greater, France,
tending towards absolutism, was, amidst bursts of daz-
zling glory, gradually losing as much as her rival gained.
The time came when the latter sought not only to re-

GROWTH OF LIBERTY. 55

cover what she had lost, what it had cost England three
hundred years to maintain and develop, but also to take
a forward leap of several centuries. Then a useful
experience proved that the social edifice has no stability
unless it be built up: slowly, stone upon stone, with
plumb-line and ,cement carefully applied to each.
When, however, the edifice has been raised without
these precautions, and consequently threatens to fall, it
may be necessary to'pull it down.

All the teachings of the past lead to the belief that
England followed the true, the better course. But, in
such matters, error is always possible, because, to the
immediate and visible results, must be added others
that are invisible and distant, and sometimes very dif-
ferent from those which seem startlingly clear. Weare
witnesses, on the one hand, of the first. consequences of
evolution; on the other, of revolution; or rather of
slow evolution and rapid evolution. For this century,
at least, the advantage is clearly on the side of slow
evolution. But who can foretell with certainty the
remote consequences in future ages? It is the secret of
Providence. Inall social questions this principle holds :
immediate or proximate results may be very different
from remote consequences. The human mind is, after
all, despairingly limited. It often happens that what
is practical wisdom in the long run comes from reputed
fools. Statues are erected in honor of those who have
foreseen immediate or proximate effects. Those who
have had intuitions of more distant results are some-
times locked up.

It may be for the interest of mankind at large that
nations work out their destinies in various ways. Hu-
“man progress is a congeries of acquired experiences.

54 GROWTH OF LIBERTY.

The doings of one people are noted by another, matured,
weighed, accepted or rejected entirely or partially; the
residuum of good becomes the property of the civilized
world. ‘

One thing seems quite certain: England has won the
first game. Her methods of success have been studied ;
they have been and still are useful toall nations. Shall
she lose the next innings? — It is the secret of the future,
the secret which statesmen are striving to discover.
All nations may have special hopes and consoling fore-
casts; but, at any rate, it is undeniable that England, by
opening up the path, has got a start that she may very
well be proud of. Some may question if her advance
has not been too slow, if the habits thus formed may
not be some day a source of danger. For her that slow-
ness was a necessity; she was feeling her way from the
known to the unknown. Now that the territory is
mostly mapped out, it is easy for other nations to take a

short cut and suppress some of the old, painful, round-
about tramping. But England’s traditional wisdom
gives us every reason to trust she will always be willing
to move on in time to avoid any dangers that may
threaten her.

Highly as I value the good points which liberty and
the struggle therefor have brought out in the institu-
tions and character of England, I am far from admiring
everything English or blaming everything French.
The scope of this work does not admit of insisting on
the defects of the picture. Else I might point toa
series of shameful acts very often far worse than the worst
deeds of France. Taking all in all, not only was Eng-
land’s seventeenth century no better than the same period
in France; but, in many respects, it was worse than the

GROWTH OF LIBERTY. 5d
eighteenth in France. Nevertheless, in the midst of her
deepest humiliations England was collecting materials
for future greatness. If deeds of shame were, in a
sense, an outcome of the struggle for liberty, it was the
stubbornness and encroachments of the crown that pro-
voked them; they were the offspring of absolutism and
of those who sacrificed to it the interests of the nation,
nor can they be fathered on the valiant defenders of
liberty. Courage and disinterestedness were needed to
expose one’s self to the royal displeasure, to persecu-
tions, to ruin, to decapitation. No wonder most of the
high functionaries sacrificed, when the sacrifice was an
essential condition, honor, principlés and humanity in
order to preserve or obtain royal favors. Those men,
who seem to us bereft of all honorable feeling, might
have been, under other circumstances, the ornament of
their race; in fact their only fault, perhaps, was rating
ambition above virtue. :

In this world of ours there is no such thing as un-
mixed good. The purest joys are the reward of suffer-
ing. This is true of liberty, and still more true of the
struggle to obtain and preserve it. This struggle was
necessary, and the defections, treachery and crime were
unavoidable. Would liberty have given to England
such favorable results, had it been acquired without
resistance? Would it be as highly valued? Would it
have taken on that stability which has hitherto secured
it from all vicissitudes? Probably not.

So long as England was in the painful period of
incubation, so long as the nations of Europe could see
only the evils accompanying those conflicts for liberty,
it was perhaps impossible for them to grasp the good
result that was tofollow. The very bitterness of the

56 GROWTH OF LIBERTY.

?

contest for freedom must necessarily have produced
special crimes from which the undisputed absolutism of
the French monarchy was exempt. The fruits of liberty
could not be tasted and appreciated until the conflict
had cooled down by the final triumph of Parliamentary
supremacy. No wonder, then, that Louis XIV., or even
the French nobility, seeing contemporary facts, judged
that the absolute rule of the sovereign was the only
means of ensuring unity of action, stability, order, har-
mony and the elements of greatness. What they wit-
nessed in their own day must have convinced them that
they were right. Very likely they saw, in those intes-
tine struggles, only the attempt of a few to gratify their
' passions or further their own interests at the expense of
the nation’s weal. Could they then descry the far-off
effects of this liberty on the national character, effects
that were only as yet dimly outlined in a maze of stril-
ing disadvantages? So long as France was in the
hands of a sovereign like Louis XIV., who dazzled her
by his greatness, she could delude herself with the
fancy that things would remain ever thus. It needed
the follies of the Regency and of Louis XV.; it needed
ruin ‘and humiliation to rouse her from her torpor, to
make her realize that she was at the mercy of the in-
frequent virtues and very frequent vices of her kings.

France has had many severe lessons. Will she profit
by them? We must hope so. Will she get back what
she has lost? ‘This again we may hope for: one or two
centuries are of small account in the life of a nation.
We may hope that she will at length reach a state of.
equilibrium, and, having secured that, will advance with
constant and measured steps. She will always be, we
hope, great in her genius, in her activity of mind, in

GROWTH OF LIBERTY. iS

noble and generous ideas, in science, in the love of the
beautiful. But, what she will never regain is the high
place she has lost, the part she once played in the civil-
izing and peopling of, the globe. If France has declined
somewhat, or rather if she has not advanced as much'as
was to be expected ; if she be destined to declinestill more,
she can trace this decline to her want of expansion, to her
lack of colonies. When France and England were con-
tending for the possession of North America, the latter
had only thirteen millions of inhabitants, whereas the
former had twenty-seven millions. Look at the situation
to-day. The United Kingdom has thirty-seven millions,
France only thirty-eight millions, while in North
America alone there are almost seventy millions of men
that speak the language and are impregnated with the
ideas and special characteristics of Britain. How shall
it be in one, two or three centuries, when England will
have developed mighty empires in the. vast colonies
under her sway? It matters little that these colonies
should become independent of the mother country;
even when her daughters leave her, their influence and
prestige is none the less traceable to their fruitful
parent.

Yet, not to the fcabeoiitninbes of. the French race is
this contrast to be attributed. Any doubt on this ques-
tion would be set aside by the prodigious expansion of
the Canadians and Acadians, an expansion the only
equal of which perhaps is that of the Boers.

When European governments, in the last two cen-
turies, strove to found colonies, they did not, as far as
we can judge, reckon with this increase and spread
of population. They were naturally inclined to think
their colonizing movements would weaken the mother

58 GROWTH OF LIBERTY.

country. They simply yielded to the pressure of com-
mercial interest. But experience has since proved that
the increase of population was largely due to increased
space and to the elbow-room thus afforded. Here, again,
is one of those far-off consequences, invisible to one
generation and yet visible to another, to which I alluded
a moment ago.

It is highly probable that British statesmen did not
foresee, any better than those of France, the future of
their colonies. Neither did they create and develop
these colonies according to a set plan and on fixed prin-
ciples, foreseeing, arranging and maturing everything.
The contrary of all this would be nearer the truth. In
this respect the English government was not more
active, nor more provident than the French. True,
British immigration was considerable from the outset ;
but it was mostly all due to private initiative. As for
_ the Puritans and the Quakers, it was an asylum from
intolerance. They wanted and hoped to govern them-
selves, or at least to be free from hindrances to freedom
of conscience. France never held out similar hopes to
the Huguenots. All other immigrants were either
traders or colonists pure and simple.

While the pernicious influence of the French court
was weakening the nobility, in England the gentry and
the rich merchants were eager for distant enterprises. —
In this latter country it was enough to let that private
initiative have its way which in France was excluded
and paralyzed by the habit of waiting in all things for
the orders and regulations of royalty. Had the Hugue-
nots been allowed the same freedom of action as the
Puritans, they would have been only too glad to set up
for themselves outside of France in her colonies ; so

GROWTH OF LIBERTY. 59
would the religious orders; but, for the latter as well
as for the former, it was feared that they might acquire
too much independence and power. Thus, between
inaction on the one hand and obstacles on the other, the
colonies were left to struggle on in their impotent way.
‘T am not aware that the English Government made
more efforts at the outset for the peopling of her colo-
nies than France did. The obstacles the latter opposed
to the Huguenots the former also opposed to the Puri-
tans: but—here comes in an important difference, on
which perhaps depended the fate of the English colonies
—LEngland yielded to entreaties, and less than a century
later that flourishing colony of the Puritans numbered
75,000 souls, four times the entire population of New
France. So true is it that the fate of empires frequently
turns on apparently insignificant events.

Nor did England govern her colonies much better
than France did hers. Like France, England granted
ridiculous charters which handed over and confiscated
vast domains, ill-defined charters which annulled each
other or which were annulled according to caprice.
Nor, again, were the British immigrants any better than
the French. Quite the contrary: when France under-
took to send colonists, she was too fastidious, while
England was perhaps not sufficiently painstaking in her
choice.

Here the Puritans are not included: they were not
sent tothe colonies; having left England, they had taken
refuge in Holland, and they succeeded in effecting a co-
lonial settlement in America only by dint of begging for
permission to do so. ‘Their motives were of the most
exalted kind. Most praiseworthy were the morals of
those families seeking an asylum where they might live

60 : GROWTH OF LIBERTY.

according to their convictions. They sought neither
riches nor pleasure, nor the satisfactions of vanity and
ambition; yet they found, together with the asylum
they had desired, all that frugality, orderliness, economy
and intelligence could procure. It was this undesired
emigration that turned out best for the strength of
England. :

Not so with the colony of Virginia. At first picked
families were sent thither; but soon recruits came from
all quarters, and immigration, lapsing into a commercial
venture, gradually deteriorated till it became altogether
bad. High bounties made the recruiting of clerks and
servants for the great colonizing companies a matter of
money grabbing. Boys of 14 and’ 15 and even sickly
youths, says Rameau,* were kidnapped from sea-ports ;
agents embarked all the vagabonds and jail-birds that
felt the need of going far away from places where they
were too well known. A still more revolting spectacle
on the shores of the New World was the sale of con-
tracts which were often wholly fictitious. In truth this
was the organizing of a white slave trade with slavery
for a term of years; from that to the negro slave trade
with indefinite slavery was only a step, and that step
was soon taken.

“ As early as 1619,” says Hildreth, ‘1,200 immigrants
came to Virginia; among them were 100 vagabonds or
old offenders, who were sold like the rest, and also 20
negroes, who were brought thither and sold by a certain
~ Dutch captain; these were the first.”
~The British Government, taking the hint thus given,
saw its way to getting rid of all its prisoners: trans-
portation, in fact, saved the expenses of their mainte-

* Quoting Carlier and Bancroft.

- GROWTH OF LIBERTY. 61

nance at home, while the sale of their services actually
brought in money. These living consignments became
frequent; nor was the transportation confined to crim-
inals ; it was soon extended to. political prisoners, and
thus the civil dissensions of England became a fruitful
source of English emigration to Virginia, and afterward
gradually to the other colonies, even to New England.
“ This traffic in men of British race became so com-
mon * that not only the Scotch who had been made
prisoners at the battle of Dunbar, were shipped to
America to be there made slaves, but also the royalists
that fell into the power of the Parliamentary party at
the battle of Worcester, as well as the leaders of the
revolt of Penruddor were embarked for the colonies.
In Ireland the transportations of Irish Catholics were
numerous and frequent, and accompanied with such
cruel treatment as. to, be scarcely better than the atroci-
ties of the African slave trade. In 1685 nearly a
thousand prisoners, compromised in the rebellion of
Monmouth, were condemned to deportation, and forth-
with many of the men that were influential at Court
wrangled over this prey as over a most profitable mer-
chandise.” Lei |
_ Thus the British Government had but a small share
in the peopling of the colonies, and this share is per-
haps not very creditable. However, for one reason or
another, the blunders of England were not so grave as
those of France, with this further difference that the
very blunders of England became ultimately profitable.
Perhaps it was better to be less exacting in the choice
of emigrants and to fill up the colonies than to remain
inactive and especially to hinder emigration. Those

* Rameau quoting Carlier and Bancroft.

62 GROWTH OF LIBERTY.

criminals must live somewhere, and it may have been
preferable to suffer them to settle in a new country,
_where, finding more numerous and yaried advantages,
they might become moral and prosperous subjects. The
original population was moral and numerous enough to
absorb without too much harm to itself those outcasts of
society. Nevertheless, if the facts themselves are ex-
cusable, the method of operation was not so: nothing
can excuse the British Government for having, not only
tolerated, but originated that hateful white slave trade
which was soon to issue in the regular negro slave trade
and to taint in their very fountain-head the really ex-
cellent qualities of an infant nation. |

France made another mistake in not colonizing, as
she might have done, the Atlantic coast from Virginia
northward, or at least a considerable portion of that
coast, so as to secure a greater variety of climate. Trade
was, of course, the motive power at the time the colonies
were founded. France made the first choice, and, as re-
gards the fur trade and the fisheries, that choice must
have been considered, at least for the first half century,
the best. Similarly, it was the gold craze that first led
multitudes to California in 1849; -yet, in the long run,
the soil and the climate were found to be greater sources
of prosperity than the richest mines. This climatic
blunder may have contributed more than anything else
to keep France in astate of great numerical inferiority in
America. People did not care to emigrate to Acadia
because it was too much exposed to attacks, nor to
Canada because the climate was too severe or not suf-
ficiently varied. Probably it was to repair this mistake
that Louis XIV. had conceived the project of colonizing
the Hlinois country and the Upper Mississsipi ; but it

GROWTH OF LIBERTY. 63

was then too late. Voltaire gave expression to this idea,
when, with his witty flippancy, he said that, after all,
France was giving up “ only a few acres of snow.”

It has become the fashion to say thatthe Frenchman is
no colonizer. No doubt he has now no great reputation
in that line ; but the reason is that France-has no longer
a single colony favorably situated as a home for the white
race. The Frenchman is no longer a colonizer, because,
amid the turmoil of revolutions and counter-revolutions,
amid constant struggles with his European neighbors, he
never has had leisure to take a serious interest in his
colonies. ButI cannot admit that the Frenchman, in the
seventeenth or eighteenth century, was not quite as
good at colonizing as the Englishman, the Spaniard or
the Dutchman. The only things that handicapped the
Frenchman were his paternalism in government and the
disadvantages of his position in Europe. As to French-
men themselves, what they achieved here on American
soil seems utterly to contradict the assertion that they
did not know how to colonize.

Having explained their numerical inferiority by causes
that do not imply an absence of the colonizing spirit, I find
that those who settled in Canada gave proofs of physical
aptitude, of energy, of skill, of courage, which, in many ©
respects, seem superior to anything of the sort the
British colonists could show. Else, how could. the
French have held their own during a century and a half
against an enemy that outnumbered them sixteen to
one? What wonderful achievements would have been
theirs, had they been, I will not say sixteen times as
numerous as the English, but fairly matched in point of
numbers? Were they not singularly gifted, those men
who penetrated into the interior of the continent and

64 GROWTH OF LIBERTY.

founded settlements and outposts in countries that were
as yet unknown to the Aierican colonist? The settle-
ments of Frontenac, Detroit, Green Bay, Vincennes, and
other colonies in Illinois date back as far as 1680. So.
great was the activity and boldness of the inhabitants of
Detroit that they offered to throw three thousand col-
onists into the adjoining territory, so as to command the
whole interior of the continent, provided the French
Government would fill up the void by encouraging a
strong emigration to Canada.

Forsaken by the mother country, without direction or
assistance, the colonists faced the difficulties of their posi-
tion with a courage andan intelligence that were seldom
st fault. By the superiority of their methods and by their
wise forecasts they acquired a great ascendancy over the
minds of the Indians. It is remarkable that the French
never had to fight the Indians of the countries they
occupied, nay, that they made them their faithful allies
even in the most critical junctures. Everybody knows
that it fared quite otherwise with the British colonies.
Whether through acts of injustice, or haughty and arbi-
trary measures, or for some other cause, they did not
know how to make friends of the Indians: hence terri-
ble deeds of vengeance provoking the British settlers to
exterminate the savage in self-defence against dangers
that they had not the wisdom to avert.

“In fine,” says Rameau, “the point in which the
intelligence of the French colonists shone forth with
especial brilliancy was their keen appreciation of topog-
raphy and of their local environment, of which they
unfailingly made an excellent use. This it was that
enabled them to maintain the defensive and to succeed
in attack. Their quickness and sureness in seizing the

_ GROWTH OF LIBERTY. 65

main point, their skill in planning, their promptness in
deciding, their energy in acting were no whit inferior
to their robustness of constitution, suppleness of body,
sobriety and austerity of habit.”

When finally they succumbed, it was only because
they seemed exhausted by their victories after cae
for a long time and repeatedly gained advantages tha
made the ultimate result doubtful. When Port Royal
fell, it had twice resisted an army that was more
numerous than the entire population of Acadia. And,
when Canada in its turn was forced to yield to the in-
vader, it had only five or six thousand soldiers left to
withstand the sixty thousand of the enemy. Canada
had then but sixty thousand souls, whereas the British
provinces had more than a million.

I have not the slightest wish to depreciate the Eng-
glish colonists, nor to extol unduly the French, nor even
to institute comparisons ; both had their good qualities
and their defects, rather difficult to estimate satisfac-
torily ; but, to any one who will put away from him
the glamour of success and view the question on its
merits, it will appear evident that, minor differences
apart, the Frenchman was, at that time, as good a
colonizer as any other European. The failure of French
colonization is traceable entirely to the faults I have
pointed out, all of which are to be imputed to the Home

Government and to an untoward combination of events.
5 ;

66 PORT ROYAL AFTER ITS SURRENDER.

CHAPTER II.

Surrender of Port Royal, Oct. 13th, 1710—Articles of the capitula-

*tion—Cession of Port Royal with the territory ‘‘ within cannon-
shot ”—Vetch named governor of the place—Five inhabitants of
Port Royal made prisoners—The garrison decimated by sickness
—Saint Castin comes with 42 Abenakis to direct operations
against the fort—Battle of ‘‘Bloody Creek ”—Port Royal
besieged—The Acadians of the ceded territory withdraw—The
garrison is reinforced and the projected siege is abandoned.

THE surrender of Port Royal to Nicholson. by de
Subercase was signed Oct. 13th, 1710. He had resisted
most heroically for nineteen days, and merited no less
honor by his surrender than he had done in the two
preceding sieges by repelling the enemy. ‘The struggle
was hopeless and surrounded with circumstances which
would induce even the bravest to withhold making any
effort. Alone with a few chosen officers, he withstood
the general call for an immediate surrender. It was
difficult to impose his will and to revive men’s courage
when there was no hope of success; when to want, to
privation, to the superior strength of the enemy, to the
uselessness of his repeated efforts, was added a still
graver circumstance, complete abandonment by the Home
Government. There was room for no feeling but dis-
couragement, when Subercase displayed such energy
and skill that he restored their drooping spirits. His
constancy won for him the admiration of his enemies

PORT ROYAL AFTER ITS SURRENDER. 67

together with most honorable conditions of surrender,
which were carried out by the English General with
great fidelity.

The articles of the capitulation referred only to Port
Royal and the dependent territory within cannon-shot
thereof. To be brief I omit the articles of the capitula-
tion which relate to the garrison, and restrict my atten-
tion to what concerned the inhabitants of the ceded
territory, for there is no question at all of the rest of
Acadia.

ARTICLE V. “That the inhabitants within cannon-
shot of Port Royal shall remain upon their estates, with
their corn, cattle and furniture, during two _years, in
case they are not desirous to go before, they taking the
oath of allegiance and fidelity to Her Sacred Majesty
of Great Britain.”

In a memorandum accompanying the articles of the
capitulation, Gen. Nicholson declares that “ within can-
non-shot ” ought to be understood to be “ three English
miles around this fort.” The number of persons com-
prised within this space according to a list presented to
the General was 481.

To have a correct view of the situation we should not
lose sight of the fact that this capitulation was limited
only to Port Royal and the country comprised within
a radius of three miles from the fort. The inhabitants
of this district had two years at most allowed them to
pass over to the French territory with all their moy-
able goods; but, pending their decision thereupon, they
were to take the oath of allegiance and fealty; which
they did. We find nowhere the terms of this oath, but
we suppose it must have been very carefully worded,
in order to make sure that, in the meantime, they woul:

68 PORT ROYAL AFTER ITS SURRENDER.

do nothing against the peace and the interest of the
English government, until their final decision to remain
or depart within two years. The circumstances them-
selves preclude any other interpretation. We should
not forget that whatever was outside this three-mile
radius remained meanwhile French territory ; it is well
also to remark that the war between the two nations
continued for nearly three years until the treaty of
Utrecht. A clear view of these facts is necessary for the
better understanding of what follows, and for avoiding
the confusion into which so many historians have here-
tofore fallen. ,

After the departure of the French garrison, Nichol-
son reimbarked with his troops on the 28th of October,
leaving in the fort, as Lieutenant-governor, Colonel
Vetch, with about 450 soldiers. From Boston Nicholson
set out for London, where he succeeded in organizing an
expedition for the conquest of Canada by land and sea ;
he himself had the command of the troops who were
to operate on Montreal through Lake Champlain; but,
owing to the unskilfulness of Admiral Walker, the
fleet suffered grievous disaster opposite the Ile aux
(Eufs, and so the expedition was abandoned.

During this time, desertions, but, still more, sickness,
reduced so greatly the Annapolis (Port Royal) garrison
that, according to an eye-witness, there remained only
a hundred able-bodied soldiers at the end of the follow-
ing June. :

With the enemy in such a plight, it became. easy
enough, for the Acadians who were outside the limits
comprised in the capitulation, to engage in hostilities and
even to seize upon the fort. Here was an excellent and
easy opportunity for retaliation. This they signified to

PORT ROYAL AFTER ITS SURRENDER. 69

de St. Castin who had previously been named Lieutenant
of the King of France in this district. The movement
was sufficiently apparent to make the governor of the
garrison anxious, and often detachments of his troops
ventured abroad in order to watch the manceuvres of
the people both within and without the bounding circle.
In one of these excursions two deserters of the garrison,
one being a certain Abraham Gaudet of Beaubassin,
and three half-breeds, strangers to the place, captured
the commissary of the garrison whom, however, they
released, for a small ransom. The governor, thinking
that there had been connivance between these men and
some inhabitants of Annapolis, arrested Wm. Bourgeois,
Peter Leblanc and John Comeau of Annapolis, as well
as Germain Bourgeois of Beaubassin and Francis
Brassard of Chipody, who were passing through Anna-
polis. We have no account of what may have been the
result of their trial. *

Saint Castin, whose warlike humor was never at
rest so long as there were blows to be given or received,
was easily prevailed upon to come and take part in the
struggle which the Acadians up the river were prepar-
ing to have with the English. With forty-two Abenakis
of the Penobscot river he succeeded in crossing the Bay
of Fundy and by his stealthy march escaped even the -
suspicion of the garrison. In one of their usual sallies,

* Haliburton gives quite a different version from that of Murdoch.
According to the former these arrests were intended to keep these men as
hostages, and by means of threats to prevent those who were not included
in the capitulation from committing any hostile act. ‘ This hostile disposi-
tion of the French settlers,” says he, ‘‘ induced the officer commanding at
Port Royal to apprehend the priest and five of the most respectable
inhabitants of the district as hostages for the good behaviour of their

countrymen, who were informed that, upon similar attempt, these prisoners
should suffer military execution.”

70 PORT ROYAL AFTER ITS SURRENDER.

eighty men of the garrison under the command of Captain
Pigeon advanced as far as twelve miles from the fort,
intending to surprise some Indian warriors who, by their
threats, were preventing the inhabitants of Annapolis
from furnishing the wood necessary to the fortifications.
Saint Castin, who was watching the movements of this
troop, surprised them in a place ever since called Bloody
Creek. Thirty soldiers and officers were killed and
the rest made prisoners.

The position of the garrison was becoming critical, if
it be true, which, however, leaves room for doubt, that,
before this encounter, there remained only a hundred
soldiers able to bear arms. This event was unfortunate
as are all those that result from war; but it cannot be
judged otherwise than as legitimate warfare, since the
action took place twelve miles from Annapolis and nine
miles outside the territory ceded by the capitulation.
The successful combatants were French subjects on
French territory ; it was in time of war and moreover
an act of self-defence against their assailants. Some
writers, forgetting the terms of the capitulation, speak
of this affair as if at that time the whole of Acadia had
been ceded, and as if these men had been guilty of
treachery. This is clearly a mistake.

During this time Abbé Gaulin, parish priest of Minés,
tried to organize an expedition against Annapolis. He
succeeded in getting together two hundred men, whom
he intrusted to Saint Castin. Annapolis was invested
for the purpose of attacking the fort, when the ammuni-
tion and cannons, which they expected from New-
foundland, should arrive; but,'as this help did not
come, and as, on other hand, the garrison received a
reinforcement, they gave up their project and disperse.

PORT ROYAL AFTER ITS SURRENDER. 71

Before investing Annapolis, writes Murdoch, “ All the
inhabitants withdrew out of cannon-shot from the fort,
and they also transported their cattle up the river.
Those of the banliewe (within cannon-shot) intimated
to the governor that he had violated the articles of the
capitulation to their prejudice, and that they were
thereby freed from the oaths they had taken not to bear
arms; after which they joined their compatriots in
blockading the Fort.”
- I have much respect for this author, whom I look
upon as a sure guide in all questions of fact: yet I must
say I have nowhere found the confirmation of the last
part of this citation. Was it simply.an inference from
the declaration that precedes it? I think so. Though
not a strictly logical inference, it might be justifiable.
In what did the governor violate the articles of the
capitulation ? I do not know, and strong reasons would
be required to justify such conduct. The time was
likewise badly chosen to take advantage of any viola-
tion whatever, and the circumstances give rise to a seri-
ous suspicion about the fairness of these reasons.
Nevertheless, for want of precise information on the
nature and gravity of these reasons, we can perhaps
supply more or less what is wanting by a document
which has an intimate connection with the question, and
which makes us see, as far as we can judge by the ac-
count of one side only, what was the fate reserved for
the Acadians by Governor Vetch. Some months before
this incident the inhabitants residing within the limits
of the territory comprised in the capitulation sent to
the Governor of Canada, M. de Vaudreuil, by M. de
Clignancourt, the following letter:

“ As Your goodness extends over all those who, being subjects of

72 PORT ROYAL AFTER ITS SURRENDER.

His Majesty, have recourse to you to relieve them in their misery, we
pray you will vouchsafe us your assistance to withdraw ourselves
from this country. ...M. de Clignancourt will tell you better than
we can do by a letter, the harsh manner in which Governor Vetch
treats us, keeping us like negroes, and wishing to persuade us that
we are under great obligation to him for not treating us much worse,
being able, he says, to do so with justice, and without having room
to complain of it. We have given to M. de Clignancourt copies of three
ordinances which M. Vetch has issued. We pray you, sir, to have
regard to our misery, and to honor us with your letter for our conso-
lation, expecting that you may furnish the necessary assistance for
our retiring from this unhappy country.”

/

TREATY OF UTRECHT. 73

CHAPTER III.

Treaty of Utrecht—Cession of Acadia—Clauses of the treaty and
letter of Queen Anne—Lieutenant-Governor Vetch opposes the
departure of the Acadians—Arrival of Governor Nicholson—MM.
de la Ronde and Pinsens at Port Royal to remove obstacles to —
their departure—Referred to the Queen—Subterfuges—Char-
acter of Nicholson and of Vetch—Compilation of the archives
of Nova Scotia—Artifices of the Compiler, his partiality, etc.,
etc.

THE war between France and England was at last
terminated, and, April 18, 1718, at Utrecht, was signed
the treaty of peace which definitively ceded Acadia to
England. Nothing in this treaty defined the extent
and limits of the country which France ceded, but these
were to be determined, later on, by a commission to be
appointed by the two Crowns. Pending this decision,
France, by the terms of the treaty, ceded: “ All of
Nova Scotia or Acadia comprised in its ancient limits,
as also the city of Port Royal.” It was, as may be >
seen, difficult to make such a badly worded declaration
the basis of a mutual understanding. What Acadia
was, what Nova Scotia had been or then was, had never
been defined with precision; but the question, already
so knotty, was still more stupidly complicated by this
additional clause, ‘as also the city of Port Royal,” as
if Acadia or Nova Scotia composed only one part of
the peninsula to which the treaty, by extension, added
on Port Royal. This could not be the intention of the

14 TREATY OF UTRECHT.

parties, since Port Royal was essentially a part of.
Acadia, since it had been its cradle and the seat of
government for a whole century. It was a gross error,
so gross that it could not be invoked or maintained as
far as Port Royal was concerned ; but the insertion of
this additional clause still left in the mind the vague
idea that Acadia or Nova Scotia could at most be under-
stood only of,the peninsula. These difficulties were to
be resolved fifty years later by force of arms.

Article XIV. of the treaty of Utrecht, which defined
the situation of the Acadians is couched in these terms :

‘* It is expressly provided that in all the said places and colonies to
be yielded and restored by the Most Christian King in pursuance of
this treaty, the subjects of the said King may have liberty to remove
themselves within a year to any other place, as they shall think fit;
with all their movable effects. But those who are willing to remain
here, and to besubjects to the kingdom of Great Britain, are to enjoy

‘the free exercise of their religion according to the usage of the
Church of Rome as far as the laws of Great Britain do allow the
same.”’

The better to define this situation, but still more to
please. the king of France, in return for some of the
latter’s acts of kindness to his Protestant subjects,
Queen Anne agreed to relieve the Acadians from the
rigor of the terms of the treaty. The new terms are
contained in her letter to Governor Nicholson, dated
June 23, 1713 :

** To our trusty and well-beloved Francis Nicholson, Governor of
our Province of Nova Scotia or Acadia, etc., ete.

‘** Whereas our good brother, the Most Christian King, hath, at our
desire, released from imprisonment on board his galleys, such of his
subjects as were detained there on account of their professing the
Protestant religion ; We, being willing to show by some mark of our
favor towards his subjects, how kind we take his compliance there-

TREATY OF UTRECHT. v 659

in, have therefore thought fit hereby to signify our will and pleasure
to you, that you permit such of them as have any lands or tenements
in the places under our Government in Acadia and Newfoundland,
that have been or are to be yielded to us by virtue of the late treaty
of peace, and are willing to continue our subjects, to retain and enjoy
their said lands and tenements without any molestation, as fully and
freely as other our subjects do or may possess their lands or estates,
or to sell the same, if they shall rather choose to remove elsewhere.
And for so doing, this shall be your warrant.
‘* By Her Majesty’s command,
** DARTMOUTH.”

The situation of the Acadians was thus established by
Art. XIV. of the treaty and by this letter. In its essen-
tial points this situation was very clear. They had,
besides the free exercise of their religion, the choice
either to remain in the country, keeping the ownership
of all they possessed, 07 to leave the country, bringing
away with them all their movable goods and also the pro-
ceeds of the sale of their immovable property. This
letter did not specify any time for their departure.
This omission, if it were one, might throw some doubt
on this point. The treaty, which was three months
previous, fixed the delay to a year. Was it then to be |
understood that the time fixed by this treaty continued
to be what the treaty had made it, or did it become un-
limited? The remark that the compiler of the archives
of Nova Scotia adds at the foot of the document might
make us believe that he adopts the second interpreta-
tion. Such, however, could not be his intention, for,
when we have better understood the motives which
always animated this compiler, we shall understand
better that he could not accept an interpretation which
would have been so favorable to the Acadians. I am
inclined to believe and I deem it my duty to say so, that,

76 TREATY OF UTRECHT.

strictly speaking, the delay fixed by the treaty was not
modified by the letter of Queen Anne.

This distinction is after all of little importance,
because, from that time forth the Acadians had decided
to leave the province, and even then they were actively
preparing to do so. This departure would have been
accomplished in the autumn of 1713, had it not been for
the obstacles opposed thereto by Governor Vetch, and
repeated under different forms by Nicholson, Cauldfield,
Doucette, Phillips, Armstrong, and later still by Corn-
wallis. During seventeen years (1713-1730) all the

events of Acadia are connected with the artifices used
- to prevent this departure and rivet the Acadians to the
soil by an oath of allegiance. To suppress these facts
is to render the history of this period unintelligible and
altogether false. For ‘some reason or other, whether it
be for not having had access to the documents which
we possess or for other less avowable reasons, these facts |
have not come to light or even been touched either by
historians or by the compiler of the archives of Nova
Scotia.

As to this gentleman, I have declared in my preface,
without hesitation and without reticence, that the
volume which he compiled has been put together
with great partiality and with the intention of prej-
udicing the public against the Acadians. This grave
accusation I have uttered deliberately after mature re-
flection and without laying aside for a single moment
the benevolence -and charity that animates me; but to
judge it well, it will be necessary to peruse this work,
since my reasons are based upon the facts and developed
from them as they present themselves in the course of
the narrative. To explain the circumstances of this

COMPILATION OF THE ARCHIVES. TT

publication let me say at the outset that the Legislative
Assembly of Nova Scotia on April 30, 1857, on motion
of Honorable Joseph Howe, adopted the following res-
olution :

‘That His Excellency the Governor be respectfully requested to
cause the ancient records and documents illustrative of the history
and progress of society in this Province, to be examined, preserved
and arranged, either for reference or publication, as the Legislature
may hereafter determine.”’

What precedes, as also what follows, is extracted from
the very preface of the volume of the Archives, compiled
by Thomas B. Akins in virtue of this resolution and of
those which followed.

‘*In the following year the Lieut.-Governor was authorized by the
Assembly to. procure from the State Paper Office, in England,
copies of any dispatches or documents that may be found necessary
to complete our files.

‘** In 1859, by another vote of the House, he was empowered to
procure from the Government of Canada, copies of such papers in
the Archives of Quebec as related to the early history of Acadia.”

The compiler afterwards adds his personal reflections
in the following manner :

‘** The expulsion of the Acadians from Nova Scotia is an important
event in the history of British America, and has lately derived pecu-
liar interest from the frequent reference made to it by modern
writers. Although much has been written on the subject, yet, until
lately, it has undergone little actual investigation, and, in conse-
quence, the necessity for their removal has not been clearly perceived
and the motives which led to its enforcement have been often mis-
understood. I have, therefore, carefully selected all documents in
possession of the Government of this Province, that could in any way
throw light on the history and conduct of the Acadians.”’

In this preface two distinct parts are to be kept in
view, (1) that which relates to the end the Legislature
had in view, namely: to unite in one volume the most

78 COMPILATION OF THE ARCHIVES.

important documents that might serve for the general
history of the Province, and to procure in London and
Quebec those which should be judged useful to fill up
the deficiencies of the Archives of Nova Scotia; and
(2) that which relates to the compiler’s own private ends.
-Even without reading between the lines, it is easy to
see that the end of Mr. Akins was not exactly the same
as that of the Legislature.

The special purpose he had in view was to comprise
in this volume all the documents that could throw some
light on the causes that furnished motives for the expul-
sion of the Acadians. In substance he says, up to the pres-
ent time these motives have not been understood. Precisely
so; during a century historians had been astray, and
he, Mr. Akins, was going to set all future historians once
more on the right path; he was going to group together
all that might be injurious to the Acadians, and to
make his volume a convenient and easy arsenal where
writers might come to seek weapons against those poor
Acadians, to whom all this would be a mystery, and
who would suffer in silence whatever insults these
writers would be pleased to heap upon them.

In matters of history, any plausible opinion, whether
it be or not the result of the aberrations of the mind or
of the heart, is to be respected, and Mr. Akins could
very well entertain the opinions which he expresses in
his preface; but I am surely justified in finding him
presumptuous when he ventures to condemn the writers
of a whole century, including those who were contem-
poraries of these events ; and in branding as unbecoming
and injudicious his inserting in a preface his own opin-
ions on events which were narrated in the compilation

he was charged to make. This compilation had to be

OMISSIONS OF THE COMPILER: 79

impartial, or it would deviate from the end which the
Legislature had in view ; and, if the fitness of things did
not move Mr. Akins, his shrewdness should have made
him hold his tongue lest his work should seem biassed.
And to show how great indeed was his want of tact, I
may say that his preface itself made me believe that he
must be partial and prejudiced, and, starting therefrom,
_ I studied him closely, compared, meditated, and finally
arrived at this clear and plain conclusion, that his par-
tiality was outdone only by his bad faith. |

For the moment, let it be sufficient to say that this
volume is in reality not, as the Legislature wished it to
be, acollection of the most important documents relating
to the general history of the province, but a collection |
of all that could appear to justify the deportation of the
Acadians ; that it omits all or nearly all the explana-
tions that might be favorable to them, and systematically
excludes all that was. unfavorable to the governors.
And, let not the reader imagine that I have purposely
hunted up the omissions I charge him with in order to
introduce them into this work; the very importance of
those which I point out by the way, shows that I have not
stopped at the trifles which abound, but that, on the con-
trary, I have kept silence on many grave facts in order
not to encumber my work.

The first documents, introduced into the volume of the
archives, are dated November, 1714. It seems to me
clear that the intention of the legislature must have been
to comprise therein all the documents since the taking
of Port Royal in 1710, or at least since April, 1713, the
date of the treaty of peace. The documents between
this date and November, 1714, were particularly import-
ant, in order to determine in a precise manner what had

80 OMISSIONS OF THE COMPILER.

been done both by the governors and by the Acadians
in respect of those clauses of the treaty that referred to
the departure. The Acadians had the space of a year
to withdraw with their effects, their cattle and the out-
come of the sale of their immovable goods: we know
by the sequel that very few of them left their country
- at that time; but did they wish to leave ? were they pre-
vented from doing so? that is what we might expect to
see in the volume of the archives. To find light on this
obscure point, I had to search elsewhere, and, as will be
seen, the result of my researches is of great importance
and diametrically opposed to the pretensions of the
Compiler.

By leaving out all the documents between 1710 and the
end of 1714 he has led into error nearly all the writers
that have written the history of Nova Scotia. They
begin where the Compiler begins; they finish where he
finishes ; they omit what he has omitted, they skip what
he has skipped. I suppose all this is done in very good
faith, and if I mention this, it is rather to show that the
Compiler has attained his end, that he will continue to
do so just so long as his motives are not understood, so
long as it is not known that there is beyond his volume
a vast unexplored field, which explains what he did not
wish to disclose, which makes us take the proper meas-
ure of the man and his work. In the part which claims
our attention at present, unless we search elsewhere
for the means to fill up this serious void, he obliges us ©
to enter on the scene in the second act of the drama ;
which may leave ies things unexplained and inexpli-

cable.*

*To be brief and to avoid all confusion, I will hereafter use the term ‘ The
Compiler’ to designate Thomas B. Akins, compiler of the archives of Nova
Beotia.

THE ACADIANS’ DEPARTURE OPPOSED. 81

At the taking of Port Royal, Colonel Vetch, as I have
said, had been appointed lieutenant-governor of the
place. The following year he went to rejoin Nicholson
in his projected expedition against Montreal, leaving in
his place, as administzvator, Sir Charles Hobby; when »
this undertaking was abandoned, he returned to his post,
where he reassumed his office and exercised it till
the summer of 1714. October 20, 1712, Nicholson had
been appointed governor, but, during his absence, Vetch
fulfilled his functions with the title of lieutenant-gover- .
nor of the garrison, in which office he was replaced in
1714 by Major Caulfield and later by Captain Dou-
cette, while Nicholson remained titular governor until
1717. |

I have said that since the signing of the treaty the
Acadians had almost decided.to leave the country, but
that they were prevented by all imaginable means and
artifices. In fact in August, or perhaps even in July
1713, they sent delegates to Louisburg to come to an
understanding with the French governor on the con- |
ditions to be held out to them if they were transported
over to the French territory. These delegates sent in
their report, and the answer of the Acadian people dated
September 23, 1713, implies arefusal. They do not wish
to accept an establishment at Ile Royale (Cape Breton)
without effectual assistance, since the soil there is of
an inferior quality, woody, and without natural meadow-
land to pasture their cattle. If, however, they are
obliged to take the oath, they will depart anyhow :—

** Besides,’’ says their report, ‘‘ we do not know yet in what man-
ner the English will use us. [If they burthen us in respect to our
religion, or cut up our settlement to divide the lands with people of
our nation we will abandon them absolutely.”’

- 82 THE ACADIANS’ DEPARTURE OPPOSED.

The governor of Louisburg, M. de Costabelle, was
sorely vexed at this reply, and still more so at a letter
from Father Gaulin, whom he had hoped to enlist as an
ally in his dealings with the Acadians. The latter had
replied “ that he could not lend himself to his manceuvres,
as he did not see any sufficient guarantees for the assist-
ance which he, M. de Costabelle, promised, and that
it did not become him to employ missionaries in an
affair, the purpose of which appeared to be to warp his
judgment in order to deceive others; that, if he could
not offer any better guarantees for his good intentions,
he preferred to see the Acadians remain on their lands
with the English, who are doing all in their power to
prevent them from departing. ” *

The more the French government desired, as will be
. explained further on, that the Acadians should take
advantage of the treaty to go over into French territory,
the more were the authorities of Port Royal opposed
thereto. Negotiations were resumed between the Aca-
dians and the governor of Louisburg; lands were offered
on Prince Edward Island (1’Ie Saint-Jean), and divers
advantages which were considered acceptable by the
Acadians. They wished to leave; Colonel Vetch
opposed this under the pretext that he was only leu-
tenant-governor, and that they had to wait for the arrival
of Governor Nicholson. He arrived only the following
summer, when the year stipulated by the treaty had
just expired. The following letters, both from Major
Hermite who replaced de Costabelle at Louisburg,
refer to these event. The first is dated July 11, 1714,
and is addressed to Nicholson himself :—

* Costabelle au Ministre, Nov. 17183—Murdoch, vol. i. p. 338.

THE ACADIANS’ DEPARTURE OPPOSED. 83

‘‘ Having learnt, sir, from several inhabitants of Port Royal, of
Mines and Beaubassin, that he who commands in your absence at_
Port Royal (Col. Vetch), has forbidden them to leave, and even re-
fused the permission to thease who asked him for it, which event
makes most_of the Acadians now established on the lands of the King
of England unable to withdraw this year. ....

‘* That is what has determined me, according to the order given me
by the King, tosend thither M. de la Ronde Denys, into whose hands
I have remitted the orders of Queen Anne; he will confer with you
about the reasons why they are detained. I hope, sir, you will
render all due justice, and that you will have no sisi view than to
obey the behests of the Queen.”’

The other letter is from the same to the Minister and dated August
29, 1714: ‘‘ He who commands Port Royal has forbidden the Acadi-
ans to leave the country before the arrival of Mr. Nicholson, so that
all those who have come here had escaped. They represented to me
that it was necessary to send an officer there in order to uphold their
rights, the English having forbidden the missionaries to meddle with
the affairs of the Acadians.’’—(Archives dela Marine et des Colonies.)

This is clear enough. The year had just expired, and
the prohibitions of Goyernor Vetch were of sufficiently
distant date to have given the Governor of Louisburg
time to be informed of them, to communicate this in-
formation to the King of France ; and the latter had had
time to obtain an order from the Queen of England, to
transmit all documents to the Governor of Louisburg,
to appoint M. de la Ronde and to write to N en
under date of July 11, 1714.

And what were these orders of Queen Anne to Nich-
olson? Tvidently, to let the Acadians depart, since
they were within the limits of the year when the com- ~
plaints were made, and since Major Hermite sum-
moned Nicholson to execute the behests of the Queen.
We shall see how he respected them, or rather what
‘measures he took to elude them.

Messrs. de la Ronde and Pinsens, bearers of the orders

84 THE ACADIANS’. DEPARTURE OPPOSED.

“of Queen Anne, arrived at Port Royal about July 20,
at the same time as Nicholson himself. He gave them
a superb reception, took cognizance of the orders which
they bore, and promised to let the Acadians depart
within the lapse of another year, should they decide
to doso. He permitted them to hold assemblies in order
to make sure of the intentions of the Acadians. All
reiterated the determination to abandon the country.*
Nicholson seemed to agree to everything; but, under
the pretext of referring the matter to the Queen, he fin-
ished by refusing everything. It required a more than
ordinary dose of bad faith to refuse to obey the formal
orders of his sovereign: that is, however, what he did,
and we have the proof of it in the following official doc-
ument, which is an account of the negotiations of
Messrs. de la Ronde and Pinsens with: Nicholson :

‘‘In 1714 Messrs. de la Ronde and Pinsens, captains, were sent to
Acadia to obtain from Mr. Nicholson freedom for the Acadians to
withdraw with their cattle and grain to le Royale.”’

‘*Mr. Nicholson permitted these officers to assemble the inhabit-
ants in order to know their intentions. They all declared that they
wanted to return to their lawful sovereign.

‘* Mr. Nicholson was asked to allow these inhabitants, conformably
to Art. XIV. of the treaty of peace, the space of a year to remain
on their land unmolested ;

‘That they might be allowed, during this time, to transport their
grain and cattle, to construct ships for the transportation of their
goods, and to receive from France the rigging and complete outfit for
_ those which would be built at Port Royal or elsewhere.

** These two articles were sent back for the decision -of the Queen.

* The Governor of Acadia, Mascarene, writing to Shirley, Governor of Mas-
sachusetts, April 6, 1748, said: “‘M. Nicholson came over as Governor,
and proposed to the Acadians the terms agreed on for them at the treaty,
which were to keep their possessions, etc., ete., or to dispose of them, if
they chose to withdraw within the space of a twelvemonth. They, to
@ man, chose the last.”

THE ACADIANS DEPARTURE OPPOSED. — 8d

‘* They asked also that they might be allowed to sell their property
or to leave therefor letters of attorney.

“This article was answered: ‘ Remitted to the Queen,’ more-
over referred to her letter which is to be a sure guarantee therefor.

‘Mr. Nicholson promised, besides, a prompt dispatch of all these
articles, but since that time there has been no reply about this mat-
ter.’’—(Conseil de Marine, March 28th, 1716.)

This official document is confirmed by several others ;
but I will give only the following, because it contains
other important facts. It is addressed by the com-
mander of Louisburg to the minister, and dated August
29,1714, that is, immediately after the return of Messrs.
de la Ronde and Pinsens:

** June 13th I had Mr. de la Ronde leave for Port Royal. I send
your Highness the copy of the letter that I wrote to Mr. Nicholson
and of the instructions that I gave to Mr. de la Ronde. J confided
to him the orders of the Queen in English and French.

‘* Your Highness tells me that you are procuring for them the rig-
ging that I had requested ; but it will come late : before they receive
it, the season will be already advanced. The Acadians had written
toe Boston to have some; Mr. Nicholson forbade it, and even seized the
ships and boats that they had built.

‘** They appeared decided not to leave their country before having re-
ecived Mr. Nicholsows decision. It is known he will do all in his
power to retain them ; they have even already twice held a@ council
with -the view of leaving Port Royal.”

Nicholson, who had just arrived, had probably not
had time to realize the dreadful consequences resulting
to the country from the departure of the Acadians.
That is why, at first, when he took cognizance of the
orders of the Queen, he promised to obey them and not
to oppose the departure of the Acadians; but, when he
was informed by his officers of the disastrous conse-
quences of this departure, he bethought himself, in
order to gain time, to refer the question to the Queen, to

86 THE ACADIANS DEPARTURE OPPOSED.

refer to her what she ordered him to do, to remit to her
decision the clear and formal clauses of a treaty. The
subterfuge was a gross one, but he had no others at
command just then.

Unfortunately for the Acadians the Queen died a few
days after August 1st, 1714; else it is probable that, in
spite of the consequences, she would have made it a
point of honor to have her decisions respected. Numer-
ous communications were successively addressed to the
Lords of Trade to represent to them in sombre colors
the many inconveniences resulting from the departure
of the Acadians, if it were not prevented ; and that is
why the questions referred to the Queen by Nicholson
were never settled in either sense; that is why for a
long time the Acadians were kept under the impression
that the questions submitted were still being considered
by the authorities, when, in reality, these latter were
perfectly determined to put all possible obstacles in the
way of their departure. In their child-like belief that
justice gave rights, that treaties were sacred, that honor
was the basis and support of governments, the Acadians
waited long for this reply, which they were always told
was under consideration ; but they waited in vain. They
felt so certain that justice would be shown them, and
that their departure could. be effected in the course of
the following summer (1715), that many did not even
sow their lands in the spring.

M. de Costabelle, in a letter to the minister, dated
Sept. 9th, 1715, informs him, “that the Acadians of
Mines had not sown their lands that year, that they had
grain to live upon for two years, and had kept them-
selves ready to abandon the country.” *

*“Father Dominic on his return presented him (M. de Costabelle) a

THE ACADIANS’ DEPARTURE OPPOSED. 87

It is clearly apparent by the documents which I have
produced, all of an official nature, and by some others
also which I have seen, that, in the autumn of 1713,
only afew months after the signing of the treaty of
peace, the Acadians announced to Lieutenant-Governor
Vetch their intention to leave the country ; that from
that moment they prepared for their departure, but
were prevented by Vetch under the pretext that they
had to await the arrival of Governor Nicholson; that
the latter, without regard for the conditions of the treaty
and the formal orders of the Queen transmitted to him
by M. de la Ronde, and without any other motive but
to gain time and deprive the Acadians of the rights
granted to them by the treaty, referred their request to
the Queen; that, subsequently, after having refused to
transport the Acadians in English vessels, he also re-
fused to French vessels entry into the ports of Acadia;
that their determination to leave the country was such
that they built vessels themselves ; that, wishing to pro-
cure at Louisburg rigging to equip them, they were re-

memoir, from which it appears that the Acadians were determined fo
abandon all in order to leave the country ; that most of them did not wish
to sow their lands in hopes of retiring in the spring. That several had
built ships for the transport of their families and their effects.” ( Conseil
de la Marine, 28 mars, 1716).

“ The English are doing all they can to retain the Acadians, not only by
avoiding useless unpleasantness, but also by refusing them the things neces-
sary for their passage, and by making them understand that they will not

it them to dispose of their immovable goods nor of their cattle, that
nothing but a few provisions would be left to them.” (Letter of Intendant
Bégon, Quebec, Sept. 25, 1715.)

“In his letter of Nov. 6th, 1715, he (M. de Costabelle) says that he
spoke to Mr. Capon, sent by the governor of Port Royal, of the hard and
unjust way in which Mr. Nicholson had treated the Acadians, altogether
contrary to theorders of Queen Anne and to the word he had given to
Messrs. de la Ronde and Pinsens.

‘“Mr. Capon agreed that Nicholson’s conduct had not been approved by
any Officer of his nation, but that Vetch, the lieutenant-governor, could
change nothing without new orders from the king of England; and thus all
further movements for the free departure of the Acadians are suspended
until more ample decision be given thereon by the two crowns.”

88 THE ACADIANS’ DEPARTURE OPPOSED.

fused permission ; that, having applied to Boston for
the same object, they again met with a refusal, aor
moreover their vessels were seized.

Nothing of what precedes is found in the volume of
the archives; it is possible the Compiler was unac-
quainted with some of these facts, and that, in spite of
their importance, he may thus escape censure. His
mission, as imposed upon him by the legislature, was
restricted to the duty of collecting materials in Halifax
and London and those of the Archives de la Marine
that were likely to be found in Quebec. But, among
the documents I have cited are: (1) a letter of Costabelle
to Nicholson, (2) the orders of Queen Anne, of which
Mr. de la Ronde was bearer, transmitted to Nicholson, (3)
the account of their proceedings, all of which must have
been in the archives of Halifax ; and, nevertheless, in
spite of their extreme importance, they are not in the
volume of the archives. However, the number of im-
portant documents omitted, all having the same general
drift, is so considerable that I am perhaps wrong in
directing attention to such a comparative trifle as the
non-appearance of three documents. He was not, how-
ever, ignorant. of this question of the obstacles put to
the departure of the Acadians: for, as it will be seen,
there are many other documents of the same kind with
which he was acquainted. The question seems to have
made him somewhat uneasy; for on page 2605 of his
volume, when the events he was then considering
referred to the transportation of 1755, he has the fol-
lowing note, relying on a declaration of Governor Mas-
carene :

-* Governor Nicholson eame to Annapolis in 1714, and then pro-
posed to the Acadians the terms agreed on for them, which were, to

oe ae

THE ACADIANS’ DEPARTURE OPPOSED. 89

keep their lands on their becoming subjects of the British Crown, or
to dispose of their property and withdraw from the country, if they
chose, within one year. They all chose the latter, and prepared to
leave the country; but the vessels promised them from Cape Breton
for the purpose of their removal not being sent, they were compelled
to remain.” :

In the foregoing very little is exact, but the Com-
piler offers us a new proof of an outrage which the
documents already cited point out. Thus the Aca-
dians, according to the Compiler, if we understand him
rightly, would not have had the privilege that the
treaty clearly gave. them; namely: to transport their
goods, their cattle, etc., etc.; but only to dispose of
them before their departure. Now, as they were the
only inhabitants of the country, the reducing of their
right to transport their cattle and effects to a mere per-
mission to dispose of them would have been illusory and
anew imposture. But, says he, they were not able to
depart, because the vessels promised from the island of
Cape Breton did not come. x

There is not a word anywhere to sustain the Com-
piler’s assertion. Can it be supposed that the French,
who had so much interest in this transmigration, would
have neglected to send them vessels for that object?
Such a supposition is absurd. But, then, why were the
Acadians prevented from setting out in their own ships
and procuring their equipment at Louisburg and even at
Boston? Clearly, this building of boats to quit the
country was butethe outcome of a prohibition to leave it in
French or English ships.

The absurdity of the Compiler’s pretension would be
alone sufficient to justify us in rejecting it with contempt.
‘This strange pretension having never been given out in
1714 or 1715 or even afterwards, one cannot expect to

>

90 THE ACADIANS’ DEPARTURE OPPOSED.

find it contradicted or disputed; however, we have it
incidentally contradicted in a very explicit manner in
two documents; here is one of them:

** The absolute refusal which the English governors have always
made, to permit even the King’s vessels to come to Acadia in order
to transport those who desired to depart, or to lend rigging for the
ships which the Acadians had built and which they were obliged to
sell to the English ; the prohibition imposed on them of transporting
with them any live stock or provisions of grain ; the grief of abandon-
ing the hereditary estates of their fathers, their own work and their
children’s, without any reimbursement or compensation ; all these
infringements are the principal reasons of the inaction in which they
have remained.’’—(Conseil de la Marine, year 1719, vol. iv. folio 96),

The other document is from Mr. de Brouillan, goy-
ernor of Louisburg, and is not less explicit.* (Archives
de la Marine, vol. III., fol. 180).

Moreover, as we have seen elsewhere, Nicholson
had referred the question of the departure of the Aca-
dians to the Queen, and this never-to-be-settled reference
is most likely the pretext afterwards used by the
Governors to prevent the Acadians from departing in
any kind of ships, English or French, or of their own
make. This is strengthened by the fact that, onthe Tth
of November following said reference (1714), Mr. de
Pontchartrain, Minister of Marine, sent the French Min-
ister at London a copy of the report of Messrs. de la
Ronde and Pinsens, with instructions to hasten the so-
lution of the questions referred by Nicholson. The only
action ever taken upon it was the submitting of the
question to the Lords of Trade by the Secretary of State,
Lord Townshend. |

** The Acadians, says Haliburton, alleged that they had been detained
contrary to their desire, that they had been refused leave to depart in
English-built vessels, and that, upon making application to embark on
board of French ships, they were informed that such vessels could not, con-
sistently with the navigation luws, be allowed to enter a colonial harbor.”

NICHOLSON AND VETCH. 91

The Compiler has not a word about this reference to the
Queen, but if he can reasonably pretend that it was not
possible for him to know most of the documents I have
cited, because they were not found in the archives of
Halifax, London or Quebec, this cannot be the case for
those which I am here about to offer to the reader :—

COLONEL VETCH TO THE BOARD OF TRADE.
** Mar. 9th, 1715.

$ My Lorps :—‘‘ I could not but judgeit my duty out of a trew con-
cern for the publick good : to put Your Lordships in mind of the cir-
cumstances of the country, the Acadians being in a manner obliged
to leave the country by the treatment they received trom Mr. Nich-
olson while Governor there ; as will be made appear to Your Lord-
ships by the affidavits of some persons lately come from thence * : to
which I humbly pray Your Lordships to be refered : what I am now
to intimate to Your Lordships is, that as the season of the year now
advances, unless some speedy orders are sent to prevent the Acadians’
removal with their cattle and effects to Cape Brittoun as it will
wholly strip and Ruine Nova Scotia, so it will attonce make Cape
Brittoun a populous and well stocked Colony, which many years and
great expense could not have done directly from France as I already
observed in a former paper.’

It has been seen that, according to the Compiler,
Nicholson, at the end of July, 1714, had given a year to
the Acadians to retire. The above letter is dated
March 9th, 1715, eight months after this promise. If
such were the case, what became of the promise, when
Vetch thus begged for prompt orders to prevent their
departure—* werd y orders to prevent their removal ?”
And Vetch only repeated what he had already said in a
letter of November 24th preceding.

The following letters throw more light on the situa-

*Vetch had then been in London since the preceding September or
October.

92 ; NICHOLSON AND VETCH.

tion. We reproduce them, like the foregoing letter, in
their original spelling : :

COLONEL VETCH TO BOARD OF TRADE.

i

‘* LONDON, Sept. 2d, 1715.

‘“M. Nicholson’s discourageing, or rather discharging all Trade
there to the Acadians, and causing keep the gates of the Fort shutt
against them night and day, that they may have no manner of com-
merce with the Garrison, and having by Proclamation discharged
their harbouring or resetting any of the natives, with whom they
used to have a considerable Trade for Peltry, hath so discouraged
them from staying that they had built abundance of small vessels to
carry themselves and effects to Cape Brittoun, which was what the
French officers so much sollicited.”’

Vetch carefully abstains from mentioning the reason
that prevented the Acadians from leaving in the numer-
ous ships that they had built, but one would easily
guess it, if one did not know it already through many
other channels.

COLONEL VETCH TO BOARD OF TRADE.

‘* LONDON, February 21st, 1716.

** As to the Acadians,by what I can learn, there is not many of them
removed notwithstanding the discouragements they mett withal some
time ago, and will, no doubt, gladly remain upon their plantations—
some of which are considerable—providing they may be protected by
the Crown, and, as no country is of value without inhabitants, so,
the removal of them and their cattle to Cape Brittoun would be a
great addition to that new colony, so it would wholly ruine Nova
Scotia unless supplyed by a British Colony, which could not be done
in several years, so that the Acadians with their stocks of cattle re-
maining there is very much for the advantage of the Crown.”

LIEUT.-GOVERNOR CAULFIELD TO CoL. VETCH.

‘* ANNAPOLIS ROYALL, 2d Vor., 1715.
““T am but too senceable of Colonel Nickolson’s unpresedented
malice, and, had his designs taken their desired effect, I am per-
swaded there had not been att this time an inhabitant of any kind in
the country, nor, indeed, a garrison: when I recollect his declara-
tion to the Acadians and afterwards to the soldiers, wherein he told

NICHOLSON AND VETCH. 93.

the latter that the french were all rebells, and would certainly cut
their throats if they went into their houses, telling of us that we must
have no manner of correspondance with them, and ordered the gates
of the garrison to be shut, tho’ att the same time he was senciable
that we could not subsist the ensueing winter, but by their mains,
there beeing no other prospects left to us . . . If the whole seine of his
administration here was plainly laid downe, itt would be very diffi-
eult to find one instance of all his proceedings, whereby the garrison
or colonny could receive the least benefit.”’

ADAMS TO CAPTAIN STEELE.

** 24th January, 1715.

...» ‘*Wewerein hopes here upon General Nicholson’s arrival, he
would settle the place on a good footing, but on the contrary, put us
‘in the greatest confusion, pull’d down the fforts, Drove away the
Acadians, and carried away all the English he cou’d, that the place is
now desolate. In short, if his commission had been to destroy the
country, he could not have discharg’d his trust to better purpose than
he did, he employed all his time here in pursuing his implacable
malice against Governor Vetch, when in truth he did the English in-
terest in this country more damage in the two months he was here
than Govr Vetch cou’d have done in all his life, if he had been as bad
as he would fain make the world believe he was, he used to curse and
damm Gov. Vetch and all his friends. There is not one soul in the
place, french or english—save 2—but hate and abhor his name.”’

We have likewise, with the same import,a letter of
Captain Armstrong who became later on Lieutenant-
Governor of the Province. :

In our first chapter we reproduced a letter of the
Acadians to Mr. de Vaudreuil, in which they complained
of being treated as negroes by Governor Vetch. If
such were the case, and it is difficult to doubt it, one
must not be astonished at the efforts they made to leave
the country, nor at the subterfuges invented to deter
them from doing so.

_ There was, evidently, great animosity between Nich-
olson and Vetch, and, what is almost as evident, it had
its source in covetousness. It seems that Vetch, who

94 NICHOLSON AND VETCH.

was then in London, sought to supplant Nicholson, by
alleging the testimonies of the principal officers of
Annapolis, testimonies which he. transmitted to the
Lords of Trade. At the same time, he sought to prove
to them that he understood better than Nicholson the
interests of the country, and that he was the man needed
in the circumstances. It would be curious to know the
counter-accusations of Nicholson; for he could not toler-
ate such an attack without a rejoinder most injurious to
Vetch’s reputation, and solid reasons were not wanting
to him, for Vetch underwent a trial in 1706 before the
legislature of Massachusetts, with the result that he was
condemned to pay £200 “ for having supplied the French
with ammunition and stores of war.” Judging the
quarrel by its results, we have reason to think that both
succumbed in one common defeat, because for both the
career of honors seems to have terminated there; Vetch
obtained nothing, and Nicholson lost his position two
years later. As it often happens on these occasions, both
succeeded in proving that they were equally unworthy.

We are better acquainted with the accusations laid
against Nicholson, and, even should allowance be made
for exaggeration, this allowance cannot be considerable,
since the accusations rest on the testimony of three per-
sons who were regularly appointed lieutenant-governors
of Nova Scotia, namely: Vetch, Caulfield, Armstrong,
and on the testimony of Adams, who, in 1739, was for
some time administrator of the province. Without this
quarrel, without this rivalry we should know nothing of
the character and conduct of Nicholson and Vetch; were
we to trust the Compiler, we should think ourselves in
the presence of irreproachable men to whose memory
posterity should raise statues.

NICHOLSON AND VETCH. 95

What is to be thought of the Compiler who has
emitted these documents? Were they unimportant
or too inconveniently important ? Was he, or could he
be ignorant of them? Certainly not, since they are all in
the Colonial Records in London (Nova Scotia section),
where the Compiler was charged to procure copies of
all the documents that interested the province. They are
to be found in volumes I. and IL. alongside of those very
documents which he procured and which we find in his
own compilation. What could be more interesting for
history than documents such as these, which, apart from
their importance arising from the publicity of the facts ©
they contain, offer us a rare opportunity of judging the
character, the temperament and the motives of the per-
sons who figure in them so conspicuously? Mr. Akins
is not only a compiler, he is at the same time a biogra-
pher. He has inserted in his volume numerous notes, in
which he gives us his appreciation of the personages who
played any part in these events; but, invariably, when
there is question of a governor or any man that had
relations with the Acadians, he is suave and eulogistic
with regard to them. Yet here was an excellent oppor-
tunity to give his judgment on Nicholson, in which the
virtues he might have would be judiciously coupled
with his faults, so as to show forth the most salient
traits of his character. This study was easy, thanks to
the well-grounded opinions of four lieutenant-governotrs ;
performed with intelligence and impartiality, it would
have powerfully assisted the reader to pass an enlight-
ened judgment on the whole course of events.

The letters quoted above are important from another
_ and not less striking point of view. They explain the
deep interest the governors had in preventing the emi-

96 NICHOLSON AND VETCH,

gration of the Acadians. As Vetch says, this departure
would ruin the country ; and, though eight months had
not yet elapsed since Nicholson had decided in presence
of Messrs. de la Ronde and Pinsens to refer this question
of the departure to the Queen, he does not hesitate to
ask the Lords of Trade for permission to prevent their
departure: “ Unless some speedy orders are sent to pre-
vent the Acadians’ removal with their cattle and effects to
Cape Breton, as itwill wholly strip and ruin Nova Scotia,
so it will at once make Cape Breton a popular and well-
stocked colony.’ And, as he says elsewhere, ‘ They
had built abundance of small vessels to carry themselves
and effects to Cape Breton.” He is careful not to say
that he had prevented them from leaving in those same
vessels; but the conclusion is self-evident. It is easy to
see that fraud and force had much more weight in his
mind than justiceand right. In aman who a few years
before had, through greed of gain, “ supplied the French
with ammunition and stores of war,” and had been con-
demned for this act, this is not surprising. Besides, it
was not otherwise with his successors.

Another not less grave reason against the departure
of the’ Acadians is, that the Indians of Acadia and of
all that forms to-day Maine and the maritime provinces |
were, from time immemorial, sworn enemies of the
English. This departure would have left Nova Scotia
without an inhabitant, and in the impossibility of peo-
pling it with colonists, who would have been daily
exposed to be massacred by these Indians. Possession of
the country would have become useless; and, if the
English had persisted in keeping a fort and garrison
there, this latter would have been provisioned only at
great expense. Such was the perplexing situation of

NICHOLSON AND VETCH. OT

the governors and of the Home Government. All the
communications exchanged between these two make us
clearly see that the situation was thus understood, and
all the obstacles accumulated to hinder the departure of
the Acadians have never had any other motives than
the various interests which have been brought to light
in the preceding documents. Anent this last motive—
fear of the Indians—I will cite one letter, from Lieu-
tenant-Governor Caulfield to the Lords of Trade, not
because it stands alone, but on account of its being more
explicit than others:

‘*T have always observed, since my coming here, the forwardness
of the Acadians to serve us when occasion offered.’’ [This is aston-
ishing, after their harsh treatment and the trickery resorted to by
Nicholson and Vetch]. ‘*And if some English inhabitants were sent
over, especially industrious laborers, tar and pitch makers, carpenters
and smiths, it would be of great advantage to this colony ; but in
case ye Acadians quit us, we shall never be able to maintain or pro-
tect our English family’s from ye insults of ye Indians, ye worst
enemies, weh ye Acadians by their staying will in a great measure
ward off for their own sakes. Your Lordships will see by ye stock of
eattell they have at this time that in two or three years, with due
encouragement, we may be furnished with everything within our-
selves.” *

_ And elsewhere, in the correspondence of the governors: ‘‘ As the
accession of such a number of Acadians to Cape Bretton, will make
it at once a very populous Colony ; so it is to be considered, one
hundred of the Acadians, who were born upon that continent, and
are perfectly known in the woods ; can march upon snow-shoes, and
understand the use of birch canoes, are of more value and service
than five times their number of raw men newly come from Europe.
So their skill in the fishery, as well as the cultivating of the soil, must

make at once of Cape Bretton the most powerful Colony the French
have in America, and of the greatest danger and damage to all the
British Colonies as well as the universal trade of Great Britain.’’

*Stated by Vetch to be about 5,000 black Sesbans, besides a great number
of a and hogs.

98 NICHOLSON AND VETCH.

With what we know of human nature, with the
teachings of history in general, and particularly of this
history, no one, taking into account the grave interests
that the departure of the Acadians compromised, will
doubt the obstacles of every kind opposed to this
departure. Even without proofs the presumptions
would be of great weight; but, when the fact is sus-
tained, without contradiction, at least without explicit
contradiction, by a mass of official documents, it becomes
a certainty of: the first order, which remains fixed in
history as a question withdrawn from debate, in spite of
the compiler, in spite of those who, like Parkman, have
accepted without further investigation his biassed and
ill-matured assertions.

THE OATH REQUIRED. 99

CHAPTER IV.

Lieutenant-Governor Caulfield—He sends Peter Capoon and
Thomas Button to have the Acadians take the oath of alle-
giance—Answers of the Acadians—Omissions of the Compiler—
Lieutenant-Governor John Doucette—New injunction to take
the oath—They consent to remain in the country on certain
conditions with regard to the oath—Other omissions.

WirH this. chapter we enter at last into the volume of
the Archives. )

It will be admitted that the two chapters immediately
preceding are not wanting in significance. The sequel
will show that the events of these five years have in
themselves alone more real importance than those of the
fifteen succeeding years. In fact, subsequent events
are so connected with those we have just sketched, that,
_ without them, they become unintelligible or assume a

‘different significance.

- While waiting till the course of our narrative has
made the learned methods of the Compiler familiar, I -
will leave the reader to his own reflections upon the
possible motives of these strange omissions. And, if
now and then indignation suggests expressions that
may seem severe, I beg pardon for the moment, until
this pardon I now solicit shall become complete and shall
be spontaneously offered by whosoever bears with me to
the end.

The Compiler makes us begin at the second act of the
drama. As the curtain rises, we perceive Lieutenant-

Governor Caulfield, successor to Vetch, Hobby, and

100 THE OATH REQUIRED.

Nicholson, the fourth on the list, in the year 1715,
ordering Messrs. Peter Capoon and Thomas Button,
officers of the garrison, to betake themselves to Mines,
to Beaubassin, to Penobscot, to River St. John and to
other places :

** Directing that His Most Sacred Majesty, George, King of Great
Britain, France and Ireland, be proclaimed in all parts of his Govern-
ment. You are likewise to tender the oaths of allegiance to ye
Acadians in ye form prescribed.”

On the 15th of the following May, Caulfield ac-
quaints the Lords of Trade with the result of the mis-
sion of Peter Capoon and Thomas Button.

“* Here inclosed are the transactions of M. M. Button and Capoon,
by which you will find that ye inhabitants, beeing most of them
-French, refused the oath, having, as I am informed, refused to quit
the collonny intirely and to settle under ye french government, and I
humblie desire to be informed how I shall behave tothem .... The
Acadians who always maintained this garrison with corn, are most
of them quitting the collonny, specially at Mines.

“ How is this ?” must the intelligent reader of the com-
piler’s extracts say, he who knows nothing of what hap-
pened between 1710 and 1715: “It is now five years
since the taking of Port Royal and two years since the
treaty of peace, and those Acadians are still in the
country, they refuse to take the oath of allegiance and
even to go away? Why, the governors must have been
very good and very paternal not to have constrained them
by force to either alternative ?”

That is indeed what the reader must have said to
himself in good faith, since historians, who have writ-
ten since the compilation of this volume, have said sub-
stantially the same thing. The Compiler knew well
that he was constructing thereby an arsenal where men

THE OATH REQUIRED. | 101

would come for arms without taking the trouble to look
any farther. He knew well that most of those who
write history, even when they have aptitude for it,
which sometimes they have not, have seldom the patience
to meditate, compare, observe and penetrate. He knew
well that many of them follow one another in a row to
fall into thesamerut. There were, however, very simple
questions to be asked here, such as these: ‘* What had
happened since 1710? Why does the Compiler begin
his volume with the year 1715? Why are not the pro-
posed formula for the oath, the replies of the Acadians
and the report of Capoon and Button in the volume of
the Archives? Why does Caulfield seem to desire and
to have ordered the departure of the Acadians, though
in a subsequent letter he says that their departure would
be the ruin of the country? Why does the Compiler
almost always omit the replies of the Acadians? The
documents from them are rare enough to have made it
a bounden duty for him eagerly to grant them a place
in his volume as well in justice to them as in order to
permit us to pass an enlightened judgment on the
events that depend thereon. He was not unaware of
these replies, since the very letter of Caulfield to the
Lords of Trade, which we have just quoted, refers to it:
“ Herein enclosed are the transactions of Messrs. Button
and Capoon.” |

Iam going to supply in part the omissions of the
Compiler. In the Colonial Records, N. S., Vol I., we
find, just alongside the documents produced in the
archives, the formula of the oath proposed by Caulfield
and the replies of the Acadians.

*“*T, A. B., sincerely promise and swear that I will be faithful and
maintain a true allegiance with His Majesty, King George.”’

102 THE OATH REQUIRED.

Reply of the Acadians of pues to Messrs. Capoon
and Button :

** To answer what you have done us the honor publicly to announce
to us last Wednesday, and for replying to which we begged you give
us till last Sunday, in which time we have not been able to accomplish
what we had promised, seeing that several learn nothing from writings
but only viva voce, and, not even knowing exactly of what there was
question, returned home without giving any answer.

‘* We have the honor to signify to you, that no one can be more
thankful than we are for the kindness that King George, whom we
recognize as the lawful sovereign of Great Britain, so graciously shows
us, under whose rule it will be for us a real joy to remain, as he is
such a good prince, if we had not since last summer, made engage-
ments to return under the rule of the King of France, having even
given our signatures to the officer sent in his name (M. de la Ronde),
contrary to which we cannot act, until Their two Majesties of France
and England have disposed of us otherwise. However, we bind our-
selves with pleasure and gratefulness, while we remain here in
Acadia, todo or undertake nothing against His Britannic Majesty,
King George, of whose proclamation to the crown we are witnesses,
which was made by you, sirs, in presence of the inhabitants of the
said places, at Mines, this 12th of March 1715, we, the undersigned,
acting and being authorized by all the inhabitants to act according
to the power of attorney which they have given us.

(Signed) Jacques Le Blane, Antoine Le Blanc, Charles Babin,
Jassemin, Philippe Melancon, Claude Landry, Pierre Terriot, René
Le Blanc, Pierre Richard, Jacques Le Blanc, Francois Rimbaut,
Germain Terriau, Jean Le Blanc, Martin Aucoin, etc., etc.”’

We have also the reply of the Acadians of Beaubassin ;
its purport is exactly the same; it is signed by Michel
Poirier, Martin Richard, Michel Bourg, Charles Bour-
geois, Frangois Doucet, Jean Cyr, Alexis Cormier, as
arbiters for the whole population.

Those of Port Royal seem to have acted otherwise.
Instead of refusing the oath presented to them, they

proposed another formula as follows :—
“*T sincerely promise and swear that I will be faithful and main-
tain a true allegiance to His Majesty, King George, as long as I shall

THE OATH REQUIRED. 103

be in Acadia or Nova Scotia: and [I stipulate] that I shall be per-
mitted to withdraw wheresoever I shall think fit with all my mov-
able goods and effects, when I shall think fit, without any one being
able to hinder me.”’ 2

It is signed by thirty-six names, twenty of which are
marked with crosses, and appears to have been accepted
by Caulfield. ,

Without being very explicit, these documents hint at
many things. One sees clearly that French delegates
had some months previous conferred with Governor
Nicholson; that the question of the departure of the
Acadians had been referred to the Queen, and that the
oath offered them could not be taken into consideration
before this decision. The publishing of these documents
would have been a key to guide the reader in researches
which would have revealed what we have set forth else-
where, and what the volume of the archives concealed
from view. :

Thus, these documents confirm anew on certain points
those which I have produced, and overthrow the vague
insinuation of Caulfield, when he says: “having, as I
am informed, refused to quit this colony entirely and to
settle under the French government.” He seems to
wish to insinuate thereby that he gave orders to the
Acadians to take the oath or to leave, and thus he mis-
represents their situation to the Lords of Trade. His in-
structions to Capoon and Button show nothing of the
kind ; the replies of the inhabitants prove the contrary ;
and a subsequent letter to the Lords of Trade shows
that he considered the departure of the Acadians as a
calamity. It is therefore ridiculous to suppose that he
gave such orders and received such replies. Moreover,
we have seen by several documents that the greater

104 THE OATH REQUIRED.
”

number of the Acadians, in this year 1715, did not even
sow their lands, so truly did they expect to leave in the
course of the summer. And, if he had given such
orders, he would be so much the more culpable, since he
knew that, a few months before, this question of the
departure had been referred by Nicholson to the decision
of the Queen, and that the reply had not yet been given.

The only means of reconciling his insinuation with
possible facts would be to attribute such a reply, I mean
the refusal to depart, to some inhabitants of Penobscot
or of the St. John River, where the Messrs. Capoon and
Button likewise betook themselves to have the oath
taken. These were upon a territory that France
claimed ; whence their declaration that they would not
leave the country. This is the only possible interpreta-
tion that I see, otherwise his assertion, “ that most of them
are quitting the collonny” would be contradictory and
absurd.

In May of dis following year Caulfield writes to the
Lords of Trade: “I received a letter from ye Acadians
of Mines of their resolution to continue in this govern-
ment, and are making all preparations for improvements
as formerly, and they seem impatient to hear what is
determined on their behalf.” *

This letter might seem contradictory; but as the last
part shows us that the Acadians were impatient to know
the decision respecting the questions submitted to the
Queen by Nicholson, it must be inferred that they were
always determined to depart as soon as this reply would
be known and the means afforded them for departing ;
else, why would they have been impatient for a reply
which was to decide their departure, if their intention

* This letter is omitted in the volume of the Archives.

A RESERVE TO THE OATH WANTED. 105

was to remain inany case? ‘The first part, then, means
that they agreed to prolong their sojourn till after the
harvest (they had not sown the preceding year).

In the ensuing October (1716), writing to the Lords
of Trade, he informs them that he has proposed the oath
to the Acadians and sends them their replies.* We infer
therefrom that they reiterated their determination to
leave the country, for he adds: “at the same time Iam
persuaded it will be with reluctancy they leave the coun-
try.”

Caulfield was replaced as Lieutenant-Governor by
John Doucette (1717). Addressing first the inhabit-
ants of Annapolis, the latter severely enjoined them to
take the oath according to the formula which he com-
municated to them. Tired of waiting in vain for a
response to the questions submitted to the Queen by
Nicholson, despairing of ever obtaining the facilities
necessary to their transmigration, they answered that
they all desired to come to a common decision, and for
that purpose it was advisable to have all the inhabitants
of the other localities assembled at the same time:

‘*For the present we can only answer, that we shall be ready to
carry into effect thedemand proposed to us, as soon as His Majesty
shall have done us the favor of providing some means of sheltering us
from the Indians, who are always ready to do all kinds of mischief,
proofs of which have been afforded on many occasions since the peace.

‘¢ That unless we are protected from them, we cannot take the oath
demanded without exposing ourselves to have our throats cut in our
houses at any time, which they have already threatened to do.

‘* In case other means cannot be found, we are ready to take an
oath that we will take up arms neither against His Britannic Majesty
nor against France, nor against any of their subjects or allies.”

Up to that time the Acadians had refused to accept
any oath that tied them to the country; they wished to

* Docyments omitted in the volume of the Archives.

106 A RESERVE TO THE OATH WANTED.

depart and had been waiting to be enabled to do so.
From that moment they no longer refused this oath,
provided a clause were inserted exempting them from
bearing arms against the French or Indians, their allies.

The situation presents no difficulties. Either they
must be allowed to leave with their goods and cattle, as
signified by the treaty and the letter of the Queen, and
obstacles must be removed and the assistance requisite
for their transmigration granted them, or the conditions
they imposed on their sojourn in the country must be
accepted. It might have been disagreeable to have con-
ditions imposed by poor peasants; but either this must
be endured or the inconveniences which their departure
entailed, at least if justice should regulate the relations
between the high and the low, between the weak and
the strong. Their conditions were certainly not friv-
olous. The only enemy that England.had to combat in
these places was France. Without the acceptance of
this condition they could be obliged to take up arms
against their compatriots and. still worse against their
brethren, their relations who resided on the north side
of the Bay of Fundy at River St. John, Chipody, Peti-
codiac; Memramcook and even at Beaubassin on a
territory which, it is true, was disputed, but which might
eventually be adjudged to France by the commission
appointed to decide thereon. |

Nothing was more reasonable than the exemption
which they claimed, especially when they were deprived
of the right of going away; and those who treat their
claim as frivolous have evidently never sounded their in-
most hearts to see what would be their sentiments in a
similar situation. Later on we shall find that the Ameri-
can colonists, who established themselves in 1760 on the

A RESERVE TO THE OATH WANTED. 107

lands of the Acadians, were exempted from bearing
arms against their brethren of New England at the time
of the war of independence; but in that case it was
deemed quite natural to grant them this exemption. Not
without heart-rending grief had the Acadians resolved
to leave their country, their property, these abodes of
their childhood bedewed by the sweat of several genera-
tions. Oh! assuredly, they would have preferred by far
to remain ; but in those days of prejudice, intolerance and
absolutism, they feared the caprice of their governors,
they feared that, sooner or later, obstacles would be
raised to the free exercise of their religion. Will it
be said that their fears were not reasonable, seeing that
for three years they had been retained by force in violation
of a treaty, at a time when England had not yet emerged
from the most intolerant period of her history? They
might perhaps run these risks, but, at least, they did not
wish to have to combat their fellow-countrymen and
their brethren ; they wished to put themselves in a
position to be able at any time to quit the country, if
the conditions imposed by them should be violated.
Upon sufficient reflection we shall find that the senti-
ments that actuated them arose from the noblest of
motives. ‘This persistency in refusing during forty years
any oath that exposed them to be obliged to combat
their compatriots, does an honor to them of which their
descendants may rightly be proud. Parkman could
carelessly assert that they were “weak of purpose ;”
but when there was question of contravening the ele-
mentary dictates of human nature, or of conscience,
then this firmness energetically faced consequences from
which men of our civilized time and probably Parkman
himself would shrink. :

108 A RESERVE TO THE OATH WANTED.

It was stilleasier for England to grant their demands,
as was done in 1730, than for the Acadians not to make
them. In their simplicity, they thought perhaps that in
these proposals they had found a very acceptable middle
term, which, while allaying their apprehensions, would
permit them to preserve their property and their father-
land. It was a proposal that could be considered, dis-
cussed and met by another proposal. Could not the local
authorities effect a compromise? could they not make al-
lowance for such justifiable repugnance, for the obstacles
opposed to the execution of a right so evident as was
that of their departure ? could they not, I ask, limit this
exemption of bearing arms to a definite length of time ?
But no; no concession! ‘ We are the authority, and
we do not treat with privateindividuals. You shall not
depart, and you must take the oath without reserve, you
must depend on our good pleasure.”

Moreover, if they felt no such natural repugnance to
fighting the Indians as they felt to fighting their own
countrymen, their own safety led them to shun all
hostility to the savage. We have seen that Vetch and
Caulfield were of opinion that there would be no security
for English colonists to settle in the country on account
of the hostility of the Indians. Wouldit have been other-
wise with the Acadians, if they had been forced to take
up arms against the Indians? There were certainly be-
tween them friendly ties which dated far back ; but what
would these ties have availed under these new circum-
stances? Does not our friend or ally of to-day become
our enemy to-morrow, if he fights against us? And
in that event, what greater security could they have
enjoyed than the English colonists? In view of their
security the objection to bear arms against the Indians

A RESERVE TO THE OATH WANTED. 109

was much more serious than the objection to bear them
against the French. What did they» really demand,
when answering the summons to take the oath? Noth-
ing more than this reasonable agreement: “ Find
some means to protect us against the Indians, and we
ask no exemption with regard to them, in spite of the
threats which they use against us every day. In de-
fault of this means, we will agree to remain in the coun-
try and take the oath of allegiance, provided we be ex-
empt from any obligation to: bear arms against the
French and the Indians.”

Certain historians speak of the efforts made by French
authorities to prevail on the Acadians to emigrate, as
if, by doing so, they had been guilty of reprehensible
intrigues, unworthy of a great nation. It may be ae-
counted ingenious to get quit of one accusation by an-
other; there are always some people who let themselves
be duped by any subterfuge, however gross it be. That
the French made efforts to engage the Acadians to take
advantage of the clauses of the treaty, is a fact not to
be doubted. That was their right and their interest, as
it was their duty; the Acadians having decided to urge
the English authorities to grant all the facilities re-
quisite for their departure, France was a party to the
treaty, and, in virtue of this, she had the obligation to
protect her former subjects against any violation of those
clauses which were profitable to them; and, if France
is to be blamed, it is for not having urged the matter
with sufficient energy, when the Acadians so earnestly
claimed her support, and when her own interests were
all in favor of it. It has been pretended that France,
under the idea that Acadia might return to her, grad-
ually fought shy of the departure of the Acadians.

110 A RESERVE TO THE OATH WANTED.

That was quite possible; although her indifference to
this departure could only be partial, since, besides the
uncertainty of such an issue as the return to French
dominion, and the fact that the departure of the Acadians
would be the ruin of Nova Scotia, there still remained
a not less urgent interest for France to people her colony
of Cape Breton and Prince Edward Island and to gain
strength for future conflicts.

But, we have not here to consider the interests of
France and England otherwise than as they explain facts.
For the moment, I am examining only the question of
right, and I assert that, for both France and England,
the lawfulness of their efforts to decide the Acadians to
depart or not to depart, was limited to persuasive in-
fluence, and that, while France, perhaps on account of
circumstances, employed only this expedient, the English
authorities used every unlawful means that ruse and force
could suggest. Such is the difference, and it is really
enormous. And yet, we might view all this with a certain
indulgence, if only the English had taken into acconnt
their own unlawful conduct in their subsequent proceed-
ings with regard to the Acadians.

As a question of fact, the idea of departure was or
appears to have been spontaneous on the part of the
Acadians. Port Royal had been in the hands of the
English for only three months, when they averred, in
an address to the Governor of Canada, that Governor
Vetch was treating them as negro slaves, and that they
desired to move into French territory. Immediately
after the treaty of Utrecht, it was still, as far as we can
judge, by a spontaneous movement, that they sent
delegates to Louisburg to treat this same question.

After having given the above response of the Aca-

A RESERVE TO THE OATH WANTED. 111

dians to the summons of Governor Doucette, the Com-
piler plunges us again into darkness by letting us re-
main ignorant of what ensued.

We can here clearly perceive an omission of five
letters, three of which are from the Governor himself
and two replies, one from Abbé Pain, curé des Mines,
the other from Mr. de Brouillan, governor of Cape Bre-
ton.* By the former’s reply we may judge what was
the drift of the latter’s answer.

MINES, 29 March, 1718.

‘“* T have received the letter, with which you honored me, under
date of Dec. 5, 1717. I have the honor to signify to you, sir, that
these Acadians must be sufficiently acquainted with their duties and
obligations without needing my help for what you desire me to do with
regard to them.... Allow me to declare to you, so that you may
have nothing to say against my behavior in this matter, that I am
resolved to give no advice for or against the measure: thus you will
recognize their natural intentions,’’ etc., ete.

FELIX PAIN.

From this reply it appears evident that the Governor
solicited the concurrence of this priest to influence the
Acadians in the direction of an unconditional oath. In
justice we must say that he declares himself satisfied
with this reply, and with the priest’s intention not to
meddle with temporal affairs. We have likewise the
reply of the governor of Cape Breton, and it confirms
all that I have previously said respecting the obstacles
opposed to the departure of the Acadians.

Louisburg, 21 July, 1718.

** Concerning your complaints that the inhabitants of Acadia had
not departed as agreed upon, and that this delay has caused loss to
His Britannic Majesty, you must have known, sir, the impossibility
in which Mr. Nicholson and other rulers of Acadia have put them of
executing what had been agreed upon; some not wishing to let them
carry away their effects, and the others not wishing us to send them

* Colonial Records, N.8., Vol. II.

112 A RESERVE TO THE OATH WANTED.

the rigging to equip the little ships they had built, and which in con-
sequence they were obliged to sell almost for nothing to English mer-
chants. I will not fail to inform the King my master of all you re-
mark to me thereon, so that he may give the orders that he will judge
proper.”’

GOVERNOR PHILIPPS’S ORDERS. 113

CHAPTER V.

Administration of Philipps (1720-1722)—Taking the required oath
of allegiance or departure within four months without carry-
ing away anything—Decision to depart—Disappointment of
Philipps—New omissions of the Compiler—The Acadians
undertake to open a road in order to effectuste their departure
—Philipps orders the suspension of the works—Prolongation
of the delay—Cajoleries to keep back the Acadians—Import-
ant letter of the Secretary of State Craggs—Parkman.

In 1720 General Philipps, who in reality had already
been for almost three years Governor of Nova Scotia,
came to Annapolis to take charge of his province. He
was invested with more ample jurisdiction than his
predecessors, and his high position in the army added
weight and importance to his authority. At first he
dealt very haughtily with the Acadians. Hardly had
he arrived when he issued a proclamation ordering them
to take the oath without reserve or to leave the country
within four months, without being able either to dis-
pose of their goods or to transport them. “It is ex-
_ pressly prohibited to those who will choose to leave the
country to sell, dispose or bring with them any of their
effects.” These conditions were excessively hard. Is
that the reason why the Compiler omits this important
document, this proclamation ?

Thus the temporizing plan invented by Vetch, and
continued by Nicholson and his successors, attained the
decile result. The only fault of the Acadians was

a Fe GOVERNOR PHILIPPS’S ORDERS.

their having let themselves be duped and their having
so meekly awaited a reply, which the rulers took good
care not to give them.

Philipps’s intention was evident. He well knew that,
without means of transport, the Acadians could not de-
part, especially on such short notice. He believed that
they were so attached to their property that his prohi-
bition to carry away anything with them would force
them to accept his terms of the oath without reserve,
and even all the conditions that he would be pleased to
exact. He was, however, deceived. Nevertheless, such
severe orders spread consternation all around ; the agita-
tion was most violent; a prompt decision was imperative.
They replied in substance as follows:* “ We cannot
take the oath which you demand of us, and the question
is still more difficult with regard to the Indians than
to the French, because the former daily threaten us
with revenge if our reservation do not extend to them.
Since you cannot grant us this reservation, there only
remains to us the alternative of retiring from the coun-
try even on the hard conditions you impose, life being
dearer to us than all our goods. As the sowing season
has just elapsed, and there remains hardly any more
grain to nourish our families, the only favor we beg of
you is to prolong the delay a little, so as to give us time
to gather in our grain and permission to carry it away
with us, and also to make use of the vehicles that we
own or of those we might make or otherwise procure,
hoping that Your Excellency will permit us to send to
Cape Breton Island to ask help for our departure.”

I have in hand, relating to these facts, six documents
or letters, all most important and absolutely indis-

* Col, Records, N. 8., vol. 3.

GOVERNOR PHILIPPS’S ORDERS. 115

pensable for the clear understanding of these events.
They consist of a reply of Father Justinian to Philipps,
30th April, 1720; two memorials of the Acadians of
Annapolis and Mines to Philipps, both presented May
26th, 1720; a letter of the Governor of Louisburg to
Philipps, June 8th, 1720; a letter of the Acadians to
the Governor of Louisburg and the latter’s reply. None
of these documents are found in the volume of the
Archives, and yet the first four are found in the Colonial
Records in London, just alongside those which the Com-
piler produces ; his volume contains all the letters of
Philipps to the persons mentioned above, but not a
single one of the replies. Oh! I am wrong; there is
one, not here mentioned, and it is the one that is the
worst drawn up, the least explicit. Is that the reason
why it is there? Is that also the reason why we find in
his volume a letter of the Acadians to the Governor of
Louisburg, when there was another far superior to it as
a statement of the situation. The Compiler renders his
case more complicated by the insertion of this document,
for this letter of the Acadians to the Governor of Louis-
burg, it will be understood, could not reasonably be
found in the archives either of Halifax or of London; it
could be had only in the archives of the Marine in Paris.
Did he go there to ferret it out? If so, then, he studied
those archives, and why in the world did he go out of

his way, while he was passing over so many important

documents in London, which should have been brought
to Halifax? However, not to run the risk of being un-
just to him, I will not hold him responsible for any other
omissions than those relative to the archives of these
two last places.

In spite of my desire to fill up the void that the Com-

116 OBSTACLES TO DEPARTURE.

piler has left, in spite of the importance of the documents
omitted, I shall present only short extracts. The letter
addressed by the Acadians to the Governor of Louisburg
contains among other things the following :

‘*You are, sir, aware of the difficulties opposed to our departure
when we petitioned for it, and the impossibility in which we were, to
accomplish what was demanded of us. And yet now they wish to
constrain us to take this oath, or to abandon the country, and it is
impossible to do either. . . We are resolved not to take this oath im-
posed upon us, but we cannot quit the country without suitable
facilities, such as were promised to us by the Court of France and re-
fused by the Court of England. Our situation is painful and per-
plexing, and we beseech you to assist us.”’

In his reply to Philipps, Mr. de Brouillan, governor
of Louisburg, says:

‘‘Allow me to state, that the inaction of the Acadians neither can
nor should be imputed to them, both on account of their want of
the assistance essentially requisite for their transmigration, and on
account of the obstacles which the Governors, general or local, who
preceded you, have put in their way.

‘*T cannot, moreover, refrain from representing to you that the
clauses of your proclamation that refer to the term and the circum-
stances of their departure seem to me but little in keeping with ordinary
‘kindness, especially after a treaty and an agreement of mutual good
faith between Queen Anne and King Louis XIV., a treaty that has
been executed in its entirety by France and partially by England.

‘* You are aware, sir, that by this agreement the lot of the inhabit-
ants of Acadia was to be the same as that of the inhabitants of Plais-
ance. It were impossible to add to the kindness and sincerity with
which this evacuation of Plaisance was accomplished, and I have the
honor to represent to you, that nothing could be harsher than the
extremity or rather the impossibility to which these poor people
would be reduced, should you not consent to be less severe for the
time and the manner in which you exact their departure.”’

To prove the obstacles opposed to the departure of
the Acadians, I have quoted, so far, more than twenty

OBSTACLES TO DEPARTURE. 117

documents, all of which are omitted in the volume of
the Archives. What is there in this volume against
these clear and precise affirmations? Nothing. No-
where do we find that these affirmations have been
contradicted in reply to those who made them. Neither
Nicholson nor Doucette replied to the affirmations of
Costabelle and de Brouillan. The only passage that looks
like a formal contradiction of these affirmations is found
in a letter of Philipps to the Lords of Trade, in which
he says:

‘* At the time of the surrender of the country, it was stipulated in
behalf of the Acadians, to have their choice, either to remain in the
Province if they would transfer their allegiance, or, in case of the al-
ternative, to dispose of their estate and effects to the best advantage ;
to determine which, one year’s time was allowed them ; but, at the
expiration thereof, finding their new masters in no condition to
oblige them to the observance of one or the other, they have
remained.”’ '

Philipps himself knew nothing of the obstacles we have
mentioned; he could, doubtless, be informed by Vetch,
Caulfield, Doucette, and other officers of the garrison ;
but it is clear that they were not eager to accuse
themselves of their own trickery. We may judge of the
credit we should give to the declaration of Philipps by
the trouble he takes to disfigure the treaty he had under
hiseyes. Clearly, the treaty gave the Acadians the right
to carry away their movable effects, their cattle, etc.
Philipps converted this clause into a right to sell or
dispose of them, and nothing more. If he erred so
grossly as to the terms of a treaty, what are we to think
of his second-hand assertions picked up from persons
interested in deceiving him? This prohibition to carry
anything away with them was not only inhuman, it was

118 _ACADIANS MAKE A ROAD.

also a fraud. He well knew that, since they were the
only inhabitants of the country, they would have no one
to whom they might sell their goods in case they de-
parted, and that is why he chose this means of attaining
his end, and preventing their departure. He was soon
to be convinced that the people about him had deceived
him respecting the reasons that had prevented their
departure, and that he deceived himself, if he fancied
his barbarous orders were going to produce the result
he expected.

As the Acadians no longer hoped to bore upon the
Governor's determination, as they no longer hoped either
for timely help or for a prolongation of the appointed
delay, they set to work to devise ways and means to
effect their departure. Unable to withdraw in ships,
they had no other alternative than the land route; but,
for that, they would be obliged to open new roads where
there were none.

The Beaubassin people could easily withdraw by Bay
Verte, but the case was otherwise with those of Mines,
_and especially of Annapolis. Between these two places
there was a space of from twenty to thirty miles which
had never yet been opened to vehicles.

To this point the Acadians of Mines first directed
their efforts, and thus came to the assistance of their
Annapolis brethren. All the able-bodied population
set resolutely to work, and the road-making was rapidly
advancing. In presence of this determination to leave
the country, which was shown in so unmistakable a
way, Philipps was alarmed; but what could be done?
Could he reasonably oppose these works, indispensable
as they were to the transmigration? Certainly not,
since it was the only means left them to depart and to

PHILIPPS, FORBIDS ROAD-MAKING. —= 119

conform to the alternative of his proclamation!........
And, nevertheless, they must not be allowed to depart!

His conduct would be incredible, had I not before me
the official documents that establish indisputably the
means which Philipps used to balk the Acadians once
more, as had previously done Vetch, Nicholson and
Caulfield. There was only one means; it was to forbid
the continuation of these works ; he did so.

‘* At a Council held, &c., &e.
‘* Present :

‘* His Honor Lieut.-Governor Armstrong, &c., &c., &e.

‘* The Honorable Lieut.-Governor acquainted the Board, that His
Excellency, General Philipps, having advice that the Acadians of this
river are cutting a road from here to Mines, which gives him suspicion
that they design by it either to molest this place, or todrive off their
cattle and carry their effects from hence by that way, in order to
settle in a body, either there or at Beaubassin, and stand in defiance
of the Government, Advised and agreed :

‘* That His Excellency be desired to send his special orders to the
Acadians of this river and Mines not to cut any such road without
having His Excellency’s leave in writing.” :

We have also the proclamation drawn up conformably
to the above order-in-council. In this proclamation he
adds: “ And Ido further forbid any persons to quit their
‘habitations clandestinely and without my leave.”

Naturally, as might be expected, the order was drawn
up as if he supposed other designs than that of quitting
the country, but one’s perceptions would have to be very
dull indeed not to understand the true sense of what
was meant by this order, “not to cut a road nor quit
their habitations without leave.”

Philipps and his council were well aware. that their
object could not have been to molest anybody, but merely
to leave the country. When writing to the Lords of

120 VEXATIOUS PROHIBITIONS

Trade, he does not feel constrained to disguise his pur-
pose under false pretexts; hence, in rendering an ac-
count of these events, he does not make a mystery of their
intention, which, he says, was, or must have been, to
leave the country by way of Bay Verte: “ Being joined
in abody, they can march off at their leisure, by the way
of the Bay Verte with their effects, and destroy what they
leave behind, without danger of being molested by the
garrison.’ So, as is clearly shown, in this opening of a
road, Philipps did not see anything but the means and
the design of leaving the country. His fear was not
that his garrison might be molested by them, but, on
the: contrary, that his garrison might not be able to
molest them and prevent their marching off. The case
_is widely different.

It reminds us somewhat of the fable of the crocodile
and the child:—‘* Why do you shed tears at the lam-
entations of this child? Have you of late become Be
tender-hearted?”” was remarked to him.—“I weep,”
retorted the crocodile, ‘“ because I could not reach him
and swallow him up.”

It was the settled fate of the Acadians that they
should not leave the country except by deportation.
Once more were they detained against their will. An
alternative had been offered them, but eventually they
had none. At first, they had thought they could leave
in English vessels; these were refused. They had
asked that French ships might be allowed to enter the
ports of Acadia; this was opposed. Having constructed
small vessels, they wished to procure the necessary
equipment at Louisburg ; this was forbidden ; at Boston,
forbidden again. This time the order to take away
nothing extended even to vehicles, and, as that did not

VEXATIOUS PROHIBITIONS. 121

suffice to deter them, the route by land was likewise
forbidden. There still remained the air route; but the
manageable balloons of the twentieth century, nay,
even the primitive fire-balloons had not yet been in-
vented. The letter of Queen Anne extended their right
to the selling of their immovable property, but, with
obstacle on obstacle, restriction on restriction, ruse on
ruse, the result was this much simplified statement : “ If
you go away, you shall not take even your effects with
you.” And to strike the lowest note of the scale: “ Go
away, if you like, but you shall not take away even your
bodies ; your bones will have to remain here. When
the time for your departure shall come, we ourselves
will see to your transportation, and we will scatter you
upon all the shores of the new world.” Considered in
all its naked reality, such was the situation.

Only peaceable persons, as they were, could have sub-
mitted toso many unjustimpositions. They could put on
foot six times more fighting men than were numbered in
the garrison of Annapolis. The decision of the Aca-
dians had rendered Philipps’s situation very perplexing.
In the same letter to the Lords of Trade he writes :

.“* For the sake of gaining time, and keeping all things quiet till I
have the honor of your further commands in what manner to act, I
have thought it most for His Majesty’s service to send home the
Acadian deputies with smooth words and promises of enlargement of
time.”’

He ends his letter as follows:

‘* They say they will oblige themselves to be good subjects in every
respect, excepting that of taking up arms against the French and
Indians. ... And I would humbly propose that if an oath were
formed for them to take, whereby they should oblige themselves to
take up arms against the Indians, if required, etc., etc., how far this
may be thought to bind them.”

122 PHILIPPS’S HUMILIATION. _

It is easy to see, while following this correspondence
of Philipps with the Secretary of State and the Lords of
Trade, that he was profoundly humiliated by his want
of success. He had flattered himself that his high posi-
tion in the army, the renown of his name, would over-
throw all the obstacles that a little simple and ignorant
population might oppose to him. Arriving with the
air of a conqueror, he had issued a pompous and severe
proclamation which admitted of no reply; then he had
encountered difficulties which he could have smoothed
away, but which he had only increased by his demeanor.
He would have liked to retrace his steps and to resort
to conciliation, but he had sown mistrust and was reap-
ing alarm. He had thought that these Acadians were
_ so attached to their goods that the short delay granted
them to leave the country and the prohibition to take
away their effects would infallibly determine them to
accept the proposed oath. As to that, he had fallen into
the same error as Nicholson, and, like him, he found
himself obliged to prevent at any price the departure of
the Acadians, with this difference, that Nicholson could
use subterfuges, while he had not even this resource.
His own order, which forbade the inhabitants to open a
road leading out of the country, while his proclamation
to evacuate it was still fresh, must have jarred his sense
of consistency. And, what.a humiliation here for a man
that deserved, I believe, on other occasions, the reputa-
tion of being able, affable and conciliating.

The more meek and amiable he became towards the
Acadians, the greater was his bitterness and the more
malevolent his insinuations with regard to them in his
correspondence. He had suffered failure. To justify
or attenuate it, he did what has always been done, what

HIS BITTERNESS. 123°

is still done: he laid the blame on others. In order to
do so, he had to represent the Acadians as headstrong,
ungovernable, directed by ‘ bigoted priests;”’ this he
did to the best of his ability.

‘‘ They will never, said he, in substance, make good subjects. They
cannot be let go now at least : their departure, if they went to swell
the colony of Cape Breton, would render our neighbors too power-
ful; we need them to erect our fortifications and to provision our
forts, tillthe English are powerful enough of themselves to go on,
and they must not withdraw before a considerable number of
British subjects be settled in their stead. On the other hand, if
they withdraw in spite of us, a great many fine possessions will be-
come vacant. I believe it will not be difficult to draw as many people
almost from New England as would supply their room, if it were not
robbing a neighboring colony without gaining much by the ex-
change ; therefore, hope there are schemes forming at Home, to set-
tle the country with British subjects in the spring, before which time
these inhabitants do not think of moving, having the benefit of enlarge-
ment of time I granted, until I shall receive your further commands.
What is to be apprehended in the resettling these farms is disturbance
from the Indians, who do. not like of the Acadians going off, and will
not want prompting to mischief.’’

In his vexation Philipps had shown only the dark
side, and had painted it so vividly as to affect the
Lords of Trade, who wrote under date of December
20th, 1720:

. « « ‘As to the Acadians of Nova Scotia, who appear so
wavering in their inclinations, we are apprehensive they will never be-
come good subjects to His Majesty. . . . Weareof opinion they ought
to be removed as soon as the forces which we have proposed to be sent
to you shall arrive in your Province; but as you are not to attempt
their removal without His Majesty’s positive order for that purpose,
you will do well in the meanwhile, to continue the same prudent and
cautious conduct towards them, to endeavor to undeceive them con-
cerning the exercise of their religion which will doubtless be allowed
them if it should be thought proper to let them stay where they are.’’*

*Parkman had this document before him. For an historian of fifty

years standing he should have wir seized a letter that threw so much
light on history; it was a real tit-bit . . . but it was not of the right kind.

124 CRAGGS TO PHILIPPS.

On reading this one feels as though a leaden cloak
were falling on his shoulders, and as though there was
not enough air to breathe freely. The sinister project
of the deportation has just been hatched. A coldshiver
runs down one’s spine. One fancies he hears the
first blasts of the trumpet that was to order the embark
ation. :

I append, by way of elucidation, a version of the same
letter in familiar style:

‘*My DEAR PHILIPPS:

‘*T see you do not get the better of the Acadians as you expected
before your departure. It is singular all the same that these people
should have preferred to lose their goods rather than be exposed to
fight against their brethren. ‘This sentimentality is stupid. These
people are evidently too much attached to their fellow-countrymen
and to their religion ever to make true Englishmen. It must be
avowed your position was deucedly critical ; it was very difficult to
prevent them from departing, after having left the bargain to their
choice. However, you did well to act thus, it was your only resource.
The treaty be hanged ! Don’t bother about justice and other baubles
any more than Nicholson and Vetch did ; those things will not ad-
vance our interests. Their departure will, doubtless, increase the
power of France ; it must not be so ; they must eventually be trans-
ported to some place, where, mingling with our subjects, they will
soon lose their language, their religion and the remembrance of the
past, to become true Englishmen. For the moment, we are too weak
to undertake this deportation ; but we purpose effecting it in the
spring time, when we shall have sent to you the required troops. Do
nothing of your own accord before we have given you orders. Mean-
while, my dear friend, lay aside your high and mighty airs, show
yourself affable and kind towards them. Encourage them with any
hopes you choose, say what you like ; provided you obtain the desired
end, which is none other than to prevent their departure, you will

merit our gratitude.
** Yours,

** CRAGGS,
*¢ Secretary of State.

‘‘N, B.—Make them believe that we shall leave them the free exer-

FIRST HINT OF DEPORTATION. 125

cise of their religion ; we shall see later on what we shall do on this
score, if it be decided to leave them in the country. In this case it is_
probable we shall allow them the free exercise of their religion.

‘“p, S.—There is a great storm brewing against Aislabie, Stanhope
and myself relatively to theSouth Sea Co... . Iam all of atremble

at itso Bit Es
** CRAGGS.*

The reader will find the document I have just para-
phrased hardly agrees with the declaration of my intro-
ductory remarks, exonerating the home government from
all complicity in this iniquitous deportation. It was, in-
deed, a Secretary of State who had resolved to execute
it, but a man of the stamp of Craggs is rarely met with
in history. There was certainly no question here of a
government project, but of the scheme of a single indi-
vidual, who had begun his career by a fraud that
brought him to the Tower, and ended it by another
which ought to have sent him back thither. Thus, the
deportation was conceived by a barber who became
Secretary of State, and it was executed thirty-five years
later by a house-painter who became Provincial Goy-
ernor. It was conceived by a plunderer and executed
for the sake of plunder. One man died as he was plan-
ning it, the other as he was realizing it. The one had
been shut up in the Tower, and avoided a return thither
by an opportune death ; the other escaped the same fate
in the same manner. Under such exceptional circum-
stances I think it would be unjust to throw the

* Craggs had begun life as a barber. He then became a footman, and,
later on, an army clothier. His dealings as such being investigated, he re-
fused to produce his books and was sent tothe Tower. Twenty-two years
later he was Secretary of State, with Aislabie as leader of the House of
Commons. When the South Sea Bubble exploded, Aislabie was expelled
from the House for his shameful conduct in connection with the famous

Bubble. Craggs escaped the same fate by a timely death. Green, in his

history, says that he died of terror at the punishment he expected to
meet.

126 ACADIANS PEACEABLE.

responsibility of this document on the home govermment
in virtue of the ministerial responsibility. It was none
the less an unfortunate deed; for Lawrence, who knew
of it, took pattern from it; he saw or thought he saw
therein his justification. |

The good-natured souls who have pitied the deporta-
tion and sad fate of the Acadians, says Rameau, have no
need, by way of explaining the fact, to credit them with
imaginary crimes. After this document, it may be said
that the proscription was not a deed improvised in
anger: it was premeditated as early as 1720. Lawrence,
upon whom this crime is charged, was acquainted with
this document.

It cannot be said that the Anndidins had been rebel-
lious, nor even that they had had recourse to violence,
since their submission embraced even obedience to the
order to depart without taking away anything, and to the
still more unjust order that put a stop to their depart-
ure, and this, when they were powerful enough to snap
their fingers at authority... Examples of such peaceable
dispositions are very rare in history. Their extreme
peaceableness was their misfortune. Had they not been
so meek, they would have had to be let go.

This document, Rameau says again, would suffice, in
default of others, to show what nervous apprehension
the Board of Trade in Europe and the Governor of
Annapolis in America felt lest the Acadians escape from
their control. They wish at all costs to avoid this
misfortune; so, in spite. of the bitter anger which
Philipps’s disappointment caused him, see how he
lavishes kind words upon them, with what insinuating
sweetness, while praising the tenderness of King George,
he slips in those perfidious assurances of liberty, of

PHILIPPS WHEEDLING. 127

peacefulness, of religious freedom, in order to protract
their present condition and make them accept a pro-
visional tolerance that should not be binding for the
future, until the favorable hour should strike when they
might be deported without risk.

Philipps perfectly understood his instructions ; he,
who had made his fortune amid the intrigues of the court,
was now altogether on his own ground: he put away
his great sabre and the high-flown phrases of his first
appearance on the scene, and continued the policy
he had just inaugurated: wheedle the Acadians so as to
make them remain on their lands, exact allegiance if
the occasion presents itself, if not, then lavish fine
words without promising anything definite; keep a
way open for retreat, so as to prove no promises had ever
been made, but only attempts at agreement. Thus
was obtained from the Acadians the desired amount of
usefulness, by freely granting them tolerance without
ever affording them any certainty.

Philipps made this situation last two years more with-
out allowing their departure, but also without accepting or
refusing the restricted oath which the Acadians claimed ;
he still kept them on their lands by protracting their un-
certainty. He thus reached the year 1722, when he re-
turned to Europe, leaving in his place Captain Doucette
as lieutenant-governor. |
_ In his work entitled “Wolfe and Montcalm” Park-
man, falling in with the Compiler, affirmed that the
-Acadians had remained in the country of their own free
will. Since writing what precedes I have noticed in his
new work, “ A Half Century of Conflict,” that he has
modified his first opinions on this subject. It was indeed
difficult not to yield to evidence that was supported by

1238 PARKMAN RETRACTS.

such a considerable mass of documents as that collected
by Casgrain in the “ Canada Frangais.” Howbeit, it is
with pleasure I give Parkman credit for this implied
concession. I cannot reasonably expect him to do as
much with respect to all his other errors, for then it
would be necessary to destroy almost all that he has
written on the history of Acadia.

‘* Governor Nicholson,”’ says he, ‘‘ like his predecessor, was resolved
to keep the Acadians in the Province if hecould. This personage, able,
energetic, headstrong, perverse, unscrupulous, conducted himself even
towards the English officers and soldiers in a manner that seems un-
accountable and that kindled their utmost indignation. Towards the
Acadians his behavior was still worse. . .The Acadians built small ves-
sels and the French authorities at Louisburg sent them the necessary
rigging. Nicholson ordered it back, forbade the sale of their lands
and houses and would not even let them sell their personal effects ;
coolly setting at naught both the treaty of Utrecht and the letter of
the Queen. Caulfield and Doucette, his deputies, both in one degree or
another, followed his example in preventing, sofar as they could, the
emigration of the Acadians.”’

All that this citation contains is, in a general way,
true; but, as a question of fact, it is not strictly
accurate ; thus, Nicholson did not order the Acadians to
send back the rigging to Louisburg, but forbade them
to procure any, nor did he forbid them to sell their
effects, but only to take them away withthem. Though
these variations would be unimportant in an ordinary
chronicler without such pretensions as Parkman has to
historic accuracy and fairness, still, it would have been
better to be absolutely precise, when it was so easy for
him to be so.

After having made this concession, apparently so
frank and candid, let us see how he sets to work to
nullify it:

NULLIFIES HIS RETRACTATION. 129

‘* Tf they had wished to emigrate, the English Governor had no
power to stop them. .. They were armed and far outnumbered the
English garrison. To say that they wished to leave Acadia, but were
prevented from so doing by a petty garrison at the other end of the
Province, so feeble that it could hardly hold Annapolis itself, is an
unjust reproach upon a people who, thoughignorant and weak of
purpose, were not wanting in physical courage. The truth is, that
from this time to their forced expatriation, all the Acadians, except
those of Annapolis, were free to go or stay at will.”

It is perfectly true, as Parkman says, that the Aca-
dians, except those of Annapolis,had the numerical —
strength to enforce their departure from the country;
nor, as is most probable, were they wanting in physical
courage, and they undoubtedly had the right to act
thus; but we must not judge their actions according to
our own ideas. Parkman, as all this history clearly
proves, should have understood that these people, these
ignorant peasants, as he never fails to call them, had, far
otherwise than we, the love of peace, respect for and
submission to authority. Instead of overthrowing by
force the iniquitous obstacles opposed to their departure,
they applied to the French authorities to put an end to
them. In their naive ignorance the stipulations of a
treaty seemed sacred, and, thought they, eventually
justice would prevail; they did not suspect, so well as
we should, the perverseness of their rulers. It is this
spirit of submission that later on enabled Lawrence to
deport them. Would Parkman have it imputed to them
as a crime? And, because they might have effected
their departure in spite of the authorities, does this fact
relieve the authorities from all blame for their unjust
proceedings? Did that iniquitous detention oblige the
Acadians to take the oath exacted of them? Is Mr.
desir eee indulgence and commiseration invariably for

130 REASONS AGAINST DEPARTING.

the oppressor as against the oppressed? To depart
without having the requisite facilities for deportation .
meant to leave behind them their effects and their cattle,
all which was very painful, especially when the right to
take them away was guaranteed by a treaty.

There are still other very important considerations to
which Mr. Parkman, from the snugness of his easy chair,
did not even take the trouble to advert. Thus, if it be
true that the Acadians of Beaubassin and Mines had
sufficient strength to effectuate their departure, and
they would, I believe, have succeeded therein, it was
not so for those of Annapolis, as he admits. By with-
drawing, the former would leave these latter behind them;
they would leave a large number of their compatriots,
their relations and brethren at the mercy of a power that
held out no hopes of equitable treatment. Not being
able to depart in English, French or even Acadian ves-
‘sels, it was expressly to permit those of Annapolis to
effect a union with themselves that the Acadians of
Mines had set to work to open a road between the two
places, in which attempt they were frustrated by an
order from Philipps. To withdraw thus and leave their
relations behind would mean a lifelong separation, un-
less they should chance to meet as adversaries upon the
field of battle, in case a war should break out between
France and England. Parkman makes no account of
this separation, or more probably he did not even think
of it; these ignorant people, who were guided in their
actions by the humane feelings inherent in our nature,
bore most heavily this separation with all its dreadful
consequences ; they had weighed and pondered it; they
had felt the delicacy of their situation; they had seen

REASONS AGAINST DEPARTING. 131

farther and more correctly than Parkman with all his
learning.
Pursuing the same idea Parkman adds:

‘‘ The year had long ago expired, and most of them were still in
Acadia, unwilling to leave it, yet, refusing to own King George.”’

Thus does Parkman endeavor to nullify all the merit
of his former admission. He had admitted that Vetch,
Nicholson, Caulfield and Doucette, in one way or an-
other, did all in their power to render the departure of
the Acadians impossible, and yet these Acadians, in spite
of all these efforts, “were unwilling to go.” It is very
hard to reconcile these two conflicting statements, but
we must be prepared to see Parkman contradict himself
on one and the same page; * the public has so eagerly
bolted his first ten volumes that he ceased to be on his
guard in the eleventh. After he had said in a general
way that the Acadians “ were unwilling to leave,” I find;
thirteen lines further on, the following, relative to the
proclamation of Philipps :

** They protested to M. de Brouillan that they would abandon all
rather than renounce their religion and their King; at the same time
they prepared for a general emigration by way of the isthmus and
Bay Verte, when it would have been impossible to stop them.”’

The contradiction is flagrant enough, but it would be
still more so, if Parkman, by a trick that is familiar to
him, had not, as it were, cut his sentence in two, so as
not to let us know what, this time, had prevented the
departure of the Acadians. We have only to add, in
order to complete the unfinished sentence, the following
words: ** but they were stopped in their preparations by

* A Half Century of Conflict, p. 198.

132 GARBLING

an order of Governor Philipps, forbidding their cutting
-aroad between Annapolis and Mines and forbidding
their leaving their habitations.” This addition is not
long, and these few words supply the reader with in-
formation of great importance. By cutting his sentence
in two, Parkman stopped, so to speak, on the brink of a
precipice, for I am merely yielding to evidence in saying,
that the avowal, which the completion of his sentence
entailed, would have been extremely painful to him.
Should the reader doubt it, I can assure him that his
hesitation will be dispelled long before reaching the
end of this work.

And, when Mr. Parkman added: ‘“ Yet, refusing to
own King George,’ had he absolutely persisted in in-
troducing these incorrect terms into his account, he
might have explained in a few words that the Acadians,
when they saw how their departure was made impos-
sible, unanimously offered to Governor Doucette to take
the oath of allegiance with a clause exempting them
from bearing arms against the French and the Indians
their allies; or simply against the French, if means were —
afforded to protect them against the Indians ; and that,
from that time up to their deportation, they never refused
such an oath. Many of Mr. Parkman’s readers might
have found this detail very instructive and very im-
portant in order to judge of the spirit that animated the
Acadians. Leaving the public undera contrary impres-
sion, through omission and misconstruction, was allow-
ing unjust prejudices against them to circulate ; which
is equivalent to falsifying history.

Ay,

DEPARTURE OF PHILIPPS. 133

CHAPTER VI.

Departure of Philipps (1722)—Doucette reassumes his functions
as lieutenant-governor, which he exercises till 1725—Total
absence in the volume of the Archives of documents for this
period—Armstrong succeeds him—His_ character—Taking
of the oath at Annapolis—Captain Bennett and Philipps
make the tour of the province for the same purpose—Their
failure—Armstrong confides the same mission to Officer
Worth—Incomplete success—His report.

Philipps returned to England altogether disgusted
with everything: with the ungrateful task that had
fallen to his lot, with the state of the fortifications,
with the weakness of the garrison, with the indifference
of the authorities in regard to his projects, with his own
inability to enforce obedience. He felt himself humbled
by his failure. Moreover, this life in an out of the way
garrison, far from comfort and civilization, coincided so
little with his tastes of a great lord and courtier that,
regardless of the general opening of hostilities with the
Indians, he embarked for England in the course of the
summer of 1722. He nevertheless remained titular
governor of the province with all the emoluments of
his office till the foundation of Halifax in 1749, at
which time he had nearly attained the age of ninety
years. !

John Doucette, who had been lieutenant-governor
some time before the arrival of Philipps, resumed his
functions, which he exercised till 1725. Oddly enough,

134 GAP IN THE ARCHIVES.

the volume of the archives does not contain a single
document of the period extending from 1722 to 1725.
Given the partiality of the Compiler and his efforts to
combine in this volume all that could be prejudicial to
the Acadians and justify their deportation, here is the
explanation that seems to me most probable. Philipps,
for fear of seeing the Acadians escape, had shown him-
self meek and amiable toward them, and up to his
departure the burning question of the oath had been
kept prudently in the shade. The proper thing to do
was to let several years glide by, to await the favorable
~moment, and, until then, to treat the Acadians with the
greatest regard. This policy was all the more com-
mendable because the Indians of Maine were in open
war and those of Nova Scotia threatened to follow their
example, and in fact were already committing depreda-
tions. Under such circumstances Philipps could not
- have failed to recommend strongly to Doucette mainte-
nance with regard to the Acadians of that same prudence
and forbearance which he himself had inaugurated.
The interposition of the governor in the affairs of the
Acadians became almost null, and that is why his corre-
spondence contained nothing or almost nothing relative
to them, and especially nothing that could be turned
against them. But, some will say, this volume was to
have been a compilation to serve for the general history
of the province. That is very true; but the Compiler
thought otherwise. For him, as I have said, and the
thing is evident, this volume was the combination of all
the documents that could throw some light on the
reasons that might have called for the deportation ;
and, whatever did not tend to confirm this proof, or
whatever tended to overthrow it, was extraneous matter.

GAP IN THE ARCHIVES. 135

Se true is this that, up to the foundation of Halifax,
this volume contains nothing but what relates to the
Acadians and to their priests ; and, when a letter men-
tions something that does not relate to them, or some-
thing that throws discredit on the governor or some
other important official, this part is systematically sup-
pressed, and this is done even when the omitted part
explains or exhibits in a different light the inserted
part. In this period, from 1722 to 1725, the Acadians,
conformably to the orders of Philipps, had been left to
themselves, and the Compiler, finding nothing in
Doucette’s correspondence to support his proofs, found
nothing worth reproducing. Yet it is certain that
Doucette must have had regular correspondence with
the Board of Trade and with Philipps. If we suppose
the small number of four dispatches a year to the Lords
of Trade, as many to Philipps and the replies thereto,
we should have forty-eight documents, of which some,
though they contained nothing for or against the
Acadians, might at least be useful for the general
history of the province. Such had been the intention
of the legislature. I have seen some of these docu-
ments, which in fact contained nothing of importance
to the Acadians.

In striking contrast with Philipps, Armstrong, who
succeeded Doucette in 1725, was a man of violent
temper, of a rough and disorderly cast of mind, alto-
gether unfit for the functions of a governor, even under
the most favorable circumstances, and still less suited
to the task of smoothing out difficulties such as then
faced him. The most salient feature of his character
was, however, the capriciousness of his humor. Some-
times affable and obliging, he was most often so harsh

136 ARMSTRONG’S ANTECEDENTS.

and brutal as to provoke officers and soldiers to insult
him publicly.

The new governor was that same Captain Armstrong
concerning whom, ten years before, Lieutenant-Governor
Caulfield addressed caren to the Lords of Trade in
the following terms :

‘“‘T must own ’tis with ye greatest reluctancy immaginable that I
am obliged to acquaint Your Lordships of ye frequent misbehaviour
of Captain Armstrong of this garrison towards several inhabitants
here, and by my next shall transmit to Your Lordships the several com-
plaints in behalf of ye said inhabitants.”’

Invested with absolute power over all the Province,
he could hardly be expected to do aught else than vex
and worry it. And, in point of fact, he was continually
at logger-heads with everybody : with the priests, with
his officers, with his soldiers, with his council, with each
member of his council, even more than with the Acadi-
ans. The volume of the archives, as might be guessed,
indicates only his quarrels with the priests and the Aca-
dians, according to the above-mentioned policy of ex-
cluding whatever might discredit Armstrong and weaken
the effect of his sayings and doings in regard to them.
Fortunately, the hostilities of the Indians had ended
before his arrival at Annapolis; else he would perhaps
have plunged the Province into a most deplorable situa-
tion. At first, he seemed to wish to make Canso the
seat of his government and assembled there a quorum of
his councillors ; but, the following year, he established
himself at Annapolis.

His nomination to the post of lieutenant-governor had
alarmed the Acadians. From the moment of his arrival
at Canso, he spoke of nothing less than crossing Nova
Scotia in battle array and thus cutting the Gordian

ARMSTRONG’S ANTECEDENTS. 137

knot, if only the necessary troops were furnished him.
Writing to the Secretary of State, he said:

‘T have written to the Government of New England to send me
sixty Indians of that country, with twelve whale-boats, which, joined
with so many of our troops and forty men from Commodore St. Lo,
l intend to take a tour through the Province to humble the villainous
french inhabitants. . . I hope we shall do our duty and give a good
account of ourselves.”’

All this had no other foundation than the taking of the
oath, and he relied on terror to exact it.. However, he
did nothing of the sort; but the Acadians long since
knew what they might expect from him. In the course
of the following summer they prepared for a general
emigration, fully resolved, should circumstances so per-
mit, not to take any account of the prohibitions that
might be opposed thereto. Some families withdrew
that very year to settle in Prince Edward Island, where
the French government were preparing to receive them.
In July of that same year Armstrong wrote:

‘“ They are resolved to quit the Province rather than take the oath,
and as I aminformed, have transported several of their cattle and other
effects.’’

Yielding to his irrepressible temper, he had hoped
violently to break down all opposition by spreading ter-
ror around him, and the only result he was obtaining
was the hatred and contempt of his officers and the de-
parture of the Acadians. The threatened exodus must
be stopped, or he would incur a severe reprimand and
ruin his dearest hopes. | |

Was he going to let France strengthen her colony
with so many useful subjects? Was he going to let his
Province be deprived of the only inhabitants that he

138 ARMSTRONG SENTIMENTAL.

had to govern? What would people say of him?
What would become of the government with which he
was charged, what would become of his own position ?
_ All this filled him with fear; his manner and taeties were.
suddenly changed; he inveigled the Acadians to well-
prepared meetings, where he spoke feelingly of the great
advantages they would secure by accepting the oath
and cordially becoming the loyal subjects of King
George. Then, as soon as he thought that the favor-
able moment had come, he proposed to them the taking
of the oath :

‘* He hoped they had come with a full resolution to take the oath
of fidelity like good subjects, induced with sincere honest principles
of submission and loyalty to so good and gracious a King, who, upon
their so doing, due and faithful observation of their sacred oaths,
had promised them, not only the free exercise of their religion, but,
even the enjoyment of their estates and other immunities of his own
free born subjects of Great Britain ; and that for his part, while he
had the honor to command, his endeavors should always be to main-
tain to them what His Majesty had so graciously vouchsafed to
grant.

‘* Whereupon, at the request of some of the inhabitants, a french
translation of the oath required to be taken was read unto them.

‘*Upon which, some of them desiring that a clause whereby they
may. not be obliged to carry arms might be inserted,

‘*T told them that they had no reason to fear any such thing as
that, it being contrary to the laws of Great Britain, that a Roman
Catholic should serve in the army, His Majesty having so many
faithful Protestant subjects first to provide for, that all His Maj-
esty required of them was to be faithful subjects.

‘* But they, upon the motion made as aforesaid, still refusing and
desiring the same clause to be inserted, the Governor, with the
advice of the Council, granted the same to he written upon the mar-
gin of the french translation, in order to get them over by degrees.
Whereupon, they took and subscribed the same both in french and
english. . . And having drank His Majesty’s, the royal family, and
several other loyal healths, I bid them good night.”

Such is the report drawn up by Armstrong himself.

HIGH COMEDY. : 139

When a man of his position has the effrontery thus to
parade his knavery in a public document of this kind,
we naturally infer that his honor is not worth much.
This document is curious, it throws a strong light on
the kind of diplomacy that was used toward the Aca-
dians. Rameau, from whom I draw, has analyzed it
with much skill. The dramatic get-up of the whole
affair, says this historian, the feigned good-nature and
honeyed speeches of the man, the “ flowing bowl” that
wins consent, and the cordial “ good-night” that sends
everybody to bed “‘mellow’”’: all this shows the consum-
mate craft of an artful dodger. A master-stroke is that
marginal note which he makes believe to accept in order
“to get them over by degrees,” and which he carelessly
inserts in only one of the reports read by no one and
never seen again. An admirable fabrication is that
subterfuge about military service.

What! says Armstrong, you fear to be enrolled by
force? Know that, as you are Catholics, you would
not even have the right to enlist of your own free will.
His Majesty reserves this honor for his Protestant sub-
jects only. Assuredly this is one of the daintiest hoaxes
ever invented in the realm of knavery. It belongs to
high comedy, not to history. A pity it is that Moliére
never heard of this adventure! ‘ What!” would Scapin
have exclaimed, “Are you afraid I will take your
purse? Why, my dear fellow, I wouldn’t have it, even
though you begged me to take it.” |

Scareely had he finished with the taking of the oath by
the inhabitants of Port Royal, when he arrested Father
Gaulin, their parish priest, “ that old mischievous incen-
diary Gaulin ” as he calls him, on the plea that he had
meddled with affairs that did not concern his ministry.

=

140 ARREST OF ABBE GAULIN.

The offence, if it should be really considered one, and if
the accusation were well grounded, was certainly trivial:
at any rate this arrest might be impolitic under the cir-
cumstances. There still remained for him to cause the
oath to be taken by the inhabitants of Grand Pré,
Pigiguit, Cobequid, Beaubassin, etc., that is by more
than three-fourths of the entire population ; butsuch was
the irrepressible violence of his character that he could
not control himself. His efforts to induce the people of
these places to take the oath were ineffectual. Capt.
Bennett and Ensign Philipps, whom he had sent for this
purpose, returned without having accomplished any-
thing. However, he does not attribute the cause of it
to the arrest of Father Gaulin, if we judge by his letter
of April 30, 1727, to the Secretary of State.

The public will be surprised to learn that he imputes
his defeat to the instigations of some merchants of
Boston and to Major Cosby, afterward leutenant-gover-
nor of Annapolis :

‘* Since my last I have the mortification to tell Your Grace that
there arrived here from Boston one M. Gambell, a lieutenant in the
army, who, I am told, came from England with Major Cosby to Boston,
where the Major still continues, tho’ I have ordered him to his post
at Canso, and in defiance and disobedience to my orders, stays in
New England to know the result of the said Gambell’s false com-
plaints against me. After his arrival here from England, he associated
himself with some Boston antimonarchical traders, who, together
with some evil intended french inhabitants, ... incited them to
sign such complaints as he had formed against me, telling them, that
I had no power nor authority to administer them such oaths, and also
that Major Cosby would be with them this spring with full power to
govern the Province.....And all this occasioned by the incitements
and ill conduct of the aforesaid Gambell, and three or four New Eng-
land traders.”’

Mr. Parkman, it seems to me, ought not to have

dl

BOSTON AGAINST ARMSTRONG, — 141

deprived his readers of this document and of the other
still more important one that precedes it. They would
be interested to know the true inwardness of the wrangle
to which Armstrong alludes. He must have had a
special gift for making , enemies, since we have here
leagued against him a major of his own regiment, a
lieutenant from some other regiment, and three or four
merchants who had come from Boston to dissuade the
Acadians from taking the oath that he proposed to them.
We can understand his having enemies in Acadia, but
his having enemies as far as Bostonis beyondus. That
there should be Frenchmen or priests to dissuade the
Acadians from taking the oath is only natural ; but that
English officers and English merchants should do so is
most astounding. And if his yoke was hateful even as
far as Boston, what must it have been at cite and
in Acadia?

Undejected by the failure of Bennett and Philipps,
Armstrong despatched to the Acadians of the district of
Mines and Beaubassin a young officer of the garrison
named Robert Wroth. He gave himsome very detailed
instructions on the way he was to proceed. First, he
was to proclaim the accession to the throne of His
Majesty George II, and to celebrate the event by pub-
lic festivities, after which he would make them sign the
proclamation of this event, and then, in the nick of time,
he was dexterously to slip in the oath of allegiance :

** You are to behave seemingly with an air of indifference, and you
are to represent to them how Divine Providence by ways unforeseen

.. You are not to depart from my instructions unless where circum-
stances and place may so require.”

In reality Wroth had great latitude as to the oath

142 ROBERT WROTH.

he was to accept. The instructions of Armstrong to
Wroth, the report of the latter, the text of the oath and
of the conventions concluded between him and the
Acadians are found in the Colonial Records. When
one reads these documents, it is easy to understand why
they were suppressed at Halifax, and still easier to
realize the fraud and duplicity with which Armstrong
presided at the taking of the oath.

‘“Copy of the oath of fealty which I left to the inhabitants of
Beaubassin and its dependencies:

**T dosincerely Promise and swear that I will be faithful and bear
True Allegiance to His Majesty King George the Second, so help me
God.

‘* Original of the articles that I granted to the inhabitants of Beau-
bassin :

‘“‘T, Robert Wroth, etc., etc., promise and grant in the name of the
king etc., etc... to the inhabitants of Beaubassin, etc., etc... the
articles here below that they have requested of me, namely:

‘* 1. That they shall be exempt from taking up arms against any-
one, so long as they shall be under the rule of the king of England.

‘*2. That they shall be free to withdraw whithersoever they will
think fit, and that they shall be discharged from this signed .agree-
ment, as soon as they shall be outside the domination of the King of
England.

‘¢3. That they shall have full and entire liberty to practise their re-
-ligion and to have Catholic, Apostolic and Roman Priests.

‘** ROBERT WROTH.”’

This oath did not differ perceptibly from that accepted
by Armstrong from the inhabitants of Annapolis, since
he himself had agreed to their exemption from military
service and the other articles had been provided for by
the treaty of Utrecht.

The report of Wroth to the governor is very long
and detailed. It is very interesting reading: step by
step, says Rameau, we can trace his method, which does

AN AMIABLE BLACKGUARD. 143

not differ from Armstrong’s as far as fraud goes ; but,
while the latter is imperious and passionate, the former
is an amiable blackguard who attends to his affairs
while enjoying himself and who enjoys himself so as to
attend to them better. Wherever he shows himself, he
opens proceedings by banquets: a banquet the first day,
a banquet the second; there is eating and drinking.
The first day no special topic is introduced ; next day,
the king’s death is announced and the accession of his
successor, who is greatly interested in the welfare of the
Acadians. They drink in memory of the death of the
former and for the health of the latter; they drink in
honor of His Gracious Majesty, they drink the health
of the Queen regnant, of the other Queen; they drink
to all the other royal and loyal toasts; then this amiable
blackguard winds up by drinking with feelings of com-
punction to Divine Providence which by ways unfore-
seen. ...

** After which,’’ resumes Wroth, ‘‘I judged the moment favorable
to introduce my little discourse as follows:

‘**T doubt not, my friends, you know what brings me here, how that

by the death of the King, my master, of glorious memory, Divine
Providence has miraculously afforded you the oceasion.”’....

Here, he extols the king and his bounty, but makes
no mention yet of the oath, which was the object of his
mission ; only, he convokes them to another banquet,
during which they were to proceed to the proclaiming
of the king, and Wroth improves the occasion by ex-
horting them to bring as many friends as possible, for
that they were to acclaim and sign the Proclamation of
the king.

The way was thus skilfully prepared ; but in spite of
orchestral symphonies, bonfires, discharges of musketry,

144 DOUBLE-DEALING.

hurrahs, enthusiastic toasts, yea even the fumes of
liquor, these Acadians had not quite lost their wits,
and, when he finally presented the written oath to have
it signed, they respectfully reminded him that he had
forgotten to complete it, and requested him to insert the
restrictions they had always demanded in such an emer-
gency. He flew into a rage, cooled down, returned to
the attack on the morrow ; but, with their simple good-
nature, he found them still inexorable.

‘** They still insisted upon the same demands, and after having seri-
ously weighed them, and not judging them repugnant to Treaties,
Acts of Parliament and Trade, I granted them as an indulgence, and
by reason of their diffidence of my authority, I was obliged to certify
the same in the body of the oath.”

It was the same at Mines: the same manceuvres, the
same results. There, objections were made with refer-
ence to the word “ obéirai,”

“e.. whichgaveme no concern,the english being what I had to govern
myself by ; and finding by advice, the same might be translated in a
manner more agreable to them, and, at the same time, as conformable
to the english and as binding ; I thought proper to alter the same,
as appears by the oath they took.”’

So, here we have, says Rameau, a man who does not
scruple, in a treaty of which two copies were extant, to
alter one of them so as to render the agreement more
acceptable, and who is, meanwhile, fully aware that the
French will understand the text in one way, while he,
the Englishman, will understand it in quite a different
way. After all, says he, I will sign whatever they
wish ; for me, only the English text will count.

Wroth was very badly received by Armstrong, and
yet he had not swerved from his instructions ; he had,

DOUBLE-DEALING. 145

substantially, followed the same line of conduct as
Armstrong himself. By a decision of the council the
oath obtained by Wroth was declared null and void ;
but, most strange to relate—for these negotiations are a
series of surprises—-it was declared in the same resolu-
tion that, since the inhabitants had signed these acts and
proclaimed His Majesty, they had become his subjects
and would enjoy all the privileges attached to that
quality, which no doubt also implies all the obligations
resus therefrom.

146 PHILIPPS REDUX. |

CHAPTER VII.

Return of Philipps—All the Acadians of the peninsula take the
oath—Nature of this oath—It was entitled ‘‘ Oath of fealty,”
(‘‘Serment de Fidélite”), and the Acadians were called
‘¢ French Neutrals”—What the Compiler thinks of this—Park-
man.

WHOEVER confronts Armstrong’s reports on the ques-
tion of the oath with his letters to the Lords of Trade
after his operations, at. Annapolis, the other letter that
followed the failure of Captain Bennett, his instructions
to Wroth and the latter’s report, can easily account for
the indignation the Lords of Trade must have felt in
presence of this series of administrative tomfooleries
and tricks, worthy, at best, of a horse-jockey or a street
mountebank. . The exploits of Wroth had filled up the
measure; all this nonsense must now be stopped; the
Government's dignity gravely compromised by Arm-
strong must be restored; a final and fairly reasonable
settlement must be made of this eternal Acadian
question.

The Lords of Trade had recourse to Philipps, who
always retained the title of Governorof Nova Scotia. It
was not without regret that he quitted London where
he led so pleasant a life of leisure on his large salary.
He himself, in his first attempt, it is true, had not been
more fortunate than Armstrong ; but he was able at least
to command attention by his high position, his courtly
manners, his urbanity; and, at all events, the dignity of

HE ADMINISTERS THE OATH. 147

the crown would be safe in his hands. Moreover,
knowing by his own experience the inflexible determina-
tion of the Acadians with regard to military exemption,
he brought with him or was expected to have brought.
a solution to the difficulty, a middle term, which, he
trusted, would give them satisfaction. We know not
the tenor of his instructions, but his subsequent acts.
permit us to form a very correct estimate thereof.

Hardly had Philipps landed at Annapolis when he
set to work, and three weeks later, he wrote to the
Lords of Trade that he had administered the oath to all
the inhabitants of Annapolis, and that at the opening of
navigation he would do the same for the inhabitants of
Mines, Cobequid and Beaubassin, who, it was said, were
all disposed to take it resolutely, “ as they are pleased to
express that the good likeing they have to my Govern-
ment, in comparison of what they experienced afterwards,
did not a little contribute, and therefore, reserved this:
honor for me; indeed, J have had no occasion to make
use of threats and compulsion.”

Philipps had arrived in December, 1729. On 54).
tember 2nd following, he informed the Lords of Trade
that he had completed the.tendering of the oath to all the
Acadians of the province. “ A work,” says he, “ which
became daily more necessary in regard to the great in-
crease of those people, who are this day a formidable
body and, like Noah’s progeny, spreading themselves
over the face of the Province. You are not unacquainted
that for twenty years past they have continued stubborn
and refractory upon all summons of this kind, but
having essayed the difference of Government in my
absence, they signified their readiness to comply .

Thus far the peace of the country is settled.”

148 ORAL PROMISE.

How had Philipps been able to obtain, and apparently
with so much case, what he himself and others had
hitherto failed to obtain? Was this, as he boasted, due
to the superiority of his methods, to the mildness of his
government? What had really happened? What was
the nature of the oath obtained? Was there a clause
exempting the Acadians from bearing arms against the
French and their allies? And if so, was it written or
verbal ?

_ The answer is easy. Philipps, it is true, did not ex-
plain that to the Lords of Trade, he merely says that he
took care not to imitate Wroth’s shameful surrender.
‘Any further statement was unnecessary, since he had
but just come from England, his instructions were quite
fresh, and the question must have been discussed in all
its different aspects before his departure. Philipps well
knew by his own sad experience that he could not hope
for an unrestricted oath ; he must therefore have come
with- a solution all prepared, and this solution was—to
agree by word of mouth with the Acadians that they should
be exempt from bearing arms. A written promise an-
nexed to the oath was the difficulty that the authorities
could not surmount; it was, thought they, a shameful
capitulation, a derogation from the dignity of the crown.
It was not so for an oral promise, and that was, I have no
doubt, the concession which Philipps was instructed to
grant; for, in England at least, it was very well under-
stood that the Acadians could not be obliged to take up
arms against their fellow-countrymen. For the Acadians,
the objection to an oral promise was the lack of security ;
but this obstacle was not insurmountable. With a
man of Philipps’s high position, newly arrived from Eng-
land, who vouched for the word of his sovereign, the

HALIBURTON'S VIEW. | | 149

guarantee seemed sufficient, and diffidence ceased. Such
was, I firmly believe, the compromise proposed, discussed
and accepted ; it readily explains the prompt success of
the negotiations. |

When Haliburton wrote his history of Nova Scotia,
he had not access to the documents we now possess. He
does not even seem to have seriously tried to penetrate
the problem ; but, with his knowledge of this people, his
great talent of observation, developed by his experience
as a lawyer and a judge, he immediately perceived that
the Acadians could not have accepted an unrestricted
oath ; but he supposes treachery ; he recalls Armstrong’s
impostures, and supposes that some artifice of the kind
had been practised. He cannot have convinced these
men, he must have deceived them, says he. He was
right in the sense that the Acadians did not indeed take
an unrestricted oath. But I do not think they were
deceived. The promise was only verbal, but was ac-
cepted as a solemn promise. Haliburton, judging accord-
ing to previous events, cannot believe the Acadians
accepted simple oral promises.. His mistake arises from
his not adverting to the wide distinction they drew be-
tween a man of Armstrong’s character, so violent, so
crafty, so fickle, so little respected by the people about
him, a man whose position was after all only secondary,
and Philipps with his imposing dignity, his high position
and the authorization which he had brought with him
from England.

Contrary, then, to several historians, who have sup-
posed a written restrictive clause annexed to the body
of the oath and afterwards suppressed as was the oath
itself, which is not in the archives of Halifax, I assert
that, in all likelihood, the Acadians were not deceived by

‘

150 LAWRENCE’S TESTIMONY.

Philipps, that the restrictive clause about not bearing
arms was only verbal, and was accepted as such.

I would not undertake to establish the proof of this
restriction, had not the Compiler objected to it, and
Parkman accepted his objection. According to them
the oath of fidelity was taken by all the Acadians vol-
untarily and without any written or verbal condition.

In support of my contention, I shall first cite Gov-
ernor Lawrence, the very man who deported the
Acadians. In his circular to the governors of New
England, which accompanied the transports laden with
‘exiled Acadians, I find the following: ‘“ The Acadians
‘ever refused to take the oath of Allegiance, without hav-
ing at the same time from the Governor an assurance in
writing that they should not be called upon to bear arms
in the defence of the Province, and with this General
Philipps did comply, of which His Majesty disap-
proved.”

This would seem to prove clearly that there was a
written promise; but Lawrence, I have every reason to
believe, was mistaken in that detail. The point on which.
he wished to throw light was the restriction in the oath,
and that alone is well founded ; the details, which were
only incidental to the principal fact, are false; and it
is equally false that His Majesty disapproved this re-
striction, for not the slightest trace of such disapproba-
tion appears in the public documents. All we see there
is a small discussion between the Lords of Trade and
Philipps on the construction of a sentence in the oath, a
mere matter of grammar. Lawrence, who was not very
particular, has construed this simple question of syn-
tax into a formal disapprobation of the oath.

In another letter of Lawrence to Sir Thomas Robin-

~

_A CLOUD OF WITNESSES. 151

son, of November 30, 1755, we find the following,
relative to the Acadians of Beaubassin:

‘‘ They were the descendants of those French who had taken the
oath of allegiance to His Majesty in the time of General Philipps’s
Government, with the reserve of not taking arms.”’

Another letter from Lawrence, in the Archives of
Nova Scotia, page 259, contains this passage :

** As the Acadians of this Province have never yet at any time taken
the oath of allegiance unqualified.”

Governor Cornwallis, in his letter, dated September
11, 1749, to the duke of Bedford, writes :

‘*T cannot help saying that General Philipps deserved the highest
punishment for what he did here, his allowing a reserve to the oath
of allegiance.”

The same Governor, addressing the Acadian deputies,
said :

‘* You have always refused to take this oath without an expressed
reservation.’’ *

Governor Hopson, writing to the Lords of Trade,
December 10, 1752, said:

** Lord Cornwallis can likewise acquaint you that the inhabitants of
Beaubassin who had, taken the oath with General Philipps’s condi-
CON. 5”

Governor Mascarene, in a letter to Shirley in April
1748, said with reference to the oath obtained by
Philipps :

** The Acadians intending to have a clause not to be obliged to take
up arms against the French, though not inserted, they have always

*N. 8. Archives, p. 174,

152 ACADIAN CERTIFICATE.

stood was promised to them ; and I have heardit owned by those who
were at Mines when the oath was administered at that place, that
such a promise was given. Their plea with the French, who pressed
them to take up arms, was their oath.”’

In 1744, when war was raging between France and
England, an attempt was made to oblige the Acadians
to serve as pilots and guides; but the Acadians, believ-
ing that their oath exempted them from a service that
appeared contrary to their neutrality, addressed a petition
to the governor to ask him his opinion on this point.
Governor Mascarene replied :

‘* Tf in taking this oath of allegiance, the Government was kind
enough to say to you, that it would not compel you to take up arms, it
was out of pure deference. That they were not thereby exempted from
- serving as pilots and guides.... Whereupon, they withdrew their
petition.

There are other proofs of the same kind in twenty
different places in the volume of the Archives, and
particularly on pages 204, 233, 234.

It was not without some apprehension that the Aca-
dians consented to waive their claim to a written proof;
so, in order to provide for emergencies, they, immediately
after the taking of the oath, drew up a certificate, which
was signed and attested, and addressed to the minister
of foreign affairs in Paris, to be, in ase of necessity,
appealed to by the French Government.

‘** We, Charles de la Goudalie, priest, missionary of the parish of
Mines, (Grand Pré and River aux Canards) and Noel Alexandre Noir-
ville, priest bachelor of the faculty of theologians of la Sarbonne, mis-
sionary and parish priest of the Assumption and of the Holy Family
of Pigiguit, certify to whom this may concern, that His Excellency
Richard Philipps, etc., etc., has promised to the inhabitants of Mines
and other rivers dependent thereon, that he exempts them from bear-
ing arms and fighting in war against the French and the Indians, and

“FRENCH NEUTRALS.” 156

that the said inhabitants have only accepted allegiance and promised
never to take up arms in the event of a war against the Kingdom of
England and its government.

‘* The present certificate made, given and signed by us here named,
this April 25, 1780, to be put into the hands of the inhabitants, to be
available and useful to them wherever there shall be need or reason
for it.

‘“* Signed : de la Goudalie, parish priest; Noel Noirville, priest and
missionary.

**Collated by Alexander Bourg Belle-Humeur, this 25th April,
1730.”’

It would be difficult not to admit the force of the
proof I have just given. I might add the very signifi-
cant fact that, since 1730, the Acadians were universally
known by the name of “ French Neutrals.” Thus are
they very often designated by. the official documents.
emanating from the governors of the province and from
the Lords of Trade. To pretend, as the Compiler does,
that their oath contained no restriction, would be to de-
stroy all the significance of this appellation, and to sup-
pose an absurdity.

In spite of all this evidence the Compiler says:
“Governor Philipps, on his return to Annapolis in 1730,.
brought the people, at last, to take an unconditional oath.
willingly.” The reader will be curious to know what
grounds the Compiler had to establish a pretension that.
was never alleged at this epoch, and which is expressly
and repeatedly contradicted by all the governors of
the Province, who succeeded Philipps, namely : by Mas-
carene, Cornwallis, Hopson, and Lawrence. The reply is
very simple: his pretension is utterly groundless. In the
entire volume, which he himself compiled, there is not
one sentence, not one word that supports his pretension
or implies it, whether directly or indirectly. This may
appear strange, but it is not so for me who am accus-

154 THE COMPILER INVENTS.

tomed to the artifices of the Compiler. It would be
difficult to express in fit language the conduct of aman
who dares to uphold such views not only without any
proof, but against a mass of documents that destroy
them.

“In April, 1730,” says the Compiler, “ Governor Phil-
ipps announced to the council the unqualified sub-
mission of the inhabitants.” . No such thing occurred.
Neither to his council, nor to the Lords of Trade did Phil-
ipps ever use the expression “ unqualified,” nor any other
-equivalent one; at least there is not a trace thereof in
the Compiler’s volume, and there can be no doubt that
-any document that contained such an expression would
not have been omitted, as he omits such documents only
as are unsuited to his purpose.

Until now I have had to attack only his bad faith,
and that was bad enough; but it is, if such a thing be
possible, outdone by his presumption. Listen to him:

-“ The-term ‘*‘ Neutral French ’’ having been so frequently applied
to the Acadians in public documents, their constant denial of an un-
qualified oath ever having been taken by them, the reiterated asser-
tions of their priests. . . led the governors at Halifax, in 1749, and at
subsequent periods, erroneously to suppose that no unconditional

-oath of allegiance had ever been taken by the people of Acadia to
‘the British Crown.”’

This is really ridiculous. A man must fancy himself
-endowed with intuitive cognition and born with infused
-science, before he thus ventures to substitute his own
groundless view for the wisely formed opinions of all his
predecessors, and to set himself against them all. He.

is ludicrously in earnest when he proclaims to the world
that the term “French Neutral” never had any foun-
dation in fact. ‘The contemporaries of these events, the

-

THE COMPILER INVENTS. 155

governors and Lords of Trade, when they made use
of it in public documents, knew not what they were
_ saying. Mascarene, who had been present at the taking
of Port Royal in 1710, who in 1730 was counsellor to
Philipps, and in 1740 governor himself, knew nothing.
The officers of the garrison who had been, some of them,
witnesses of this tendering of the oath, and who had
reported it to Mascarene, Cornwallis, Hopson and Law-
rence, knew nothing. All these governors had a thou-
sand ways of ascertaining the true state of the case ;
yet, they knew nothing. The facts that they so posi-
tively affirm were contrary to their interests and desires,
and, nevertheless, they let themselves be imposed upon
by the affirmations of the Acadians. What a fraud
history is, if this be the case! But, considering that
this attempt to overthrow one of the best established
historical facts is supported only by the ipse divit of a
man living in a different century, even though he be a
compiler of archives, I prefer to say: What monumen-
tal audacity !

“ Their constant denial ........ led the governors to be-
eve ENE, 5 , as if there had then been a great contro-
versy on this subject between the Acadians and the
’ governors; whereas, I repeat, there is not one sentence,
not one word in the whole volume of the archives, com-
piled by himself, that shows it was so. It is a pure
fabrication. And, if in reality this question had been
the object of a controversy, it would be necessary to
believe that the Acadians were able to satisfy these
governors that their pretensions were well founded, and
then it would be rash for a fin-de-siécle compiler of the
nineteenth century to dispute the validity of facts a
century and a half old, already pondered, matured and

156 PARKMAN RECTIFIES.

accepted by contemporaries whose interest it was not to
admit them. ‘“ Their constant denial of an unqualified
oath, and the rezterated assertions of their priests... led
the governors erroneously to believe”.... According
to this ineffable compiler, the testimony, the constant
affirmations of the Acadians and their priests, all count
for nothing, are not worth the least verbal report of the
vilest soldier of the garrison; that is no doubt the
reason why he has systematically omitted the few
documents coming from the Acadians. In this spirit
has all this volume been compiled.

Haliburton, it is easy to see, cannot have known the
opinion on this subject of the four governors I have
just named ; however, his powers of observation and his
legal instinct, aided by his impartiality, had guided him
securely in this search for truth. He had not been able
to believe in an oath without restriction; the subse-
quent discoveries showed he was right. Thus is true
history written; one must possess these qualities to
write it; otherwise it is only a lie.

Parkman, on this point, as on many others, has
endorsed the opinion of the Compiler. It is so conven-
ient to find opinions ready-made. But, there is this
difference between them: while the Compiler had abso-
lutely no ground for his opinion, Parkman had at least
the excuse of resting on the Compiler’s authority.
Slender as this is, let him have the benefit of it.*

* Since the foregoing was written, Mr. Parkman in his new work, “A
Half Century of Conflict” has rectified in these terms what he had for-
merly said : ,

“‘ Recently, however, evidence has appeared that, so far at least as regards
the Acadians on and near the. Mines Basin, the effect of the oath was quali-
fied by a promise on the part of Philipps that they should not be required
to take up arms either against French or Indians.”

Mr. Parkman had accepted the opinion of the Compiler without verify-
ing it. I must do him the justice of admitting that he likes to found his

PARKMAN RECTIFIES. 157

statements on something ; but he is wrong in saying: “recently evidence
has appeared,” for with the exception of the affidavit of Messrs. de la
Goudalie, Noirville and Bourg, the entire proof I have produced is drawn
from the volume of the Archives itself, which he quotes frequently in his
former work, “‘ Wolfe and Montcalm ;” however, some labor is needed to
combine the factors of this proof. Besides,his correction is incomplete, as
he applies to the Acadians of Mines what should apply to all.

158 QUESTION APPARENTLY SETTLED.

CHAPTER VITI.

Philipps returns to England 1731—Armstrong resumes the admin-
istration of the province—His character, his difficulties with
Major Cosby, Blinn, Winniett, etc.—His relations with Mau-
geant—The Compiler, his omissions, his artifices—Suicide of
Armstrong, Dec. 6th, 1739. |

AT last, this question of the oath, so long an occasion
of strife, vexation.and uncertainty, was, apparently at
least, settled for good. There was no more question of
it for twenty years till the foundation of Halifax in 1749.
Until then, the Acadians had been held captive in the
‘country by the orders and hindrances of the governors,
who had refused to accept in good faith the os and
conventions of Queen Anne.

Wearied of a bootless struggle, the Atta had
accepted the oath of fealty which granted them the
‘exemption which they clung to so earnestly. They were
becoming English subjects, and were finally giving up the
ever-entertained idea of a departure. Their agricultural
holdings, which had suffered from this uncertainty, were
about to make rapid progress. Peace and contentment
were about to take the place of distrust, and prosperity
was going to spring up anew.

This period of twenty years was the most tranquil,
the happiest and most prosperous in the history of
Acadia. The Acadians had still to suffer from Arm-
strong, who, for nine years after the departure of

“PROCUL A JOVE.” 159°

Philipps, once more filled the office of lieutenant-
governor; but as much might be said of the garrison,
the officers and the council, all of whom suffered perhaps.
even more than the Acadians, because the daily contact
they had with him exposed them still more to his whims .
and bursts of anger. On the whole the Acadians did
not feel the yoke too severely; in fact, those of Mines .
and Beaubassin were almost left to themselves. For a.
long time there was almost no other garrison in the:
Province than that of Annapolis. Outside this place the -
authority of the governmént was in no way represented, .
except perhaps by the notary, who was at the same time -
receiver of the rents and revenues of the Crown, which
were very little. These notaries, moreover, were them- -
selves Acadians,* and, during six months of the year, all
communications between these places and Annapolis were -
interrupted. Disagreements between Acadians were.
rare, and were usually settled by arbiters, except those -
arising from the limits of their lands, which were re-
ferred to the Council of Annapolis. These latter seem
to have been frequent after 1780. These properties.
had never been regularly surveyed, and, as the popula-
tion rapidly increased and the government refused or
delayed to make new concessions, the result was re-
peated subdivisions of the land and frequent conflicts, .
which were submitted to the decision of the council. I
shall return to this subject.

I would like to speak as seldom as possible of the -
Compiler, but, in spite of myself, I am forced to return
to him, because he puts me in the impossibility of passing -

* Jean Duon was notary at Annapolis, Pierre Bergeron at Beaubassin,
Alexandre Bourg at Mines. Saint Cenne was physician at Annapolis, .
Bugeaud and Mouton at Mines.

160 . GRAVE LACUNAE. |

an enlightened judgment on many a phase of this—
history. His volume, which, in the intention of the
Legislature, was to serve for the general history of the
province, is, as I have already said, only a compilation
of complaints against the Acadians and the clergy.
Insignificant as they sometimes are, they take up the
whole of his space during Armstrong’s administration,
from 1725 to 1740. There is not in the volume of the
Archives asingle document emanating from the Acadians
or their priests during these fifteen years; it was not,
however, because they were completely wanting, since
in several of Armstrong’s letters to the Lords of Trade
he makes mention of copies of such documents which he
communicates to them.

Not only does the volume of the Archives contain
nothing but letters setting forth complaints against the
Acadians and the clergy, but these letters are mutilated
in such a way as to exclude all that does not relate
thereto. It is easy to understand that Armstrong in his
letters to the Lords of Trade must have most carefully
avoided whatever might damage him; but his other let-
ters, treating of his endless difficulties with his officers,
his council and all his attendants, are quite sufficient to
give us a clear insight into his character, and these
were omitted by the Compiler, who, I have no hesitation
in saying it, has carefully eliminated all that might
direct suspicion to Armstrong. And, if Armstrong’s
own letters are a sufficient portrait of himself, how much
more life-like that portrait would be, if in each case the
letters of others about him were also shown? Did the
Compiler imagine that writers who like to get to the
bottom of a question were going to accept as proved
and indisputable every accusation brought by Arm-

ARMSTRONG’S MISDEEDS. Jel

strong, even were this man what the Compiler has en-
deavored to make him? With some people, doubtless,
he has succeeded; but all this deception will come to an
end: for, not to speak of the researches of painstaking
writers on this subject, the Government of Nova Scotia
will, I trust, understand how it is its bounden duty to
have the Archives overhauled and that compilation
completed and corrected, which has issued so incomplete
and so one-sided from the hands of Thomas B. Akins.

_ Through the fault of this Compiler, I am unable to
satisfy myself and the public fully as to Armstrong’s
administration, which occupies, in the period of history
I am engaged on, fifteen years, that is, nearly one-third
of the whole. Though the Compiler’s handling of the
other two-thirds is not much better, I have at least had,
in certain parts, the advantage of receiving more com-
plete information from documents outside the volume
of the Archives. 7

I will, however, try to make up, as best I can, for the
Compiler’s omissions, and to show, what he hides, the
character of Armstrong ; for that purpose I shall in cer-
tain cases receive help from the curtailed portion of the
documents that he delivers to us, in others, from new
documents coming mostly from Armstrong himself.
Thus, to a great extent, which is certainly a rare priv-
ilege, Armstrong shall be judged by himself.

We have already seen what Lieutenant-Governor
Caulfield said of him to the Lords of Trade, when Arm-
strong was as yet only captain in the regiment gar-
risoned at Annapolis in 1715. We have seen how he
had made himself enemies at Boston among the mer-
chants of the place. We have seen, besides, by another

letter dated October 24, 1735, not cited in the volume of
11

162. - ARMSTRONG’S MISDEEDS.

the Archives, that, as soon as he arrived at Canso from
London with his commission as lieutenant-governor, he —
wrote to the Lords of Trade, that he had asked to have
_ from Boston sixty Indians and twelve whalers, that he
had from Commodore St. Lo the promise of sixty
marines, that, with all of these joined to the soldiers of
his garrison, he intended to traverse the province for
the purpose of forcing the Acadians to take the oath.
He ended his letter thus: “I hope we shall do our
duty, and give a good account of ourselves.” True, he
did nothing of the kind; but perhaps he could not help
himself. Atall events this letter speaks volumes for
his character. 3

At the same time he complained of Captain John
Eliot, Captain Franklin, Captain Kenwood and several
others. On September 23, 1726, he accused his servant,
John Nichols, of an assault on his person. In the month
of July following, Mr. Shirreff, secretary of the council,
resigned his position after some difficulties he had with
Armstrong. A month later, as Murdoch writes: “ A
discord arose between Armstrong and M. M. Winniett,
James Blinn and Bissell, merchants, connected with the
supplies for the garrison.” August 23d, Armstrong in-
formed the council: “of M. Blinn’s insolent behaviour
to him on Monday last, upon the public parade, before
most of the officers and soldiers of the garrison, where,
after a great deal of disrespectful language and unman-
nerly gestures, he, at length, told him that he would
not give him two pence for his commission.”

In September of the sante year he notified the inhabi-
tants of Annapolis to take the oath. They refused un-
less he would insert the restriction. He imprisoned the
three delegates they sent him, Landry, Bourgeois and

WINNIETT. 163

Richard: “It was ordered that they should be sent to
prison and laid in irons.” Landry’s wife applied to
Armstrong, in consequence of her husband being
dangerously ill, to grant his liberty on surety for his re-
turn when recovered. Her prayer was rejected.

July 12, 1728, Armstrong wrote to Mr. Stanion, of
the office of the Secretary of State : “ Several complaints
being sent against me by two or three malicious leaders
in this Province, although not exhibited, but lodged in
the hands of Governor Philipps, who, I am sure, only
wants a proper opportunity of making his own use of
them to my prejudice.” Murdoch, the estimable author
of a history of Nova Scotia, to whom I owe some of my
quotations, says, that Armstrong had, in 1711 and after-
wards, undergone some losses, and that in consequence
he became “unhappy, irritable, and jealous. He sus-
pected Philipps and Cosby of being his enemies,” the
last named gentleman because he had married the
daughter of Winniett, with whom Armstrong had had
some difficulties. ‘Mr. Winniett,” continues Murdoch,
“geems to have been married to an Acadian lady and
to have had great personal influence among the Aca-
dians, but I believe it was never used for any improper
purpose, and that he was upright, loyal and kindly dis-
posed.” !

June 23, 1729, Armstrong wrote again to the Lords

1 Winniett, who was a merchant at Annapolis and counsellor of the gov-
ernor, had married in 1711 Marie Madeleine Maisonnat, second daughter
of Pierre Maisonnat and Marguerite Bourgeois. This Pierre Maisonnat,
in the wars that preceded the capture of Port Royal, was, together with
Pierre Morpain and Francis Guyon, the terror of Boston commerce. He
was known throughout all New England by the name of ‘“ Bapiiste.”
Toward 1706 his vessel. was taken and he himself brought prisoner to Bos-
ton. In 1707 he was exchanged for Rev. John Williams, the unfortunate
victim of the massacre of Deerfield. Major Cosby, lieutenant-governor of

the garrison of Annapolis, married Anne, the eldest daughter of Winniett.
Pierre Maisonnat settled about 1712 at Beaubassin with his wife’s relatives.

Saal
al

164 MAUGEANT.

of Trade. In this letter, which is very long, he com-
plains of everybody, of Major Cosby in particular, of
Father Breslay, of the French papists, of the collector of
customs, etc., etc.

On the arrival of Philipps, in 1730, Armstrong went
back to England, whence he returned the following
year. Here is what Philipps wrote to the Secretary of
State a few weeks after his arrival at Annapolis: “I
found at my coming a general dissatisfaction in all
parts, and disagreement between the two lieutenant-goy-
ernors (Cosby and Armstrong) about the right of
power and command, which drew the inferior officers
into parties ; but I assure Your Grace it is now the reverse.
Joy and satisfaction appear in every countenance among
the people, and in the garrison tranquillity.”

This letter is in the volume of the archives, but the
part I quote is omitted. Doubtless it is by mistake the
Compiler dates this letter January 3, 1729, for in
reality it should be January 3, 1730:

The following fact is a revelation of Armstrong’s
character. In 1726, there arrived at Annapolis a
Frenchman by the name of Maugeant, who, when ex-
amined by the council, admitted that he was fleeing
from French justice for a murder he had committed at
Quebec. He pleaded as an excuse self-defence. Arm-
strong made him his man of business, his instrument,
and, as far as we can judge, his intimate counsellor.

With Armstrong’s confidence and protection, Maugeant
incurred the detestation of everybody: officers, soldiers,
and Acadians. His infatuation for Maugeant was so
great that he took him with him to England, on the
arrival of Philipps. Here is what Philipps wrote of
him, September, 2, 1730: )

PHILIPPS AND ARMSTRONG. 165

7 Tjieut.-Col. Armstrong who is gone for England, carried with
him one Maugeant, a french papist, who fled lately from Canada into ~
this Province fora barbarous murder. The Lieut.-Governor took
him into his protection and admitted him to take the oath, after
which he rendered himself exceedingly odious to the inhabitants,
both English and French, they, believing that the Lieut.-Governor
acted toward them by his council and advice. At my arrival, he,
finding many complaints were ready to be exhibited against him,
petitioned for leave tosretire, which, being granted, with a defense
never to return, gave a general satibfactlon, and proved a great in-
ducement casiands their submission to the Crown of Great Britain.
The fellow’s character is very bad, but is allowed to have a genius,
and would make an excellent minister to an arbitrary prince.”’

This letter is also in the volume of the archives,
except, however, this citation; and nevertheless this
short extract says more as to the character of Arm-
strong and is more useful to the general history of the
Province than many other documents found therein.

Philipps sang his own praises rather loud when he
attributed his prompt success to the good remembrance
every one had preserved of him, and to the difference
between his administration and Armstrong’s. He can-
not be judged exactly by his own valuation; for,
though he undoubtedly possessed great practical. judg-
‘ment, tact, and many of the qualities that go to make a
good administrator, yet all this was favored and en-
hanced by circumstances; the contrast made him seem
greater than he really was. ;

Obliged to return to England for affairs of his regi-
ment, he was again replaced by Armstrong. At the
moment of his departure, Philipps wrote to the Duke of
Newcastle: ‘“‘It imports me much to be very careful of
delivering up the Government to Lieutenant-Governor
Armstrong with the greatest exactness, who is turning
up every stone and raking into every kennel, to find

i

166 PHILIPPS AND ARMSTRONG.

some dirt to bespatter me with, in hopes that some
_ may stick, etc., etc.” He accuses him of ingratitude.

Hardly had Philipps gone home, when Armstrong’s dif-
ficulties commenced again worse than before with Cosby
and Winniett. Cosby did not wish to sit with Arm-
strong, and the council was reduced to four councillors.
Twice in the course of the autumn of 1732 did Arm-
strong complain of both these councillors to the Lords
of Trade. At that time he wished to establish a fort at_
Mines, but was prevented by the Indians. Murdoch says
in reference to this: ‘ Armstrong accuses and suspects
everybody i in his disappointment.”

There is reason to believe that Armstrong’ S unpopu-
larity and his ever-recurring difficulties embittered him
more and more and drew upon him a severe reprimand
from the Lords of Trade; for he ended by committing
suicide, December 6,17389. He had made his will a
month before, and a few weeks after his death all his goods
were seized in the hands of his executors, to pay for
rents and government. fees which he had collected for
several years without rendering any account of them ;
in other words he was a peculator.

I ask the reader: Is the writer that does not get firm
hold of these facts a person capable of forming a sound
estimate of events? By silently ignoring them, does
he fulfil his duty towards the public as an historian ?
I think not; on the contrary, I think that, when there
is question of a government the power of which is
centred in the hands of a single man, the first duty of
the historian is to seek to penetrate the character of
that man. This once found, he has the secret that will
enable him to disentangle and elucidate many confused
situations, to substitute light for darkness.

SOME VIRTUES, MANY VICES. Y > <LBT.

I might perhaps express an opinion about some of
Armstrong’s difficulties; I will not do so; it is not
necessary. It matters little, after all, whether in this or
that particular case he may have been right or wrong.
The fact that he was in a continual turmoil during his
whole administration, with everybody and everywhere,
is ample evidence that he himself was the author of his
troubles through his cross-grained and hot-tempered
nature. His was an ill-balanced mind. This makes it
more difficult to understand and judge him than a man
whose character is firm and steadfast, whether for good
or evil; however, enough is known of him to preclude
all danger of a mistake. He was by turns kind and
tyrannical. Amidst his fits of rage and his brutalities he
sometimes gave proofs of humane feelings and of a sin-
cere desire to promote the interests of his government.
Though despotic at times, he was the first to suggest
to the Lords of Trade the establishment of a representa-
tive assembly, and, when he saw that his idea was for the
moment impracticable, he nevertheless granted the Aca-
dians, and that spontaneously, the privilege to name
deputies, Their functions and powers were almost null ;
yet this creation of his,was wise and disinterested ; it
produced excellent results under his successor.

While passing judgment on his character and admin-
istration, we cannot forget these facts; however, they
atone but very poorly for his long series of administra-_
tive buffooneries, his frauds, his unspeakable brutalities.
He made enemies of all the people abouthim: of Major
Crosby, of the secretary of the Council, of the mer-
chants, the Acadians, the clergy, and even of Philipps,
with whom it was so much his interest to be on good
terms. His authority had so fallen into discredit that

168 ACADIAN LETTERS MISSING.

he was even publicly insulted by a merchant of the place
and suffered a personal assault from his servant. It
would indeed be something quite unprecedented if dif-
ficulties so frequent and persistent crossed the path
of one who knew how to use his authority with dignity
and justice. The tree is judged by its fruits.

Nothing gives us a better insight into Armstrong’s
character than his relations with Maugeant. Though
the latter had been expelled by Philipps on account of his
criminal record, and for having made himself odious to
everybody, Armstrong took him with him to England
as a chosen companion, brought him back again after
eighteen months’ absence, and, in direct opposition to
the orders of his chief, retained him near his own person
even till death, as his intimate counsellor and the instru-
ment of his caprice. In view of these facts it is not
surprising that Armstrong’s authority had fallen so low.

It will be readily understood that what I have alleged
embraces only a very small part of Armstrong’s deeds
and feats, for, I have hardly touched on the last seven
years of his administration, the years that immediately
preceded his suicide. Very little is known of the
events of that period; presumably, this suicide was
brought on by the aggravation of his faults and disap-
pointments so keenly felt by his ill-balanced mind as to
throw it completely out of gear; but the Compiler cun-
ningly saw that all this would throw too much light on
Armstrong’s administration and character, and defeat
his purpose ; so he deemed it expedient to eliminate
carefully whatever might reflect upon Armstrong, in
order, thereby, to animadvert with cumulative force
upon the Acadians and the clergy. When the docu-
ments contain nothing against them, his occupation is

ACADIAN LETTERS MISSING. 169

gone; he creates a vacuum. And, so far did hé carry
these tactics, that he even carefully omitted all docu- -
ments which would let the reader know of Armstrong’s
suicide.

The better to exhibit his artifice, I here give the num-
ber of the documents that the volume of the Archives
contains for each year of Armstrong’s administration:
1725, 3—17 26, 41727, 11—1728, 1—1729, 1—1731, 5—
1732, 9—1733, 0—1734, 0—1735, 1—1736, 2—1737, 0—
1738, 0—1739, 0. Except five or six documents of the
Council, this collection is wholly made up of Arm-

_strong’s own letters to the Lords of Trade. There is

not a single letter from the Acadians or the priests,
and yet there were such communications, since even
Armstrong’s letters mention’ several of them. Writing
on June 10th, 1732, he says: “I transmit the enclosed
letters; Nos. 4,5, 6, from priest de la Goudalie ; 7, 8,
are mine; No. 9 is from René Le Blane.” In another
letter of Nov. 22nd, 1736, he writes: “ No. 1 is M. St.
Ovide’s first letter, No.2 is my answer; No. 3 are the
minutes of the Council; No. 4 is M. St. Poncy’s decla-
ration in Council; No. 5 are the minutes of Council:
No. 6 is the petition of the Acadians.”

170 . STRONG LANGUAGE. ~

CHAPTER IX.

Armstrong’s difficulties with the clergy—The case of Abbé de
Bréslay, Abbé Isidore, and Messrs Chauvreulx and de St. Poncy—
Painful situation of the clergy—Their attitude.

In the preceding chapter I have, of Armstrong’s diffi-”
culties, touched only on those which he had with his
_ officers, his council, and the English merchants of Anna-
polis. It may reasonably be supposed that he had some
also with the priests and the Acadians. Strange to say,
_ those he had with the Acadians are few in number and
relate only to the question of the oath before it was
settled by Philipps in 1730, and they are of so trivial a
nature that the reader may well be spared the recital of
them. All may be reduced to some complaints to the
Lords of Trade concerning their refusal to take the oath
in the form desired ; but, if the facts are in themselves
insignificant or justifiable, the expressions Armstrong
uses are not wanting in force. Their conduct, in so
resisting his wishes, is repeatedly termed: undutiful,
insolent, contemptuous, etc., ete.

He had far more trouble with the clergy ; but, just as
it would be impossible in most cases to judge between
Armstrong and Philipps, Armstrong and Cosby, Arm-
strong and Winniett, so it would be impossible for me
to judge between Armstrong and the priests with whom
he was at variance. After what is known of Armstrong,
who would venture to accept as the exact truth all he
has said of Philipps and Cosby, and to believe, upon his

M. DE BRESLAY. 171

simple affirmation, that he was right and they were
wrong? No one, I presume, would be so rash. Simi-
larly, I am utterly unable to decide between Armstrong
and these priests. I regret it: for, 1 would act with
the same freedom of mind as if there were question of
anything else; I regret it, because, far from discourag-
ing me, problems of this sort have a particular attrac-
tion. The reproach I should feel most would be that
I let myself be influenced by prejudices, likes or dis-
likes, all of which itis my most sincere desire to eschew.
It were, I think, a legitimate inference, after what has
been said of Armstrong, that, in his difficulties with
Philipps, Cosby or others, the blame was generally on
his side, and, when it was not wholly so, he was guilty
of having drawn the quarrel upon himself.

The first important difficulty of this kind was with
M. de Breslay, parish-priest of Annapolis. All that we
know of it is contained in a letter of Armstrong’s to

the Lords of Trade, dated June 23d,1729. This letter,

as a matter of course, is published by the Compiler, but,
as he only gives the middle of it (the part indicated
herein by italics), I transcribe it here almost in full,
because the passages he has suppressed modify consid-
erably the part he has given. Armstrong first speaks
of a series of insults committed against him by divers
persons of his garrison and others :

‘‘Through the malice of some people who are abetted and en-
couraged by the favor and countenance of Major Cosby, the

. Lieut.-Governor of this garrison, who, forgetting his character and

dignity, has condescended to become a party in the malicious con-
trivances of my enemies, who, without any regard to truth or
justice, or His Majesty’s service, have obstructed, vilified and mis-
represented all my actions.

‘* The first person I shall take notice of for his notorious inso-

172 M. DE BRESLAY.

lence is M. de Breslay, the Popish priest of this river, who, having
for some time past endeavoured to withdraw the people from their
dependence on H. M’s Government, by assuming to himself the
authority of a judge in civil affairs, and employing his spiritual
censures to force them to asubmission. His insolence and tyranny
growing at last insupportable, I sent the adjudant to him to his
house, to desire to speak with him, but his intelligence proved so
good, though nobody was acquainted therewith but Major Cosby,
that, before the adjudant could reach his house, he was gone off, and
has ever since absconded in the woods, about this river, among the
Indians, pursuing his former practices of obstructing H. M’s
service, and exciting the savages to mischief. To prevent which,
I thought proper, by an order, published at the’Mass house, to
command him to be gone out of the Province in a month’s time.
‘The Sieur Maugeant, whom I employed for to read the same
to them in French, in the presence of the Fort Major, M. Wroth,
and some other gentlemen, which, having done, as they were re-
turning back to make me a report, amongst a crowd of people,
they happened to meet Major Cosby, the Lieut.-Governor, on the
highway, who, without any provocation, insulted and abused the
said Maugeant. . . Major Cosby sent me immediately a complaint
. against the said Maugeant, alleging that he had affronted him, by
grinning or laughing in his face. I found M. Cosby’s allegations
against Maugeant to be frivolous and groundless, and the true
reason of the affront and insult to proceed from his resenting the
services M. Maugeant had done His Majesty by reading and pub-
lishing my orders to the people against their departing the Prov-
ince without leave, and against M. de. Breslay, the Popish priest,
whose cause he avowedly espouses merely in opposition to me.”

Such was the accusation. The obvious inference is
that M. de Breslay had.been chosen as arbiter ; that
one of the parties refused to submit to his decision, and
that he had made use of ecclesiastical censures to con-
strain him thereto. But there was question here -
neither of conspiracy against the safety of the state nor
of direct offence against authority. Arbitration has
always been allowable in the settlement of differences,
and it is devoutly to be wished that this practice were

MUCH ADO ABOUT NOTHING. 173

more general. The fact that nations are adopting it in
our own time is one of the healthiest signs of social prog-
ress in this nineteenth century. The censures may have
been misused or inflicted for trivial motives ; but such
abuse bore with it its own remedy, by averting suitors
from an arbiter who had so high-handed a way of en-
forcing his judgments. It was indeed very impolitic
of the priest thus at once to ruin the popularity of his
tribunal. However, Armstrong’s brutality must as-
suredly have been most terrifying to oblige him to flee
into the woods for such a peccadillo; and it is known
from other sources that for more than a year he did not
dare present himself at Annapolis. Very likely the.
case is not fully stated by Armstrong in his letter, for
M. de Breslay, before returning, lodged his complaints
in England and defended himself against the accusation
of meddling with the affairs of the government, by pro-
ducing certificates from Philipps and Cosby, attesting
that on all occasions, as far as they knew, he had be-
haved well.* That part of Armstrong’s letter which is
eliminated by the Compiler shows us that Cosby had
espoused the cause of M.de Breslay. This was impor-
tant. It was calculated to throw some doubt on the
justice of Armstrong’s proceedings, and the Compiler
would have acted very kindly had he not deprived the
public of this information. Very little is known of
Cosby. He may have been no better than Armstrong ;

* Armstrong insulted M. de Breslay even in the church while he was
officiating, and had some of the people flogged in order to force them to
bear witness against him. He broke open his doors, plundered his house
and sold his cattle, keeping the proceeds for himself ; finally, he drove him
by his violence to go and hide in the depths of the woods during more
than fourteen months. M. de Breslay saw noother means to protect himself
than to lodge his complaints in England, whither the governor had to go
in person to defend himself (Casgrain, Pélérinage au pays d’ Evangéline—
Archives de la marine et des colonies).

174 AN INTERDICTED PRIEST.

butit must certainly have been very disagreeable to him,
lieutenant-governor of the garrison, to see himself
cast into the shade, supplanted in his authority by this
Maugeant. With the above remarks, I leave the
de Breslay incident to the reader’s judgment.

Another of Armstrong’s difficulties was connected
with Father Isidore, who was an interdicted priest.
Armstrong wished to place him over the parish of Mines.
He ought to have had sense enough to understand
that a Catholic population would never consent to ac-
cept an interdicted priest. By the fact of his interdic-
tion he had no. more right than Armstrong himself to say
mass, hear confessions, or administer the sacraments:
in diplomatic parlance, his usefulness was gone. In his
anger Armstrong did not understand the obstacles he
was running up against; he wished to impose Father
Isidore anyhow; but in this case he was powerless to
accomplish his will; there ever remained to the in-
habitants the privilege of not attending church, and
against that Armstrong could effect nothing. That is
precisely what they did, and, to use an altogether
modern. expression, Father Isidore was boycotted. Inde
trae. Armstrong could punish the parish by refusing
it another priest; he did so as long as his rage lasted.

The most serious difficulty, or at least that which is
sometimes cited with accents of indignation against the
insolence of the priests, particularly by Parkman,
relates to Messrs. de Chauvreulx and de St Ponecy. As
there is here question of the actions of the Council, the
case would seem to deserve special attention ; but, it must
not be forgotten that Armstrong alone was not far from
constituting the whole force of the Council. His brutal-
ities had disgusted the most important members and

_IN HIGH DUDGEON. 175

kept them from attending it; those who still consented
to attend. (and the number was, at the arrival of
Philipps in 1730, no longer sufficient for a quorum)
had evidently to give up their independence. They had
either to submit to him or to resign, or at least to absent |
themselves on critical occasions. |

After this necessary explanation I shall reproduce in
their essential parts the minutes of the Council relating
to the case of Messrs. de Chauvreulx and de St. Poncy;
it is the last document that the Compiler transmits to us
concerning Armstrong’s administration, the document
nearest to the time of his suicide.

‘‘ Whereupon, M M. de St. Poncy and de Chauvreulx, the two
Romish priests, were called in and informed that it was judged
necessary before M. de St. Poncy’s departure for Cobequid, that he
or M. de Chauvreulx should first go to Pobomcoup, along with M:
d@’Entremont and Amherst, to use endeavors that restitution may
be made of the vessel’s sails and such other effects as the Indians
had taken. .

‘¢ They, thereunto, answered His Honor and the Board in a most
insolent, audacious and disrespectful manner, saying, that abso-
lutely they would not go, and that they would have nothing to do
in the affair ; and, being asked if they would not obey the just
and lawful orders of H. M.’s Government, to which M. de Chau- -
vreulx answered contemptuously with unbecoming air and un-
mannerly gestures, saying: ‘Que je suis ici de la part du Roi
de France,’ and M. de St. Poncy affrontingly affirming the same
also, in words to the same effect.

‘‘His Honor therefore told them that he had a mind to send
them to France.

‘“They replied with a laugh and a most haughty insolent air :
4 with all their hearts,’ then turn their backs and went out of the
room, seemingly in a great passion, slamming and throwing the
doors in a most rude and insolent manner, and without His
Honor’s leave left the Board.

‘‘Then M. d’Entremont being called, he said he was very sorry
for it, for it was his opinion that the most expedient method to
bring these Indians to reason and restitution would-be to send a

176 IMPERIOUSNESS.

priest ; a priest being also much needed to baptize and administer
the Sacrament.

‘* It was resolved to send them out of the Province.

‘* Whereupon, the two priests appearing again, their sentence
was read; they resumed their former insolence, calling for chairs
to sit down, saying that they did not appear as criminals, and that
they had no business with things temporal.”

Had the Compiler produced the declaration of M. de
St. Poncy, which Armstrong communicated to the Lords
of Trade with the minutes of the Council, we should
probably be better able to understand the situation.
After all, even according to Armstrong’s own statement,
it was a storm in a tea-cup. The demand was an impo-
sition, though it might have been accepted if preferred
as a polite request and not as an insulting command.
How that. command was intimated to them is what we
should know in order to be in a position to judge ; but,
even though this detail be not known, Armstrong is
sufficiently known; we know he had the knack of
offending everybody, and that his difficulties were almost
always the consequence of his petulance and fits of
anger. It must have been so in this case; otherwise it
would be inexplicable that two persons, even though
not clothed with the priestly dignity, should become,
both at the same moment, on hearing an unforeseen, or
apparently unforeseen injunction, so enraged as to
answer and act as the minutes of the Council represent
them. This is a most exceptional proceeding: a polite
request is usually followed by a polite reply, and an
insolence generally proceeds from’a previous insolence
either in the form of words, the attitude and manner,
or in the matter, by uttering an imperious order when
one has only the right to make a request. Armstrong
prudently throws a veil over his own manner on that

FLOATING A BRIGANTINE. 177

occasion ; but if one examine closely, he will see there
was question here of an order, which was more than he
had a right to use, on a point that did not regard the
duties of these priests; but even this does not alto-
gether suffice to explain the contents of the minutes of
the Council; the order must have been accompanied by
unbecoming conduct, or perhaps there may be some
other fact which we do not know. As in the case of
M. de Breslay, I am of opinion that Armstrong, here
also, only makes known a part of the proceedings, and
that what is omitted is the most important part.

To support my statement I have at hand a document
that would warrant very different conclusions, were I
not distrustful of possible rashness in deciding ques-
tions of this nature. The document bears upon this
very incident. Itseems that the religious persecution
which Armstrong exercised upon the Acadians of Anna-
polis had become so intolerable that they addressed a
petition to the King of France to interpose in their
favor with the English government, so as to put an end
to the persecution by determining more precisely the
position and the duties of the French priests in Acadia.

‘We beseech,” say they, ‘‘ Your Majesty to permit us to repre-
sent the sad situation to which we are reduced, declaring truly
that in the parish of Annapolis Royal, May 29th, 1736, contrary to
the treaty and to all the promises made to us when we took the oath
of fealty to His Majesty George II., Governor Armstrong forbade
Messrs. de St. Poncy and Chauvreulx, our two missionary priests,
as worthy ones as we have ever had, forbade them, we repeat, to
say mass, to enter the church, to hear our confessions, administer
the sacraments to us, and discharge any of their ecclesiastical
functions, arrested and obliged them to depart, though the gov-
ernor, or other persons whom he had gained over to his opinion,
were unable to show or prove that our above-named missionaries
have any other faults than those of which they pretend to find

178 | PERSECUTION.

them guilty, namely, not to have been willing to go far from our
_ parish to float a brigantine, which in no way concerns our mis-
sionaries and their functions.

**On the following Sunday the governor assembled the deputies
and forbade them to do anything or say any prayer in the chapel
up the river. These are the sad and deplorable conjunctures to
which we are daily exposed with respect to our religion, which
oblige us to implore respectfully Your Majesty, that you would
deign to have determined and permanently settled the conditions
by which our missionaries may hereafter abide, in order that we
may not be deprived of spiritual succor, atthe least whim of those
who command.”

Thus, therefore, according to this document, which
did not proceed ab irate as Armstrong’s letters generally
did, it was not, or it was not only, in order to make the
Indians restore the effects they had carried away from
a shipwrecked vessel, that Armstrong ordered M. de
St. Poncy to repair to Pobomcoup, but also to oblige
him to help in floating this stranded vessel. Thus
Armstrong was imposing on a, French subject and a
missionary the compulsory labor he was wont to exact,
and had the right to exact from the Acadians, as being
British subjects. If such were the case, and the affirm-
ation of the many persons that signed the petition is
surely worth Armstrong’s counter-affirmation, we find
ourselves in presence of an act of persecution and abuse
of authority that is a worthy complement to what we
already know of him. This fact explains in a rational
manner the insolence of which Armstrong complained,
and it would be difficult to explain it otherwise than by
an act of this character.

Moreover, even though his severities towards the two
missionaries had been justifiable, was not his forbidding
the Acadians to make use of the church to pray therein’
another equally tyrannical act? The author of the one

PERSECUTION. 179

might very well be the author of the other. Can any-
thing but a long series of arbitrary acts and persecu-
tions, of which, in fact, the petition complains, have
forced these people to implore the intervention of the
King of France in their favor ? * ?
From all that precedes it must be evident that the
volume of the archives is much too fragmentary and
incomplete for the purposes of history. With all my
efforts to complete it by the analysis of what it contains
and by my researches in other quarters, I feel that the
result is unsatisfactory; but I experience at least the
satisfaction of a conscientious effort to throw some light
on this “‘ Lost Chapter.” The reader must have already
understood what methods the Compiler follows, and also
that, when I accuse him of partiality and bad faith, I
assert nothing without powerful reasons therefor.

“As we are just now concerned with the Acadian
clergy, I shall immediately complete my view of them.
The facts I have pointed out must be the most im-
portant of the individual cases, for they are almost the
only ones that have found a place in the volume of the
archives, Nevertheless, insinuations of a general char-
acter were not wanting against them; far from it.
Often, indeed, were complaints made of their influence
and the exercise of this influence overthe Acadians. It
was supposed that the priests did all in their power to

When I undertook this work, I intended to publish only a series of
articles in rectification of what I deemed the errors ofan article inserted

- in “The Week” of Toronto from the pen of the historian, Stevens Pierce

Hamilton, who committed suicide at the beginning of this year (1893).
His conclusions were to a great extent drawn from the affirmations of the
self-murdered Armstrong and especially of what he said of Messrs. de
Chauvreulx and de St. Poney. I thought that the intemperance of his pen
was explained by his suicide, that he who wrote on the eve of his own
self-destruction was not in a suitable frame of mind to form a sound esti-
mate of history. This is the reason why I have dropped out his name and
transformed my articles into the work which I now offer to the public.

180 PARKMAN EXAGGERATES.

preserye them in their attachment to France, to avert
them from the oath and induce them to leave the
country. We are at liberty to believe that these accu-
sations were well-founded or not, or that they were so
to a certain extent. The authorities knew that the
priests possessed influence over them, they knew that
the Acadians obstinately refused to take the oath thrust
upon them; this was enough to give rise to suspicions,
which sometimes probably had more or less foundation.
~ Here there can -be little else than conjecture, and the
conclusions may vary according to the points of view,
according to one’s greater or less knowledge of the
behavior of the clergy; for no doubt this influence, if it
really were exercised, must have been used discreetly
enough to make it almost impossible for the authorities
to detect it. ;

Granting the morality of the Acadians which was
undoubtedly great, their ignorance which was not less
so, their peaceful manners, their isolation, their lively
faith, the strictness of the principles of their religion,
the clergy’s influence over them must have been great.
But, great though it was, Parkman has exaggerated
beyond all measure both this influence and its exercise, |
with the evident object of giving a brilliant illustration
to his favorite theory about the enervating action of the
clergy on Catholic peoples. Unquestionably, whoever
abdicates his liberty of thinking and acting in the
ordinary affairs of life, loses all initiative, becomes ener-
vated. However, I shall have to animadvert on too many
greater shortcomings of Parkman’s, to hold him to any
‘severe account for what is, after all, only an exaggera-
tion of facts in themselves partly true. I blame him
only for his exaggerations, which are inexcusable.

eee eS ee ee ee Re ee ee es ay Le Jk he? i ote ie: ae Sea es ee” ae es
yor R acte . Salt ae bad re & Wee ve 2 eA a te rise eo eee ee bat
* % nee ig to Yh as Ae ae tr, RS eT PP Oe Le RY By RES Se ,
> ~ T — at c Fl P

VARIOUS PLANS. 181

Enough on a point that would call for very special
treatment. Certain it is that the situation of the priests

- of Acadia at that time was extremely delicate and fraught

with danger. They were French subjects and mission-
aries to their compatriots in an English country bor-
dering on the French possessions, where the interests of
both nations were frequently in direct conflict. Their
position was awkward and difficult in many ways, and
the remedy to this state of things equally difficult to
find.

Armstrong thought of replacing these French priests
by others of English or Irish nationality. This project
could not have been realized: a move in that direction
would have provoked the departure of the Acadians.
The only remedy to this anomalous situation was to
create among the Acadians a hational clergy: The
authorities could reasonably say to them: We are
loyally bound to grant you the free exercise of your
religion; but in our interest and yours, to save you and. |
to save us froma delicate situation, beset with dangers,

it is becoming that your priests be chosen from among

your children, in order that their interests may be
identical with yours. As this cannot be accomplished
at short notice, we give you eight or ten years to attain
this object. We shall permit two French priests, of
whom one will be stationed at Mines and the other at

- Annapolis, to be exclusively occupied in educating

young men for the priesthood. After this period has

elapsed, you must provide for yourselves, and we will

no longer permit any French priests to enter into the
province, at least so long as France will be our neigh-
bor.

This plan does not seem to have occurred to any one

182 “VARIOUS PLANS.

at the time; it probably did not even enter the mind
of any of the governors. Until 1730, the question of
the oath and of the departure of the Acadians occupied
too much place to leave room for any such design.
After 1730, Armstrong, as I have just said, thought of
English or Irish priests; but the only project enter-
tained in the sequel was, either to expel the Catholic
priests and replace them by French Protestant ministers,
introducing at the same time among the Acadian popu-
lation French Protestants or simply English ministers
and English colonists, as we shall see later on. There
was sometimes a tendency to adopt the first project,
because it was thought more acceptable to the Acadians ;
but oftenest the second prevailed. The sentiments of
the Acadians thereon must have been little known to
those who conceived either plan, and imagined that
they would submit to such a poorly disguised conspiracy.
To formulate such a plan supposes that respect for
treaties, for conventions, for promises and for liberty of
conscience must have been greatly weakened, though,
indeed. it must be said, to the honor of the Home Govern-
ment, that these iniquitous projects formed at Anna-
polis and Boston never received, as far as I can see, the
least encouragement in London.

I am considering in this chapter only the attitude of
the clergy from the treaty of Utrecht till 1740. Iam
trying to show it in a light that will most truly and -
clearly set forth their share in the’ events of this epoch.
The best way to do this is to examine the state of minds
at this time and the interests on which the influence of
this clergy could be exercised. It is well known that
prejudices and fanaticism were never more rife. We
naturally expect expressions of contempt from Protes-

f

WHAT HAUNTED THE GOVERNORS. 183°

tants to Catholics and from Catholics to Protestants in
conversation and private documents; but, in perusing
the archives of Nova Scotia, we are astounded to find
that even these public documents are full of invective.
Armstrong and his predecessors, in their dispatches to
the Lords of Trade, invariably use such expressions as
“‘ Papists,” ‘“‘Popish superstition,” ‘¢ Mass house,” etc.,
etc. ‘ What better proof of their bad faith can I give ?”’
said Armstrong, ‘ they are papists.”

So long as Catholics and Protestants struggled in
each, state to remain or to become the dominant element,
the persecution was intense and plots frequent. When
the fight for supremacy was over, this gradually abated ;
but there remained the settled idea that the minority
were always plotting, whereas in reality, if there were
still any plot, it was oftenest that of the conqueror to
definitively crush the conquered. The human mind is
inclined to fall into extremes on questions of this sort.
Men either sleep peacefully while their enemy is work-
ing out their ruin, or they are morbidly sensitive to
imaginary intrigues that have no foundation in fact.
Thus were the governors of Acadia haunted by the idea
that the priests were constantly conspiring against the
safety of the state.

The better to comprehend the situation, let us con-
sider the points on which the influence of the clergy
could be brought to bear. First, there was the question
of the oath and of the departure. Did they use their.
influence for either alternative? There is room for
_ doubt, but I think it probable that some of the priests.
did to some extent seek to persuade or confirm the
Acadians in the idea of sis aan ac or of an oath with
proper restrictions.

184 NO PRIESTLY CONSPIRACY.

Practically, outside the fantastical picture drawn by
Parkman, here is what generally happens and what
must naturally have happened at that time. Priests are
not wanting whom no one dreams of consulting about
worldly matters, because, devoted entirely to spiritual
concerns, they hold themselves entirely aloof from
purely temporal interests. Others there are who are
very glad to give their opinion when asked; these are
consulted by a small number of persons, and their opin-
ion has more or less weight according to the importance
of the question and the reputation for wisdom they may
have earned. Finally, there are others, few in number,
who seek to impose their ideas and sometimes by unduly
interposing spiritual motives ; but, in such cases, there
is almost always agitation, murmuring, discord, religious
coldness, decrease of influence. One single interposi-:
tion of this kind by a priest is more remarked than the
silence of twenty others, and, at a distance, the noisy
exception easily passes for the rule. Thus perhaps
may be explained Parkman’s extravagant exaggerations.
The rule, however, was not different then from what it
is to-day, since, fifteen years later, Abbé Le Loutre was
severely reprimanded by the Bishop of Quebec for
having meddled with temporal affairs that did not con-
cern him, contrary to the instructions the bishop had
given him. |

I am of opinion, however, that the majority of the
priests expressed privately their opinion on this ques-
tion of the oath and the departure, but that opinion was
so obvious and so manifestly correct that this expression
of it was not necessary and had probably but little influ-
ence on the result of the deliberations. Even were it
otherwise, it would be very hard to blame a wise and

CLERICAL PLACE-KEEPERS.. 185

prudent influence exerted on the exercise of a right so
evident as was that of the departure, and on a petition
so reasonable as was that of adding the restrictive
clause to the oath. It was certainly not conspiracy to
repeat to the Acadians what they could not otherwise
be ignorant of: that they had the right to quit the
country, that obstacles to their departure were unjust,
that, if they remained, they should impose the condition
of not being required to bear arms against the French.
What can very properly be termed conspiracy is the
action of the governors from Nicholson to Armstrong,
who had recourse to all imaginable artifices to prevent
the Acadians from taking advantage of the treaty.
Moreover, if these priests exercised so much influence,
it is astonishing that the Acadians, shortly after the
treaty of Utrecht, offered to remain if they were ex-
empted from bearing arms against the French, at a
time when France, by this decision, would be deprived
of all the strength that this population would have
added. Either the priests did only feebly interpose in
these questions, or they did not, as people seem to think,
busy themselves with the interests of France, or, at any
rate they gave precedence to the interests of the Aca-
dians.

Nevertheless, it need hardly be said that in those days
of rampant prejudices, any interposition of the priests,
however insignificant in itself, must have aroused great
anger against them. If such would have been the feel-
ings of purely civil rulers, how much greater must have
been the anger of a military authority at a time when
its designs could not be thwarted without peril.

Still, I believe, and all the evidence confirms this be-
lief, that the action of the clergy was on the whole con-

186 AN ASTOUNDING FACT.

ducive to the preservation of peace and the submission
of the Acadians. Was there during this period of
almost thirty years, from 1713 to 1740, a single insur-
rection, even a threat to ‘trouble the peace, or a simple
brawl? Was there as much as one act of resistance to.
the orders of the authority, or even one single murder ?
I see no trace of anything of the kind in the whole vol-
ume of the archives. During all this time there was,
properly speaking, only one serious cause of dissension,
always the same, the difficulty about taking the oath.
Over and over again were the Acadians ordered to
‘meet and send delegates to Annapolis ; sometimes anger
got the upper hand, and these delegates, simple bearers
of a general decision, were put in irons; and yet, in
spite of this provocation to disobedience, did they ever
refuse to obey these orders? Is it not astonishing
that so many hindrances, so many base subterfuges were
unable to produce a single act of prolonged insubor-
dination, when the government, with its little garrison
of one hundred to one hundred and fifty soldiers, was
unable to constrain by main force a population compar-
- atively numerous, scattered in places of difficult access,
in summer difficult, in winter impossible? This is, if
well pondered, the most astounding fact in the present
history, and it must be well understood in order to
appreciate all the rest. It may, therefore, be a mere
matter of justice to give the clergy some credit for it
especially if they had as much influence as is generally
attributed to them. The advantages I have had for
forming a correct judgment on this point and the inten-
sity of my meditations thereon have, I make bold to
say, never been equalled by any of those who have
written on this subject: I know whereof I speak. This

EXTRAORDINARY OBEDIENCE. = 187

point being understood, the reader will be convinced, in
spite of appearances, that I am not indulging in special
pleading, but that I am chronicling facts in all their
simplicity.

In spite of the noisy and ill-sounding expressions of
Philipps and Armstrong, which may be imputed to their
vexation at not being able to force the Acadians to take
the oath, I do not find, from 1713 to 1740, a single well-
grounded, or rather well-defined complaint against them,
except the following:

From 1720 to 1724 there were general hostilities of
Indians on all the frontier of these English colonies and
particularly in Maine. In Nova Scotia they were lim-
ited rather to depredations than to a serious open war.
Eleven Indians seized a merchant vessel in Mines Basin
and plundered it. Philipps was highly indignant be-
cause the Acadians of the place had not interfered to
oppose the seizure of this boat, or to hunt down these
Indians. The Acadians were ordered to prepare a
document in which they were to express ‘‘in unequiv-
ocal terms, the enormity of their offence;” and _ this
document, signed by all the inhabitants, must be deliv-
ered by the delegates and the parish priest of the place,
and the value of the effects carried off must be paid by
them. All which was faithfully done.

_ This happened at the beginning of the year 1721,
when Philipps had just ordered the. Acadians either to
leave the country without carrying anything away or to
take the oath, and when he had just forbidden them to
open a road so as to withdraw from the province. It is
probable that the Acadians preferred to sign such a
document and reimburse the losses rather than to expose
themselves to the vengeance of the Indians; for we

188 THE CLERGY SAVED CANADA.

know, from other sources, that those who displayed their
zeal against the Indians had to suffer disastrous ven-
geance from the latter, the government being powerless
to protect them. Philipps acted very injudiciously in
exacting such amends when he had just shown himself
so unjust and cruel towards the Acadians. It was
precisely in order to avoid the reprisals to which they
would be exposed from the Indians, that they had
stipulated for exemption from bearing arms against
them, and it was on account of this same danger that,
for forty years, English colonists could not be persuaded
to settle in the country. It is not easy to understand
why Philipps thus forced the parish-priest of Mines to
take part in the delegation, if the governor was so
anxious to exclude the priests from all temporal affairs.
Did he think that the priest himself should have taken
up arms to repulse the Indians ?

The influence of the clergy, I repeat, must have been
exercised to foster peace and submission to the author-
ities. All the history of Canada is there to prove this
assertion. After the treaty of Paris, the Bishop of
Quebec even went so far as to excommunicate those
who would not submit to the English government, and
five persons were,in virtue of this excommunication,
deprived of Catholic burial. If Canada is still a British
possession, England owes it to this same influence. Let
the situation of Canada in 1775 be borne in mind. The
country was governed in a military, that is, despotic
manner, and did not contain five thousand Englishmen.
France had just thrown her sword into the scales on the
side of the revolted colonies. Lafayette deputed French-
men to Quebec and Montreal to incite the people to
shake off the yoke of the Home Government. The clergy

THE CLERGY SAVED CANADA. 189

opposed with all its might any collusion with the United
States, the people took up arms to defend their soil, and
the country remained English. After the victory of Tra-
_ falgar, so disastrous for France, a solemn Te Dewm was
sung in the Cathedral of Quebec. In 1837, in spite of
well-founded grievances, much more serious than those
which gave rise to the independence of the United
States, it was still the clergy’s efforts that paralyzed the
rebellion and made it miscarry. Whether or not these
proceedings of the religious authority be approved, they
are none the less a fact, they constitute none the less,
for the clergy, a point of tradition, if not of absolute
doctrine. They hold that there can be no lawful revolt
against legitimate authority, except when persecution
becomes intolerable and when religious interests are
gravely threatened in their very foundations. If Canada
were ever to separate from the mother country, by an
act of rebellion, I do not hesitate to say that the
Catholic clergy would be the last bulwark of British
union, the last refuge of toryism.

It was not otherwise in Acadia. The priests might
desire that the country should again become a French
colony, much more through fear of religious fanaticism
than through pure love of France; perhaps they may
have fostered in the Acadians their love for France, they
may have sometimes advised them as to their rights and
the means of influencing the authorities of Annapolis,
counselled them to quit the country when they had a
right to do so, suggested a restriction to the oath, com-
municated in general terms to the French authorities
their fears and their hopes. All these things may be
supposed, if they cannot be proved, for they are pos-
sible andeven probable. These things may be approved,

190 THE CLERGY SAVED CANADA.

blamed, diminished or exaggerated at one’s choice; but
- what cannot be doubted by any one who knows that
clergy—unless, of course, the fact may have occurred
exceptionally or in cases of doubtful interpretation—is
that the priests, whatever may be thought of them in
other respects, did nothing to make the Acadians swerve
from their fidelity to the oath and their lawful duties —
towards the English Government.

A PARAGON. 191

CHAPTER X.

Major Paul Mascarene succeeds Armstrong—His character—His
skill—His success—(1740-1744).

Wir lively satisfaction do I now pass to the adminis-
tration of Mascarene, called to replace Armstrong in
the office of lieuteriant-governor of the province. The
death of the latter, by creating a vacancy in Philipps’s
regiment, promoted Major Cosby to the rank of lieu-
tenant-colonel and Captain Mascarene to that of major ;
but, as first counsellor of the governor, the latter,
according to custom, became lieutenant-governor of the
province. . —

For several years Mascarene, probably through disgust
for Armstrong’s brutality and eccentricity, and in order

to avoid the inevitable jars his presence at Annapolis
- might draw upon him, had passed the greatest part of

his time at Boston. He was still there in the month
of December, 1739, when Armstrong put an end to his

life, and it was only in the following Spay that he was
_able to enter on his office.

It would be difficult to imagine a more striking con-
trast than that which existed between Mascarene and
his predecessor. Whereas Armstrong was impetuous,
fickle and passionate, Mascarene was calm, firm and
gentle. The one could not stir without getting into

192 A PARAGON.

trouble ; the other never gave any trouble at all, and
had the gift of smoothing down whatever difficulties
might occur, however complicated they might be.

Paul Mascarene was the son of a French Protestant
whom the revocation of the edict of Nantes had obliged
to go into voluntary exile. While still young, he fol-
lowed his father first to Geneva and a few years later
to England. He joined the army and gradually, by
sheer merit, raised himself to the position in which we
at present find him. Conciliating, clever, well-instructed,
’ of a lofty turn of mind, he gained the esteem and con-
fidence of everybody. Allhis correspondence is instinct
with the same spirit, and gives the highest idea of his
character and education. It would be difficult to find
in his conduct a single point that could be seriously
blamed; it would be hard to note in his character one
striking defect; we behold in him nothing but good
qualities of a very high order. He could be severe
nay, very severe, but also as humane and kindly as he
was severe. He meant to command and be respectfully
obeyed, and he was obeyed. He was patient, exceed-
ingly particular; he pushed the love of details even to
importunity, but he was loyal, just, compassionate ; and,
though he did not always succeed in convincing, yet he

OF ora tailed “in securing most absolute obedience.

His vigilance bore on the minutest details of his admin-
istration and extended to the remotest parts of his prov-
ince. Nothing escaped him; the least delay, the least
infringement of his orders and regulations became the
subject of a long correspondence, in which he paternally
reprimanded and uttered warnings of danger. He
punished sometimes ; but most often sent away the
delinquents with kind words ; and, when he did punish,

‘SUPREME ABILITY. 193

it was only after having heard, weighed, matured his
decision, and given every chance of self-defente. He
united in a high degree the most commendable qualities
of the French character with the sterling worth of the
_ English; from the former he took the affability,
courtesy, regard for the weak, the desire and the art to
please; from the latter, calmness, determination, wise
deliberateness and perseverance. Devoted to his office,
to his duty and to his adopted country, he was’ even
more the man of letters of exquisite taste than the
soldier, and that is what gave him such superiority as _
an administrator.

His position afforded him a fine opportunity to take
revenge on the Acadians and the priests for the intoler-
ance of which his family had been the object. - He, how-
ever, did nothing of the kind. Weneed no other proof
of this than the results he obtained in the most diffi-
cult circumstances of this history; and his merit was
all the greater because he had to struggle against the
prejudices of the people about him and of Shirley,
governor of Massachusetts, to whom the imperial gov-
ernment had given a voice in the administration of the
province. His tact, superior to that of others round
him and even to Shirley’s, showed him the line of con-
duct he was to adopt in the difficulties incidental to the
war. Without offending anybody, his skill triumphed
over all opposition; and I have no hesitation in declar-
ing that not one of the governors who preceded or fol-
lowed him would have been able to overcome so many
obstacles. He had that supreme ability which is the

result of high breeding in a man gifted with a clear
_ bright intellect and a noble heart.

Surrounded with counsellors who knew nothing but
13

194 STRICT WITH THE CLERGY.

the arbitrary ways and rough manners of the camp, his
natural ias strikes us as having been occasionally fet-
tered by his environment; he showed more severity
than he would have wished, in order to avoid the
reproach of letting himself be guided by latent sympa-
thy ; and yet in reality his great powers of observation
made him understand that mildness and persuasion were
the most efficacious means of securing the fidelity of
the Acadians.

He was especially severe towards the clergy. Was
he, whose family had suffered persecution and exile on
account of their religious belief, now giving way to the
prejudices he must naturally have entertained? Per-
haps his family had been humiliated, crushed by this
same clergy: he, in his turn had now the power they
formerly had against-him ; he could bend them to obey
his will, and even his caprices, if he so desired. It would
not be astonishing if this feeling had sometimes got the
upper hand in spite of his lofty intelligence and just
and kindly spirit. Nevertheless, I have good reason to
think this was not the case. It is true he imposed on
the clergy numerous restrictions; but, he always had
.the condescension to discuss them point by point, and,
as a general rule, he obtained assent and obedience.
Moreover, in the particular circumstances in which these
priests were then placed, I am of opinion that these
restrictions were for the most part perfectly justifiable.

The volume of the archives contains five letters of
Mascarene to the missionaries De la Goudalie and Desen-
claves, in which he most courteously discusses the
motives of his restrictions. The Compiler, as usual,
gives none of the replies; but, here, at least, their
presence is not éssential, and could merely satisfy our

Ne a a ee a eT ae

ee a a Fe ae

STRICT WITH THE CLERGY. 195

curiosity; besides, we can often form a sufficiently pre-
cise estimate of what these replies contained. —

‘* Another point of your letter,” said Mascarene to M. Desen-
claves, ‘‘is that in which you mention the temporal to be some-
times so connected with the spiritual as not to be able to be di-
vided.” : |

_ Apparently the weight of his reasons produced an
understanding on this knotty point, for in another letter
he said to him:

‘“‘T am glad to see from what I wrote to you, that you are sensi-
ble of the ill consequences that will follow from connecting the
temporal with the spiritual.”

In another he informs him of the situation in Europe
and forewarns him against the dangers that a war would
entail on them and on the Acadians:

‘‘ The affairs in Europe are much embroiled, and, in case they
should occasion a rupture between Great Britain and France, the
missionaries must expect to fall very naturally under suspicion,
and therefore ought to be more circumspect in their conduct in
regard to themselves and towards the inhabitants.”

To Abbé de la Goudalie, vicar-general of the clergy of
the province, he writes :

‘*T found you so well disposed since I have personally known
you during your residence here to conform to those rules, that I
make no doubt of your continuing in the same good intention,
and that by your example and admonitions you will contribute
to keep. the missionaries to act in concert in maintaining the in-
habitants in their obedience and duty to the government.”

To the same, a year later :

“Tam well satisfied with the assurances you give me on your
side as well as those of the other missionaries to act in concert in

196 STUDY THE RULERS.

‘maintaining the inhabitants in peace and tranquillity and in their
duty towards the Government as the oath they have taken obliges
them to.”

In less than two years, Mascarene, by his so remark-
ably skilful and just administration, had extirpated all
causes of dissension. There were none left; he had
only to give an order and he was eagerly obeyed in the
most distant parts of the province, though the only fort he
had was in ruins, and his garrison comprised only 100 able-
bodied soldiers. These facts are eloquent to show what
might be expected from this peaceable and submissive
people, provided they were ruled with equity by humane
and conciliatory governors. The keystone of all history,
especially in absolute governments and more especially
in small ones, is’ the character of the rulers; hence the
care I have taken to give an accurate picture of each of
the governors. Those who neglect this cannot throw
light on difficult situations nor faithfully discharge the
duty incumbent on him who undertakes to write history.
Some one has said: “ Tell me what company you keep,
and I will tell you what youare.” Still more appositely
may we say: “ Give me the character of him who rules,
and I will tell you the character of the people he rules.”
If this man be an Armstrong, we may unhesitatingly
declare that, should the population he governs be
naturally unruly and turbulent, he will be continually
causing trouble, and perhaps a rebellion ; and that, how-
ever submissive the population may be, dissensions will
unavoidably arise even when the situation would call
for nothing but harmony and peace. If, on the contrary,
he be a Mascarene, he will maintain order and peace in
the most difficult crises. The blame, or at least most
of it, lies at the door of the government.

CRAMPED FOR ROOM. SOT

- Mascarene was hardly installed in his office when he set
to work to remedy the painful situation in which former
rulers had placed the Acadians by refusing to them,
since the treaty of Utrecht, any new grant of lands,
From 2,500 souls in 17138, the Acadian population had
reached in 1740 about 9,000 souls, and, nevertheless,
strange to say, this population was confined within
the same extent of land as in 1713. Nov. 15, 1740,
Mascarene, in a letter to the Lords of Trade, represented
to them in the following terms the injustice and incon-
veniences of this state of things:

' The increase of the Acadians calls for some fresh instructions
how to dispose of them. They have divided and subdivided
amongst their children the lands they were in possession of. . .
They applied for new grants which the Governors. Philipps and
Armstrong did not think themselves authorized to favor them with,
as His Majesty’s instructions on that head prescribe the grant of
unappropriated lands to Protestant subjects only. This long delay
has occasioned several of them to settle themselves on some of
the skirts of this Province, pretty far distant from this place, not-
withstanding Proclamations and orders to the contrary have been
often repeated. ... If they are debarred from new possessions,
they must live here miserably, and, consequently, be troublesome, or
else, they will possess themselves of new tracts contrary to orders,
or they must be made to withdraw to the neighboring french
colony.

‘*The French of Cape Breton will naturally watch all opportuni-
ties of disturbing the peace of this Province, specially at this
juncture, in case of a war with France; and, if occasion of dis-
gust was given to these people here, they would soon make an
advantage of it, and, by the numbers of these Acadians, they
would soon distress the garrison if not taking the fort which is in
a very ruinous condition.”

After this statement it is not astonishing that Arm-
strong should write: ‘They are a litigious sort of
people, and so ill-natured to one another, as daily to

198 CRAMPED FOR ROOM.

encroach upon their neighbour’s properties.” Parkman,
who has searched every nook and corner to find where-
- with to besmirch the Acadians, did not fail to fasten on
this sentence. Whatcared he for Armstrong’s charac-
ter, which, by the way, he was careful not to describe
to the public? what cared he for the actual cireum-
stances which he passes over in silence? He had at
hand what he was looking for, and with this bit of a
sentence he was able to draw his conclusions against a
hundred contrary statements: “They were vexed with
incessant quarrels among themselves arising from the
unsettled boundaries of their lands,” and much more to
the same effect. Could it be otherwise, when’ the
population was four times as large as in 1713, when their
lands had been divided and subdivided so as to leave
nothing but morsels, and when these lands had never been
surveyed by the government? With what we know of
Armstrong, of his character and his exaggeration in all
things, of his violent language, are we not justified in
supposing that the expressions he made use of magnified
beyond measure the grain of truth that constituted the
foundation of this fact?

Why does not Parkman, who busies himself so much
with the character of the Acadians, and always with the
evident aim of reversing the invariable verdict of
history, why does he not sometimes, since he is so good
a judge, make known to us what was the character of
the governors? It must be easier to judge a man than
a whole nation.

After having kept the Acadians in the country in
spite of themselves, it was ashame to refuse them grants
of land and thus drive them into indefinite subdivisions.
This retarded their progress, produced discontent,

EXTENSIVE. BOODLING. 199

provoked disobedience, troubled harmony, weakened
their loyalty, exposed the rulers to grave disappoint-
ment; such was Masecarene’s view. He tells us, indeed,
that, in spite of injunctions, several took up lands on
the confines of the province; but what is surprising
is that the greater number submitted to such unjust
orders. J have serious doubts whether the colonists of
New England, and in fact any other colonists, would have
submitted during forty years to such a system without
revolting against authority, especially if that authority
had been represented by only 100 soldiers or a propor-
tionately small number?

Mascarene tells’ us that the instructions of His
Majesty were to bestow grants of land only on Protes-
tant subjects. This is undoubtedly true; but it is not
improbable that this order was obtained through the
influence of those who had voted to themselves a grant of
100,000 acres of land at Grand Pré and Beaubassin in
Armstrong’s time, and among whom, besides Armstrong,
Philipps and his councillors, figured King Gould,
Allured Popple, Henry Popple, Andrew Robinson,
Henry Daniels, Esquires, all of England. We know not
the character of these gentlemen, except that of King
Gould, who was financial agent for Philipps; but I
have good reason to believe that one of them, Allured

_ Popple was no less a personage than the Allured Popple

who was then the Secretary of State. With an inter-
ested party of such position and influence it was easy to
secure and maintain the decree excluding the Acadians
from any new grant, in order to oblige them to buy land
from these fortunate grantees. In fact, I find nowhere
that the wise recommendations of Mascarene had their
effect, and I have reason to believe that this iniquitous

200 EXTENSIVE BOODLING.

situation continued till the time of the deportation.
These lands, granted to the above Englishmen, sur-
rounded those that were next to the Acadians’ lands in
the two most important centres. This must have been
a speculation at their expense, like the one that provoked
and followed their deportation. I have not striven to
clear up this matter, but I reeommend it to Mr. Park-
man’s notice.* ~ :

* This grant, or what was left of it, was escheated on the 21st of April,

1760, to be granted afresh to Governor Lawrence’s councillors after the
‘deportation.

MASCARENE ANXIOUS. 201

CHAPTER, XI.

War declared between France and England—Acadia invaded by
the French under the command of Duvivier and De Ganne—
Efforts to stir up the Acadians to revolt—The expedition with-
draws—New expedition by Marin and later by Ramesay—Battle
of Grand Pré—Fidelity of the Acadians—Testimonies of Masca-
rene, etc., etc.—The Compiler—Parkman.

MASCARENE’S wise and prudent conduct had produced
the happiest results. Not only had he gained the
esteem and confidence of all; but he had in all things
established regulations and procedures, which, in his
relations with the clergy and the Acadians, ensured
harmony and put an end to all the misunderstandings so
frequent in Armstrong’s time. On June 28, 1742, he
wrote to the Duke of Newcastle :

‘‘The frequent rumors we have had of war being on the point
of being declared against France, have not as yet made any alter-
ation in the temper of the Acadians, who appear in a good disposi-
tion of keeping to their oath of fidelity, and of submitting to the
orders and regulations of this government for maintaining peace.”

However, he was still very anxious ; he knew that, if
the French invaded Nova Scotia, they would not fail to
make great efforts to persuade the Acadians to join
them. His fort was in ruins; he had only five com-
panies of thirty-one men each, a third of whom were
invalids. In his letter of December, 1748, to the
Secretary of State, he complained bitterly of his
situation :

202 LOYALTY SECURED.

‘*The inhabitants are all French Roman Catholics; in case of a
rupture with France, it is as much as we can expect if we can
keep them from joining with thc enemy or being stirred up by
them to rebel. To prevent this, I have used the best means I
could by making them sensible of the advantage and ease they
enjoy under the British Government, whereby to wean them.from
their old masters, but to do this effectually, a considerable time
will be required, this Province in the meantime is in a worse con-
dition for defence than the other American Plantations.”

War was declared on March 15th of the following year
(1744). This untoward event was going to submit
the fidelity of the Acadians to ahard trial. With a few
more years of peace, Mascarene, by following the line
of conduct which his tact and benignity dictated to
him, would have been able, as he hoped, to give rise to.
a solid sentiment of loyalty based on ties of affection
and gratitude strong enough to resist all allurements.
His methods and his results would have been a safe
precedent, from which his successors would not “have
dared to depart.

France, which had done so little to colonize and
preserve Acadia, had never lost the hope of reconquer-
ing it; and it is evident, from the documents of French
origin, that the authorities of Canada flattered them-
selves with the hope that the Acadians would seize on
the opportunity about to be offered them of shaking off
the English yoke. The course of events will, however,
show that the fears of Mascarene and the hopes of the
French had no foundation.

If Mascarene had not had time to establish the loyalty
of the Acadians on the more lasting basis of affection,
this loyalty was none the less really established on the.
grounds of interest and of respect for the oath: “ Their
plea with the French who pressed them to take up

ACADIANS HARRIED BY THE FRENCH. 203

arms,’ said Masearene in 1748, when the war had conie
to an end, “was their oath; their living easy under the
Government, and their having no complaint to make
against it.” This was the result of a few years of a just
and conciliatory administration. |

During four years Acadia was invaded at least four
times by the French; Annapolis was besieged three
times, always in the hope of taking it with the concur-
rence of the Acadians, for whom they had brought arms;
but they were obliged just so many times to withdraw
without this concurrence, and without having made any
serious attempt. Every means was tried to overcome
the resistance of the Acadians. From flatteries the
French passed to threats, and from threats to open |
force, without shaking their determination, and this
happened at Beaubassin as well as at Grand Pré and
Annapolis.

The disappointment of the French must have been
extreme to induce them to have recourse to such means,
since the result could not fail to diminish the sympathy
the Acadians must naturally have felt for the French.

After having exhausted all the means of persuasion,
Duvivier and de Ganne, who commanded the first expe-
dition, issued the most severe orders :

“‘ We order you to deliver up your arms, ammunitions. . . and
those who contravene these orders shall be punished and delivered
into the hands of the Indians, as we cannet refuse the demands
these savages make for all those who will not submit themselves.”

Here is one of the replies of the Acadians :

‘We, the inhabitants of Mines, Grand Pré, River Canard, Pigi-
guit and the surrounding rivers, beg that you will be pleased to
consider that while there would be no difficulty, by virtue of the

204 $ACADIANS HARRIED BY THE FRENCH.

strong force you command, in supplying yourself with the quan-
tity of grain and meat you have ordered, it would be quite impos-
sible for us to furnish you the quantity you demand, or even a
smaller, without placing ourselves in great peril.

“We hope, gentlemen, that you will not plunge both ourselves
and our families into a state of total loss ; and that this considera-
tion will cause you to withdraw your savages and troops from
our districts.

**We live under a mild and tranquil Government, and we have
all good reason to be faithful to it. We hope therefore, that you
will have the goodness not to separate us from it, and that you
will grant us the favor not to plunge us into utter misery. This
we hope from your goodness, assuring you that we are with much
respect.
Your very humble and obedient servants,

Acting for the communities above mentioned,
Jacques Le Blanc, Pierre Le Blanc,
Francois Le Blanc, René Granger his mark, Claude Le Blanc, —
Jacques Tériau, Antoine Landry, Joseph X Granger his mark,
Pierre Richard,* René Le Blanc.
Mines, 14 Oct. 1744.”

‘*We have remaining,” says Murdoch, ‘‘as many as twelve or-
ders issued by Duvivier from the French camp, of this nature, com-
manding theservices of individuals by name—the furnishing horses
and men to lead them, the bringing in powder, horns, etc., the
swearing allegiance by the deputies and elders, furnishing ladders,
pickaxes, shovels, cattle, wheat—baking of bread—to forbid buy-
ing arms—the supplying of shirts, furnishing canoes, etc., etc.
Disobedience to these, is usually menaced with death, sometimes
with corporal punishment. . . I do not know whether we should
attribute this to the pride of noblesse, then so predominant, to the
harshness of military sentiment at that time, or to personal in-
capacity on the part of Duvivier; but, from whatever source, I
look on it as having been fatal to his cause.” +

* Brother of my ancestor René Richard, who came to Canada after the
deportation.

+ “Duvivier issued peremptory orders to the Acadians for supplies. . .
Notwithstanding his threat, the Acadians were very unwilling to give him
any assistance, and his bright hopes of a spontaneous rising of the Aca-
dian people against British power vanished before the chilling reality.
A new generation had grown up who were not disposed to welcome those
who would bring war to their doors.’’-Hannay, History of Acadia.

DUVIVIER BAFFLED. 205

The hasty retreat of Duvivier can be explained only
by the disappointment he must have felt in not being
supported by the Acadians. A French squadron was
daily expected in Annapolis harbor, and nothing seemed
to call for the raising of the siege. This squadron,
- bearing 75 guns, arrived a few days after his departure.
Not finding the troops he had reckoned upon meeting
there, unable with his crews alone to reduce the garrison,
the commander put out to sea again without having
made any attempt. This new hasty departure was as
disastrous to the French as had been that of Duvivier,
for there came from Boston, four days after this de-
parture, a whole convoy laden with provisions and
ammunition for the garrison, which would have un-
avoidably fallen into the hands of the commander of
the French squadron.

Hannay, speaking of the expedition of Duvivier, says :
-* Duvivier, unsuccessful at Annapolis, returned to Mines,
where he proposed to remain for the winter with his
soldiers, but the Acadians sent in such a strongly worded
remonstrance that he was constrained to withdraw. At
Beaubassin he found the people equally averse to his
remaining and finally returned to Louisbourg.” -

As soon as war was declared, Mascarene actively
employed himself in putting the fort of Annapolis, the
only one in the province, in fit condition to resist a
siege. These works were considerable, since the walls
had fallen into ruins. For the materials especially, but
- even for the manual labor, he could count but little on
any but the Acadians. Of course in strict justice, they
were bound to do this work; nevertheless the actual
doing of it was a great proof of good will. Mascarene
had gained such an ascendancy over them that they

206 ACADIANS REPAIR FORT.

never made any objection. Writing to Shirley he said:
“The Acadians showed themselves ready, not only to
get the timber necessary for that kind of work, but to
be employed in the repairs, when, on the Ist of July,
the first party oF Indians, consisting of about 300, came
to interrupt us.’

Later, after the departure of Dawivier Mascarene
resumed the works that had been abandoned and
demanded anew the assistance of the Acadians: ‘TI also
prevailed with the deputies of the Acadians of this
river,” said he to Shirley, ‘‘to furnish the engineer the
material requisite for our repairs, which they seemed to
undertake and perform cheerfully.”

The fruitless expedition of Duvivier was followed in ~
the succeeding year by that of Captain Marin with the
same results.

The moral decadence of France, commenced under
Louis XIV., continued and hastened under the regency,
was, under Louis XV., about to consummate its degra-
dation and provoke the great catastrophe which would
later ruin or regenerate it. This moral degeneracy had
its effect on the warlike virtues of the nation, and this
war was going to give the measure of the evil. Watch-
ful England was ready to realize this, and to take upon
itself, a few years later, the task of completing the
humiliation of a too restless rival, by overthrowing its
prestige and depriving it of what might yet re-establish
its strength and its renown.

England’s apprehensions were greatly relieved when
it became evident that the Duke D’Anville’s powerful
fleet, dispersed by storms, weakened and demoralized by
death, sickness and dissensions, was no longer to be
dreaded.

GRAND PRE RAID. | 207

De Ramesay, who had waited under the walls of
Annapolis for the co-operation of this fleet, was obliged
to withdraw upon Mines and soon after on Beaubassin.

Here comes the only glorious feat of arms for France
in this part of the country, and it was accomplished by
the Canadians whom de Ramesay commanded. While
this officer was at Beaubassin, Mascarene, after having
revictualled Annapolis, stationed in the district of
Mines a detachment of 470 men commanded by Colonel
Noble of Massachusetts. This armed body were billeted
for the time being at the village of Grand Pré in the
houses of the Acadians. De Ramesay conceived the
daring ‘project of traversing on snowshoes the long
distance that separated him from Grand Pré, and of
surprising during the night the troops stationed there ;
a raid which, though it won renown for the Canadians,
produced no practical result.

We have seen, from divers extracts, what was the
attitude of the Acadians during these four years of
repeated invasion by the French troops; let us now
listen to other testimonies gleaned from the correspond-
ence of Governor Mascarene himself.

At different times he bears witness that, during the
intervals between these successive expeditions, the
Acadians came to inform him of the movements of the
French and to work at putting the foundations in a fit
state to withstand their attacks.

To Governor Philipps, on June 9th 1744, he writes: ‘‘I have
done all in my power to keep the Acadians in their fidelity who
promise fair and as yet assist us in repairing our breaches.”

To the Lords of Trade on the same date: ‘‘ These latter (the
Acadians) have given me assurances of their resolution to keep
in their fidelity to His Majesty, which they seem to justify in

208. MASCARENE PRAISES THE ACADIANS.

having hitherto given us their assistance in the works going on for
the repairs of this Fort, which according to my former represen-
tations of the nature of these inhabitants is the utmost we can ex-
pect from them.”

To the Secretary of War, July 2nd 1744: ‘‘ The Acadians of this
river have kept hitherto in their fidelity, and no ways joined with
the enemy, who has killed most of their cattle, and the priest re-
siding amongst them has behaved also as an honest man, though
none of them dare come to us at present. They helped in the re-
pairing of our works to the very day preceding the attack.”

To Governor Shirley, July 28th 1744: ‘‘ The Acadians, as soon
as the Indians withdrew from us, brought us provisions and con-
tinue to testify their resolution to keep to their fidelity as long as
we keep this fort. Two deputies arrived yesterday from Mines,
who have brought mea paper containing an association signed by
most of the inhabitants of that place to prevent cattle being trans-
ported to the French, according to the prohibition sent them from.
hence. These Acadians are certainly in a very perillous situation.
Those who pretend to be their friends and old masters having let
loose a parcel of banditti to plunder them, whilst on the other
hand they see themselves threatened with ruin and destruction if
they failed in their allegiance to the British Government.”

To King Gould, on the same date: ‘‘ The Acadians still keep
in their fidelity and have not anyways joined with the enemy,
but we have lost their assistance in the repairing of our works,
they being in dread of the Indians.”

To Dec. 1744: ‘*To the timely succour received from the
Governor of Massachusetts, and our French inhabitants refusing
to take up arms against us we owe our preservation. If the Acadi-
ans had taken up arms they might have brought three or four
thousand men against us.”

To dear Ladevése, —— 1747, at the close of the war : ‘‘ The great
french Armada under Duke D’Anville which would have swal-
lowed us up, was by God’s Providence, weakened and shattered by
sickness and storms.’. . In these several struggles I used our
Acadians with so much mildness, administered justice, so impar-
tially and employed all the skill I was master of in managing them
to so good purpose, that, though the enemy brought near two
thousand men in arms in the midst of them, and used all the
means of cajoling and threatening to make them take up arms,
having brought spare ones for that end, they could not prevail
upon above twenty to join them.”

THE COMPILER AT HIS TRICKS. 209

To the Duke of Bedford, June 15th 1748, after the war: ‘‘ The
repeated attempts of the enemy on Nova Scotia have not had the:
success they expected; and, notwithstanding the means they
have used to entice or force into open rebellion the Acadians, who
are all of french extraction and papists, they have not been able
to prevail except upon a few of them ;‘and, after having entered
this province three different times, with forces far superior to
_ what could be opposed to them, they were at last obliged to retire
to Quebec.”

Two months later, in August, 1748, Mascarene ordered
Lieutenant-Colonel Gorham “to proceed to Mines to
pay the Acadians for provisions and other necessaries,
also for labor and losses incurred by them for. houses
burnt and fences destroyed to the value of over ten
thousand pounds.” |

I would have the reader remark, in passing, that none
of the letters quoted above are found in the volume of
_the archives except two, which are the least important.
I would also have him remark that, from July 4, 1740
to October 27, 1745, this volume contains forty-three
documents of divers kinds, while it contains not a single
one from October, 1745 to April, 1748.

Why, one naturally asks, this accumulation of forty-
three documents within the four years before the war
and nothing within the three years during the war, that
is, during the most important period? The reason is
not far to seek; it is always the same: suppression is so
plainly a set plan that one only need open his eyes to
detect it. Before the war Mascarene entertained doubts
of the fidelity of the Acadians and gave utterance to
them; in the first years of his administration he had
discussions by letter with the priests before inducing
them to accept his regulations concerning themselves

and concerning the Acadians. These documents also
14

210 MURDOCH DEFENDS ACADIANS.

contained remarks favorable to the Acadians, which
the Compiler could not easily separate: he has allowed
a few of them to pass. But, to include the documents
of the period of the war, was to make known to the
public that the Acadians had been faithful to their oath
in the most perplexing of situations. Therefore, these
documents must not be included. So manifest is this
set purpose of his, that, in spite of this gap of three »
years he found means, before creating the gap, to in-
sert in a note a letter of M. de Beauharnois to the minis-
ter at Paris, in which this gentleman expressed the hopes
he entertained that the French would be supported
by the Acadians. This document is, clearly, foreign to
the archives, but the Compiler, however shortsighted he
may sometimes be, has found means to ferret out this
one somewhere. Nevertheless, this document had no
real importance. Hopes! why, every one has them ;
M. de Beauharnois was welcome to have his; he was
quite free to believe that the Acadians would take up
arms against the English. But the real facts were far
more important, and they were to be found in the docu-
ments of which the Compiler has deprived us just in the
very place where he has created a gaping void. . History .
is based on facts, not on the vague hopes of this or that
individual.

Both the fears of the English and the hopes of the
French had, therefore, no serious foundation, as the above
citations abundantly prove. This war had submitted
the fidelity of the Acadians to a hard trial, such as ought
to give the exact measure of what might be hoped from
them under equitable treatment. ‘ When we consider
these matters,” says Murdoch, summing up the events of
this war, “ we see more clearly how it was that the little

MURDOCH DEFENDS ACADIANS. 211

army from Louisbourg, while it was largely reinforced
by the Micmac warriors, who had always been taught to
believe that the French king had not ceded their terri-
torial rights, received no effective aid from the Acadians.
Although there were always a portion of the inhabitants
of Beaubassin positively disaffected to English rule, in
the other settlements of Cobequid, Pigiquit, Grand Pré,
River Canard, as well on the Annapolis river, there were
very few persons who were even suspected of willingly aid-
ing the invasion, and Duvivier received as little support
from the Acadians after he crossed the Avon, as
Prince Charles Stewart did in the next year after cross-
ing the Tweed.” » Mascarene had notified the Acadians
that their neutrality did not relieve them from the duty
of instructing him with the movements of the French
whenever they could ; as a result, the latter never moved
to another place without having previously guarded the
roads, to prevent them from communicating with the
English. )

It is undoubtedly true, as Mascarene says, that the
French had “a few sympathizers amongst them.” He
fixes the number at about twenty. This account seems
to me exact, considering that it fairly tallies with °
French reports. Twelve of these sympathizers were
arrested upon the denunciations of Acadians. How-
ever, it should be carefully noted that no Acadians were
arrested for having taken up arms, but only for having
advised and assisted the enemy, or for having neglected
to give information to the authorities when they were
able to do so. The names of those twelve persons are:
Lonis Gauthier and his two sons, Armand Bugeaud,
Joseph LeBlanc dit Le Maigre, Charles and Frangois
Raymond, Charles and Philippe Leroy, Joseph Brassard,

24:2 FEW SYMPATHIZE WITH THE FRENCH.

Pierre Guedry (half-bred) and Louis Hébert, former
servant to Captain Handfield. Some were condemned;
others were released, their explanations having been
judged satisfactory.

The wonder is, not that twenty persons thus lent as-
sistance to the enemy, but rather that there were not
more, as this war lasted four years, and the province
was invaded so many times. There must necessarily
have been officious persons giving information to one
side or the other. To suppose the contrary would be to
be totally ignorant of human nature. The French re-
ports show us that there often came to them soldiers
who had escaped from the Annapolis garrison. These
deserters informed them of the situation of the English.
Such isolated facts belong to all times and places, and
no unfavorable conclusion can reasonably be drawn
therefrom.

It is useless to insist on this point; the fact remains
established, that the Acadians, in this juncture, the
most difficult in their history, superabundantly proved
the great esteem in which they held their oath of
fidelity. ‘Their plea with the French who pressed
them to take up arms, was their oath,” said Mascarene.
Besides, these facts are not disputed, except by Park-
man who dissents only by implication, by making use
of expressions that give quite a different impression.
This writer, who, in his work “ Montcalm and Wolfe,”
devotes only three pages to the account of the events
that occurred from 1710 to 1749, sums up in three lines
the events of the war of which we have just sketched
the most important phases: ‘ This,” he says, “ restored
comparative quiet till the war of 1745, when some of the
Acadians remained neutral, while some took arms

A PARKMAN DODGE. 218

against the English, and many others aided the enemy
with information and supplies.” This sentence, appar-
ently simple and candid, is distinctly insidious and dis-
honest: latet anguisin herba. It specifies nothing; but,
through crafty insinuation, it leaves the reader under
the impression that about one third of the Acadians re-
mained neutral, that another third took up arms, and
that the remaining third aided the enemy in different
ways. This trick is a great. favorite of his; I could
quote several examples of it without even going out-
side this subject. A dodge of this kind might be con-
sidered, in common parlance, smart; some people
might admire it in a lawyer or a politician driven into
a corner; but there is question here of history, the mas-
ter quality of which is impartiality. However, no
Acadian, so far as { know, was ever accused of having
taken up arms during this war.

In presence of this fidelity, preserved in spite of all
sorts of seductions and threats, what becomes of Park-
man’s accusation that ‘the influence of the priests was
always directed to alienating the Acadians from their
allegiance ?”’ an accusation which he repeats in every
key and in the most positive terms. If the people re-
mained faithful, then the priests had not the influence
which he attributes to them, when he tells us that the
Acadians had no will of their own, that they were the
docile instruments of these priests. Either these priests,
having the great influence which Parkman attributes to
them, exercised it in instilling fidelity to the oath, or
the Acadians had the firmness and independence neces-
sary to resist them. Surely, the Acadians needed a
strong dose of firmness to resist the solicitations and
threats of the French, especially if, as Parkman avers,

214 ACADIAN STUBBORNNESS,

they had likewise to resist those of their priests, pressing
them in the same direction.

Parkman, in order to prove brilliantly his theory of
the debilitating action of the clergy, had to suppose,
firstly, a great influence of this clergy, secondly, a con-
- tinual exercise of this influence, and, in order to draw
conclusions from his theory, true in itself, if taken in
the abstract, false or exaggerated in the concrete reality,
he had to infer that the Acadians had lost all initiative,
all will, all energy; in a word, to make of them, as he
does, men who could hardly stand up alone. That was
giving free rein to his fancy, and if the conclusions do
logically follow from the premises, these latter rested only
on one crutch, stans pede in uno.

Although I sometimes pass judgment on the character
of individuals, I have no inclination to do so in the case
of a nation; it is so easy, in such matters, to be too abso-
lute. However, I will venture one such judgment on
the Acadians, and it will bear on a defect in their char-
acter, and one directly opposed to what Parkman blames
in them, namely: “that they were weak of purpose.”’
The most characteristic fault of the Acadians is to be
extremely headstrong. Even to this day, in the pro-
vince of Quebec, when people wish to express in a strik-
ing phrase any one’s obstinacy, they say: ‘ He has the
head of an Acadian,” which is tantamount to saying:
“He has the stubbornness ofa mule.” Firmness is a
beautiful quality; but stubbornness, which is its first
cousin, is a grave defect, and it is the besetting sin of
the Acadians. But Parkman, who beats the air at
random, without seeing anything else than his theory,
has, as might have been expected, hit upon the opposite
defect. Men rarely make a bull’s eye when they fire

MISTAKE IN FRENCH POLICY. 215

with their eyes shut. Was this defect. acquired by the
Acadians in their struggles on the question ofthe oath,
or was it in them before that? I know not. If Park-
man, instead of theorizing in a vacuum, had made a
more careful study of their history, he would have
become convinced of this fact, which is too evident to
escape observation.

The efforts of the Frsich to engage the Acadians:
to violate their oath of fidelity, merit, in all respects,
severe condemnation, and these efforts were continual
from the beginning of this war until the taking of Beau-
séjour by the English. True, with the help of the
Acadians, Annapolis would have been taken; but the
definitive conquest of Acadia would not have been
thereby decided. Even had the taking of Annapolis
meant the conquest of Acadia, the French were none
the less in honor bound not to urge the Acadians to
swerve from duty, and not thus to expose them to .the
direst calamities. Their lot, till then, had been as favor-
able as they could have hoped it to be under a military
administration, with the intense prejudices that then
prevailed. France, for a whole century, had done
nothing to people Acadia and to make of it a self-pro-
tecting province ; she had done nothing to preserve and
support it in the moment of danger. If, at the eleventh
hour, she wished to repair the errors of her past, she
must first reconquer the country with her own troops,
and then protect her conquest effectually.

I am convinced that the conduct of France towards
the Acadians during this war caused her to lose their
sympathy, which she had been able to retain up till that
time. If England, or rather her representatives, had
understood the Acadian character, if they had trusted

216 MISTAKE IN FRENCH POLICY.

them and made the mostof their faithfulness, we should
not have to deplore the misfortunes that ensued. At
any rate, these incessant attempts to seduce them, far
from being prejudicial to them, should have been an
additional proof of their fidelity, a certain pledge for the
future. At the same time, their conduct, interpreted
with kindliness, should have become for the English
authorities an earnest of lasting friendship and practical
gratitude ; for, as Mascarene said, “ without the neu-
trality of the Acadians, the province would have been
lost;” it would likewise have been lost, if they had
emigrated to the French possessions of Cape Breton, for
then they would have been soldiers of France in the
war. But gratitude is a rara avis.

PROSELYTIZING SCHEME. 217

CHAPTER XII.

Other events of the war (1744-1748)—Iniquitous projects of Shirley
against the Acadians—Their alarms—Letter of Shirley repudi-
ating the supposed projects—It is not judged satisfactory—
Shirley procures the authorization of the Secretary of State and
issues a proclamation to the Acadians—His correspondence
with the Duke of Newcastle—Proclamations of the French com-
mander to the Acadians—Firmness of the Acadians.

OTHER circumstances add a new and immense weight
to the fidelity of the Acadians in this war. If Mascarene
had not been obliged to endure the meddlesomeness of
Shirley, governor of Massachusetts, there would prob-
ably not have been a single exception to the strictest
fidelity. Mascarene, by his conduct, admirable in every
respect, had gained the esteem and confidence of the
Acadians to an almost incredible degree. They came to
him as to a friend, as to a father. Whenever any diffi-
culty arose respecting the extent of their obligations, |
they came to submit it to his decision, and his reply was
invariably accepted withouta murmur. The documents
in hand offer several examples of this, among others the
following: Some English officers obliged some Aca-
dians to serve as guides and pilots against the French).
Interpreting these orders as contrary to their neutrality,
they addressed a petition to Mascarene, entreating him
not to oblige them to such service. He entered into
long arguments with their delegates to show them that
their oath did not exempt them from this service.

218 PROSELYTIZING SCHEME.

Without hesitation they withdrew their petition, and
afterwards no longer objected to any assistance that did
not imply the bearing of arms. ,

Shirley, who was not animated with the same spirit,
came near ruining everything, and, once more, Mas-
carene saved the situation. Toward the beginning of
the war, Shirley, somewhat through distrust for the
fidelity of the Acadians, but much more through
fanaticism and contempt of right and liberty, had
proposed a project in regard to them which Murdoch
thus epitomizes: “ He proposes to intersperse Protestant
settlements among the Acadians, taking part of the
marsh lands from them for the new settlers. . . . herecom-
mends granting small privileges and immunities for the en-
couragement of such as should come over to the Protes-
tant communion and send their children to learn
English.”

This upright historian cannot help condemning the
project : * This suggestion of offering worldly advantages
in exchange of profession,” says he, “can hardly be com-
mended in our days.”

This plan included a further injustice, that of
arbitrarily depriving the Acadians of the best part of
their lands, of that which had entailed the most labor,
the marshes. Would his suggestions have been
adopted? Certainly, if Shirley had been master of the
situation; but, as we shall see elsewhere, the authorities
in England were far from taking the same view. The
Duke of Newcastle may have been a great briber, he
may not have known, as Parkman says, where Acadia
was situated on the map ; but, at least, he had respect
for certain things. Shirley himself may have been very
sagacious ; but he was laboring under a strange delu-

‘SHIRLEY A TRIMMER. 219

sion when he imagined that, with such projects, he could
retain the Acadians in the province.

This design became known to the Acadians in the
second year of the war, 1745, but was falsely represented
to them as a plan for their expulsion. They were
greatly alarmed thereat. The French took every
advantage of this rumor to increase this alarm and to
overcome the resistance they were meeting with. They
argued that such arbitrary acts released them from their
oath of fidelity ; that sooner or later they would be
wholly deprived of the free exercise of their religion, of
their priests and their language; that their properties
would be confiscated, etc., etc. In this’ perplexity
Acadian deputies from all parts of the province went
to consult Mascarene. He combated their apprehen-
sion, and promised to procure a speedy denial from
Shirley, and assurances guaranteeing anew the free
exercise of their religion, etc.

Shirley clung tenaciously to his project, for, at this
very time, August 15, 1746, he wrote to the Duke of
Neweastle: . . . “ By which means, and removing the
Romish priests out of the Province, and introducing Pro-
testant English schools and French Protestant ministers
and due encouragement given to such of the Acadians as
shall conform to the Protestant religion, and send their
children to English schools, in the next generation they
would in a great measure become true Protestant sub-
jects.”

When the Acadians had resisted all seductions and
saved the province by their neutrality and their labor in
repairing the fort, at that very time did Shirley renew
his infamous project.

September 16th, four weeks after the above letter,

220 LETTER TO THE DUKE.

Shirley, as representative of His Majesty, addressed to
the Acadians a letter in which he affirmed: “ That the
apprehensions of being removed were groundless, and
that they might be assured that he would use his best
endeavors to obtain the continuance of the Royal favor
and protection.”

Three days later, September 19th, Shirley made the
Duke of Newcastle acquainted with the situation. As we
have seen, Shirley’s plan was not expulsion, but it was
none the better for that; it was equivalent to an expul-
siomiand more odious than a mere order to depart, which
would have left the Acadians free to go where they
liked. It was therefore easy for him to repudiate a
project, which, literally, he had not formed, and to. re-
main vague on other matters: but the Acadians were not
to be taken in by assurances that were so little defined
and so unauthorized.

November 21st, Shirley wrote to the Duke of New-
castle to inform him that his letter to the Acadians had
not had the effect of quieting their fears :

‘They are still alarmed at the rumor of the design to remove
them. New assurances should be given by His Majesty at once;
if this was done it would have a great tendency to remove their
present apprehensions of being sent off. . . . These measures, to-
gether with the introducing of French protestant ministers and
English schools, and some small encouragements by privileges to
such as should conform to the Protestant religion ; the disallowance
of the public exercise of the Romish religion, at least after a short
term of years, and forbidding Romish priests under severe penal-
ties to come into the country. .....

‘« Just as I had finished the last parapraph, a letter from Ad-
miral Knowles was delivered to me in which he informs me that
he has given his opinion to Your Grace, that it will be necessary
to drive all the Acadians out of Acadia. . . Iam of a contrary
opinion. . . It seems very difficult to drive all the Acadians out of

SE ee a

LETTER TO THE DUKE. O21

Acadia. This would strengthen the French considerably, and
would make the reclaiming of the Indians impracticable. . . . But,
after their having remained so long in the country upon the foot-
ing of British subjects, wnder the sanction of the treaty of Utrecht,
and making improvements on their lands for one or two genera~
tions, and being grown up into such a number of families, to drive
them all off without further enquiry seems to be liable to many ob-
jections. Among others, it may be doubted whether under the
circumstances of these people it would clearly appear to be a just
usage of them. ....» The exemption of not bearing arms wpon
any account given to them by Governor Philipps, on thetr consent-
ing to take an oath of allegiance, whether it was done by him with
or without authority, it may perhaps be deemed too rigorous a
punishment that would envolve the innocent with the guilty in the
loss of their estates and the expulsion out of the country ;“it is not
improbable but that there may be many among them who would
even prefer His Majesty’s Government to a French one, and have
done nothing to deserve such fate. Some allowance may likewise
be made for their bad situation between Canadians, Indians and
English, the ravages of all which they have felt by turns in the
course of the war ; during which they seem to have been continu-
ally placed between two fires, the force and menaces of the Cana-
dians and Indians plundering them of whatever they wanted and
deterring them in the strongest manner from having any commu-
nication with His Majesty’s garrison on the one hand, and the re-
sentment of the garrison for their withholding their intelligence
and supplies on the other, though at the same time it was not in a
condition to protect them from the enemy. Wherefore, it seems a
matter worthy of your Grace’s consideration whether, under such
doubtful circumstances, the driving all the Acadians off the coun-
try, thereby greatly strengthening the enemy, is more eligible than
treating them as subjects.”

Such is the man whom Parkman sets on a pedestal
for the admiration of his fellow-citizens. True, he was
“determined,” “energetic,” “ resolute,” and these qual-
ities appear to be those which Parkman appreciates
above all others. I am willing to make allowances for
times and circumstances; but I refuse to believe that
this conduct of Shirley’s was comformable to the code

022 A PRECURSOR TO LAWRENCE.

of honor that then prevailed, how low soever that was ;
and yet all this vile stuff was written to a duke and
a secretary of state, and it was the third time he re-
peated his project, at the very moment when he had just
assured the Acadians “of his best endeavors to obtain
the continuance of the Royal favor and protection ;”
when, as he himself said, “* they were under the sanction
of a treaty,’ and, when, as scocigehaeng said, geet had
in no ways joined the enemy.”
Need we be astonished, after this, that a man AEN
“ firm and resolute,” but morally much inferior to Shir-
ley, deported the Acadians without more reason than
Shirley would have had at this time ? Shirley, however,
‘keeps within bounds; feelings of honor stop him some-
where; the limit is not very high, it is even very low;
but we can guess ata vague boundary line which he
prefers not to overleap. This vague line is the treaty,
that oath with a restriction, the difficult position of the
Acadians, their resistance to the seductions and threats
of the enemy. On second thoughts, he asks himself
whether the Acadians should be blamed for, some-
times, not giving information to the government, when
they were prevented from doing so by terrible threats,
and when this government was unable to protect them.
These objections would hardly be obstacles, “ but the
departure of the Acadians would greatly strengthen the
enemy and would make the reclaiming of the Indians im-
practicable.” This is the serious point. At bottom, the
politic aspect alone interests him, and, for this reason,
“it is more eligible to consider them as subjects.”
- Between Shirley and Admiral Knowles who left such
@ poor reputation at Boston and elsewhere, there is at
least’ this difference that the former is amenable to

NEWCASTLE TO THE RESCUE. 223 *

diplomatic reasons, while the latter stops at nothing.
But, had Shirley’s diplomacy been anything more than
skilful wire-pulling, he must have understood that not
an Acadian would remain in the country, if they were
deprived of their religion. It is truly remarkable that
not one of these governors, except Mascarene and Hop-
son, realized this, though the proofs of it stared them in
the face. Evidently they judged others by their own
feelings. )

Let us pass to the reply of the Duke of Newcastle on

May 30th following (1747) :

“As you and Mr. Warren have represented that an opinion
prevailed amongst the Acadians, that it was intended to remove
them from their settlements and habitations in the Province ; and
as that report may probably have been artfully spread amongst
them in order to induce them to withdraw themselves from their
allegiance to His Majesty and to take part with the enemy: His
Majesty thinks it necessary that proper measures should be taken
to remove any such ill-grounded suggestions ; and, for that pur-
pose, it is the King’s pleasure, that you should declare in some
public and authentic manner to His Majesty’s subjects, the Aca-
dians of that Province, that there is not the least foundation for
any apprehension of that nature; on the contrary, it is His Maj-
esty’s: resolution to protect and maintain all such of them as shall
continue in their duty and allegiance to His Majesty, in the quiet
and peaceable possession of their respective habitations, and that
they shall continue to enjoy the free exercise of their religion.”

Here again is a striking instance of the immense
superiority of the Home authorities on the score of justice

-and honor. The provincial government systematically

misstates all the facts so as to deceive the Home Govern-
ment; and yet the latter never swerves, to any great
extent, from its righteous line of conduct, When Shirley
has done all he could to get his infamous. project ap-

\

224 SHIRLEY GARBLES AND EXPLAINS.

proved, the answer comes back that the Acadians should

be promised “ the free exercise of their religion.”

What is Shirley going to do? Weshallsee. But
first, I shall produce an extract from another of Shirley’s
letters to the Duke of Neweastle, addressed to him a few

‘days before the receipt of the preceding one. On July
8th he represented to him that the French had just left
Grand Pré to retire to Beaubassin ; that they ought to
be dislodged, that English-American colonists ought to
be settled there in place of the Acadians of this district,
“and these Acadians transplanted in New England, and
distributed among the four governments there.”

This shows I was quite right in saying that Shirley’s
scruples were of a very low order, almost infinitesimal.
He was much put out by the orders of the Duke of
Newcastle, so much so that, for a long time, he did
nothing at all. It was important for the safety of the
province to allay as soon as possible the apprehensions of
the Acadians, lest they should weary of waiting and
allow themselves at length to be seduced and convinced
by the French. But Shirley persisted so strongly in
his project of Protestantizing the Acadians, that he did

‘nothing for several months, and, when he made up his
mind to act, he simply suppressed that part of the Duke
of Neweastle’s letter which ordered him to promise them
the full exercise of their religion.

He explained his conduct to the Duke on Oct. 28th,
when a whole year had elapsed since he had promised.
the Acadians to procure from the King himself the
promises they solicited. In this letter of Oct. 28th,
1747, he informs His Grace that he has just drawn up a
proclamation conformable to his letter of the preceding

_ 80th of May; but that he has taken upon himself to

i ee ee ee ee

SHIRLEY GARBLES AND EXPLAINS. 295°

omit the clause concerning the free exercise of their
religion :

e

‘‘ Because the treaty of Utrecht does not seem to lay His Majesty
under an obligation to allow the Acadians the exercise of the
Roman Catholic religion.* ..... And, as His Majesty is as yet
under no promise to do it, J should hope that methods might be
found for weakening the ties of consanguinity and religion. . .
which may possibly be cut off or at least obstructed by His Majesty
making a promise to continue the Acadians in the free exercise
of their religion. . . Therefore, I have taken the liberty to suspend
promising them the free exercise of the Romish religion, though
it is mentioned in your Grace’s letter to have been part of what
was to be included in His Majesty’s intended Proclamation, till I
could transmit my sentiments to your Grace, and I should have
His Majesty’s farther directions upon it; and have in the mean-
time made a declaration of such points as seemed necessary to be
ascertained to the Acadians for quieting their minds and would
not admit delay.”

What an accumulation of frauds from Nicholson to
Lawrence! Pelion on QOssa. Shirley would, indeed, —
haye included in his proclamation the promise of the
free exercise of their religion, but that promise, emanat-
ing from His Majesty, might “ possibly” have been
“an obstruction.” <A trifle, a mere nothing which could
not embarrass a statesman! A simple question of not
pledging imprudently the name of His Majesty without
absolute necessity, in order to be more at liberty to seek
some means of weakening this senseless attachment they
have for their religion !

Mascarene communicated to the Acadians Shirley’s

* By the treaty of Utrecht: ‘ The Acadians are to enjoy the free exercise
of their religion according to the uSage of the Church of Rome, as far as
the laws of Great Britain do allow the same.” In1730 the Acadians agreed
to take the oath only because this privilege was more explicitly granted
to them anew by Philipps.

226 MASCARENE THE COMFORTER.

proclamation on Oct. 21st, 1747. To their deputies he
wrote :

‘* ‘You have in possession His Excellency William Shirley’s Pro-
clamation, whereby you may be made easy in that respect, you are
sensible of the promise I made to you, the effects of which you
have already felt, that I would protect you so long as by your con-
duct and fidelity to the crown of Great Britain you would enable
me to do so, which promise I do again repeat to you.”

I do not believe the Acadians were fully satisfied
with Shirley’s proclamation. The tenor of Mascarene’s
letter seems to indicate that he was anxious about it,
and that, knowing the confidence he inspired them
with, he relied quite as much on his own personal assur-
ance, to dispel their doubts, as on Shirley’s proclama-
tion. They had been left more than a year under an
impression that was but too well grounded. During all
this time, in order to maintain their fidelity to the oath,
they had resisted the arguments, cajoleriés and threats
of the French; and if, by exception, some assisted the
enemy, these exceptions were so rare that, taking all in
all, they count for nothing; and it may be reasonably
supposed that these exceptions would not have existed,
ifthe projects formed against them had not come to
their knowledge.

In all this I fail to see the “‘ weakness of purpose ”
with which Parkman entertains us; it is rather a firm-
ness that resembles obstinacy. The sequel will show
how far this firmness went. Here I shall lay aside the
documents I possess in order to quote Parkman him-
self, who, to my surprise, sums them up faithfully
enough in his new work “ Half aCentury’s Conflict: ”

‘‘De Ramesay, who was at Grand Pré, on learning the approach

FIGHT AT GRAND PRE. ‘BOF

of an English force, had tried to persuade the Acadians. that they
were to be driven from their homes, and that their only hope was
in joining with him to meet force by force, but they trusted
Shirley’s recent assurance of protection, and replied that they
would not break their oath of fidelity to King George. On this,
de Ramesay retreated to his old station at Beaubassin, and Noble
and his men occupied Grand Pré without opposition.” *

A few months later, in February, 1747, took place the
memorable fight at Grand Pré, which we have already
mentioned. Surprised during the night by the French
under the command of Coulon de Villiers, who had
taken advantage of the darkness and a blinding snow-
storm, the English troops occupying this new post were
obliged to capitulate after losing, according to French
reports, a hundred and forty officers and soldiers killed,
among whom were Colonel Noble, his brother, Lieu-
tenants Lechmere, Jones and Pickering, and fifty-four
taken prisoners, among whom was Edward Howe, com-
missary of the English troops in Acadia.t Not long
before, when some Acadians had warned Colonel Noble
that the French were planning an assault on Grand Pré,
they were laughed at: ‘They, the people of Mines,”
says Murdoch, “ had assured the English that the French
would come and attack them, but the English were in-
credulous, relying on the severity of the winter.” +

The French then found themselves masters of Grand
Pré, after a battle in which they had defeated and driven

* Parkman must be here alluding only to the first letter of Shirley tothe

Acadians and not to his proclamation, since Grand Pré was occupied by
Col. Noble in the autumn of 1746, and the proclamation is dated Oct. 21st.
1747.

+ The French-Canadian nobility were numerously represented at this
combat: ‘* Coulon de Villiers, La Corne de St. Luc, de Beaujeu, de Léry, de
Gaspé, de Lotbiniére, de Ligneris, de Repentigny, de Rigauville, de Lan-
gis, de Boishébert, de Lusignan, de la Colombiére, de Bailleul ;” were °
present also MM. Marin, Mercier, Major.

¢ Cf. Hannay, Hist. of Acadia, p. 349.

228 PRESSURE IMMENSE.

away the English; after a capitulation in virtue of
which the conquered had given up the post with all it
contained, and had pledged themselves to retire to
Annapolis and not to bear arms for six months. It was,
properly speaking, a conquest of this part of Acadia.
The Acadians, who dwelt therein, thus changed mas-
ters, at least they might have reasonably believed they
did, and it was possible to find more arguments in favor
of this view than of the contrary one. De Ramesay
directly understood the advantage he could derive from
this situation: he availed himself of it’to issue a proc-
lamation in which he declared that, by this battle,
France had reconquered this part of Acadia; that the
Acadians had thereby become once more French sub-
jects, and that therefore they owed submission and
fidelity to the French Government ; that they should no
longer entertain any relations with the English under
severe penalties.

To this proclamation the Acadians replied by a letter
of which we have only the conclusion :

“Thus, sir, we beg of you to regard our good will and at the
same time our powerlessness, poor people as we are, burdened,
most of us with large families, without succor if obliged to evacu-
ate the country, a disaster that daily threatens us, that keeps us in
continual fear, for we see ourselves in proximity to those who
have been our rulers for such a great number of years.”

Meanwhile, they wrote to Mascarene, explaining their
situation and communicating to him a copy of de
Ramesay’s proclamation.

Not content with the result of his proclamation, de
Ramesay applied to the Governor of Canada to obtain
from him orders confirming his own. Upon receiving a

BUT UNAVAILING. 229

reply, he addressed a new proclamation to the Acadiasn,
ordering them in the name of the King of France to
take up arms against the English, and adding an extract
of a letter of the Governor of Canada, which was as
follows :

‘We consider ourselves as masters of the districts of Beaubas-
sin and Mines, since we have driven off the English. Therefore,
there is no difficulty in forcing the Acadians of these parts to
take arms for us ; to which end we declare to them, that they are
discharged from the oath that they formerly took to the English,
by which they are bound no longer, as had been decided by the
_ authorities of Canada and Monseigneur our bishop.”

The pressure, it must be admitted, was immense. It
was Ramesay’s second proclamation, and this time,
besides his personal opinion on the lawfulness of his
pretensions, he produced that of the Governor of Canada
and even that of the Bishop of Quebec. Besides, every-
thing seemed to show that the conquest and capitulation
did indeed release the Acadians from their oath of
fealty.

Nothing of all this seems to have had any effect on
the Acadians. On June 8th following, Shirley wrote
to the Duke of Newcastle :

‘<T have nothing to add to my letters, which I have lately trans-
mitted to Your Grace, except that Mr. de Ramesay is still at
Beaubassin with his party in expectation of a reinforcement from
Canada. . . and that he has not thought fit to venture again to
Mines, but insists in his messages to the Acadians there, that they
should look upon themselves as subjects to the King of France,
since the New England troops were obliged to retire out of their
District by capitulation, but that this has had no effect upon the
Acadians, the reinforcement which I sent there afterwards having
taken repossession of Mines, . . . and the deputies having there-
upon renewed their oath of fidelity to His Majesty at Annapolis.”

230 BUT UNAVAILING.

It is not easy to see in all of this any sign that the
Acadians were “ weak of purpose,” and such slaves to
the influence of the clergy, since they resisted even the
opinion of a bishop, if it be true that this opinion was

not invented or misapplied. Subsequent events will -

abundantly prove that their firmness or even their
obstinacy was the same up to the deportation.

What more, then, was wanted to satisfy the Govern-
ment and deserve its gratitude? Mascarene perfectly
understood that the safety of the province was due to
the firm attitude of the Acadians, and, had he been left
to himself, I doubt not they would have received from
him a most equitable treatment; but Shirley was far
from allowing himself to be Bpived by such high
motives.™ .

* Not a single one of the documents cited in this chapter is found in the
volume of the archives,

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LOUISBURG RESTORED. 931

CHAPTER XIII.

Signing of the treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle—Cape Breton restored to
France—The French remain in their positions on the north side
of the Bay of Fundy—Founding of Halifax, June, 1749—Proc-
lamation of the new governor, Edward Cornwallis—Oath with-
out restriction exacted or departure within three months—
Refusal of the whole population—Embarrassment of Cornwallis—
Temporizing—Founding of Beauséjour by the French—Their
efforts to attract the Acadians.

PEACE was concluded in October, 1748, at Aix-la-
Chapelle. The treaty left the respective situations of
the two nations as they were before the war. The
provinces or towns, that were conquered, were restored.

L’fle Royale (Cape Breton) was given back to France.

For special reasons this restoration was particularly
vexing to the Anglo-Americans. To them, indeed,
belonged the honor of having taken Louisburg, where
their militia had given proofs of much courage and skill.
This fortress, which had cost France so much money,
had, been a continual menace to the English posses-

sions; the news of its fall had been hailed with great

rejoicings, and its restitution left bitter regrets.

Nearly forty years had elapsed since the treaty of
Utrecht, which had stipulated that France was to cede
Acadia, but without otherwise specifying what consti-
tuted Acadia. Its frontiers, as well as those of the
whole of Canada, were to be determined by commis-
sioners to be appointed for this purpose. Nothing had

232 WHAT WAS ACADIA ?

yet been regulated at the time of the treaty of Aix.
la-Chapelle, nor did this treaty decide the question.

The neglect to settle the frontier difficulty was to
give rise to many other difficulties, and eventually to
inflict on France, not only humiliation, but a blow the
consequences of which were the most disastrous it had
ever experienced, Until now France and England
seemed to struggle with equal chances of success for
the empire of the sea; Spain had been left in the lurch.
The Seven Years’ War was about to decide that Eng-
land should definitively occupy the first place; that
its language, civilization, and institutions should spread
over all colonizable countries, all the strategic points
of the Old and New worlds; that its industry and its
commerce should assume an immense development and
bring it great wealth ; that its wares and its money,
scattered broadcast over the surface of the globe, should
secure for it a preponderating influence in the council
of nations.

The English claimed that Acadia ought to comprise
all New Brunswick, besides the peninsula; while the
French, on the other hand, claimed all the country to
the north of the Bay of Fundy and even the east coast
of the peninsula ; nor were reasons wanting to support
each of these alleged rights, since these rights were
based on undefined or contradictory charters granted
more than a century before. In each case and for
similar reasons the conflicting parties asked for more
than they knew they had a right to or than they hoped
to obtain.

- Meanwhile, Captain Marin, after the treaty of Aix-la-
Chapelle, occupied the north coast of the Bay of Fundy,
that is, all the country that is now New Brunswick,

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WHAT WAS ACADIA ? a5

leaving to the English, until the decision of the com-
mission, the present province of Nova Scotia except
the island of Cape Breton. Marin’s territory comprised
the Acadian settlements of the river St. John, of Chi-
pody, Memramcook and Peticodiac. Beaubassin was
situated partly on the French side, partly in the penin-
sula.

This state of affairs awakened in the mind of the Eng-
lish authorities the idea, often expressed by Philipps,
Mascarene and Shirley, of founding English colonies in
Nova Scotia. The two first-named suggested the estab-
lishment of a fort at Beaubassin, and the colonizing of
the isthmus from the eastern extremity of the Bay of
Fundy as far as Bay Verte. Shirley, as we have seen
elsewhere, proposed moreover to take away from the
Acadians a partof their lands and to introduce thereon
colonists from New England, in order the more effect-
ually to make the Acadians English and bring about their
conversion to Protestantism. Whatever may have been
the reason, whether neglect, or the dangers of the situa-
tion on account of the hostility of the Indians, or
because these projects implied too great an expenditure
of money, or because already those colonists of Massa-
chusetts inspired the imperial government with distrust ;
at any rate nothing had been effected.

The first of these projects had become harder to realize
on account of the great expansion of the Acadian popu-
lation in these parts; on the other hand Shizley’s pro-
ject, which implied spoliation and an odious infringe-
ment of the religious liberty guaranteed by a treaty,
was not to be encouraged by the English Government,
always more equitable and humane than the colonial
authorities.

234 RAPID INCREASE.

The Acadian population had increased with surprising
rapidity. From 175 heads of families who arrived in
Acadia at different times in the course of a century, a
little nation had sprung up, which, at the time of the
cession of the country, counted 2,500 souls, 7,114 in the
year 1739, and about 12,500 in 1749. Of this number
nearly 3,500 dwelt north of the present borders of
Nova Scotia on the territory then occupied by the
French.

The position of these latter Acadians was going to be-
come exceedingly critical and perplexing. Until then,
this part of the country had, properly speaking, been
held neither by France nor by England. The inhabit-
ants, who occupied it, especially those of River St.
John, Chipody, Memramcook and Peticodiac, had
governed themselves, or rather lived peacefully without
government, without control, without intervention.
As France had ceded Acadia, and as they were the sons
of the Acadians established in the peninsula, they made
no difficulty in acknowledging themselves English sub-
jects, and in 1730 they took the oath of fealty.

The encroachments of France, before the decision of
the commission appointed to fix the limits of Acadia,
determined England to found an English colony and a

fortified post that might serve as a counterpoise to —

Louisburg. Chibucto Bay was chosen, and the found-
ing of Halifax decided in March, 1749. Fourteen
ships, bearing 2,756 persons with all the necessary pro-
visions and a complete civil organization, comprising an
administrative council, magistrates, a schoolmaster, a
minister, as well as merchants, artisans, and clerks, set
sail on May 14th, and entered Chibucto harbor June
27th following. Edward Cornwallis was the new

STRATEGIC VALUE OF HALIFAX. oo On

governor. Halifax was founded. The place was most
judiciously chosen. The French had made the mistake
of overlooking the advantages of this harbor and of pre-
ferring Louisburg to it. The English were perhaps
wrong in delaying so long to occupy it. Acadia had
been forty years in their possession, and yet, in 1748,
there were not a dozen English colonists in the whole
province. The consequence was that the Annapolis
garrison would not have been able to subsist without the
Acadians, and this dependence on them had been partly
the cause of all the efforts and frauds of the governors
to retain, against their will, a population which had for
a long time wanted to withdraw at any cost.

The much-delayed foundation of Halifax repaired to
a certain extent this error, which had no grievous con-
sequences for England, thanks to the mild and peaceful
manners of the Acadians; but, later*on, it enabled an
unfeeling and conscienceless governor to crush this little
nation and inflict on it woes, the remembrance of which,
after more than a century, still fills with anguish the de-
_scendants of those who were his victims. |

If, upon the whole, regard being had to the times, the
Acadians had been hitherto governed with gentleness,
they met with different treatment after the foundation of
Halifax ; which proves that this gentleness originated in
the weakness of the rulers and the submissive spirit of the
governed, in the fear of losing a population whose as-
sistance was indispensable. How could they have been
governed harshly, when there were only from a hun-
dred to a hundred and fifty soldiers at Annapolis,
when the mass of the population was far distant from the
only fortified place in the whole country? Such a state
of things would have been impossible with any other

236 STRATEGIC VALUE OF HALIFAX.

but'a peaceable and submissive people. Orders may
sometimes have been executed reluctantly or slowly ;
but instances of this kind are so insignificant that they
would not deserve to be mentioned, were they not the
only instances on record, and had not the deportation
invested them with a certain interest. Even when,
under Armstrong’s administration, several priests were
arrested, and ill-used, and the churches closed, we do
not hear of any threat or act of resistance from the Aca-
dians. We shall see the same self-restraint later on,
despite provocations and an ever-increasing oppression,
all of which was seemingly designed to provoke a pre-
text for deporting them.

As may be supposed, this new town suddenly arising
must have greatly exercised the Acadian centres. An
event of this importance could not fail to entail upon
them very serious proximate or remote consequences ;
they must have understood its bearings and commented
at length upon the new situation. Clearly this was a
serious enterprise, a colony that would be strongly en-
couraged and assisted by England. What boded it for
them? Would the actual state of affairs be changed ?
Would their happiness be troubled thereby, the free
_exercise of their religion restricted, or entirely taken
away from them? Had they not reason to fear that a
“part of their lands would be confiscated? It may well
be supposed that these questions and others of like
nature were so many problems stated and discussed at
the fireside in evening chats. In this review of pos-
sibilities it was very likely the pessimistic opinions
that generally prevailed.

The fleet, as I have said, had entered Chibucto harbor
June 27, 1749. A few days later, the Acadians of

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S
CORNWALLIS ANSWERS A DEPUTATION. 23%

River Canard, Grand Pré and Pigiguit, sent three dep-
uties to the new governor to present him in their name
their respects and their homage.

Jean Melangon, Claude LeBlanc and Philippe Melan-
con were the three deputies admitted to the presence of
the Governor. They were asked if they had any petition
to present from the Acadians of their district ; they re-
plied that they had come simply to offer their respects
to His Excellency and to know if their condition would
remain the same as before, especially with regard to the
free exercise of their religion. His Excellency, who
had just drawn up a proclamation enjoining upon the
Acadians to take the oath without restriction, communi-
cated it to them with the order to publish it, to post it

- up in all public places, to return within fifteen days

with the other deputies, and to give an account of the
resolutions of the inhabitants of their respective districts.

On July 29th, the date fixed for their return, despite
the long distances they had to travel, the Acadian depu-
ties of the whole province, including those residing
north of the Bay of Fundy, had reached Halifax, namely :

Alexandre Hébert, } . :
Joseph Dugas, Annapolis.

Claude Le Blanc, ) Grand Pré.

Jean Melangon, § Riviére aux Canards.
Baptiste Gaillard,
Pierre Landry,
Pierre Gautereau,—Cobéquid.
Pierre Doucet, | Besubeani
Frangois Bourg, { 7°*1@881-
Alexandre Brassard,—Chipody.

Pigiguit.

“‘They were called in before the Council and asked what reso-
lutions the inhabitants had taken in consequence of His Majesty’s
declarations.

238 RESPECTFUL PROTEST.

‘‘ Jean Melancon delivered to His Excellency a letter wherein, he
said, was contained their answer, which letter, being read, the
Council was of opinion that with regard to that part of their letter
demanding an exemption from bearing arms, it was the opinion
of the Council that no exception should be granted them, but that
they should be told peremptorily that they must take the oath as
offered them. That His Excellency will send persons as soon as
possible to administer the oath, and that all such as are willing to
continue in the possession of their lands, must appear and take the
oath before the 26th of October, which will be the last day allowed
them.

‘*This declaration being read to them, they asked whether, if
they had a mind to evacuate the country they would have leave to
sell their lands and effects. His Excellency answered, that, by
the Treaty of Utrecht, there was one year allowed them, wherein
they might have sold their effects, but that at the present time,
those that should choose to retire could not be allowed to sell or
carry off anything. »

“The deputies beg leave to return to their Departments and
consult with the inhabitants. Upon which they were warned,
that, whoever should not have taken the oath before the 26th of

October, should forfeit all their possessions and rights in this

Province.
‘‘They then asked leave to go to the french governor and see
what condition might be offered them. His Excellency’s order
was, that whoever should leave this Province without taking the
oath should immediately forfeit all their rights.
“The oped was ordered to write all the priests to repair
hither.”

A proclamation conformable to the reply of the
governor was left in the ‘hands of the deputies to. be
published in their respective districts. A few weeks
later the same deputies returned, bearing a letter to the
governor, signed by a thousand persons, in which they
most courteously expressed their views : )

‘‘We are very contrite, sir, when we consider the privileges
which were granted to us by General ee after we had taken
the oath of allegiance to His Majesty. .

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RESPECTFUL PROTEST. 239

f Tio years ago, His Majesty was pleased to grant us the enjoy-
ment of our property, etc., etc. We have received all these promises

as coming from His Majesty ; we have encouragingly relied upon

them and have rendered service to the Government, never having
had the wish to violate our oath. We believe, Your Excellency,
that if His Majesty had been informed of our conduct towards his
Government, he would not propose to us an oath which, if taken,
would at any moment expose our lives to great peril from the sav-
age nations, who have reproached us in a strange manner, as to
the oath we have taken to His Majesty. This one binding us still
more strictly, we should assuredly become the victims of their
barbarous cruel

‘‘The inhabitants in general, sir, have resolved not to take the
oath which your Excellency require of us ; but, if your Excellency
will grant us our old oath, which was given to Governor Philipps,
with an exemption from taking up arms, we will accept it.

‘*But if Your Excellency is not disposed to grant us what we
take the liberty of asking, we are resolved every one of us to leave.
the country.

‘“We take the liberty, sir, to beg Your Excellency whether or
not His Majesty has annulled the oath given to us by General
Philipps.

‘Thereupon, we hope, sir, that you will take notice of our hum-
ble supplications, and that Your Excellency will allow yourself
to be moved by our miseries, and we, on our part, we will exert
ourselves to the utmost in praying to God for the preservation of
your person.”

Cornwallis had previously told them that they could
quit the country, but that they should take nothing
away with them. He had committed the same blunder
as his predecessors. He had thought that these men.

. were too much attached to their goods to resign them-

selves tothe utter abandonment of the fruit of their
patient labor. Like his predecessors, he was deceived.
Perhaps he did not yet see his mistake clearly; but he
was soon to be convinced of it.

His reply was, as the preceding ones had been. harsh
and haughty : |

240 CORNWALLIS WAXES WROTH.

**You do nothing but repeat the same story without the least
change ; you want to be subjects onsuch or such conditions. That
cannot be. All those who chose to remain after the Treaty of
Utrecht have become British subjects and could not have imposed
conditions to their becoming such. You have always refused to
take this oath without an unexpressed reservation ; I tell you that
Governor Philipps who granted you such reservation did not do his
duty. It is only out of pity to your inexperience that we con-
descend to reason with you, otherwise the question would not be
reasoning but commanding and being obeyed.” ;

Thus did he dismiss them with these harsh words,
without reiterating or even mentioning the orders con-
tained in his proclamation, and without so much as
communicating to them a written answer, which they
awaited in order to transmit it to the inhabitants.

His letter to the Lords of Trade, five days later,
shows us clearly enough the state of his mind and the
current of his thoughts :

‘‘The Acadian deputies have been with us this week. They
came, as they said, with their final answer. Your Lordships will
see from the enclosed copy, that they are, or say they are, resolved
to retire, rather than take the oath of Allegiance. As Iam sure
they will not leave their habitations this season, when the letter
‘was read to the Council in their presence, IT made them answer
without changing anything of my former declaration, or saying
one word about it. My view is to make them as useful as possible
to His Majesty while they do stay. If, afterwards, they are still
obstinate, and refuse the oath, I shall receive in the spring His
Majesty’s further instructions from Your Lordships.

“‘ As they stayed to have copies of my answer in writing, I saw
some of them in the afternoon by myself, and exhorted them to
be faithful to His Majesty. . . They went home in good humour
promising great things.”

Cornwallis seems already to be doubtful of the result.
Had he known their history and the relations of his

INJUDICIOUS ARROGANCE. tae «4 |

predecessors with them, he would. have: immediately
understood that his haughty manners, his arrogance as
of a Roman proconsul, must, while alarming them,
produce an effect just the opposite of what he intended.
Any humane and tolerably observant man would have
realized this. He had flattered himself that, by de-
livering, in a magisterial tone, these subtilties to poor
ignorant people, he would lord it over them and thus
stamp out all resistance. This showed great ignorance
of their character. Besides, it was a very bad begin-
ning; he was entering upon a line of conduct that
could bring him only deceptions and humiliations ; he
was about to traverse all the phases through which
Armstrong and Philipps had passed, before making up
his mind to adopt mild and conciliatory measures, and
then it would be too late.

Other deputations followed; memorials were pre-
sented in which were narrated the facts relating to
their sojourn in the country and to the oath. They
recalled the treaty of Utrecht, which gave to all those
who did not desire to \become English subjects the
right to depart within the space of a year taking with
them their movable property ; they mentioned the let-
ter of Queen Anne which enlarged the privileges of
the treaty. They reminded him that their decision
had been to quit the country, but that they had been
always prevented by all sorts of means. “In presence
of so many obstacles we have,” said they, “ offered and
taken several oaths, all of which were based on that
promise of exemption from service in war; if we have
stayed in this country, it has been with this explicit
reservation, and the finest phrases could not change our
‘eae pe on that point.” “Your oaths are illegal,”

242 HIS HIGH MIGHTINESS.

said Cornwallis, ‘and if the preceding governors sanc-
tioned them by their promises, they delivered to you
titles that are null and void; you are here subjects of
the King of England, even without having taken the
oath of allegiance ; you have therefore lost all your
rights, and it is a favor he granted you when he con-
sented to admit you again to the benefit of his alle-
giance.”

The Acadians replied that their claims were founded
on authentic acts, which could not be repudiated or
distorted by mere words. “Governor Philipps had
begun by denying our claims; then, after examining
into them, he recognized our rights and consented to
grant this exemption from bearing arms; he assured
us he had full authority therefor. If we have been
deceived, the King cannot turn against us such a
fraud; if the condition of our sojourn be withdrawn, we
should, at least, be replaced in the position that the
treaty guaranteed.” Then these unfortunate persons,
who naively believed in justice, brought forth the copy

of the acts they had signed. ‘We have always lived

thus on our plighted oath, without having heard from
any one that these agreements were null; on the con-
trary, they were recognized and acted upon in the last
war. As for ourselves, we have preserved inviolate our
fidelity to the oath, despite seductions and threats.”
“So much the worse for you,” replied Cornwallis, “ if
you knew not the invalidity of these conventions, you
now have only to submit, or you shall be despoiled of all
you possess.” This is a pretty fair summary of these
negotiations, says Rameau, whom I am quoting.

Obliged, before this quasi-Majesty to couch their >

thoughts in terms of the most profound respect, obliged

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GREAT EXCITEMENT. 243

to avoid even the appearance of a contradiction, they
were condemned beforehand to be in the wrong. It
was the earthen jar against the iron pot.

However, says Murdoch, the historian of Nova
Scotia: “‘ The memorials which these Acadians sent to
the Council were all stamped with a respectful modera-
tion and also with a profound conviction. They all
rested on this fundamental point; an oath of allegiance
taken with all due restrictions, from which they had
never consented to swerve since the conquest.”

The Acadians invariably asserted that they willingly
recognized themselves to be the very faithful subjects of
the King of England; that the obligation to bear arms
against their compatriots was repugnant to their
feelings; that, if an oath like the one they had already
taken were accepted, they would.be happy to remain in
the country and maintain, under all circumstances, the
inviolability of this oath.

While these negotiations were being carried on, the
excitement, as may well be expected, was increasing in all
the Acadian centres. Would their requests be granted ?

Should they depart or should they not? Many were

getting ready to go away; the majority did not wish to
do so without an express authorization of the governor.

The French still occupied the north of the Bay of

Fundy; they were building a fort which they called
Beauséjour at a mile and a half from the village of
Beaubassin. Great efforts were made by Abbé Le
Loutre and the French to induce the Acadian colonists,
and particularly those who dwelt near this frontier, to
emigrate over to the French side. The haughty and
unjust conduct of Cornwallis was beginning to produce
the results he ought to have foreseen. Irritated by the

244 GREAT EXCITEMENT.

efforts of the French to attract the Acadians to their
settlements, he gave Captain Cobb the following order :

“You are hereby to proceed to Chignecto (Beaubassin) to seize
and secure as many of the inhabitants as you can, or, in case they
quit their houses upon your approach, you are to seize and secure
as many of their wives and children as you think proper and de-
liver them to the first English Fort you shall come to, to remain
as hostages of their better behaviour.”

This order however, was not carried out.

So, while on the one hand he ‘was forcing the
Acadians to choose between swearing allegiance and
leaving the country, on the other he was giving orders
to prevent them from taking advantage of his alter-
native. ei ee

BRIEF RETROSPECT. 245

CHAPTER XIV.

Cornwallis’s proclamation is followed by the departure of some
families—The emigration threatens to become general—In the
beginning of May, 1750, the Acadian deputies, assembled at
Halifax, ask leave to quit the country—Cornwallis, frightened,
changes his tone—He avoids giving an answer ; will give it when
they have done their sowing—Seed-time over, the deputies
return to Halifax—Fresh subterfuge.

CORNWALLIS seemed at length to understand that he
was not going to obtain from the Acadians the oath he
required; that they would submit to the cruel alter-
native of abandoning their property and leaving the
country rather than consent to an act that did violence
to their feelings. All the old artifices, all the cheats of
Nicholson, Vetch, Armstrong and Philipps were to be
repeated to prevent their departure.

In Nicholson’s time, as we have seen, the Acadians
were not allowed the benefit of the clauses of the
treaty. Under various pretexts their departure was made

impossible. On the one hand, French vessels were forbid-

den to enter the ports; on the other, the Acadians were
not permitted to take passage in English ships. They
built themselves small vessels; but, when they wanted
to equip them at Louisburg, this was refused. Later
on, they were forbidden to apply at Boston. Undis-
mayed, they begged the French authorities to act as
mediators in their favor at the English court. When
the order of the English Government instructing

246 FRENCH NEUTRALS.

Nicholson to give the Acadians full permission to leave
was handed to Colonel Vetch, he pretended that he had
no authority to act, that he must await the arrival of
the governor. Nicholson, on his return, in order to
avoid obeying orders, reserved certain points to the
decision of the Queen.

For three years the Acadians, who, perhaps, trusted
artlessly in the good faith of their rulers, waited for the
answer to these reserved points; it never came. Sub-
sequently, Philipps, thinking that the time had come
for exacting an oath of allegiance, issued a proclamation
ordering the taking of this oath within four. months, or,
in default thereof, departure from the province without
taking away anything but clothes. Ill informed of the
character of this people, he believed, as his predecessors
did, that love of property and the absence of all means
of transportation would force them to accept his pro-
posals. Great was his surprise when he saw them at
work opening out a road for their departure. This
contingency had not entered into his calculations. He
was equal to the emergency and forbade them to con-
tinue that road.
~ At last, finding that matters could not be settled
otherwise, the Acadians resigned themselves to remain
in the country and to take the oath, on condition that
they should not bear arms against the French. This
condition being accepted, the struggle came to an end.
Thenceforth they were called by themselves, by their
rulers, by everybody, “ The French Neutrals.” During
twenty years, relying on this solemn agreement, they
lived in the most perfect tranquillity. Not only the
agreement was not disavowed, but both sides observed
it scrupulously during all that time, and especially

FRENCH NEUTRALS. 247

during the war. At bottom, there was good faith only
on one side; the government was waiting for an oppor-
tunity to repudiate what had been merely a makeshift
to get out of a difficulty.

The opportunity was now at hand in the foundation
of Halifax. Cornwallis could now, he thought, speak
as a master, ego nominor leo; agreements were of little
weight with him; nor was it necessary for him to plead
want of fidelity on the part of the Acadians, for of this
he says not a word. Might for him was all sufficient ;
with that, a soldier of his importance could snap his
fingersatarguments. Like his predecessors, he believed
the Acadians would elect to take the required oath
rather than lose their possessions. Instead of a year or
four months—the delay granted by Philipps—he allowed
three months only ; and, like Philipps, he forbade them
to take anything away. When, at last, he came to
realize that the Acadians would quit the country rather
than submit to his oath, he, too, adopted “ ways that are
dark:” ‘ As they stayed to have copies of my answer in
writing, I made them answer, without changing anything
of my former declaration, or saying one word about it.
My view is to make them as useful as possible while they
do stay.”

This happened in September. He hoped that, when
the season would be more advanced, there would no
longer be question of leaving in winter; by the time
spring came round, he could find some other pretext,
should they persist in their intentions.

The French, as I have already pointed out, remained,
_after the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle, in the northern part
of the Bay of Fundy. This territory was disputed by
the two crowns, and the question referred to a commis-

248 THE GOVERNOR OF CANADA INTERFERES.

sion. As soonas the foundation of Halifax was resolved,

upon, the French, supposing that the intention of the
English was also to occupy and colonize the district of
Beaubassin, had a mind to settle there permanently.
Cornwallis’s proclamation to the Acadians determined
the French to improve the occasion and try to win them
over. The Governor of Canada, M. de la Jonquiere,
sent the Chevalier de la Corne with reinforcements
strongly to occupy the isthmus from Beaubassin to Bay
Verte. 7

During this autumn of 1749, the English were too
busy putting things into shape at Halifax to make any
effective opposition to the manceuvres of the French.
The latter, taking advantage of the state of alarm into
which the Acadians had been thrown by the Proc-
lamation, left no stone unturned to induce them to
choose the alternative of departure and emigrate all
together. The French had to make haste, for the
English would not fail, the next year, to thwart their
plans. Meanwhile, as a check on them, Cornwallis
threw a small garrison into Grand Pré under Captain
Handfield. Instigated by the French, no doubt, three
hundred Indians in October (1749), blockaded this
garrison with a view to enable the Acadians to quit the
country without being molested by the soldiers. The
attempt was made in vain; not one of the. Acadians
wished to leave before obtaining a final answer from the
Governor and without his permission. A few days
later, seeing the uselessness of their efforts, the Indians
raised the blockade, taking away with them the notary
Le Blane, Captain Hamilton and eighteen soldiers who
had been surrounded and made prisoners in one of the
sorties of the garrison. As no one was killed, it is

‘ys
a

A NEW DODGE. __ 249

evident that the only object of this attack was to facili-
tate the departure of the Acadians.

On the affidavit of Honoré Gauterot, a warrant was
issued for the arrest of Charles Hébert, Francois Le
Prince, Claude Le Prince, Renauchon Aucoin, Joseph
Vincent, accused of having assisted the Indians; but
they could not be arrested. At Cobequid, where there
were no troops, no protection of any sort, the Indians,
by threats and violence, forced a part of the population
to follow them before the arrival of the troops.

In the following March (1750), Cornwallis wrote to
the Duke of Bedford :

‘« T propose to defer pressing them upon that head (the oath of
allegiance) till we see what can be done at Beaubassin, and what
_ settlers come from England; then I will demand a peremptory
answer.” .

This letter had not yet reached its destination when
Cornwallis received from the Secretary of State the order
not to exact the oath for the present, and to treat the
Acadians with kindness in order to wean them from
their intention of quitting’the country. :

At last, in the month of May, when the Acadians
came to Halifax to beg leave to depart, there was noth-
ing left but to choose between consenting and inventing
some new dodge. Pretexts were getting rare: Nichol-
son, Vetch, Armstrong and Philipps had almost ex-
hausted the supply. However, listen to Cornwallis :

** You were indebted to me for not having made you leave the
country even during winter. But, after having past the winter in
the province, it is ridiculous to come and tell me, that you will not
sow having resolved to withdraw. My friends, you must go and sow
your lands in order that they may be leftin that condition in which

250 CORNWALLIS COAXES.

they ought to be at this season, without that you will have no right
to expect the least favor from the government. When you have
done your duty in this respect, I will give you a more precise reply
to your request.”

They had not been allowed to leave in English,
French or Acadian vessels, by sea or land, in the autumn ;
now the springtime is denied them, for they must sow
their land. This long series of subterfuges, which
would be incredible if the proof were not before our
eyes, consigned in documents written by the governors
themselves, is, however, not yet ended, as far as Corn-
wallis’s contribution is concerned. The Acadians were
determined to have the last word. Seeing that, in order
‘to obtain permission to quit the country, they had to
sow their land for the benefit of strangers, they did so.
When this work was over, on May 25th, they once more
stood before the Governor, hoping that this time no
new objection would be raised. Once more they were
doomed to disappointment. There yet remained one
pretext which had not been unearthed by Nicholson,
nor Vetch, nor Philipps, nor hitherto by Cornwallis him-
self. Only, there was danger lest the Acadians, detect-
ing his purpose, should refuse any longer to submit to
his trickery. Hence the oratorical precautions with
which he approaches the subject. The irrepressible
martinet, who, shortly before had been so harsh and
haughty, finally understood that he must change his
face; he became gentle, insinuating, even flattering.
Parkman, who has noticed nothing of the farce played
anent the Acadians, or who has purposely ignored it,
is deeply affected by Cornwallis’s words:

‘** We promised to give a precise reply to the inhabitants, with

PASSPORTS REQUIRED. 251

respect to the permission they ask to leave the Province when they
shall have sown their lands, and, as it appears that you have obeyed
our orders in that particular, we will explain to you our senti-
ments on that very important affair, with the same sincerity that
we have always made use of towards you. :

_‘* My friends, the moment that you have declared your desire to ©
leave and submit yourselves to another government, our deter-
mination was to hinder nobody from following what he imagined
to be his interest.

«We frankly confess, however, that your determination to leave
gives us pain.

“We are well aware of your industry and your temperance,
and that you are not addicted to any vice or debauchery. This
Province is your country ; you or your fathers have cultivated it ;
naturally you ought yourselves to enjoy the fruits of your labour.

‘* When we arrived here, we expected that nothing would give
you so much pleasure as the determination of His Majesty to settle
this Province. Certainly nothing more advantageous to you could
take place. You possess the only cultivated lands in this Province ;
they produce grain and nourish cattle sufficient for the whole
colony. In short, we flattered ourselves that we would make you
the happiest people in the world. . . In your petitions you ask for
a general leave. As it is impossible that you could all meet at a
certain rendez-vous in order to set out all together, with all your
families, one must understand by the expression, ‘ congé général,’ a
general permission to set out whenever you shall think proper, by
land, or by sea, or by whatever conveyances you please. In order
to effect this, we should have to notify all the commanders of His
Majesty’s ships and troops to allow every one to pass and repass
which would cause the greatest confusion... .

‘“* The only manner in which you can withdraw from the Prov-
- inee, is to follow the regulations already established. The order is,
that all persons wishing to leave the Province shall provide them-
selves with our passport. And we declare that nothing shall pre-
vent us from giving such passports, the moment that peace and
tranquillity are re-established in the Province.”

Cornwallis must have thought himself very skilful,
and indeed he showed great skill in striving to reverse the
unfortunate impression he had at first produced, and to
prevent at any cost the departure of the Acadians. Tired

252 THE POWER OF KINDNESS.

of short-lived tricks, which had several times betrayed
his bad faith, he was now to hold the key of the situa-
tion; he would make that situation last as long as he
pleased. Nobody could leave the country without first
coming to him; it was always in his power to refuse
under pretext that the country was not quiet, or under
any other pretext, it mattered little which; the main
thing was to put an end to these deputations that
worried him.

This subterfuge was, I believe, Cornwallis’s last; the
country was tranquil, and would never be more so. ‘The
Acadians seemed to understand that those passports
would never be granted to them; for thenceforth they
ceased to press their claims. They had been told to
take the oath or go; and, in point of fact, they had no
alternative but to remain at the good pleasure of the
Governor or leave without permission. They remained
quietly on their lands until the time of the deportation.
Those who had chosen to emigrate to French soil had
done so, for the most part, the previous autumn after
Cornwallis’s proclamation.

Cornwallis’s behavior toward the Acadians was not
only unjust, it could not have been more unwise than it
was at his arrival in the country. He was confronted
by a moral and peaceful people, from whom he had
reason to hope for the most willing assistance and the
most complete submission. To ensure their permanent
attachment to the Crown, all he need do was to let them
understand that they had nothing to fear from him, and
to treat them with gentleness and humanity.

After giving such evident proofs of their fidelity to
the oath during the recent war, in exceptional circum-
stances which enhanced their merit, after receiving the

THE POWER OF KINDNESS. 253

assurances of His Majesty through the Secretary of
State, the Duke of Newcastle, the Acadians might have
hoped that the bearing of the governors would: not
change. Cornwallis had only to let his better nature
appear. Mildness and justice have always been infal-
lible methods of action ; obedience and sympathy spring
from kindness as water from its source; no bond is
lasting that is not woven of sympathy and _ justice.
Searcely had Cornwallis touched the soil of Acadia,
when the Acadian deputies hastened to do him homage.
What must they have thought, when, instead of the
cordial welcome they had a right to expect, they were
received with arrogance, when so severe a proclamation
was flung in their teeth? Did not this sudden change
seem to say: ‘So long as we were weak, we had re-
course to all sorts of subterfuges and stratagems to keep
you in the country; now that we are strong, we are
going to speak as your lords and masters ; we mean to
treat you in a very different way?” Had they not
reason to fear that their privileges would be taken from
them one by one ? that the free exercise of their religion
would be impeded, perhaps done away with? Since the
solemn agreements made twenty years before in the mat-
ter of the oath were no longer respected, why should
their other privileges escape the same fate ?
_ For still another reason was this an excellent occasion
for winning their affectionate fealty. The way the
French officers had treated them during the invasions
of the late war had considerably weakened their natural
sympathy for France. A little kindness, together with
the assurance that the foundation of Halifax would not
alter the good understanding of the last ten years, would
have sufficed to bind them to England more closely, and

954 A LION IN THE PATH.

to induce them later on, without pressure and without
trickery, to take the much-desired oath.

It would seem, at first sight, that with the foundation
of Halifax. the retention of the Acadians had ceased to
be an important object. Their farms were the most
fertile in the province, their system of dikes represented
an enormous expenditure of labor; these farms could
give plenty to a population of 12,000 souls. Quite
true; but there was a lion in the path, as ready to
devour now as he was in 1718. The Indians were still
the irreconcilable enemies of the English. This hostility
was skilfully fostered by the French of Cape Breton.
So long as the latter owned a square mile of territory
thereabouts, it would be impossible or, at least, dangerous,
_to establish new colonies without effectively protecting
them at great expense against those Indians. Otherwise
no one would risk settling there.

However, the strongest motive for keeping thie’ Aca-
dians was the increase of strength the accession of their
great numbers would give to France. ‘This considera-
tion, weighty enough in the days of Nicholson and
Philipps, was doubly so now. The addition of thirteen
thousand souls might make the situation of England in
the peninsula very precarious. This was clear to
Cornwallis, and just as clear to his successor, Hopson,
when he begged the Lords of Trade not to force him to
urge this question of the oath, alleging that, for the
moment, it was impossible to make them take it, and
that their departure would be the ruin of the country.

The French were as much interested in getting them
to quit Acadia as the English were in keeping them
there. The question of the oath had been settled under
Philipps for the benefit of England, and thenceforth

RIGHTS OF THE FRENCH. Desi:

Frapece had seemed indifferent. But Cornwallis’s

proclamation, by withdrawing the long-standing agree-
ment, had re-opened the whole question and now left
the Acadians free to depart. As the proclamation

itself said, the only issue was submission to an unre-

stricted oath or departure.

Cornwallis severely criticises the conduct of the
French striving to win over the Acadians, and their
conduct was indeed blameworthy, rather in its methods
than in its purpose, for it was France’s right and duty,
as a party to the Treaty of Utrecht, to have an eye to
the fulfilment thereof. Since the Acadians had the
undoubted right to quit the country, the French had an
equal right to persuade them to do so; further than
persuasion this right did not go. Because they used
undue pressure and violence, they are to be blamed, and
this blame they deserve to receive much more from the
Acadians than from the authorities at Halifax. How-
ever, the guilt of the French does not surpass nor even
equal that of the governors: in the one case there was
violence in the exercise of a right, in the other, violence
against the exercise of aright. This oath, agreed to by
Philipps, was for the Acadians the necessary condition of
their remaining in the country, it bound the English
Government quite as much as the Acadians. To say
the least, they ought to have been restored to the
position they occupied before Philipps’s compromise ; |
that is, they ought to have once more become free to
withdraw within the space of a year with all their
effects, and even with the proceeds of the sale of their
property. Cornwallis had, with no little subtlety, laid
down the principle that no man can be a subject
conditionally. But governments, as well as individuals,

256 RIGHTS OF THE FRENCH.

are bound to the conditions which they accept. There
is no loophole of escape here. Either leave to depart
must be granted to the Acadians who claimed it as a right
recognized by a solemn treaty, or the conditions of their
settlement must be sanctioned. This latter alternative
having been accepted, the Government was as strictly
bound as private persons are by contracts. Did not the
autocratic Tzar accept the settlement of the Mennonites
in his empire under the same condition of not bearing
arms? ‘True, this agreement was revoked a century
later, but after notice given long beforehand and with
the privilege of selling and carrying away all that
belonged to them. Could a constitutional government
like that of England do less? As the Acadians wished
to leave, they would have been justified in taking no
account of Cornwallis’s hindrances, and in departing
with their effects and without passports, since the
exacting of the latter was only a trick to keep them.
- But the generality of them did no such thing. They
once more withstood all the seductions and threats of
the French, as they had done during the war: a new
proof of their firmness and submission to the Govern-
ment ; a new proof also, may be, of the non-intervention
of their clergy, if not of the slight influence of the
latter.

MISSIONARY TO THE INDIANS. 257

CHAPTER XV.

Doings of the French—The Abbe Le Loutre—His character—
Parkman’s opinion.

THE entire summer of 1750 was devoted by the
French to fortifying Fort Beauséjour, which they had
begun the previous autumn. It was in the most land-
ward part of the Bay of Fundy, on a high hill north of
the village of Beaubassin and of the little river Messa-
gouetche, which the French considered as the frontier
of Acadia, until the decision of the commission then
sitting. This district of Beaubassin, or Chignecto, as
it was sometimes called, had become very populous, and
contained a vast extent of very fertile meadow land, of
which a large portion was enclosed by strong dikes.
Northward of this frontier were the settlements of
Chipody, Petitcodiac, Memramcook, Jolicceur, Aulac, la
prée des Bourgs, la prée des Richards, Cocagne, etc.
Southward were the village of Beaubassin, the Riviére
des Héberts, Menoudy, etc. Thus half, or nearly half,
of this district was on English territory, and the French
naturally expected that the English would lose no time
in occupying it, were it only to prevent the emigration
of the Acadians.

In the mean time, the Abbé Le Loutre, who was a
self-constituted agent of the French, made great but
vain efforts to determine the Acadians that lived near

this frontier to go over to the French side. Here it
17

258 INDIANS HATE THE ENGLISH.

will be well to pause and consider this Abbé Le Loutre,
who played so considerable a part in the events of this
epoch. He has brought upon himself much hatred, not
less from the French officers and even from the Acadians
than from the English.

For about ten years he was a missionary among the
Micmac Indians of the river Shubenecadie, between
Cobequid and Chibouctou (Truro and Halifax). We
hardly ever hear of him till the war of 1744. In 1745
he accompanied the Indians of his mission and others in
an expedition against Annapolis, after which he with-
drew to Bay Verte (on French territory or claimed as
such by France) with his Indians. Shortly after, he
went to France, whence he returned in 1747, when the
war was drawing toaclose. Thenceforward, until 1755
he resided at Beaus¢jour.

The foundation of Halifax alarmed the French; they
had always hoped that some day or other a treaty or the
chances of war would restore to them Acadia, which
the English did not seem to value very highly, as they
had done nothing to consolidate their conquest. The
foundation of Halifax dashed these hopes; it foreshad-
owed a colonizing policy, which, in a few years, was to
endear this province to England by its sacrifices and its
population. Honor showed France what her duty was;
but honor in America was, between the two historic
rivals, an evanescent quantity which frequently went
no deeper than the surface of things. To save appear-
ances was the main point, and these appearances were
screened by the Indian allies of either nation. In the
west, England had her savage allies, whom she occa-
sionally used to defeat French plans ; there France also
had hers, so that neither the one nor the other could

ae oT o

we ee ee Se en

INDIANS HATE THE ENGLISH. 259

move without difficulty. But in the east all the Indians
were friendly to France and sworn enemies of England,
which, exasperated by their continued attacks, had
fought them with a barbarity that frequently surpassed:
that of the savages themselves. These Indians had
many wrongs to avenge, and so intense was their hatred
of the English that it was always easy to urge them to
hostile acts.

It was dread of these Indians that, for half a century,
prevented England from colonizing Nova Scotia. The
French imagined that, by harassing the new colonists
and spreading terror through skilfully managed hostili-
ties, they would disgust them with the country and frus-
trate England’s projects. It was an inhuman and insane:
policy, which could only end in embittering England,
and in increasing her efforts to dislodge a rival whose
presence would ever be an obstacle to her commerce
and to her expansion.

The influence of the French on the Indians of these
regions was artfully disguised; but we know enough
about it to visit it with unqualified reprobation. The
instrument employed by the governors of Canada to:
carry out this wicked and fatal policy was that Abbé Le
Loutre whom I have just mentioned. His blind zeal,
his efforts urging the Indians to worry the colonists
introduced by Cornwallis, his unjustifiable methods for
forcing the Acadians against their will to cross the
frontier, deserve to. be condemned by every one and
especially by the Acadians.

Before proceeding, it is well to explain an important
point which has never yet been cleared up. All histo-
rians speak of the Abbés Le Loutre, Germain, Maillard, Le
Guerne, as if they had been missionaries to the Acadians

260 A MISTAKE CORRECTED.

on English territory. On this supposition, their efforts
to subserve the interests of France are interpreted as
shameful. Now to obviate the confusion introduced by
these writers, let it be well understood, once for all,
that not one of these priests ever was, as far as I know,
@ missionary to the Acadians in the peninsula. Mail-
lard, until the dispersion, was never employed as a mis-
sionary elsewhere than in the island of Cape Breton,
which belonged to France; Germain ministered to the
Malecite Indians in the upper waters of the St. John
River ; Le Guerne was missionary among the Indians of
the north.shore of the Bay of Fundy, and also attended
to the few Acadians living on these coasts. Le Loutre
was long a missionary to the Micmacs of the Shubene-
ecadie River; but during all that time he never caused
any trouble; when he decided upon another line of

conduct, he withdrew with his Indians to Bay Verte on

the French territory. Consequently, all of these priests
were on the territory claimed and occupied by France;
hence their patriotism, ardent though it was, was justi-
fiable, if not deserving of credit. If their actions were
not honorable, let them be condemned. Because Le
Loutre’s conduct is condemnable, I stigmatize it as it
deserves. But it is a sovereign injustice toward these
men to leave the public under an impression that blames
_ what is honorable, and brands with infamy what is merely
blamable. :

This important distinction ought not, in fairness, to
have escaped the attention of these writers, still less
that of Parkman, who lays especial stress on the doings
of this Abbé Le Loutre. Yet he seems to have done
his best to increase the confusion. Thus, when he tells
us that Le Loutre was Vicar-General of Acadia; that

Re ee ee eae ee Lie ah

lem. 4 Tan

, ee ee

ee ee a ee eee oT en Se ee ee ee ee

Ye

”

WILFUL DECEPTION. 261

the Indians to whom he ministered lived a day’s march |

from Halifax on the banks of the Shubenecadie River,

which implies that that was his residence, he is know-
ingly guilty of a twofold deception, because Le Loutre
was not then Vicar-General, and because both he and
his Indians had long since left the Shubenecadie River,
and then lived at Bay Verte on the territory claimed
and occupied by France. I might add that the decep-
tion is threefold, because Le Loutre was named, four
years later, Vicar-General, not for Acadia or the pe-
ninsula, but for the northern part of the Bay of Fundy,
then called French Acadia to distinguish it from Canada
and from the peninsula which the French called Eng-
lish Acadia.*

I should be glad to be able to say that Parkman
merely blundered; but I cannot: I have studied too
closely his methods, I am too fully aware of his con-
stant efforts at disguising the truth, not to recognize,
here as elsewhere,. the elaborate system of deceit that
underlies every page he has written on Acadia. Dura
veritas, sed veritas. -

I have sought to penetrate the character of this
Abbé Le Loutre who has heaped well-deserved hatred
on his own devoted head. The undertaking was far
from easy ; however, I think I have had a large meas-
ure of success. Parkman, who “rushes in where
angels fear to tread,” soon measures and weighs him.
In a few words, with the laconism of Cesar describing
his conquest in Gaul—“veni, vidi, vici,” he says
oracularly: “ Le Loutre was a man of boundless egotism,

* Parkman saw the proof of this last fact in a report of the Acadian Mis-
sions by the Abbé de L’ile-Dieu in 1755, who was himself Vicar-General of

the diocese of Quebec, on which the missions of Acadia depended, and who
was, therefore, the best authority on this question.

262 CLAPTRAP.

a violent spirit of domination, an intense hatred of the
English, and a fanaticism that stopped at nothing.”
Sir Oracle “ opes his mouth; let no dog bark.” As a
literary effect it is startling ; the common herd likes to
be thus whirled at a gallop through the obscurities of
history ; nothing is so popular and catchy as this sem-
blance of devouring activity which pierces to the quick,
cuts out and fashions, as by magic, a something that
looks surprisingly like a brand-new bright and polished
gem.« Serious writers, however, disdain this claptrap.
Seldom, if ever, can a striking portrait of the inner
depths of a man’s character be drawn by a few strokes
of the pen. Caricatures can; and, as a caricature,
Parkman’s portrait of Le Loutre may bear a distant.
resemblance to the original. Macaulay also seeks con-
ciseness and rapid movement; but he does not seem to
- have discovered Parkman’s secret; on the contrary, like
the great masters, he limns his portraits with the
greatest care, the result being that they are generally
good likenesses, thanks to the after-touches of pen and
brush, to the delicacy of shades and tints, to the pains-
taking patience of the artist.

With some corrections I might admit, as a back-
ground, one or two of the four pen-strokes of Parkman;
but I refuse to subscribe to the “ boundless egotism ”’ of
Le Loutre. I see no proof of this assertion and much
proof of the exact opposite. To arrive at a fair esti-
mate of Le Loutre, one must enter into the feelings and
thoughts that generally actuate a Catholic missionary.
Clearly, this was difficult, not to say impossible for
Parkman, even if he had been gifted with that rectitude
which, to my mind, he lacks, and with that penetration
in which, though to a less degree, he is deficient.

FAITH AND UNFAITH. 263

Moreover, this character must be viewed in the light
of the ideas of the time and of the special circumstances
of the place. Great was national fanaticism, but greater
still was religious fanaticism. Prejudices had struck
deep roots. Persecution was only beginning to relax
its revolting rigor; but intolerance still subsisted in all
its strength. Not long before, France had expelled the
Huguenots ; Ireland was gasping under England’s heel;
everywhere minorities were oppressed. What crimes
were committed in the name of religion! What acts
of cruelty done in the name of a good and merciful
God! Was this a fruit of Christianity or of human
interests and passions? Was this a permanent result,
or merely a transient phase, a bad dream that would
wear itself out and indirectly serve the cause of Chris-
tianity and civilization? ‘This last question must have
been in many people’s minds ; two answers were to be
given to it: unbelief, fruit of a spurious and merciless
Christianity ; and a return movement to the pure
Christian spirit, all impregnated with charity, love, and
mercy. Man moves and God directs. In the life of
religions as in that of commonwealths nothing happens
without an aftermath which no one had suspected.
Small events added together produce great events;
fact is linked to fact by invisible bonds, as thread to
thread in the weaver’s loom.

Though the true fibre of Christianity was warped,
faith was strong; in other words, motives were excel-
lent, methods often deplorable; this double aspect of
things should be borne in mind when judging Abbé Le
Loutre. It is no easy matter for us, men living in the
world, to realize the faith that animates those who con-
secrate their lives to Christian education, especially to

264 LE LOUTRE NO EGOTIST.

the irksome catechetical labors of a Catholic missionary
Struggling as we are with one another for the necessaries
or the comforts of existence, absorbed and, as it were,
overwhelmed by the thousand and one details of ways
and means for needs and pleasures, we easily lose sight
of the motives that actuate and the spirit that animates
the missionary. That ‘boundless egotism’ which Park-
man attributes to Le Loutre, applicable, as it very often
is, to ourselves, can hardly be applied to the missionary.
He who, like Le Loutre, had forsaken fortune, pleasure,
kindred, friends and fatherland, to spend his life in the
heart of the forest with coarse and cruel savages, he
who, in order to evangelize these savages, had volun-
tarily embraced privations of all sorts, from which the
most devoted of men would recoil in disgust and horror,
could not be, what Parkman fancies him, ‘a man of
boundless egotism.’

No doubt human nature is very complex, no doubt a
man’s high calling does not destroy his natural bent ;
still, as a general rule, incompatible defects disappear
or are dwarfed and replaced by other defects compatible
with the new vocation. In the case of a missionary,
egotism, having nothing to feed on, must be diminished
or obliterated, though it may sometimes be replaced by
other defects which are, so to speak, the human excres-
cences of the divine gift of a lively faith. From this
view-point must we examine into the defects of Le
Loutre.

In what he did where is the proof of that ‘ boundless
egotism?’ In that he harassed the English settle-
ments? In that he tried hard to force the Acadians. to
emigrate and thus be deprived of their property? Other
motives may explain these acts, but certainly not ego-

MOTIVES FOR ALARM. 265.

tism. No other motives at all commensurate with his.
selfless activity can be assigned but religion and pa--
triotism, especially religion, to which he had sacrificed his.
life. He had spent twelve peaceful years among his
Indians when Halifax was founded. From that mo-
ment, his activity, his zeal, his fanaticism rose to a high
key ; he is no longer a mild and peaceable missionary ;
he is a dictator, an energumen frantically striving to.
snatch the Acadians from their country, as if he were
struggling with a madman on the brink of a precipice.
Unable to persuade even those who lived near the
frontier to emigrate willingly, he gets the Indians to.
burn down their houses in order to constrain them.
What had happened to him? Whence this change ?’
Evidently, something had filled his soul with anxiety,.
and that anxiety could be only the effect of some im-
pending danger to religion. The change wrought in
him can scarcely be explained otherwise.

This impending danger is easily found. Have we-
not seen that Shirley had entertained the project of
Protestantizing the Acadians, of expelling their priests?’
that he had reaffirmed this project with extraordinary
persistency ? that, a vague rumor of it, having reached
the Acadians, had given them great alarm? What.
wonder that Le Loutre should have been inexpressibly
shocked at it and profoundly convinced that this project.
would soon be realized? Since it had been conceived
in time of war, when the neutrality of the Acadians was
most needed, when these very Acadians were withstand-
ing seductions and threats for the sake of fidelity to.
their oath, when Acadia was practically at their mercy,
defended, as it was, by a mere handful of soldiers, had
they not everything to fear now that Halifax was,

\

266 MOTIVES FOR ALARM.

founded? Had not Cornwallis marked his arrival by a
proclamation which annulled the agreement of 1730
and the recent engagements of the King through his
Secretary of State, the Duke of Newcastle? Had not
the deportation itself been already thought of by a
Secretary of State (Craggs) ? Had not the same idea

been entertained by Admiral Knowles and by Shirley —

himself, and in each case without any excuse? Even
though Le Loutre may not have known all these things,
he surely knew enough to feel his soul stirred to its
depths. I do not hesitate to say that his fears were not
only justifiable but, to all appearances from what we
now know, founded upon stubborn facts. Under such
circumstances we need only consider the ardor of his
faith and suppose that he was hot-tempered, to find a
satisfactory explanation of his conduct, without draw-
ing on our imagination for a fancy picture that has no
solid foundation. :

How far removed soever we may be from the ideas of
a man we wish to judge, we must, in order to pass judg-
ment on him with some degree of precision, put aside
our own views and enter, as far as possible, into his,
‘taking into account his beliefs, his education, his sur-
roundings. Le Loutre had sacrificed everything to one
single idea; he had sacrificed the enjoyments of this
world for the joys of the next. To us, to the man of
the world, this Abbé’s ideas seem very narrow ; to him,
perhaps, our struggles to acquire things frivolous and
transitory must have appeared very mean ; we find him
cruel to deprive the Acadians of their homes; for him
the sacrifice was nothing compared to the loss of relig-
ion. The scientific theorist buried in meditation, and
the astronomer soaring in thought through interstellar

ice at Na i a

ie: es ata

hay hy rat |

A GENEROUS SOUL. 267

space, both strangers to this nether earth they tread, are
also to the worldling very narrow-minded ; yet we, in
our feverish moving to and fro, appear to them, from
their high. vantage-ground, as so many little ants bus-
tling around an ant-hill. ;

Le Loutre’s faults, to my thinking, are attributable
rather to his ill-balanced mind than to a disordered will.
Like all men of one idea, he was ignorant of the world
and unsuited to the governance of men. _ His letters to

- his superiors are impregnated with an ardent faith and

the purest spirit of the gospel. In 1740 he wrote to his
superior: ‘ Remember that I am here only in obe-
dience to your orders; I am here for the glory of God
and the salvation of souls.” In 1747, when he had
returned to France, his superiors, thinking that he had
had his share of hardship, proposed that he should re-
main there. Deeming that he had not done enough for
his salvation, he refused all such offers. We know that,
on several occasions, he saved the lives of English
officers ; that Captain Hamilton, who had witnessed his
kindliness, esteemed him highly ; that, after the deporta-
ion and his return to France, he became a ministering
angel to the Acadian refugees, that he devoted his

_. time and his money to the alleviation of their lot.

His friend, Abbé Maillard, who had initiated him
into the Micmac language and the management of
missions, was himself, though in a lesser degree,
involved in the same condemnation. He spent the last
years of his life at Halifax, in the midst of those who
had been his enemies. Now, he conquered them all by
the irresistible ascendency of his talent and virtue.
There stood by his dying bed the Protestant minister
whose friendship he had won and who read certain

268 | A GENEROUS SOUL.

prayers to him at his own request; the élite of Halifax
society, civil and military, the government and the
council followed his remains to the tomb. Perhaps,
under similar circumstances, Le Loutre would have
received the same homage. What we know of him
rests on so valueless an authority—Pichon—that no his-
torian, except Parkman, has consented to use it. More-
of this anon.

FORTS BEAUSEJOUR AND LAWRENCE. 269

CHAPTER XVI.

Murder of Edward Howe—What Parkman says of it—He accuses
Le Loutre—His partiality and his ruses—‘‘ Les Mémoires sur le
Canada ”—Pichon— What he was.

CoRNWALLIS’S proclamation had. revived in the
French the hope of regaining the sympathy of the
Acadians, which the events of the last war had severely
shaken. De la Galissonniére, the new governor of
Canada, hoped it would now be easy to decide them to
emigrate. For this purpose he needed a man active,
determined, known to the Acadians and able to exert
influence over them. He was not slow to understand

chow serviceable would be Le Loutre, who was already

heading a movement in this direction. Thenceforth
until the fall of Beauséjour, four years later, Le Loutre,
owing to his high standing with the governor, shared
with the local authorities the conduct of affairs in this
part of the country. He seems to have inspired all the
operations directed against the English in the penin-
sula.

Surmising that the English would soon occupy Beau-
bassin and build a fort there, the French vigorously
pushed on the works at Fort Beauséjour. They had to
make haste and lay waste the English side of the
frontier. Having hitherto failed to make the Acadians
emigrate voluntarily, Le Loutre, in order to gain his:
point and to leave the English in a wilderness, decided,

270 EDWARD HOWE,

as a last resort, to fire the dwellings of the Acadians.
On the approach of the English, commanded by Law-
rence, the Indians, doubtless obeying Le Loutre’s orders,
set about their incendiary work and destroyed most of
the Acadian houses. The pretty village of Beaubassin,
which contained over one baritred: buildings, was
reduced to ashes, the church with the rest. The
inhabitants, left without shelter, were obliged to take
refuge on the French side of the frontier. Lawrence,
finding nothing but ruins, and having too small a force
to resist if attacked, re-embarked with his troops and
withdrew. In September, he returned with seventeen
small vessels and seven hundred men. After a slight
skirmish with the French outposts, he established
himself on the site of the village of Beaubassin and
built a fort there, which he called Fort Lawrence, less
than two miles from Fort Beauséjour, and a few
hundred yards from the little river Messagouetche,
which the French looked upon as the frontier between
the two countries.

Lawrence was succeeded the following year by Cap-
tain Scott, and it was shortly after the arrival of the
Jatter, in October, 1751, that occurred the murder of
Edward Howe, which made such a noise at the time and
threw a shroud of sadness and stupor over both camps.
Howe had been for many years judge of the Court of
Admiralty and commissary of the English forces in
Acadia. He had been first counsellor to Governor
Masearene, and, when Cornwallis became governor,
he sat in the council next to Mascarene.* As com-

* According to a custom established at the occupation of the country.

Howe should have succeeded Mascarene as governor; but the foundation
of Halifax led to a derogation from this rule. Some weeks before Howe’s

death, Cornwallis had asked to be relieved, but he had also suggested

EDWARD HOWE. 271

missary of the forces, he had had long and con-
tinued intercourse with the Acadians, and, as . he
spoke French fluently, he was Mascarene’s principal
adviser and go-between in the efforts made to keep
them faithful to the Government. His influence with
the Acadians rivalled that of Mascarene, and he was
distinctly the man for all difficult missions. He was
acknowledged on all hands to be a man of great worth,
of tried and trusted bravery and devotion. :

The mission confided to him by Cornwallis at Fort
Lawrence seems to have been to negotiate the return of
the Acadian refugees, to conclude a treaty with the
Indians and to withdraw from their hands the prisoners
made by them two years before at Grand Pré.

Lawrence as his successor, on the plea that Mascarene “ had sold out and
was worn out, and that Howe, not being a military man, was unfit.” Pos-
sibly, Cornwallis’s objection to Howe might not have been accepted, for
Lawrence was not appointed his successor. Howe is almost invariably
designated under the title of Captain; the reason probably was that he was
commissary of the forces and had often been charged with military opera-
tions: thus, when Annapolis was first attacked by Duvivier, he was ordered
by Mascarene to dislodge the enemy and to raze the houses that protected
them. At the battle of Grand Pré, Howe fell grievously wounded beside
Colonel Noble. As he was fast bleeding to death from a wound he had re-
ceived inthe left arm, he asked a French officer to have the wound dressed
by their surgeon; but the latter was busy with M. Coulon de Villiers, also
badly wounded; then Howe begged the French officer to transmit his re-
quest to the English surgeon. This led to overtures of surrender, and
Howe, weakened though he was, acted as interpreter during the negotia-
‘tions. He wasallowed to withdraw to Annapolis on parole, and afterwards
ee exchanged for M. Lacroix and all the Canadian prisoners then at
ston.

Murdoch says of him: “He left several children. The esteem he won
while living, the general usefulness of his conduct as an early founder of
our colony, and the cruel circumstances of his death commend his memory
to us who enjoy a happy, peaceful and prosperous home; for the security
and comfort of which we are bound to be grateful to those who pioneered
the way in the earliest periods under many and serious circumstances.”

_Edward Howe is one of my ancestors. His descendants are numerous
in the Districts of Three Rivers and Montreal. Conspicuous among them
are Theodore Doucet, Esq., N. P.; his sisters Lady Middleton and the
Comtesse de Bligny; Edmund Barnard, Esq., Q. C.; Lieutenant-Colonel
Hughes, Chief of Police in Montreal; Odilon Doucet of the Post Office De-
partment in Ottawa; Antonio Prince, M.P.P.; Auguste Richard, Vice-
Consul of France in Winnipeg; Canons Jean and Joél Prince.

el be PARKMAN’S STORY.

Listen to Parkman relating in his own way the
-circumstances of his death :

‘** Among the English officers was Captain Edward Howe, an in-
‘telligent and agreeable person who spoke French fluently, and had
“been long stationed in the Province. Le Loutre detested him ;

dreading his influence over the Acadians, by many of whom he
was known and liked. One morning, at about eight o’clock, the
inmates of Fort Lawrence saw what seemed an officer from Beau-
séjour, carrying a flag, and followed by several men in uniform,
wading through the sea of grass that stretched beyond the Mis-
-sagouetche. When the tide was out, this river was but an ugly
trench of reddish mud gashed across the face of the marsh, with
_a thread of half fluid slime lazily crawling along the bottom; but
-at high tide it was filled to the brim. with an opaque torrent that
would have overflowed, but for the dikes thrown up to confine it.
Behind the dike on the farther bank stood the seeming officer, wav-
ing his flag in sign that he desired a parley. He was in reality no
officer, but one of Le Loutre’s Indians in disguise, Etienne le Batard,
or, as others say, the great chief Jean Baptiste Cope. Howe, carry-
ing a white flag, and accompanied by a few officers and men, went
towards the river to hear what he had to say. As they drew near,
his look and language excited theirsuspicion. But it was too late ;
for a number of Indians, who had hidden behind the dike during
the night, fired upon Howe across the stream, and mortally
wounded him. They continued their fire on his companions, but
could not prevent them from carrying the dying. man to the fort.
_ The French officers, indignant at this villainy, did not hesitate to
charge it upon Le Loutre: for, says one of them: ‘ What is not a
wicked priest capable of doing ?’”

The very special interest I have taken in trying to
get at the facts in this mournful tragedy will easily be
credited on the score of my descent 5 yet, the true state

-of the case still seems to me very doubtful. I should
never dream, in’ putting any version of the story before
the public, of being as dogmatical as Parkman is. I
believe I have seen all the documents he has seen him-
self; at any rate, I have seen all those he quotes ; how-

i 3 ee ae oe ee, teas ET a 4 a Be ae,
VSR Atta a © ay la fly Fon bee a ees CPE Nae Oe Sra Onl ge! oe
ee Fe ee ee Pd Pe ne A ar % a *, m4

‘“ MEMOLRES SUR LE CANADA.” 273

ever, he gives new details, which I have reason to think
have been evolved by his imagination alone. - The
story is based on three or four different accounts, all
more or less contradictory; he has adopted the one
which seems to me the least probable, the least honor-
able. The authority he relies on is so questionable that
serious writers fight shy of it, or, if they refer to it, they
are candid enough to warn the reader and let him know
their reasons for distrusting that authority.

Some idea may be formed of Parkman’s calibre as an
historian by the fact that this rejected authority, and
another almost as questionable, supply much of the ma-
terial for the two chapters which he devotes to the his-
tory of Acadia in his “ Montcalm and Wolfe.” These
two chapters, one entitled “Conflict for Acadia,” and
the other, “The Removal of the Acadians,” contain
ninety pages. He skims lightly over the events of the
first forty years in ten pages, in order to get quickly to
Abbe Le Loutre and to devote to him the greater part
of his narrative.

The doings of this ardent abbé were too keenly in-
teresting to Parkman to allow of his losing this oppor-
tunity. What a sensational chapter he could create out
of the chaos of historic data! Unfortunately, most of
what we know of the doings of Le Loutre rests on the
two suspicious sources I have just mentioned. The
less contemptible of the two is an anonymous work
styled “ Mémoires sur le Canada, 1749-1760.” Parkman
takes good care not to say that the book is anonymous,
that the author professes a deep hatred for the clergy,
that he is so partial to the infamous Intendant Bigot as to
call him an honest man. This author’s hatred for the
clergy is so glaring that Murdoch, who incidentally

274 A DISTRUSTED TRAITOR.

quotes him in reference to other matters, has the frank
ness to cast doubts on his veracity : i ;

“« Tt must nevertheless be remembered that we have derived our
information of Le Loutre from sources not friendly to priests—

the French of that period being tinged with the philosophy of Vol-

taire.”

This is the caution of an historian worthy of the
name; but Parkman, as usual, is silent about all such
matters, nay, he emphasizes his inferences by laying
stress on the fact that he is quoting an authority that is
French. His fraud, however, does not stop there. To
add weight to his assertions, he sometimes uses the
author vaguely as “a Catholic contemporary,” as if a
Voltairian could be a Catholic, and thus we cannot even
guess that he is alluding to the “ Mémoires sur le Can-
ada.” No alternative is left to the ingenuous reader
but to suppose that there is question of some additional
authority corroborating what was said by another writer
or confirming the “Mémoires” themselves. Of one
poor. authority he cunningly builds up two apparently
good ones. This is killing two birds with one stone;
multiplying by dividing. Between such double-dealing
and the candor of Murdoch yawns a bridgeless gulf.

Parkman’s other authority is very much worse yet,
and, in passing from one to the other, he falls out of
_ the frying-pan into the fire. I refer to Pichon, a French
subaltern, who, after having been several years at
Louisburg, was transferred to Beauséjour in 1758, that
is, two years after the events we are now considering.
Captain Scott was then in command at Fort Lawrence.
Pichon found means to secure an interview with him,
in the course of which he offered his services, pledging

A OT tn See Se ed

A DISTRUSTED TRAITOR. 275

himself, in return for a pecuniary reward and promises
‘of protection, to communicate all the information he
could get hold of on the actions and plans of the French,
and copies of all the documents that might pass through
his hands. Pichon transacted this hateful business
with great assiduity, in his\communications, first with
Scott and later on with Captain Hussey, who soon suc-
ceeded the former in the command of Fort Lawrence.
Pichon continued his treachery at Halifax, Louisburg
and Philadelphia; after which he withdrew to: England,
where he published a pamphlet entitled, ‘ Letters and
Memoirs relating to Cape Breton.”

’ Such was the man and such the part he played. A
creature of this stamp is, evidently, not a weighty
authority, even if there were nothing worse against
him; but we have plenty of other reasons for discredit-
ing his testimony. He was all that his dirty work
implied. Captain Hussey, when transmitting. to the
Governor the information he had received from Pichon,
gave his reasons for believing and for doubting him,
and frequently pointed out his inconsistencies and the
slender credit one could give to his affirmations; so
much so that he ended by expressing the opinion that it
would be better to cease all intercourse with him. Dr.
Brown also discusses the testimony and the writings of
Pichon, and very sagaciously sets off the baseness they
reveal. . Admiral Boscawen would not believe Pichon,
and Murdoch, having to quote him with regard to the
taking of Beauséjour, begs the reader’s pardon, and
alleges as an excuse the absence of all other sources of
information.*

* Capt. Hussey to Capt. Scott, 11th of Nov. 1754. The inconsist-
ency, the fear of guilt, make the guilty commit absurdities ruinous to

276 PARKMAN DISSECTED.

Without the “ Mémoires sur le Canada” and Pichon’s
-numerous details, Parkman would have to lose all his
-anecdotes about Le Loutre and the most interesting
part of his two chapters. He knew how all that
would be eagerly devoured, how his gifts of word-
painting would tell in the book-market. What. was
to be done? The situation was ticklish in the ex-
treme, full of temptations and dangers. Must he let
so fine a plum fall without plucking it whilst*it is
within easy reach? True, no one had ever dared to
touch it before; but this only made it more of a tempta-

themselvés. Traitors are never cordially believed ; how is it possible
to bind them by ordinary ties ?”’

Later, Hussey to Scott: ‘‘ enclosed you have some letters I received
from Pichon, must confess Ihave some suspicions of his sincerity. ..”’

Hussey to the Commissioner in Chief, 12th Nov. 1754: ‘* The 9th of
_ this month I received the enclosed letter, which, whether authentic
or not, I think my duty to transmit to you... J cannot help sus-
- pecting Pichon’s sincerity, and very often find great inconsistencies
in his letters. Ycannot but remark, that in this, sir, he makes the gov-
ernor of Canada say that he engages Le Loutre and de Vergor to find
some plausible pretext to make the Indians break out, and tells me
- that de Vergor will take care that they do not attempt anything

2?

‘* He hath also, ever since I have been here, complained how nar-
rowly he is observed and how jealous Le Loutre—whom in contempt
_ he styles Moses—is of him, which I think, is a little inconsistent
_ with his trusting him with his letters so far as to take copies of them.

‘*T think, sir, I have good reasons to believe that the letter Pichon
calls Mr. Dusquesne’s 7s of his own composing, for I ain this morning
informed from. ...

‘* Mr. Pichon is also mistaken about. . . . would you think proper

of my keeping up this correspondence with him during the winter ?”’
‘The Rev. Mr. Brown devotes a whole chapter to dissecting Pichon’s
inconsistencies and character, with the title: ‘‘ Casual hints from the
letters of Pichon indicating the state of his mind during his traitor-
ous correspondence.”

Admiral Boscawen, writing to Lord Chatham after the taking of
Louisburg in 1758, says: ‘‘ I received this statement with but a mod-
erate amount of belief in its accuracy, as Pichon my informer was not
there himself, and, being an open scoffer at the priesthood, without
impugning his veracity, I think he was prone to believe any canards
he heard that tended to disparage French authorities or priests. It
resembles too closely the harsh charges of pillage at Beausejour for
which we have only his assertion.”’

FIVE TRICKS. ZLL

tion and a relish. Se non é vero, é ben trovato. At
last, the inevitable has come to pass; Parkman yields
and seizes the forbidden fruit. Still, we must give him
credit for having long hesitated before plucking it, as
is evident from the great pains he takes to disguise
Pichon’s identity and to suppress whatever might de-
preciate him. 3
_ An analysis of Parkman’s embarrassment is extremely
interesting; it constitutes a sort of vivisection of the
ways and means, ruses and shifts that may be adopted
by a tricky writer. We witness the fluctuations of a
soul buffeted to and fro by glee and distress, and yet
maturing the most skilful combinations of a fertile
brain. :
As to the *“ Mémoires sur le Canada,” he seems to
have made up his mind readily enough. After all, »
thought he, there was no need to follow Murdoch’s
example; it was not absolutely necessary to say that
the work is anonymous, that it exudes hatred of the
clergy. But,in the case of Pichon, the problem was
far more difficult ; something must. be said of the part
he played. Here several alternative courses were open
to Parkman : he might (1) quote Pichon under the vague
designation of “a French officer ;”’ (2) simply refer to his
letters or to the page of the volume of the archives for
those of his letters that are there ; * (3) mention his name
without comment ; (4) acknowledge Pichon’s odious oc-
cupation and yet say something in his favor to act as a
buffer against the shock of the disclosure ; or, (5) finally,
take shelter behind some respectable name. Instead of
choosing one of these numerous alternatives, Parkman —

- *The Compiler has yielded to the same temptation ; he has inserted
some of Pichon’s letters in the volume of the archives. Arcades ambo,

278 FIVE TRICKS.

thought the best way out of the tangle was to take 7

them all up one after another, in skilful gradation, so
as properly to prepare the reader. Thus, in case of
attack, he had five doors to escape through, not to speak
of the windows. In sheer astuteness it would be hard
to find a parallel to this feat. All Parkman seems to

- care about is to cover and protect his retreat in case of

an attack, which was very unlikely. Who would be
painstaking and suspicious enough to search and fer-
ret out, to weigh and compare? Certainly not the
Acadians, whose astuteness would not rise to the level
of such refined tricks. If we could have read Park-
man’s thoughts and seen him chuckling over his discoy-
ery of these five tricks for whitewashing or concealing
his Pichon, we should have witnessed a scene of high
- comedy. ?

First trick: Pichon’s name does not appear; Park-
man quotes him in this way: ‘“ A French officer says,”
‘a French writer relates,” doing like the naughty boy
in the Spanish proverb who throws a stone and then
puts his hands in his pockets, “ tira la piedra y esconde
la mano.” Second trick: a little further on, he refers
to the pages of the volume of the archives, still with-
out naming Pichon. Third trick: he names Pichon
without a word of comment. Fourth trick: he tells us
very briefly what Pichon was, but does his best to raise
him in the reader’s estimation: “ He was now acting the
part of a traitor, carrying on a secret correspondence.
He was aman of education, born in France of an English

mother, he was author of genuine letters relating to —

Cape Breton, a work of some value.”
Thanks to this method, the reader is not aware that
Pichon has been really quoted about twenty times. If

7 m * * r - af!
Ba A I eta a ho ol

Raabe ste ter Make nce HR eight nisl ~ : :

5 Asta
i

ae ae be -
POTN Na

bi ot
‘

WHITEWASHING PICHON. 279

he knows nothing of Parkman’s dodges (and how could
he know them ?), he supposes that the “ French officer ”’
was very respectable, and that his testimony is all the
more convincing because he relates facts that tell against
his fellow-countrymen. In the second alternative, the
authority is, apparently, no longer “a French officer,”
still less Pichon, but the volume of the archives, there-
fore, some official document; this satisfies the reader,
and saves him the trouble of consulting that volume.
In the third alternative, he reads Pichon’s name; but,
as he does not yet know who he is, he pays no special
attention to that name. At length, in another chapter,
towards the end of the story, and far apart from the
first, he learns that a certain Thomas Pichon,.a store-
keeper, was a traitor to his country ; but there is nothing
to show that he is the French officer quoted in another
chapter, especially as Parkman, by another character-
istic ruse of his, speaks of him, no more as an officer,
but as “« Commissary of stores.’’ Moreover, the reader,
being introduced to a man of whom Parkman writes
favorably, lays no further stress on the matter. He has
been deftly thrown off the scent.
- It must be admitted that all this is “very smart,”
and such smartness, with an attractive style, is a
quality with which Parkman cannot but be credited.
Yet he seems, at last, to have been ashamed of himself,
or rather, to have feared lest perhaps his artifice should
be discovered; for—and this is the fifth trick—after
what he has admitted about the traitor, he adds, while
quoting Pichon once more, ‘* Pichon cited by Murdoch.”
Evidently he felt he was not quite safe ; he must seek
- shelter behind a respectable name. But Murdoch, who
really does cite Pichon once or tiwice, speaks of him at

280 PICHON’S STORY.

some length and tells us immediately and without sub-
terfuge what he was. He cites him anent the siege of
Beauséjour on questions that have no further importance
than to satisfy curiosity ; and, even then, he seems to

have felt scruples, and so excuses himself by the absence

of other sources: ‘“ In the following account of the siege
of Beauséjour we have not any English account, official

or private, to help us. . . . The main parts of our nar-

rative are derived from Pichon.”

Thus, Murdoch’s use of him, far from being blame-
worthy, gives us a high idea of the historian’s character ;
while Parkman’s methods produce a diametrically oppo-
site impression, and, in particular, his attempt to enlist
Murdoch as an accomplice, aggravates, instead of attenu-
ating, his guilt. .

Painful as is the task I have undertaken with respect
to Parkman, I venture to think that the interests of
historic truth make it imperative. Leaving to others
the duty of applying a similar analysis to his other
works, I will confine myself to the ninety pages he has
written on the subject in hand.

After this long parenthesis I return to the murder of
Edward Howe and to Parkman’s account of it, drawn
from Pichon, who was then at Louisburg ; for, as has
already been said, he did not come to Beauséjour till
two years later, in 1758, so that he was not even a resi-
dent, still less an eye-witness. We have read how
Parkman said: “ The French officers indignant at this
villainy, did not hesitate to charge it upon Le Loutre,
for, says one of them: “ What is not a wicked priest capable
of doing?’”

Now,I am going to give Pichon’s aecount of this

PE AY ea ia. ae, fa sein eC ial Sialic a fo tal a Se ae ek ae
Sh oe ek yl a AS he AA A Nig aah ah CENT ae te BN tl a ee ie bs ry i X
Ee Bete) Coie IN cyrus ins Peete 1 a ee ae aie ara Pe ae

ee

A TELL-TALE PHRASE. | 281

murder. It is to be found at page 195 of the Volume

of the Archives :

‘“‘ It was very wrongfully and with the greatest injustice that the
English accused the French of having a hand in the horrors com-
mitted daily by Le Loutre with his Indians. What is not a wicked
priest capable of doing? Heclothed in an officer’s regimentals an
Indian named Cope, and laying an ambuscade of Indians near to
the Fort, he sent Cope to it, waving a white handkerchief in his
hand, which was the usual sign for the admittance of the French
into the English Fort, having affairs with the commander of the
Post. The Major of the Fort, a worthy man, and greatly beloved
by all the French officers, taking Cope for a French officer, came
out with his usual politeness to receive him. But he no sooner
appeared than the Indians in ambush fired at him and. killed
him. All the French officers had the greatest horror and indig-

‘nation at Le Loutre’s barbarous actions; and, I dare say, if the

Court of France had known them, they would have been very
far from approving them ; but he had so ingratiated himself with
the Marquis de la Galissonniére that it became a crime to write
against him. Itis needless to explain further Le Loutre’s execra-
ble conduct. Cruelty and inhumanity has ever been sacerdotal
from all ages.”

On comparing Pichon’s narrative with Parkman’s, it
is easy to see that the one is the offspring of the other.
We have Parkman clothed in Pichon’s regimentals with

some additional trimmings drawn from his imagination.

On one point Parkman has been imprudent. By yield-
ing to the temptation of quoting Pichon’s ipsissima
verba: “ What is not a wicked priest capable of doing ?”
he has furnished us with indisputable proof that the
officer on whom he relied was none other than Pichon,
ond that Pichon himself was also his only authority for
aferring to “the French officers” in general and to
-aeir supposed indignation at Le Loutre. Was it pos-
aible to doubt that Le Loutre was the real culprit, when

282 CORNWALLIS’S ACCOUNT.

Parkman was backed, apparently at least, by the French
officers themselves? “ The French officers,” says he,
*‘ did not hesitate to charge it on Le Loutre, for, says
one of them, etc.”

There is much scientific work in all this, and the
public, it is to be regretted, seems indulgent when
smartly taken in. ‘Qui nescit dissimulare nescit
regnare”’ is one of Machiavelli’s sayings. The spirit
that animated Pichon is manifest in the closing sen-
tence: ‘ Cruelty and inhumanity has ever been sacer-
dotal from all ages.’ The hypocritical traitor thus
aimed at flattering the prejudices of those whom he was
writing for and increasing his chances of reward. Let us
note, by the way, that Edward Howe was neither major
nor commander of the fort, as Pichon calls him.

Cornwallis, writing to the Duke of Bedford less than
a month after the murder, says:

‘*T have now an affair of more extraordinary a nature to inform
you of. Captain Howe was employed on the expedition to Beau-
bassin as knowing the Country well, and being better acquainted
both with the Indians and inhabitants, and, poor man, fancied he
knew the French better, and personally those villains de la Corne
and Le Loutre. His whole aim and study was to try a peace with
the Indians and to get our prisoners out of their hands. For
which purpose, he had frequent conferences with Le Loutre and
the French officers under a flag of truce. La Corne* sent, one
day, a flag of truce by a French officer to the water side of a small
river that parts his people from our troops. Captain Howe and the
officer held a parley for some time across the river. Howe had no
sooner taken leave of the officer, than a party that lay perdue fired
a volley at him and shot him through the heart.”

Cornwallis’s account is, clearly, very different from
the Pichon-Parkman one. True, Cornwallis speaks dis-

* De la Corne was commanding officer in those parts.

Ee ae ee ee ee eee
eli ER ean lect oe

Pat veers

hie Rigo

aN
cE

‘

VALLIERE’S STORY. oe

paragingly of the French, and especially of De la Corne
and Le Loutre in commection with this murder. It is
clear that he entertained suspicions of complicity, but
it is equally clear that his suspicions are of a vague,
general character. Other accounts there are which
Parkman knew of, since he refers to them at the foot of
the page. Prévost, intendant-commissary (commissaire-
ordonnateur) at Louisburg, says distinctly that Howe
had been forewarned by Le Loutre himself of the risk
he ran by trusting too much to the Indians, and that
it was owing to his own imprudence, and for hot having
followed Le Loutre’s advice, that he was killed.

“Mr. Howe,” says Prévost ... “ having long an-
noyed the Indians, took it into his head to risk it again,
notwithstanding the warnings of Abbé Le Loutre and even
of the Indians themselves. He came, with a white flag,
opposite one of them, and the Indian, having a red flag, .
fired his gun at him and stretched him dead.” *

The Abbé Maillard seems to confirm Prévost’s testi-
mony. ‘If that man did not wish to perish in this
way, he ought to have carefully avoided any meeting
with the Micmacs. He had been warned to that effect
shortly before this fate befell him.”

Another version is from M. dela Valliére, an officer
who was then at Fort Beauséjour and who kept a journal
of local events from September 19, 1750 to July 28,
1751; therefore, to all appearances, a man well able to
form a correct opinion.

He thus related Howe’s death :

_ * Two years later this same Prévost, writing to the Minister, said: “T
have learnt that the man named Cope, a bad Micmac who has always been
uncertain in his behavior and suspected by both nations, has made several
journeys to the English settlements in Acadia, and that he has ended by
signing at Halifax a sort of treaty.”

™

284 VALLLERE’S STORY.

*“ About the 15th of October, the Indians, who had

observed and had been informed that Mr. Howe, com-.

missary of the English troops, often came to walk on
the river bank, where he had already had conferences
with the officers and missionaries, in order to speak to
the inhabitants and persuade them, by making many
promises, to come over to the English side, went dur-
ing the night into ambush with some Acadians behind
a levee that runs along the river; and, at about eight
o'clock in the morning, Stephen Batard went with a
white flag opposite on the other side of the river. The
Indian, after putting a few questions to Mr. Howe,
threw down his flag and gave the signal to his men,
who fired immediately on Mr. Howe and wounded him
mortally.”

These are the only authorities I know; Parkman
mentions another in a note, * Les Mémoires sur le
Canada,” which, he says, declares that Le Loutre was
present. So it does, but it does not accuse him of com-
plicity in the murder, evil-minded though its author al-
Ways is against the priests.* Now, whosoever weighs
and compares these different accounts cannot help think-
ing that Parkman’s view, expressed with so much assur-
ance and as though it was the only one, is by far the most
improbable. I felt a lively personal interest in ascertain-
ing the truth, and yet I am now far from inclined to ad-
vance a positive opinion in favor of any view: in fact,
no one could do so with the diverse and conflicting
testimonies which we possess.

* This anonymous writer, often quoted by Parkman, is so inaccurate in
all that concerns Acadian affairs that it is better to ignore him. His ver-
sion of Howe’s murder is a new one and evidently absurd in more than
one point. We should bear in mind that the author must have resided in
Quebec or Montreal, as his book treats chiefly of Canadian affairs.

Bah i A ahah Saar 90
Pe nn ey eam

PROBABLE EXPLANATION. 285

Although I have not yet solved the problem, I will,

however, hesitatingly hazard an explanation. Howe, as

may have been gathered from Cornwallis’s letter, had
been sent to this post with a view to concluding a
treaty with the Indians and to withdrawing from their
hands the prisoners they held. Having been there
some weeks, if not some months, he had already had
several conferences with the Indians on the banks of the
little river that was the border-line between them.
Though he had hitherto been unsuccessful, he still
persisted in his efforts. He also had frequent inter-
views in the same place with Le Loutre and the French
officers. My view is, that, on this occasion, Howe went
to the usual place to meet an officer, who was perhaps
accompanied by Le Loutre; that Cope, chief of one
Indian tribe, Le Batard, chief of another, and some
other savages, were in ambush along the levee, watch-
ing for an interview between Howe and the French

officers in order to carry out their purpose; that, di-
rectly after the French officer and Le Loutre had left, at

the end of the interview, and before Howe had with-

-drawn, the Indians waved a flag as a signal that they

wished to have a parley. This interpretation has, at
least, the merit of reconciling otherwise irreconcilable
differences in the various accounts. Pichon says Howe
went down to the river bank to meet an Indian dressed
as an officer. Thisis scarcely possible, as Cornwallis,
who was not likely to be mistaken about a fact which

-he could verify, says that ‘ Howe and the officer held a

parley for some time across the river.” ‘“ Howe had no
sooner taken leave of the officer than a party that lay
perdue, etc:” The Indians had to make haste in order
not to let Howe escape ; consequently, the French

286 CONJURING WITH WITNESSES.

officer and Le Loutre, if indeed the latter was present,
cannot have been far off. Prévost pretends that the
Indian who killed Howe was Cope; La Valliére accuses
Stephen Le Batard; perhaps both of them had a hand
in it. :

Cornwallis makes it clear that Howe had a conference
with a genuine officer, that he held for some time a parley
with him, that when their parley was over they took

leave of each other. It could not have been so if that —

man had been an Indian in an officer’s regimentals, as
the fraud would surely have been detected at once ; and
this is made clearer by Cornwallis’s further statement
that it was after taking leave of the French officer that
“a party that lay perdue fired a volley.” The absurd story
of an Indian clothed in an officer's regimentals is not al-
luded to by any other than Pichon, and is, inferentially,
contradicted by Cornwallis. Moreover, according to
Cornwallis, that officer was sent by De la Corne himself,
so that, if there was an ambush by others than Indians,
we should have to connect with it the commander of the
French post and the officer who held the parley. Thus,
Parkman, who, for these particulars, had the testimony
of the English governor about facts part of which he had
been able to: verify and control, has preferred to accept
in all details the fanciful and absurd story of Pichon,
for no other motive, it seems, than the better to connect
Le Loutre with this murder. |

To sum up in a few words: Parkman’s proof of Le
Loutre’s.complicity in the murder of Howe has no other
foundation than the testimony of Pichon, of Pichon who
then, and for the two subsequent years, lived at Louis-
burg. Directly, inferentially or in essential details, he

was contradicted by Maillard, Prévost, La Valliére and

baa al a ace aI et

CONJURING WITH WITNESSES. 287

Cornwallis, that is, by a distinguished priest, two of-
ficers of high rank and one governor. The odds were

thus very heavy against the version Parkman sought to.

foist on the public, and few even of the most artful and
unscrupulous writers would have faced such odds.
Parkman, however, did. He was bound to get Pichon
admitted and to give him a solid backing. Audacity is
an insatiable craving which every success develops more
and.more. Parkman had succeeded so well in recom-
mending the “‘ Mémoires sur le Canada”’ thanks to his
little trick of division by which this witness suspected of

' partiality and irreligion is made to reappear tncog. under

the veil of ‘‘a Catholic contemporary,” that he thought
he could adopt similar tactics in Pichon’s case; only he
must make them more elaborate to fit the higher impor-
tance of this new accusation. His first step was to give
Pichon an air of respectability by speaking of him, with-
out naming him, as “a French officer.” His next was
to make use of this officer as a voucher that all the
French officers held the same opinion. But now Park-
man was confronted with a more serious difficulty.
What was to be done about Maillard, Prévost, La Val-
liére and Cornwallis? Must he reproduce the substance
of their version, or should he ignore them completely ?
Neither of these extreme courses suited him; he sought
and found a third alternative. He ingeniously con-
trived to put their names at the foot of the page with
an unimportant remark about each of them, so worded,
however, as to create the impression that they had not
taken a different view of the matter, but that the little

they had said tended to corroborate his “French
officer.”

So with nothing, or something worse than nothing in

288 MALICE AS'A FINE ART.

his favor, and with an overwhelming proof against his
charges, Parkman has constructed crushing evidence
against Le Loutre. He has so twisted and disfigured
every authority as to make it appear that Le Loutre was
accused and condemned on all sides: by “a French
officer,” “all the French officers,” * by Prévost, Mail-
lard, La Valliére, Cornwallis, and ‘Les Mémoires sur le
Canada.”

Thus, Parkman has given an honorable character to
the worst accusations against Le Loutre, particularly to
that which implicated him in a murder. After that, he
had no doubt people would believe whatever he chose
to advance against him. 7

With such methods you can prove anything. Give
Parkman a blackmailing letter from the veriest black-
guard, and, if not closely looked after, he might bring
about the conviction and electrocution of the President
of the United States. Have we not a right to apply
Pichon’s virtuous indignation to Parkman and exclaim :
“* What is not a wicked story-teller capable of doing ?”

Let us not forget that the first use made of Pichon
is about Le Loutre ; that, subsequently, he quotes him
‘no less than fifteen or twenty times in five different dis-
guises. He could safely divulge the name and charac-
ter of Pichon when once he had extracted from him all
his venom against Le. Loutre, and when the divulging

thereof did not remove the euphemism under cover of»

which he had administered his poison.+
It may be very difficult to get a correct idea of the
details of Howe’s death; but I refuse to believe that an

* It is Pichon who says that the French officers accused Le Loutre.

+ Pichonis introduced as ‘“‘a French Officer ” in Parkman’s book at page
118, in the fourth chapter; and itis not till page 243, in the eighth chap-
ter, that his name and his vile business are revealed.

ee a ee a

ee ee ee ee a eee ee ae Se

LE LOUTRE’S COMPLICITY IMPOSSIBLE. 289

officer or a priest, great as may have been their preju-
dices or their fanaticism, can have had the smallest share
in a crime of this sort, when they had nothing to gain
or more to lose than to gain by even an indirect partici-
pation in it. Barbarians alone could have conceived
and executed such a crime.

I do not believe that suspicions were then entertained
at Halifax of Le Loutre’s complicity in the murder;
though, if they were, these suspicions would lead, as a
natural consequence, to the further supposition that he
was capable of any villainy. Butif,in fact, according to
the affirmations of Prévost and Maillard, Le Loutre had
really warned Howe of the danger he ran, we are con-
fronted no longer with a crime, nor with the suspicion
thereof, but with a praiseworthy action that exhibits Le
Loutre in a less unlikely character and one far more in
keeping with his past devotedness as a missionary.

In order to elucidate this mysterious affair, I have, as
I usually do in such matters, tried to fathom the mo-
tives of the actors therein. I find that, though Le
Loutre may have been jealous of Howe’s influence with
the Acadians, this jealousy is far from sufficient to
implicate him in this murder. My first reason is that,
without convincing evidence, no one can be warranted
in making a monster of a man who had sacrificed all the
comforts of life to the salvation of his soul and to the
higher interests of religion. Secondly, this crime would
be altogether at variance with what we already know of
him. Thirdly, it were impossible to suppose him short-
sighted or blind enough not to have foreseen the disas-
trous and inevitable consequences of such a deed for
him and for his dearest interests. Fourthly, to connect

Le Loutre with this crime seems necessarily to imply
19

290) LE LOUTRE’S COMPLICITY IMPOSSIBLE.

the complicity of certain French officers, in particular of
the Commandant De la Corne, and thus charge them
with the same perverseness and blindness. Now we
have the clearest proofs that these officers had excellent
reason to be jealous, and were indeed jealous, of Le
Loutre’s influence and of his share in the conduct of
military and civil operations. Moreover, we know that
Howe was held in high esteem by these same French
officers. Therefore, I infer, they cannot have conspired
with Le Loutre against Howe.

What, then, can have been the motive of the Indian
assassins? I do not know. Written proofs are want-
ing, as they are wanting in so many other chapters of
this history, where clearly-defined facts are the excep-
tion. Though the Indians may have had many a
long-standing grudge to wipe out, they probably had no
more valid excuse than the harm Howe was doing them
by his zeal for the service of England.

However, we are justified in supposing that Le
Loutre, by his overstrained ardor and his violent dia-
tribes, may have, indirectly and unconsciously, influ-
enced to some extent the conduct of the murderous
Indians. For many years he had been fanning the
flames of fanaticism; and to the savage mind the
logical and practical consequence might have been the

removal of the man who personified all that made against _ :

their nation, against France and Catholicism. This is
the conclusion I am inclined to arrive at, in virtue, not
of documentary evidence, but of arguments based on
the study of human motives and the teachings of his-
tory.

Seeing that Parkman undoubtedly aimed at imparting
a flavor to his narrative by implicating a priest in this

\
> ay . ree a a ‘
ey eee i a ee ee ee ee

Bi eR i i lel td le

oe
a

ae es
ie aaa

a

+.

LEGERDEMAIN NOT ANALYSIS. : 991

murder, he might have attained his object in a less.
sensational fashion but more plausibly, had he used the-
method I have adopted. This method, albeit necessary,
he seldom follows. For him, as all his works show,.
history is merely a clever game of legerdemain, a hunt
after anecdotes, a salmagundi of items picked up every-
where without much regard to their origin or their
value. He has no misgivings, he cuts the toughest.
Gordian knots with a few swift strokes of the pen, with
a few admirably balanced sentences which give the
reader no inkling of the tremendous difficulties involved..
Small wonder that he should thus deport himself ;
analysis would shackle his dainty feet, would over-
weight his style; analysis is a painful. process, which
suits the sincere writer alone ; analysis is the weapon of
him only who, seeking in history nothing but the truth,
is not afraid to place the reader ina position to judge by”
himself of the facts at issue, and of the value of con-
flicting testimony. Hence it is that Parkman, even if
he had the necessary penetration, seldom sifts and
analyzes evidence in such a way that the public may
judge of his power of analysis.

The facts that form the basis of the foregoing chapter
are important, not only in that they afford full play to
Parkman’s peculiar methods, but also in their bearing
on the subsequent history of the Acadians. Howe’s.
death had much to do with the sequel of that sad
history. By increasing the irritation of the English
against the French it made the deportation possible.?

1Since writing the above, I see that Parkman, in his last work, says,
without explanation, that Le Loutre’s complicity is not proved. “ Quan-
tum mutatus ab illo!” Whence comes this change? What has happened?
Nothing, except that Casgrain has taken exception to his inferences, telling’
him that La Valliére, Prévost, Maillard, whom he cites, draw inferences.
very different from his and from what he leads the reader to infer; but

292 GOING BEHIND THE RETURNS.

CHAPTER XVII.

‘Intrigues of the French to urge the Indians to hostilities—Letter
of La Jonquiére to the Minister—Indian warfare against the
English—Hostilities between English and French—Le Loutre’s
methods against the Acadians—He is blamed by the Bishop of
Quebec—Divers acts of cruelty against the Indians of Maine.

I am proceeding with a sincere desire to discover the
share of blame which belongs to each of the conflict-
ing parties; endeavoring to be just to the English as
well as to the French, to the Home Government as well
as to the local authorities, to the Acadians as well as to
the priests. The materials for this history are so scanty,
there are so many gaps to fill, that here, more than else-
where, it becomes imperative to enter successively into
the minds of the interested parties in order to detect
the motives that impelled them to adopt one course
rather than another. One must become, so to speak, by
turns, a missionary, an Acadian peasant, an Englishman
and a Frenchman, a Catholic and a Protestant; one
must divest oneself of preconceived notions, narrow or
broaden one’s views, penetrate into the prejudices of all.
‘This is not always easy, nor equally easy for every one.
My life has been spent amidst these opposite elements,

-Casgrain has produced no new proof. True, Casgrain has not discovered
the great secret ; but he may be on the right scent, and he must therefore
be immediately turned away from it by some concession; else either he or
somebody else might make further researches and possibly ferret out
Parkman’s artful dodges and his dear Pichon. Matters had reached a
point where Parkman might say, as children do when they play Hunt the
Slipper : “It’s getting very hot!”

eal

SF EE Re hn tee ee ee, Wee

ee ee ee ee, ee

~—*

’

INDIAN ALLIES. 293.

and, owing to exceptional circumstances and perhaps:
also to my turn of mind, I experience no difficulty in
seeing with the eyes of others. If some writers have
examined more documents than I have, perhaps no one
has more honestly and deeply pondered the true inward-
ness of the facts.

Under different circumstances it is possible, by a mere
compilation of documents connected by such explana-
tions as are necessary for understanding the narrative, to:
compose a history that would be a pretty faithful picture
of events; in this case, such a compilation would be
altogether insufficient, Not only are materials few, not.
only have the most important been suppressed, but
those which remain are generally but the story as.
written by one side, in stiff official letters calculated to-
show merely the deceptive surface facts, merely what it
pleased the writer to say. Motives, intentions, secret
thoughts, all the inner springs of action, which are
revealed in private letters, secret journals, documents
from the other side, are completely wanting here.

The circumstances did not favor an international code
of honor equal to that which obtained among the civil-
ized nations of Europe. The interference of Indian
allies in war made peace factitious, war doubly cruel
and hatred incredibly intense. Each nation had its
savage allies, sometimes fighting on their own account,
oftener egged on by one or the other of the two nations.
Even when they spontaneously took to the warpath,
they were suspected of doing so at the suggestion of
interested whites. An act of hostility committed on
the great lakes was avenged later on in New England
or in Nova Scotia, and vice versa.

Numerically, France was much inferior to her rival.

294 INDIAN ALLIES.

The assistance of the Indians was, therefore, a necessary
condition of her existence; and so we find that France
always more assiduously and more successfully culti-
vated their friendship. Her most powerful lever was
the missionary. Whilst this spurner of creature-com-
forts plunged into the forest to follow the Indians in
their expeditions for the chase, for barter or for war,
sharing their privations, associating with their daily
life and their interests, the Protestant minister, bound
to civilization by family ties, could not expose his loved
ones to the trials of such a life and to the contact of
those barbarians ; yet this was the best means of evangel-
izing them and ultimately of winning them to civiliza-
tion. We can readily understand how, for the mission-
ary, the interests of_religion were closely linked with
those of his nation, since his efforts became or might
become useless as soon as the territory passed into
English hands. It was, assuredly, very natural that
the missionary should preserve his love for France;
but Parkman, in viewing him as too exclusively domi-
nated by this sentiment, does not realize the intimate
connection which the missionary saw between his
religion and his country.

Those vast and fertile regions that had no other
masters than a few savage tribes were coveted by both
nations, and had to be occupied as early as possible, so
that the rival nation might not step in beforehand.
However, there were no exact and definite titles to
legal possession accepted and recognized as such ; much
stress must also be laid on the friendship of the Indians,
often an uncertain and easily-broken bond, often threat-
ened by underhand seduction. Thus it happened that
there was no distinct line of demarcation beyond which

“ha

a | DEEDS OF SHAME. 295

honor could not safely go. In Europe the most insig-

zr nificant actions were done before the eyes of all, honor
was held in check by public opinion, ever such a
mighty power. Here, the blackest crimes frequently
were -without echo, or were lost in the solitude of the
forest. We need not, then, be surprised that rival
interests should have prompted many acts of duplicity,

. and that both nations are responsible for deeds the
memory of which may well make them blush. Indul-
gence is, therefore, opportune ; still, there are misdeeds
so blameworthy that history cannot ignore them ; and,
if such blame’ is deserved by France, it applies par-
ticularly, I believe, to her conduct in this part. of
the country, and at the very period upon which we are
entering. —

The eight years’ peace, from 1748 to 1756, in America,
was nothing but a series of continued hostilities, getting
worse each year. Macaulay says: ‘The peace was,
as regards Europe, but a truce; it was not even a truce
in other quarters of the globe.”

Cornwallis’s proclamation, ordering the Acadians to
take an unrestricted oath, was, for Acadia, the cause or
the pretext, at first, of secret hostilities, and ultimately
of open war. :

The enmity of the Indians for the English had always
been carefully fostered ; it was the counterpoise which
equalized the advantages of the two nations in this part
of the continent. We shall presently see, as Parkman
rightly says, that nothing was neglected by the French
to urge them to hostilities, whether with a view to dis-

courage the colonists introduced by Cornwallis or to
force the Acadians to cross the frontier. A few days
after this proclamation, De la Jonquiére wrote to the

296 USING THE INDIANS.

Minister of Colonies that Cornwallis, on his arrival, had
issued a proclamation requiring from the Acadians an
unrestricted oath ; that this proclamation had filled them
with alarm ; and that he himself had given instructions
to Captain de Boishébert to favor their departure. He
informed him of the conferences he had had with the
Indians :

**T did not care to give them any advice upon the matter, and
confined myself to a promise that I would on no account abandon
them; and I have provided for supplying them with everything,
whether arms, ammunition or other necessaries. It is to be de-
sired that these savages should succeed in thwarting the designs of
the English, and even their settlement at Halifax. They are bent
on doing so; and if they can carry out their plans, it is certain
that they will give the English great trouble, and so harass them
that they will be a great obstacle in their path. These Savages are
to act alone ; neither soldier nor French inhabitant is to join them ;
everything will be done of their own motion, and without showing
that Ihad any knowledge of the matter. This is very esssntial;
therefore, I have written to the Sieur de Boishébert to observe
great prudence in his measures, and to act very secretly, in order
that the English may not perceive that we are providing for the
needs of the said Savages. It will be the missionaries who will
manage all the negotiations, and direct the movements of the Sav-
ages, who are in excellent hands, as Father Germain and Abbé Le
Loutre are very capable of making the most of them, and using
them to the greatest advantage for our interests. They will man-
age their intrigue in such a way as not to appear in it.”

He went on to say that he hoped thus to prevent the
English from making any new settlement, to remove
the Acadians from them, and to discourage them by con-
tinual attacks of Indians, so as to make them give up
their pretensions to the territories of the King of
France.

Nothing can be clearer. De la Jonquiére’s sugges-
tions, it appears, were approved by the French govern-

USING THE INDIANS. 297°

ment. This approval is both contemptible and inexcu-
sable. This document is a stigma on France’s honor,
and is doubly so, as it directly involves the Home-
Authorities. True, hostilities had been committed’
shortly before in these parts by the English on the:
French and Indians; it would be no easy matter to
ascertain satisfactorily which side was the first aggressor
and on whom the blame, or most of it, rests; yet, as
this letter shows that peace might have been restored
without these instigations, France’s guilt cannot be ex-
cused nor diminished to any great extent. The same
reprobation may be applied, though with less force, to:
the participation of Le Loutre and Germain ; history is
justified in charging them with the vexations and atroc-
ities committed by the Indians on the colonists of
Halifax. However, in all fairness, I must once more
direct attention to the fact that Fathers Germain and Le
Loutre were missionaries among the Indians of French
Acadia (New Brunswick), and not Signet those of the
Peninsula (Nova Scotia).

I have already mentioned how Le Loutre failed to
make the Acadians of Grand Pré and of all the Mines
Basin emigrate; I have also indicated the means he
used toward those who dwelt at Beaubassin near the
frontier. For fuller details as to these latter, I will
quote Parkman, not because of the absolute accuracy of
his facts, for his information is mainly derived from the
questionable sources examined in the previous chapter,
but because, in the absence of all other information, his
account may be received as containing a substratum of
truth, now that the reader is in a position to estimate
the value of his authorities.

At page 116 of his work, “ Montcalm and Wolfe,”

298 BURNING HOUSES.

Parkman says: “ Resolved that the people of Beau-
bassin should not live under English influence, Le
Loutre with his own hand (?) set fire to the parish
church and this compelled the Acadians to cross to the
French side of the river.”

Speaking of the inhabitants of Cobequid (now Truro),
he says: “They began to move their baggage only
when the savages compelled them.”

When Lawrence landed with his men to found Fort
Lawrence on the frontier, there still remained, in the
neighborhood of Beaubassin village, which had been de-
stroyed some months before,-and, on the English side,
quite a number of houses and barns that had not been
burned. ‘ Le Leutre’s Indians,” says Parkman, ‘ now
threatened to plunder and kill the inhabitants if they
did not take arms against the English. . Few complied,
and the greater part fled to the woods. On this the
Indians and their Acadian allies set the houses and
barns on fire, and laid waste the whole district, leaving
the inhabitants no ehoice but to seek food and shelter
with the French.” : : }

At page 120 Parkman says: “ Le Loutre, fearing that
they would return to their lands and submit to the
English, sent some of them to isle St. Jean. They re-
fused to go, but he compelled them at last, by threaten-
ing the Indians to pillage them, carrying off their
wives and children, and even kill them before their
eyes (?)”

After making allowances for the exaggerations of
details, I am not far from believing that these events
really occurred pretty nearly as they are described. It
must be said, however, in extenuation of Le Loutre’s
conduct, that he acted on the understanding that the

LE LOUTRE REPRIMANDED. 299

Acadians would be fully indemnified for all their
losses, and, if these promises were partially frustrated,
the fault lies at the door of Intendant Bigot, Vergor
and their accomplices, who kept, for their own benefit, |
the funds set apart for the relief of the Acadian ref-
ugees. |

Men who, like Le Loutre, allow themselves to be
carried away by religious fanaticism, almost always be-
come dangerous as soon as they quit the sphere of re-
ligion to come down into the arena of worldly conflicts.
He should have ceased pestering the Acadians to move,
as soon as he met with decided resistance on their part;
and, since he was so vigorously opposed by those who
lived near the frontier, he had nothing to hope for from
those whose remoteness placed them beyond his reach.
His machinations could only serve to aggravate a situa-
tion that was already painful enough. Although the
Acadians, as we shall see, never did anything that could
justify either their deportation or any severity even re-
motely comparable to that, yet, when they weigh all the
causes of their exile, they cannot shut their eyes to the
unforgotten fact that the conduct of France toward
them was impolitic, selfish and cruel, that it quickened
latent prejudices and antipathy against them, and paved
the way for the misfortunes that ensued. And here, as
Parkman, in quoting Pichon, states facts of a public
nature, which could not be altogether unknown to the
Halifax authorities, and which are partly sustained by,
or in line with, De la Jonquiére’s letter, I would find no
fault, provided he had given out the name of his author-
ity, objectionable though it be.

The following letter of the Bishop of Quebec to Le
Loutre shows what the prelate thought of his behavior:

300 LE LOUTRE REPRIMANDED.

** You have at last, my dear sir, got into the very trouble which
I foresaw, and which I predicted long ago.

‘* The refugees could not fail to get into misery sooner or later,
and to charge you with being the cause of their misfortunes. The
Court thought it necessary to facilitate their departure from their
lands, but it is not the concern of our profession. It was my
opinion that we should neither say anything against the course
pursued, nor anything to induceit. I reminded youa long time
ago, that a priest ought not to meddle with temporal affairs, and
that, if he did so, he would always create enemies and cause his
people to be discontented.

‘‘T am now persuaded that the General and all France will not
approve of the return of the refugees to their lands, and the Eng-
lish Government must endeavour to attract them... But, is it
right for you to refuse the sacraments, to threaten that they shall.
be deprived of the services of a priest, and that the savages shall.
treat them as enemies? I wish them conscientiously to abandon
the lands they possessed under English rule; but can it be said:
that they cannot conscientiously return to them ?”

The above letter shows the vast difference between a
distinguished prelate and a fiery abbé of Le Loutre’s
stamp.

In the absence of clear documentary evidence to prove
which side provoked the hostilities, prior to De la Jon-.
quiére’s letter, we have to guide ourselves by the cir-.
cumstances of the time, which show that the French
had every motive to hinder the English from colonizing
Nova Scotia, whereas the latter were just as much inter-.
ested, for the moment, in avoiding all aggressions.

The first attack made by the Indians occurred August
19, 1749, about six weeks after Cornwallis’s arrival at.
Halifax. They captured twenty persons who were cut-
ting hay at Canso, and brought them as prisoners to:
Louisburg, where they were freed on the intervention of
the French commandant: “The Indians pretend they
did: this,” says Cornwallis, “because a New England

Pa es beset Deel nae Se
ete Pen
Fi

CANSO AND BEAUBASSIN RAIDS. 301

man who had ransomed his véssel of them for £100,
and left his son hostage, never returned to them, though
Colonel Hopson advanced him the money. I have
written to Boston to have this examined and have the
master, one Ellingwood, taken up.”

In September, Cornwallis again informs us, the In-
dians, under pretext of barter, attacked two vessels at
Beaubassin; three Englishmen and seven Indians were
killed. On the 30th of this same month, four men

_ who were working in a mill were killed by the Indians,

and another made prisoner. The next day, the Council
of Halifax passed a resolution ordering all the com-
manders “to annoy, distress, and destroy the Indians
everywhere. That a premium of ten guineas be prom-
ised for every Indian killed or taken prisoner.”

While throwing most of the blame on the French, I
think it only right to refer to the counter-accusations
consigned in the French archives or elsewhere. Invari-
ably the archives of one or the other nation contain
nothing but accusations against the opposing nation ;
so that history based on the exclusive testimony of one
of them, as has been more especially the case for Acadia,
cannot but be altogether one-sided and incorrect.

“Everybody knows,” wrote to the French Court the
Comte de Raymond, commander at Louisburg, “ that,
since the year of the last peace (1748), there has hardly
been a month in which the English have not sent armed
corsairs to visit the coasts of this colony.”

“Since the end of the year 1749,” says he elsewhere,
“a date at which the English began to come in crowds
to Chibouctou (Halifax) to settle there, the French
have not been able to navigate in safety along the east
coast, and even in the neighborhood of the island of

302 COMPLAINTS OF THE FRENCH.

CARSOL os on account of the frequent threats made
there. They have continued to capture vessels of all
kinds, to lay hands on whatever they contained, and, at
the same time, to seize on the mariners themselves.”

The Comte de Raymond supported these accusations
by a number of facts related with the most circumstan-
tial and precise details. He mentioned, among other
things, that the English had seized, in this very year
1749, in a port of Cape Breton, three boats together
with their crews, and had released them only after
taking all the codfish the boats contained.

“ They attacked and captured French boats plying
between Cape Breton and Prince Edward Island, ill-
used the crews, laid hands on: their cargoes and some-
times on their boats.”

On October 16, 1750, a brigantine belonging to the
French navy, the Saint Frangois, laden with the pro-
visions, clothing and arms destined to the French posts
of the St. John River, was captured and looted.

In the Lettres et Mémoires sur le Cap Breton (Pichon)
we read :

“ Towards the end of July, 1749, when the news of

the truce between the two crowns had not yet reached

New France, the Indians had taken some of the English
prisoners on the island of Newfoundland; but these
prisoners, having informed them of the truce signed the
previous year at Aix-la-Chapelle, they believed them on
their mere word, treated them as brothers, released them
from their bonds ; but, in spite of so much kind treatment,
these perfidious guests massacred, during the night,
twenty-five Indians, men and women.”

“ Towards the end of the month of December, 1744,”
says another document, “ Mr. Ganon (?), commanding

COMPLAINTS OF THE FRENCH. . 303

a detachment of English troops . . . . found, ina lonely
place, near Annapolis, two huts of Micmac Indians. In
these huts were five women and three children, two of
the women being pregnant ; but, despite the feelings of
humanity that such persons were likely to excite, the
English not only plundered and burned these huts, but
also massacred the five women and the three children.
It was even found that the pregnant women had been
disembowelled.”

I have no intention of drawing a parallel between the
misdeeds of the two nations, so as to decide which of
them deserves more blame for the cruelty practised by
the savages in the wars between the two nations or in
those which they waged against the Indians. Owing to
the circumstances of the time, the historian must shut
his eyes, provided the authorities took reasonable pains
to repress cruelty. A distinction must also be made
between the conduct of subalterns and that of superior
officers. But the atrocious crimes perpetrated by the
whites themselves against the Indians are inexcusable,
and, in particular, those which are traceable to the
authorities of Massachusetts against the Indians of
Maine far exceed all other atrocities committed else-
where, even those of the Indians themselves. I do not
think that the French ever were guilty of anything that
can remotely be compared to what I am about to relate.
These facts are told in the same way by many historians ;
but I take them from Hannay, whom I have at hand :

‘‘The Eastern Indians renewed the war in June,'1689, by the
destruction of Dover, N. H., where Major Waldron and twenty-two
others were killed and twenty-nine taken captive. Waldron
richly deserved his fate, for more than twelve years before he had
been guilty of a base act of treachery towards the Indians, which

304 i WALDRON AND CHURCH.

-has doubtless since caused the spilling of much innocent blood.
In 1676, Waldron, then commander of the militia at Dover, had
made peace with four hundred Indians, and they were encamped
near his house. Two companies of soldiers soon after arrived at
‘Dover, and by their aid Waldron contrived a scheme to make the
Indians prisoners. He proposed to the savages to have a review
and sham fight after the English fashion, the militia and soldiers
to form one party and the Indians another. After manoeuvring
‘for some time, Waldron induced the Indians to fire the first voliey,
vand the instant this was done they were surrounded by the soldiers,
and the whole of them made prisoners. Some of them were set
at liberty, but over two hundred were taken to Boston, where
‘seven or eight were hanged and the rest sold into slavery. It
~was to avenge this despicable act that Waldron was slain in 1689.”

Again, page 238:

‘“*One hundred ‘and fifty Penobscot Indians made an attack on
_ Yorkin February, 1692. The place was surprised and all the inhab-
‘itants who were unable to escape killed or captured. About
.seventy-five were slain. Several aged women and children were
released and allowed to go to the garrisoned houses, to requite the
English for sparing the lives of some of the Indian women and
children at Pejepscot a year and a half before. This proves that
_thesavages were not wholly destitute of gratitude, and that they
had rather a nice sense of honor, for, it is worthy of note that at
Pejepscot Church did not spare all the squaws and children, but
only the wives of two chiefs, their children and two or three old
‘squaws. All the other Indian women andthe children, of which
‘there was a large number, this squaw-killer Church slew in cold
blood.”

Elsewhere, again :

‘‘ During the winter the English were guilty of an act of treacher- :

ous folly, unparalleled anywhere. Stoughton, Governor of Massa-
chusetts, sent a message to the Indians, telling them to bring in
their prisoners for exchange. They brought five English prisoners
to Pemaquid for exchange. Captain Chubb persuaded them to
deliver them up, promising to send to Boston at once for those
desired in return. A conference was proposed inside the Fort,
nine Indians and nine English only to be present without arms ;

BW I” Ta aii

i i

nds

pes
£*
a
ee

CHUBB—RASLE. 305

the nine English had pistols concealed in their bosoms. They were
surrounded by a party of soldiers and all killed except two who

escaped. Three of the Indians were chiefs of great renown. It

is unnecessary to enlarge upon the character of this scandalous
transaction, further than to observe that it was a crime not only
against the Indians, but also against the English settlers, who, in
the end, were the greatest sufferers by all such treacherous acts.
Such insiougabis crimes against faith and honesty as those of
Waldron and Chubb, made it impossible for the Indians to believe
that the English would keep any truce with them; for those

_ instances of English treachery were told at the camp fires of every

tribe from Cape Breton to Lake PUperior, and they were repaid
in kind in after years.”

It will not be amiss to insert here the treatment of
Father Rasle, who had been a missionary on the Kenne-
bee River for forty years.

‘* This Romanist,” says Smith, * ‘‘ was highly accomplished, and
his life literally one long martyrdom. Being a correspondent and
friend of the Governor of Canada, the English believed he might
be the instigator of hostilities of the Indians. Their village was
taken by surprise ; Father Ralle, in hopes of diverting the atten-
tion of the enemy to himself and screen his beloved flock by his
voluntary offering of his own life, fell together with seven Indians
who had rushed out to defend him with their bodies. When the
pursuit had ceased, the Indians returned to find their missionary
dead at the foot of the village cross, his body perforated with balls,
his scalp taken, his skull broken with blows of hatchet, his mouth
filled with mud, the bones of his legs broken and otherwise man-
gled. Thedeath of Ralle caused great rejoicings in Massachusetts,
and when Harmon, who was senior in command, carried the
scalps of his victims to Boston (this string of bloody trophies in-
cluding the scalps of women and children and an aged priest), he
was received as if he had been some great general, fresh from the
field of victory. +

* Philip H. Smith: Acadia—A Lost Chapter in American History, p. 119.
+ This episode is related otherwise by Parkman. I have not tried to
get at the most correct version ; I give this one as I find it without vouch-
ing for its exactness, However, this is the version adopted by all the his-
torians I have seen. Murdoch attributes these cruelties and others of the
same kind to the peculiar notions of the Puritans. ‘‘We must bear in

306 SCALPS OF MEN AND WOMEN.

“ A certain Captain Lovewell,” says Hannay, “ emu-
lous of Harmon’s fame as a taker of scalps, and with
patriotism fired by the large bounty offered by Massa-

chusetts for that kind of article, gathered a band of

volunteers and commenced scalp-hunting. They killed
one Indian for whose scalp the company received £100.
He started next year with forty men, surprised the
Indians whose scalps netted £1,000. In a subsequent
fight he lost his own scalp, as did thirty-four of his
men.”

These barbarities were not, as is clear, perpetrated by
irresponsible individuals acting on their own impulse,
but by superior officers yielding to the stimulus of a
government boufity. In the war which had just come
to an end (1744-1748), this very government of Massa-
chusetts had offered a bounty of £100 for the scalp of
each male Indian above twelve years of age, and of £50
for the scalp of euch woman or child. I am aware that,
in certain circumstances, the French also offered
bounties to the Indians for the scalps of their enemies,
but I have yet to learn of a single instance where this
bounty was applicable to either women or children;
and—an essential difference—this hateful work, instead
of being performed by whites, as was continually done
in Massachusetts, was left to the savages. Moreover,
during the last fifty years of the French régime in

America the: manners of the Indians had become more >

gentle, most probably thanks to the missionaries, so much
so, indeed, that the usual custom was to make prisoners
who were afterwards released on ransom.

mind,” says he, “that the doctrines of the New England Puritans at that
period were deeply tinged with ideas drawn from the ancient Jewish his-

tory, in the Old Testament, whence they also drew their maxims of reprisals
and retaliation.”

SCALPS OF MEN AND WOMEN. 307

No doubt the barbarous outrages of the Indians upon
defenceless colonists put the latter into a state of great
exasperation. They honestly thought that the only
means of putting a stop to those crimes was to make use
of reprisals in kind. This was a fatal blunder from
every point of view; it was provoking a repetition of
the same crimes, perpetuating hatred, delaying and
spoiling the work of civilizing the savage. The least
that white men should have done would have been to
exhibit to the Indians a higher civilization by respecting
pledges, by sparing the lives of women and children.
These Indians were as amenable to gratitude as to
revenge ; and never would the French have acquired

_the immemorial ascendency they enjoyed over them,

had they not respected their rights and abstained from
such barbarities as I have related above. All the
Indians of New Brunswick and Maine: Malecites, Abe-
nakis, Medoctetes, constituted, together with the Mic-
macs of Acadia, one great family united by the bonds
of kindred and friendship. An injury done to one of
these tribes rankled for a long time in the breasts of all
the others as a personal wrong. Under such conditions
it is not to be wondered at if the Indians of Acadia were
always the mortal enemies of the English.

308 CLAIMING SCALP BOUNTY.

CHAPTER XVIII. i

Treaty of peace concluded between the English and the Indians of

- Acadia during the autumn of 1752—An infamous deed com-
mitted by Conner and Grace, two inhabitants of Halifax, puts
an end to the treaty—Revenge of the Indians—Captivity of
Anthony Casteel, messenger of the Council—His journal—Mis-
takes of historians with regard to these two incidents.

WHETHER it was that the French were ashamed of
their own conduét, or that they began to see it was im-
politic, or that they met with more apathy on the part
of the Indians than they had expected, or, perhaps, for
all these motives together; at all events, we have every
‘reason to believe that they soon gave up the odious
plans they had formed against the English settlements ;
this, at least, is the inference to be drawn from the
general trend of events..

In November, 1752, the preliminaries of a treaty of
peace between the governor and the Micmac chiefs were
arranged at Halifax. Three years before, a similar
peace had been signed with the Indians of the St. John
River, and until now this peace had not been broken.
However, this peace was so short that Le Loutre and the
French are almost invariably accused of having pre-
vented the treaty from being concluded. This might
be considered probable if we had not manifest evidence
of the contrary.

The act which gave rise to this accusation was the
following : In April, 1753, two inhabitants of Halifax,

AN ATROCIOUS CRIME. 309

John Conner and James Grace, came before the council
and presented seven Indian scalps for which they
claimed the usual bounty. They related how that, with
John Poor and Michael Hagarthy, they were wrecked
on the coast; that their companions were killed and
scalped ; that, after several days of captivity, they took
advantage of the absence of the Indians to butcher the

- woman and the child that had been left with them ; and

that, on the return of these Indians, they had fallen upon
them, killing and scalping them. 3 |
‘ The tale was improbable. It was hard to explain
why they had been left alone with a woman and a child,
and still more difficult to account for their not having
run away instead of waiting for the return of the In-
dians. This was, doubtless, the impression produced on
the council, which ordered: “that John Conner and
James Grace do give security for their appearance at
the next general court, in case any complaint should be
prought against them by the Indians.”

“ This is the substance of their story,” said the sur-
veyor Morris, afterward judge of the province, writing |
to Cornwallis, who was then in England ; “ but, as the
Indians complained, a little after the sailing of Conner’s
schooner, that one exactly answering her description
put into Jedore, where these Indians had their stores,
and robbed them of forty barrels of provisions given
them by the Government, ’tis supposed that these men

might afterwards have been apprehended by some of

this tribe whom they killed as they describe.

“If this be the case, tis a very unhappy accident at
this juncture, and time only can discover what its con-
sequences will be. The chiefs of every tribe in the

310 AN ATROCIOUS CRIME.

Peninsula had sent in messages of friendship, and, I
believe, would have signed articles of pene this spring,
if this accident does not prevent them.”

The Reverend Andrew Brown, who BBE 8, on

what Morris called an unhappy accident, adds these

remarks :

‘‘ Thus far Mr. Morris ; but the facts were still blacker than he
suspected. After having robbed the Indian store-houses, Conner
and the crew of his unfortunate schooner were obliged to encounter
the fury of the deep. They suffered shipwreck ; the two survi-
vors, Conner and Grace, were found by the Indians drenched
with water and destitute of everything, were taken home, cher-
ished, and kindly entertained, yet watched their opportunity,
and to procure tle price of scalps, murdered their benefactors,
and came to Halifax to claim the wages of their atrocious deed.

‘‘The Indians, as may well be supposed, were exasperated
beyond measure at this act of ingratitude and murder. (Revenge
boils keenly in their bosoms, and their teeth were set on edge.)
To procure immediate retaliation they sent some of their warriors
to Halifax, to complain of the difficulty they found to keep their
provisions safe during the fishing season, and to request that the
Governor would send a small vessel to bring their families and
their stores to Halifax. In compliance with this desire, the vessel
and crew mentioned in the Journal of Anthony Casteel were
engaged, tho’ several suspected from the first that it was an
“Indian feint to spill blood.”

The ruse the Indians had adopted for the sake of
revenge met with complete success. A schooner was
put at their disposal in order to bring back their families
to Halifax. The crew consisted of Anthony Casteel,
messenger of the council, of Captain Bannerman, of a
Mr. Cleveland, and of four sailors. All were butchered
and scalped except Casteel. How he was saved is ex-
plained minutely in the journal he kept, which, on his
return, was sworn to and transmitted by the Governor
to the Secretary of State. It is a thrilling tale and

CASTREL’S NARRATIVE. 311

shows the base treacher ‘y of which Conner and Grace
had been guilty against the Indians.

Casteel, after the massacre of his companions, was
dragged from Jedore, not far from Halifax, to Bay
Verte. Near this place they reached a camp of almost:
five hundred Indians, who made a circle around him.

After deliberating on his fate, an old man, the father-in-

law of the chief whose prisoner Casteel was, declared to
him that his life would be spared on payment of a
ransom of three hundred livres. “We were on the
point of signing a lasting peace,” said the old man ; “ we
had for a long time abstained from any act of hostility
against your countrymen; but now that the English
have begun, we will not stop. We had sheltered two |
shipwrecked men, who, the day before, had stolen most
of our provisions; they were almost lifeless; we had
brought them into our camp, where we fed and took
care of them; we were soon to take them to Halifax
when, taking advantage of our absence, they massacred
during the night two men, three women and two chil-
dren, one an infant at the breast. In return for such a
deed our vengeance would not be satisfied even if we
had killed as many English as their victims had hairs
on their heads. We have hitherto always spared
women when we could; henceforth, we will not even
spare the infant in its mother’s womb.” Then he tore
up before Casteel the paper that bore the preliminaries
of the treaty.

_ These facts, Casteel goes on to say, were confirmed
by other persons.. The culprits were Conner and Grace,
who, some weeks before, had brought to Halifax seven
scalps, for which they claimed the bounty.

~The chief who held Casteel prisoner stopped at the.

a12 CASTEEL’S NARRATIVE.

house of an Acadian named Jacques Vigneau dit Mau-
rice. There he met some Indians and a French officer.
One of them asked him what ransom he wanted for his
prisoner. “Three hundred livres,” said Casteel’s mas-
ter. “I will give them to you,” said another Indian,
“my father was hanged at Boston.” He rushed at
Casteel to stab him; but the French officer, who had
been watching the Indian’s movement, gave Casteel a
great shove that stretched him on his back and saved
him from the blow. The sons of James Vigneau carried
him into a little room, where he swooned away. When
he came to himself, Vigneau’s wife offered him a glass
of wine and asked him if he was wounded. He said
no. She then went to a chest, opened it and took from
it fifty pieces of six /ivres forming the three hundred /ivres
of his ransom. Jacques Vigneau called Casteel’s mas-
ter and counted out the money to him saying: “ This
man belongs to me; let none of you come here to
molest .|him, or I will break his bones.” “I then
asked Vigneau,” says Casteel, “if he would take my
note, he answered no; that he believed I was an honest
man, but, if he was never to receive one farthing, that
should not hinder him saving the English to the utmost
of his power, even to the last shirt on his back. The
next day Vigneau gave me a shirt, a few other articles,
a six-livres piece, and we parted.”

I have dwelt at some length upon these two incidents,
the Conner and Grace butchery and Casteel’s advent-
ures, because all the historians that mention them point
to the murder of Casteel’s companions as to an infamous
crime traceable to French instigation. Some of them,
literally believing the declaration of Conner and Grace,
count this as another crime referable to the same source,

THE FRENCH UNJUSTLY ACCUSED. 513

although the companions of these two miscreants really
perished when their vessel was wrecked.

Parkman, as usual, must needs fall into the worst
possible view against the French. It is amusing to see
with what a sagacious air of superior penetration he
strives to entangle the facts and circumstances so as to
implicate the French. He harks back five years in order
to weave a chain of circumstantial evidence that jus-
tifies him in concluding, or in insinuating, that the
preliminaries of the treaty in the previous autumn were
only a stratagem invented by the French.

It is true that the Compiler has not summarized the
contents of Casteel’s journal as satisfactorily as. could
have been wished. However, there is enough in what
he has given, provided the summary of Casteel’s journal
be compared with Conner’s declaration; to show that —
the incidents of the one are connected with those of the
other. There might still remain some uncertainty ;
but, if Parkman was in doubt, he ought either not to
have touched the matter or to have pushed his researches
farther. Instead of a cruel crime committed by Indians
at the instigation of the French, we find an act of excus-
able hostility done by these Indians to avenge ashameful
crime committed against their tribe by Conner and
Grace.* ,

Though the responsibility of this deed rests only on
two unimportant individuals and not on the govern-
ment, yet it is none the less certain that the peace,
which was about to be definitively signed, was broken for
a long time to come on account of this crime, and that

* About this time, the crew of a vessel hailing from Boston had treach-
erously killed, near Cape Sable, two Indian girls and an Indian boy, who
had been invited on board their ship.

314 THE GOVERNOR'S STRANGE CONDUCT.

deeds of blood were the outcome of it, deeds that exas-
perated the authorities and largely contributed to shape
the unfortunate events that followed. It would seem
that the Governor’s duty was, as soon as he had discoy-
ered the atrocious conduct of Conner and Grace, to
confer with the Indians, repudiate this crime, and give
them satisfaction in some way or other. Nothing of the
sort appears. Those haughty soldiers had too much
contempt for the savage to treat him as a human being.
We do not even hear of any punishment inflicted on
the monsters, Conner and Grace. One thing I cannot
understand is the strange conduct of the Government
signing the preliminaries of a treaty of peace with the
Indians in the autumn, and yet keeping up, during the
ensuing winter and spring, the bounty on Indian scalps.

In a letter of July 23rd, 1753, the Governor, com-
municating to the Lords of Trade the sworn deposition
of Casteel, mentions the facts of the case. This letter
is in the volume of the Archives; but the Compiler has
thought proper to suppress all that it contains on. this
subject, just as he has completely omitted another
letter of the 29th relating to this.affair. Whatever may
have been the Compiler’s motives, his omissions have
had the effect of leaving the question somewhat mud-
dled; hence it is that some historians have eluded it,
and others have fallen into an erroneous interpretation
of it.

Mistakes of this nature, shifting the crimes of one
party on to the shoulders of another, are not calculated
to inspire confidence in history. The events related
above contain the key to an important situation. By
throwing on the Indians or the French the odium that
really belonged to English subjects, the entire sequence

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MERCILESS OFFICERS. 315

of facts in this obscure epoch becomes very seriously
distorted. Had not.Casteel escaped the fate of his com-
panions, or had he not kept a journal of his adventures,
we should never have been able to get at the truth of
this story; for, even with his sworn declaration before
them, men have found means to palm off as the truth
what is only a shameless counterfeit. All history, and
particularly the history of Acadia, is perforce honey-
combed with similar les, which one writer passes on

~ to another, and which ultimately crystallize into indis-

putable facts.

The most barbarous have not always been the Indians.
It would be hard to find any Indian misdeeds that can
be compared to the duplicity and atrocity of the crimes

attributed to Stoughton, Church, Waldron, Chubb, Love-

well and Harmon. And these were not irresponsible
individuals like Grace and Conner; one of them was a
governor, another a colonel, a third a major, and the
three others captains. It may truly be said that the
government of Massachusetts is responsible for these
horrors, since it tolerated or encouraged them by tempt-
ing bounties for scalps of Indian men, squaws and
children.

In striking contrast with these colonial cruelties is the
bearing of the Home Government toward the Indians.
Had its counsels been heeded many misfortunes might
have been averted. Such acts as I have just related
could only perpetuate hatred and revenge. Twice was
Cornwallis lectured by the Lords of Trade because he
wished to wage against the Indians a merciless war :

‘“‘ As to your opinion of never hereafter making peace with the
Indians and of totally extirpating them, we cannot but think that
as the prosecution of such a design must be attended with acts of

316 ENGLISH VERSUS FRENCH METHODS.

great severity, it may prove full of dangerous consequences to the .
safety of His Majesty’s other colonies upon the continent, by fill-
ing the minds of the bordering Indians with ideas of our cruelty
and instigating them to a dangerous spirit of resentment.”

In a subsequent letter the Lords of Trade, apparently
dreading Cornwallis’s impetuosity, renewed the same
advice: “ Gentler methods and offers of peace have
more frequently prevailed with the Indians than the
sword.”

These gentle methods do not seem to have been con-
genial to the English national character; and, though
circumstances made it the evident interest of English-
men to adopt these methods, they seldom have been
able to count on the absolute fidelity of any Indian
tribe. One would think there lies, deep down in the
Anglo-Saxon, a rock-bed of roughness which the best
instruments of civilization cannot smooth, just as in the
Gaul there lurks a mercurial substratum of levity which
no disasters can solidify. In spite of his defects, the
Frenchman was much the more successful with the
Indians; he honestly strove to make the latter forget
the difference between the pale-face and the red-man,
whereas the Englishman ever sought to emphasize his
own superiority. The former’s first thought was, ‘* How
shall I win the Indian’s heart?” The latter’s main
question was, or seems to have been, “ How shall I
make that d d redskin respect me?” and he pro-
ceeded to enforee this respect by a dignified demeanor,
if he was well-bred, or by surliness, if he was a cad.
This scornful bearing led to brutality, and brutality led
to that curious historical fact which Sir Charles Dilke
chronicles when he says that the Anglo-Saxon is the
only race that exterminates the savage.

|

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ENGLISH VERSUS FRENCH METHODS. 317

Soon after the events recorded above it seemed likely
that a treaty of peace would be made between the
English and the Micmac Indians. Captain Hussey,
commanding at Fort Lawrence, notified Le Loutre to
bring with him, according to agreement, a delegation of
Indians to confer about the preliminaries of a treaty.
He received them, says Le Loutre, with such disdainful
haughtiness that the Indians, who had taken the trouble
to come from a long distance, went back greatly of-
fended. The negotiations were broken off. History is
full of similar incidents. What disasters might have
been averted had the advice of the Lords of Trade
recommending gentle measures been followed! Some-
thing of the same kind occurred about this time, when
General Braddock undertook his disastrous expedition
to the Monongahela River. He received the Indians
with such contemptuous stiffness that they all aban-
doned him with the result we know.

318 CORNWALLIS IMPROVES.

CHAPTER XIX.

Peace-making—Peregrine Thomas Hopson succeeds Cornwallis in
1752—His conciliatory spirit—He inspires great confidence and
secures happy results—After fifteen months his health obliges
him to return to England.

Le LoutreE’s efforts to make the Acadians emigrate
were soon exhausted. He may have been disheartened
by his failure; he may even have changed his mind as
to the advisability of such a course; but probably what
made him give up was ge cena the way the English
thwarted him.

On the other hand, there was no sien any talk at
Halifax of requiring the oath from the Acadians, who,
relying on the righteousness of their claim and on their
experience of the past, must have believed that this
silence was equivalent to a definitive return to the old
state of affairs. This was acruel illusion. Meanwhile,
however, quiet was restored everywhere ; so much so,
indeed, that, from 1750 to September, 1752, the date of
Cornwallis’s departure, hardly any mention is made of
the Acadians in the despatches of the governor or in the
deliberations of the council. The most important refer-
ence to them is in a letter of Cornwallis to the Lords
of Trade in September, 1751:

‘‘ There is a visible alteration in the behavior of the Acadians ;
they have this year cultivated well their lands and have great
crops, a quantity of corn to dispose of over and above what will
serve their families ; this will be of great service to this settlement

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PN ae ee ee ee

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AN ERA OF HUMANITY. 319

at this critical juncture. Both as to the Acadians and Indians,
it would be improper to send the Germans into that part of the
country.”

Hitherto Cornwallis had several times suggested that
Protestant colonists should be placed here and there
among the Acadians, “in order to remove their preju-
dices in favor of the Romish faith.” But each time the
Lords of Trade had. rejected his suggestion; and now
Cornwallis seemed won over to their views. His atti-
tude towards the Acadians appears to have notably
altered. In September, 1750, he had applied for leave
of absence, suggesting Lawrence as his substitute ; and
yet we find Hopson succeeding Cornwallis at the latter’s
departure in 1752. In 1750 Cornwallis leaned to harsh
measures, and in this policy Lawrence was the man to
continue and improve upon his predecessor. Undoubt-
edly, from 1750 to 1752, a great change had come over
Cornwallis; he seems to have realized that he had
blundered, that harshness and stiffness raise up obstacles
instead of removing them. Had harshness been the
hasis of his character, he never could have so materially
altered his demeanor. Strongly imbued with military
notions, having but an imperfect knowledge of the
special status of the people under his jurisdiction, he
had honestly thought that it was wise to act as he did
on his arrival. He had the good sense to turn back
from the error of his ways. However, the consequences
of his first mistake were too disastrous to admit of
complete reparation; and, able and worthy though he
may have been at bottom, the change came too late for
a full development of his latent virtues.

Peregrine Thomas Hopson, who succeeded Cornwallis,
had been commander-in-chief at Louisburg, and, when,

320 HOPSON, COPE, AND LE LOUTRE. |

this fortress was surrendered to France, after the treaty
of Aix-la-Chapelle, he, with the troops under his com-
_ mand, joined Cornwallis at Halifax. I venture to say
that Hopson shared with Mascarene the honor of being
the most straightforward, humane and conciliating of all
the governors of Acadia since the Treaty of Utrecht.
His letters, orders and all his acts prove this assertion.
Though Cornwallis left him a legacy of trouble, yet he
managed, in a very short time, to make peace with
every one. Despite an unfortunate event that hindered
his liberty of action, he would probably have reconciled
the Indians to English rule had not ill-health obliged
him to resign after fifteen months of office.

His kindly disposition led, only two months after his
inauguration, to offers of peace from John Baptist Cope,
the great chief of the Micmacs. An understanding was
arrived at, and some weeks later a treaty of peace was
concluded and signed between Cope and the govern-
ment. Cope pledged himself to exert his influence to
persuade all the Indians of his nation to make a final
treaty the following spring.

Was this peaceful issue due to the good reputation
Hopson had already earned? Was this a bona fide
pledge on the part of the Indians, and what share in it
should we attribute to Le Loutre? For this John Bap-
tist Cope was, I believe, chief of the Indians in Le
Loutre’s mission. The latter could not but be aware of
this step ; and if he really wielded over the Indians the
power that is commonly attributed to him, this treaty,
whether feigned or sincere, must have been, at least in
part, his work. ‘True, it was broken eight months later,
but the motive, viz., the infamous crime of Conner and
Grace, affords a full explanation of the rupture ; and for

HOPSON PLEADS FOR THE ACADIANS. 321

eight entire months the Indians observed the treaty
faithfully. Now if, as seems probable, Le Loutre favored
this treaty, the question naturally presents itself, why
did he favor it? The only reason I can see is the con-
fidence inspired by Hopson’s noble character and the
sincerity of his dealings with the Acadians. This makes
the inference probable that, had there been no violence
nor arrogance on the part of Cornwallis, Le Loutre
would haye done nothing to force emigration upon the
Acadians or to stir up the Indians to hostilities. Per-
haps the very foundation of Fort Beauséjour had no
other motive than resistance to the. arbitrary proceed-
ings of Cornwallis.

On the 10th of December, 1753, soon after the de-
parture of Cornwallis, Hopson wrote to the Lords of
Trade : |

**T should be glad to have Your Lordships’ opinion as early in

_ the spring as possible, concerning the oath I am to tender to the

Acadians, as directed by the 68th article of my instructions.

‘Mr. Cornwallis can thoroughly inform Your Lordships how
difficult, if not impossible it may be, to force such a thing upon
them, and what ill consequences may attend it. I believe he can
likewise acquaint you that the inhabitants of Beaubassin—who
had taken it before with General Philipps’s conditions—made it a
pretence to quit their allegiance and retire from their lands,
though it was not otherwise offered to them than by issuing the
King’s Proclamation to that effect.

** As they appear to be much better disposed than they have
been, and hope will still amend, and, in a long course of time,
become less scrupulous, 1 beg to know from Your Lordships in the
spring how far His Majesty would approve my silence on this head
till a more convenient opportunity.

“ Mr. Cornwallis can inform Your Lordships how useful and nec-
essary these people are to us, how impossible it is to do without
them, or to replace them even if we had other settlers to put in
their places; and, at the same time, how obstinate they have
always been when the oath has been offered.

‘Son WORKINGS OF CONSCIENCE.

It appears evident by this letter that Cornwallis had
come round from his earliest impressions and shared
Hopson’s views as to the manner of treating the Aca-
dians. How easy it is, on reading this letter, to feel
that we are in the presence of a man in whom kindliness,
gentleness, calmness and reflection predominate! He
neither can nor will blame his predecessor; yet he none
the less implies that there has been blundering, that time
and tact will be needed to bring back the spirit of trust
so rudely shaken, and to do away with the scruples
aroused by exacting the oath. No stranger is he to the
feelings of the Acadians; he has put himself in their
place; he seems to experience their own sentiments.
He has gone down into his own soul to listen there to
the answer of his conscience, and has heard his own
heart tell him that, were he in their place, he could not
easily make up his mind to bear arms for strangers
against his brothers, for enemies of his religion against
his co-religionists, for people whose language he does
not understand against those with whom he has familiar
intercourse ; hence he sees before him “a long course of
time ”’ before their scruples can be effaced. That phrase,
“less scrupulous,” shows that he has in very deed con-
sulted his conscience and his own feelings.

Cornwallis had perceived merely the material aspect
of their situation. He had thought that attachment to
their property was the great, the only motive of their
actions ; it had seemed clear to him that all that was
needed, to get the better of their sheer stubbornness, was
resolutely to place them face to face with the cruel
choice between abundance on the one hand and desti-
tution on the other. But, when he saw deputation after
deputation unhesitatingly accepting destitution, begging

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NO EXCITEMENT. 323

for leave to depart, he was quite upset; he could make
nothing out of such conduct; either he himself is really
moved or he wishes to move them by his words, but his
emotion all turns on the enjoyment or the loss of their
goods: “Your lands produce grain and nourish cattle
sufficient for the whole colony. It is you who would.
have had the advantages for a long time. We flattered.
ourselves we would make you the happiest people im
the world.”

Hopson’s vision was clearer and more far-reaching ; he
saw that conscientious motives threw all purely material
interests into the shade, and therefore he ¢mplores the
Lords of Trade not to oblige him to urge the question
of the oath. “Mr. Cornwallis can inform you how use-
ful and necessary these people are to us, how impossible
it is to do without them, etc., etc.”

Could such a description apply to a-turbulent and
dangerous population, ripe for revolt? Clearly not.

‘And yet the period we have just traversed has been more

agitated than that which is to follow and which imme-
diately precedes the deportation. We have reached
1753, only two years before the terrible event. Ad-
visedly do I use the word “agitated,” for I intend to
convince whoever is open to conviction, without hiding
anything and without going beyond official documents,
that nothing more serious than agitation occurred
throughout the whole extent of the peninsula. And
what did this agitation amount to? Merely peaceful
meetings of men who discussed the situation, simple
peasants who weighed the pros and cons to decide upon
the alternative imposed to them. This agitation, if
indeed it deserves the name, lasted some months, at
most one year, the first of Cornwallis’s governorship.

324 EVEN-HANDED JUSTICE.

‘There is not the slightest sign that these meetings were
‘seditious or even noisy ; quite the reverse. When they
had decided to choose thé alternative of leaving the
country, they went directly to inform the Governor and
to ask his permission. Before granting it, he obliged
them to sow their fields; without a murmur they did
‘so; they sowed what they believed would be reaped by
others; then they came back for the promised permis-
sion; again were they put off with wretched pretexts,
again did they return to their homes without a murmur
and remain perfectly quiet. In all this there is not the
vestige of a single act of insubordination or even of re-
sistance. And yet there were strong excuses for sedi-
tion. Seeing that they had been kept in the country
against their will, that a compromise had been made
with them in 1730, they certainly had the right of carry-
ing off their movable goods, which was an important
consideration for them. To deprive them of this right
was to cast them from plenty into beggary. And yet,
without complaint, they yielded up this manifest. right.
Does not this submissiveness afford a safe standard by
which to judge of their dispositions and of their subse-
quent conduct ?

Cornwallis had mapped out his plan of action before
hearing them; Hopson had taken pains to see and hear
everything and consider the motives on which their

claims were based. The following order, addressed to.

the commanders of Forts Vieux Logis (Grand Pré, now
Horton), and Edward (Pigiguit, now Windsor) by Hop-
son, reveals the same kindly temper observed upon
above :

_** You are to look on the Acadians in the same light with the rest
of His Majesty's subjects, as to the protection of the laws and Gov-

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EVEN-HANDED JUSTICE. 325

ernment, for which reason nothing is to be taken from them by
force, or any price set upon their goods but what they themselves
agree to; and, if at any time they should obstinately refuse to com-
ply with what His Majesty’s service may require of them, you
are not to redress yourself by military force, or in any unlawful
manner, but to lay the case before the Governor and wait his
orders thereon. You are to cause the following orders to be stuck
up in the most public part of the Fort, both in English and
French.

‘1st. The provisions or any other commodities that the Acadians
shall bring to the Fort to sell, are not to be taken from them at
any fixed price, but to be paid for according toa free agreement.
made between them and the purchasers.

2d. No officer, non-commissioned officer, or soldier, shall pre-
sume to insult or otherwise abuse any of the Acadians, who are
upon all occasions to be treated as His Majesty’s subjects, and to
whom the laws of the country are open, to protect as well as to
punish.

** At the season of laying in fuel for the Fort, you are to signify
to the Acadians by their deputies, that it is His Majesty’s pleasure
they lay in the quantity of wood that you require, and when they
have complied, you are to give them certificates specifying what
quantity they have furnished, which will entitle them to payment.

at Halifax.”
P. T. Hopson.

This order was evidently intended to modify or com-
pletely change previous orders; else it would have been
purposeless. It amounted to saying: Hitherto the
Acadians have. not been on the same footing as the rest
of His Majesty’s subjects; henceforth they shall be.
You shall take nothing from them by force; they shall
have, like others, the privilege of making bargains for
their produce; and if you have reason to complain of
them, you shall not employ force or any other illegal
means.

This. order is just as eloquent a eulogy of Hopson’s
character as it is a powerful plea against Cornwallis.

326 WHAT THIS ORDER IMPLIES.

Thus, to all appearances, under the latter’s government
the treatment of the Acadians was one thing and that
of His Majesty’s other subjects was quite another. The
pettiest sergeant could lay hands on Acadian produce,
and any resistance might be punished as he chose with-
out trial and without appeal. When one reflects on the
tyranny inseparable from a military rule, even in our
day, a tyranny sometimes bearable from superior offi-
cers, but ever growing less endurable with lesser rank,
one feels that the abuses of this power committed to
subalterns must surely have been occasionally deplor-
able. Yet, save in one instance under the ferocious
Lawrence, there does not appear in the entire volume of
the Archives a single case of recrimjpation on the part
of the Acadians.

Perhaps this order may have been inspired by the
Lords of Trade; but, as the Compiler does not publish
so much as one of their letters to Hopson, we can only
indulge in conjecture. However, this document is al-
together in keeping with what we know of Hopson’s
character.

On another occasion he gives us a new proof of his
excellent sentiments. Among the emigrants landed at
Halifax in the course of the autumn of 1752 were a
certain number of decrepit old men and some orphans.
Hopson complained to the Lords of Trade against such

people being sent out to the colonies. In the course of
his letter he cannot refrain from pitying the woes of
these wretched beings: “I can assure you, my Lords,
that I find this very shocking, for no mortal that has
the least humanity can do otherwise than feel to the
very heart at the sight of such a scene of misery.”

The character of Cornwallis does not stand out so

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ACADIANS FEAR INDIANS. 827

clearly; he may have been merely haughty and impe-
rious; but he shows no signs of commiseration. Hop-
son, on the contrary, proves that he was not only full
of equity and kindliness, but also that he had the gift
of exquisite sympathy. All his acts are impressed with
the same stamp; and so his administration, unfortu-
nately too short, was fertile in happy results, and would
have been still happier, had it not been for the dastardly
crime of Conner and Grace which revived Indian hos-
tilities fora time.

If his administration had lasted some years, he would,
most likely, have won from the Acadians, without any
show of force, the unreserved oath required of them.
He wrote, July 23rd 1753, to the Lords of Trade that
he was privately informed that some Acadians who had
left their lands had been delegated to confer about the
situation with their fellow-countrymen dwelling on
English territory ;

‘*That they went so far as to hold consultations whether they
should not throw themselves under the protection of the English
Government and become subjects to all intents and purposes ; but
there arose a considerable objection to their taking this step, which
was, that, as they lived on farms very remote from one another, and
of course are not capable of resisting any kind of enemy, the French
might send the Indians among them and distress them to such a
degree, that they would not be able to remain on their farms.”

Was Hopson’s information correct? Most probably,
for what he relates is in full accordance with the well-
known sentiments of the Acadians. No doubt they had
the greatest repugnance to the obligation of bearing
arms against the French; but the danger of Indian hos-
tility was an equally important matter, and recurs in all
their petitions whenever the question of the oath is
raised. Cornwallis and afterward Lawrence laughed at

328 REALIZING THE DANGER.

this.as ata foolish dread. But, as we have here their
deliberations among themselves, unknown to the au-
thorities and free from all outside pressure, it is easy to
see that this danger was thought by them to be a serious
one, since it alone stood in the way of their nase
the oath.

Would they really have been molested by the fodiane |

at the instigation of the French, if they had taken the
oath? I cannot say; however, I am inclined to believe
they would not. It was plainly in the French interest
to perpetuate the status of neutrality ; they tried to
make the Acadians believe that they would be molested
by the Indians if they took the oath; but, once that
oath had become an accomplished fact, I am convinced
that no hostility would have been manifested on the

part of the French or Indians until the Acadians should

actually have had to take up arms against either of
them. From that moment, however, they would have
been just as much exposed to the hostility of the In-
dians, just as much their enemies, as were the English
colonists, and then, as Hopson says, “As they live on
farms very remote from one another, and of course not
capable of resisting any kind of enemy,” their position
would have been untenable. The Acadians, deliberat-
ing with a full sense of their grave interests at stake,
and with long experience of the character of these In-
dians, must be considered the best judges of what was
likely to happen. Hopson seems to admit the force of
their reasons; unlike Cornwallis and Lawrence, his
delicacy of feeling and sympathetic nature enabled him
to enter into their views.

Although there is nothing surprising in these delibera-
tions of the Acadians, there is something that rather de-

AE a ee eS Lene Oe ee ee

HOME, SWEET HOME! 329

‘tracts from the heroic aspect we are wont to view them:

in, since they now were ready to sacrifice their sentiments.
to their material interests. However, the residue of
virtue in them is quite sufficient to endear them to their
descendants. Heroic sacrifices are above nature; hesi-
taney before making them is therefore not astonishing.
More than a century had elapsed since their forefathers
had opened out the country, several generations had sat
by the same hearth. Whatever makes man, especially
the husbandman, cherish life, whatever is dear to simple
and honest hearts, they saw there in Acadia. It was
their fatherland, the home of their ancestors, all the
dearer to them because they had founded and created it.
Each hill and dale, each glimpse of smiling landscape
was sparkling with sweet memories. Those luxuriant. |
meadows that fed their immense herds had been wrested
from the sea by their own patient and painful toil. That.
church whither they came to kneel each Sunday had
witnessed the only important events of their simple and
peaceful lives. That graveyard held the remains of
their kindred,.and told in its inscriptions the story of
those who had gone before. How their hearts must.
have been wrung at the mere thought of going away !
Going! Why, that meant bidding an everlasting fare-
well to home and country, to all they had and all they
loved, quitting ease and plenty, the joys of the dear old
fireside, for exile, separation and penury.
Dear were the homes where they were born,
Where slept their honored dead ;

And rich and wide, on every side
Their fruitful acres spread.

On the 12th of September, 1753, Hopson read to his.
council the following petition : -

330 PETITIONS.

‘** The inhabitants of Grand Pré, River Canard, Pigiguit, etc., etc.,
etc., take the liberty of presenting their very humble petition to
Your Excellency, begging you to remove the difficulty which
presents itself with respect to the missionaries who came here, by
exempting them from the oath of allegiance which is required of
them.

_ * We hope, sir, that Your Excellency will be kind enough to
grant that favor, inasmuch as, when we took the oath of Allegi-

ance to His Britannic Majesty, we took it only on condition that _

we should be allowed the free exercise of our religion, and a suf-
ficient number of ministers to perform the services.

** It appears, sir, that we would be deprived of this last article,
if the Government were to force them to take this oath, because
the missionaries would certainly not remain among us on terms
which they cannot agree to; we should therefore see ourselves
deprived of the main point granted to us.

** Moreover, sir, when we submitted on the terms by which the
practice of our religion is granted to us, it was by no means speci-

fied that our missionaries should be obliged to take this oath.
That is proved by the two missionaries who were present when we
took the oath, and who were also entrusted with our affairs, with-
out its being thought necessary to exact of them what is now re-
quired of them. Notwithstanding all the expense we have in-
curred in endeavoring to get them at Louisburg and even at
Quebec, the difficulty of this oath prevents them from settling
amongst us.”

Hopson granted this request on condition that the
priests would conform to what was required of them in
the regulations. It was Cornwallis who had, on the
31st of July, 1749, issued an order obliging the priests
to take the oath of allegiance. Here again Hopson
gives a new proof of his liberality.

On the 27th of the same September another petition
was presented to him by those Acadians who had crossed
the frontier three years before :

‘«‘ We, the inhabitants formerly settled at Beaubassin and vicinity,

beg to inform you that the reason which caused us to leave our
property was the new oath which His Excellency M. Cornwallis

oe ee

\

PETITIONS. 351

wished to exact from us, desiring to break and revoke the one
granted to us before. Having learnt since our departure, that if
we were willing to return, we should have the same favors that
were granted to us formerly, we are ready to accept it under these
conditions. It is impossible for us to sign any other oath on ac-
count of the Indians, as we have stated on several occasions to
His Excellency M. Cornwallis. If he had known better our cir-
cumstances he would have seen that it was impossible for us to sign
any other than that which we have signed.

‘* We hope that these articles will be granted to us by Your Ex- »
cellency, and even ratified by the Court of England, so that those
who may succeed Your Excellency shali not make the pretext that
His Excellency M. Cornwallis made in saying that M. Philipps
had no authority from the Court of England for the oath which he
granted us.

‘‘These being granted, we shall feel constrained to continue,
and even increase our prayer for Your Excellency’s health and
prosperity.”

This proposed return of the voluntary exiles was
another happy result of the good reputation Hopson
had so soon earned. He granted all their requests
except that which bore on a restriction to the oath, for
he had not then the necessary authority for making this
concession.

It is worth noting that the petitioners, though always
respectful, yet, being safe from restraint beyond the fron-
tier, freely stigmatize as a pretext Cornwallis’s proceed-
ings towards them when revoking the agreement entered
into with Philipps. The statement was true, but they
would not have dared to express it in this way had they
still been under English rule. Now, if their proposition
was accepted, they wanted to be shown an express rati-
fication from His Majesty.

Here ends Hopson’s career as Governor of Acadia.
Ill, and perhaps disgusted with the part he had to play,
he set sail for England, leaving the temporary adminis-

332 PETITIONS.

tration of the province to Lawrence, his first coun-
cillor. Hopson carried away with him the esteem and

the confidence of every one, after fifteen months of a.

firm and energetic administration, tempered by a spirit

of justice and conciliation the like of which no other

governor but Mascarene had shown.

aes ” ee

HOPSON’S SUCCESS. | 333

CHAPTER XxX.
General Considerations—England and France.

Ir is painful to take leave of so worthy a man as
Hopson, endowed with all the gifts that were called for
by the perplexing condition of the province. He had
governed it but one year and a quarter. In that short
space, without violent orders, without threats, without
apparent effort, by the mere persuasiveness of his kindly
character and gentle ways, he had so far restored confi-. .
dence as to induce the Acadians, of their own accord, to
consider the question of an unrestricted oath. Had it
not been for the dread of Indian hostility, the problem
was in a fair way of solution. Those Acadians who
had crossed the frontier, learning of the Governor’s
favorable dispositions, asked leave to return to their
farms.

During these fifteen months, in spite of Indian hos-
tility aroused by an untimely. crime, for which the
Governor was in no way responsible, the greatest tran-
quillity reigned in the Acadian settlements ; no sign of
discontent, no act of insubordination is mentioned any-
where. Is this not a fresh proof of the mild and peace-
able character of the Acadians? A little kindness,
some consideration for their difficult position, care not
to alarm them by arbitrary or violent measures, which
might make them fear interference with the free exer-
cise of their religion: this was all, and yet this—if sup-

334 PERSONAL GOVERNMENT.

plemented by protection against Indian attacks—was
enough to win from the Acadians the desired consent.

This fact also proves to a demonstration that the heads
of small absolute governments are alone responsible for
the good or evil conduct of their subjects. Therefore
it is strange that the majority of those who have written
about this period of Acadian history have laid no stress
at all on the respective characters of the various goy-
ernors. Surely this point was here, more than in most
countries, essential to a clear understanding of the facts.
In a representative and responsible commonwealth it
might have been overlooked as of slight importance;
but here was an absolute ruler, and what is more a sol-
dier, whose will was law, whose wishes were commands.
In such small despotic governments good rulers make
good subjects. Let the governor be kind, humane, just,
careful of the interests of all; peace and contentment
will flow from him as naturally as water from a spring.
Let him be haughty, arbitrary or cruel; mistrust, discord,
uprisings perhaps, will be just as certain tofollow. The
mass of the people will have remained the same; the
governors only have changed. So true is this that the
Home Office might have said to each of these governors:
“ Your administration has been marked by much trouble
and dissatisfaction ; therefore you have ruled unwisely ;”
or, “During your governorship there have been no
complaints, no unrest; therefore you have been a wise
ruler.”

The first thing, then, is to study the character of the
governors. When this has once been carefully done, it
is easy to pass judgment on the various events of their
administration. ‘Those who are unable or too careless
to undertake this critical examination should refrain

’ PERSONAL GOVERNMENT. 335

from writing history. Though sometimes difficult, and
especially so here, this inquiry is, nevertheless, possible,
even without any other assistance than that supplied in
the official documents.

We cannot expect that an autocratic governor, when
writing to his superiors, will make a clean breast ofall he
does and ofallhis plans. Farfromit. He has every in-
centive to show himself in the best light, to omit facts that
tell seriously against himself, to defend himself against

all comers, to throw the blame on all who thwart his de-

signs or interfere with his tastes and caprices. And
yet the attentive observer will almost always detect,

either in the details or in the general tone of his cor-

respondence, something that will reveal the undercur-
rent of his character and his secret motives.

Other historians of this period give us little or no in-
sight into the character of the governors. They pass
from Armstrong to Mascarene, from Mascarene to Corn-
wallis, from Cornwallis to Hopson, from Hopson to
Lawrence, as if there had occurred no material change,
as if they were talking of an impersonal being, devoid
of passions, interests, caprices, prejudices and defects.
Yet, what a fathomless abyss yawns between a restless,
whimsical spirit, like that of the ill-balanced Armstrong,
by turns benevolent and tyrannical, and Mascarene, the
cultured quiet gentleman, too particular perhaps on oc-
casion, but ever paternal, firm and kind! Again, what
a striking contrast between Hopson, so upright, so con-
ciliatory, so humane, and Lawrence so false, so despotic,
so cruel !

After carefully weighing the whole matter, and with-
out taking into account the possible adverse action of
Hopson’s successors, I feel convinced that the latter,

“336 WHAT MIGHT HAVE BEEN.

in a few years, thanks to his kindliness, would have ob-
tained from the Acadians an unrestricted oath. Their
-attachment to France was no doubt great, but not great
-enough to have been the sole motive, as Parkman and
other writers make it, of their refusal. Indeed, the
Acadians did not object to remain British subjects.
What is more, I do not hesitate to say that, if the re-
-striction to the oath had been maintained, if further
_grants of land had been made to them in proportion to
the growth of their population and to their needs, if
they had had no cause to dread any interference with
the free exercise of their religion, they would probably
have preferred to see Acadia remain an English posses-
-sion in order that they might enjoy their neutrality.
So long as the restriction subsisted, they were under the
protection of a contract that gave them the undoubted
right to leave the province if the stipulations of that
contract were violated. To take an unrestricted oath
was to forfeit this right. This they must have realized.
To bear arms against the French was a thing they had
-a horror of. It seemed to them a monstrous crime
_against nature. Yet, such was their situation, so badly
had they been treated by them, that they would perhaps,
“at this time, have sacrificed this question of sentiment,
with the vague hope that they would never be actually
called upon to fight the French. But, what they never
would have sacrificed—and this was the most delicate
question of all—was their religion, which they thought
threatened and exposed to cureless ills by the rescinding
-of their neutrality contract, as it was indeed menaced
by projects of which they had heard.
Never was a people in such a desperately critical
situation. Both French and English were too busy with

OS Rn. a a es eh ee ae ee

a ft.
ee |

NAUGHT BUT THE MIGHT OF RIGHT. 35T

the coming conflict to take serious thought of Acadian
sentiment or to pity the woes of Acadia. This people,
with its spirit of obedience, had no shield but the might
of right. They were clearly free either to go if they

refused the proposals of England or to accept them and

remain. They artlessly thought that justice would
finally prevail. The bold intriguer who succeeded —
Hopson was about cruelly to undeceive them.

As to the insurmountable horror the Acadians had of
bearing arms against the French, we French Canadians
and Acadians by descent can thoroughly understand it
and speak of it knowingly ; for we need only analyze
our own feelings.

We esteem England and her institutions the blessings

of which we enjoy ; we admire her creative genius, her

civilization, the wisdom of her statesmen, her far-seeing
plans and the tenacity with which she carries them out.
We have served her faithfully ; we are willing to do so
again. We have had more liberty than French rule
would have granted us. We are satisfied; our lot is
just about what we should have chosen ourselves. And
yet, after 130 years of separation, we still love France
as we did in 1768. Is ours an exceptional case, or
would Englishmen feel as we do if they were in our
place? Human nature is pretty nearly the same every-
where. But the question is not practical, since England
—however the fact may be explained—has always man-
aged to keep her conquests, and above all she has never
been forced to abandon her children to the enemy.

Our love for France seems to surprise our English fel-
low-countrymen. They seem to think love of country
is a chattel that can be transferred by order from place
to re a on a given date. Is this thoughtlessness or

338 LOVE FOR FRANCE.

narrowness of mind? Does it arise from the fact that
Englishmen have never had any personal experience of
a situation like ours? Or are they less sensitive to the
finer feelings ?

Suppose, for a moment, that the Province of Quebec
became once more a colony of France. Ask the English
residing in Quebec if they would not feel scruples and
an insurmountable horror at the thought of fighting for
France against England, against Ontario, even after a
century of allegiance to France with the greatest pos-
sible freedom. Their answer admits of no doubt; but,
whatever it might be, this is our view: nothing could
induce us to fight against France on foreign battlefields ;
and if the refusal to do so were to entail upon us what
the Acadians suffered, our hesitancy would be short,
with this difference, however, that we would meet force
with force. Cold-blooded reasoning has no place here ;
we are not free to change the feelings which are in-
grained in our nature. Should Englishmen act differ-
ently in similar circumstances, the inference would be
that their nature is diametrically opposed to ours.

It is a matter of common observation that a French-
man is swayed more by sentiment. than by self-interest ;
that an Englishman, on the contrary, places self-interest
alongside, and sometimes above sentiment. Some think
this distinction is merely a difference of degrees and
shades, not of natures. But may not the divergence be
radical ?

When the United States revolted against the mother
country, the Acadians, unable to understand such con-
duct, never called that struggle by any other name than
the mad war. Still, the Americans, struggling for their
money interests, were fighting for a principle; whereas

THE IMMIGRANT AND THE NATIVE. 339

the Acadians could have invoked no principle to justify
their taking up arms against France.

An important distinction must be drawn between the
immigrant and the man that claims the country he dwells
in as the home of his forefathers. The immigrant’s ob-
ject is business ; unwittingly, perhaps, he has made up
his mind beforehand to become, to all intents and pur-
poses, a citizen of his new country. His children, if not
himself, will claim hardly any other country than this
new land of theirs. The native, on the other hand, is
still more firmly rooted to the soil. His attitude to-
wards the immigrant must be carefully considered. His
traits of character, his customs, traditions, language, are
all dear to him; he means to cling to them as long as
possible, he hopes, forever. His eye is on the immi-
grant, who may easily excite his suspicions. If he finds
out that the newcomer wants to dislodge him, he will
never forget it; he will ever attribute to him the same
purpose, even in the latter’s most harmless behavior. If
the natives constitute a people, be it ever so small, they
will close up their ranks and become more and more
clannish ; and, should they come of a strong and manly
race, whose past history is glorious, there is no knowing
what complications may ensue.

But if the incoming settler is prudent, gentle and
generous ; if he lets the native know that, far from hav-
ing any designs upon the autonomy and maintenance of
the native nationality, he is anxious to keep up all the
dearly loved traditions of the country, then afew gen-
erations will suffice to win over the native element to
the immigrant nation, fusion will take place without
friction, without hitch, without bitter regrets. A con-
trary course on the settler’s part would leave the various

B40 LIVE AND LET LIVE.

elements unharmonized after ten generations. The con-
sequent need of prudence is especially great where the
natives are French, because of the extreme delicacy of
their feelings.

In colonies conquered by England, the English set-
tlers have almost always striven to implant their lan-
guage and religious beliefs by stratagem or by force.
They are striving to do so more or lessevennow. Their

great object seems to be the formation of one solid, ho-

mogeneous, despairingly monotonous mass of human
beings instinct with the same ideas, the same tastes, the
same feelings, as if this objective were indispensable to
the security and progress of the country. They seem to
forget that such ill-concealed strivings produce an effect
_ exactly contrary to that which was expected, and tend
to weaken those bonds of sympathy which a kindly ob-
servance of the advice, “ live and let live,” would have
helped to strengthen. Agreement in essentials is quite
enough ; to aim at more is to secure less.

France, with all her faults, has ever adopted a very dif-
ferent line of conduct, with much more satisfactory results,
Her Brittany, after so many centuries, still speaks

Breton, and is none the less very French. Alsace was
German, spoke and still speaks German ; but, after two
centuries of French rule, it groans in German under the
German yoke, and sighs for return to France. Corsica,
Nice, Savoy, treated as sisters, never uttered a murmur.
The Arab, reconciled after a short resistance, dies for
France on every field of battle, only too proud to be able
to defend her flag. In spite of the errors and the levity

of France, the nations she takes to her bosom become
French in heart and mind.
While France was urged on by her feelings, England

a eee ee SP

ON Oe ee

WINSOME: FIANCE, - 341

was stimulated by her interests. While the former
aimed at assimilating her new subjects by respecting
their customs and traditions, by making them sharers in
the privileges and» rights common to Frenchmen, by
acts of kindness and urbanity, the latter strove to bring
the colonists into line by sheer force or by craft.- Had
England added to her other gifts, so numerous and so
imperial, the further gift of winsomeness, she would
have been by this time doubly the mistress of the world;
the whole of this continent would now be hers; Ireland

would be to her a garland of honor instead of a thorn

in her side. Alas! It is with nations as with indi-
viduals ; there are virtues that exclude one another.

Throughout all her vicissitudes France always re-
mained, politically and economically, one with her
colonies. In war, in peace, in revolution; under king,
emperor or republic; under Bourbons, Bonapartes or
the Orleans citizen king; with one tariff or another,
the colonies submitted to every change without com-
plaint. Never could England achieve such a result.
Self-interest bars the way.

342 AMBITIOUS AND HEARTLESS.

CHAPTER XXI.

Major Charles Lawrence, President of the Council, acts as ad-
ministrator in expectation of Hopson’s return—His character—
His behavior towards the English colonists, the Germans and
the Acadians, causes great dissatisfaction.

THE good feeling which Hopson had so happily
restored was to disappear with him. He had made the
governorship an easy task, if only his successor had had
some of the virtues for which he himself was so emi-
nently distinguished. Unfortunately, Lawrence, a first-
rate soldier, a bold and active man, endowed with more
than common intelligence, with that insinuating manner
which so often is the intriguer’s passport to success,
was totally devoid of moral sense and utterly heartless.
The be-all and end-all with him was his ambition, to
which he had vowed all the resources of his lively mind.
Tmperious and cruel to his subordinates, he was supple
and obsequious to his superiors. Of humble birth,
having begun life as an apprentice to a house-painter,
he had raised himself, while yet in the prime of life, to
a position which a nobleman’s son might have envied.

A knowledge of the character of this man is very
important: for on the judgment that shall be meted out
to him depends, to a great extent, the judgment history
must pass on the extraordinary act that marked his
government. By the help of the public documents
alone—his own documents, garbled as they are—any one

7” 4 =

ee re ee

Oe ee ee ee a

my
faa ae

Ba aI Ti i

=, A

RE a een one ee

gD dl &

HALIGONIANS DESCRIBE LAWRENCE. 343

ean convince himself that my opinion of him is not too
severe, since, throughout his whole career, one looks in
vain for a single deed, and, in all the documents, for a
single line that might hint at the semblance of any feel-
ing of delicacy.

My search after further information to confirm or
modify the impression produced upon me by the mere
perusal of the volume of the Archives has been rewarded
beyond my hopes; and I can now safely assert that my
first view fell far short of the reality. I will adduce
some of my proofs in the course of the narrative; for
the present, I need only give a short extract from a long
petition addressed by the citizens of Halifax in 1757 to
a distinguished person in England whose name does
not appear in the document supplied by Rev. Andrew
Brown.

‘* We are extremely obliged to you for your favor of the 3rd of
July last and for your assiduity in our affairs.

‘* We can assure you, sir, that we were almost without hopes of
being considered as English subjects; the haughty and disdainful
behaviour of our governor to all our remonstrances, although
tendered with the utmost submission, gave us much reason to
think he was countenanced at Home.....

‘** Your letter has revived the hopes of the inhabitants, and it
has been great comfort to them to find an Englishman in England
who has their unhappy state and condition at heart and commiser-
ates their bondage under oppression and tyranny. . ‘

‘¢These are all the friends Governor Lawrence had at Hine.
for on this side of the water he has none, either of the inhabitants
or gentlemen of the army, who hold him in the utmost contempt,
except those formerly mentioned to you his agents in oppres-
sion. .-. .

‘Perhaps you will be surprised to hear how this gentleman,
who, some time ago, was only a painter’s apprentice in London,
should have advanced himself to such heights. We are obliged to
confess that he has a good address, a great deal of low cunning,
is a most consummate flatterer, has words full of the warmest ex-

344 . IMPUNITY.

pression of an upright intention, though never intended, and with
much art most solicitously courts all strangers whom he thinks can

be of any service to him. By these and such arts has hesisen to be

what he is, and, elated with his success, is outrageously bent upon
the destruction of every one that does not concur in his measures.
** Another of the Governor’s acts is to misrepresent and abuse

all below him. He has publicly called his Council a pack of scoun- -

drels, the merchants a parcel of villains and bankrupts, and has

represented at Home the whole as a people discontented and re-

bellious.” *

Such was, according to his fellow-countrymen, the
man who conceived and carried out the deportation of
the Acadians. If he painted the citizens of Halifax in
such sombre colors, we need not wonder that the
Acadians should have met with the same treatment.
Nor should we wonder that he grievously oppressed
them, since the oppression he exercised on those whom
it was manifestly his interest to spare had driven them
to extreme exasperation.

His must have been a strangely cruel and perverse
nature, since he could not curb it when his fellow-citi-
zens might denounce him, overwhelm him with disgrace
and ruin his prospects forever. But what had he to
fear from the Acadians? Would their complaints find
an echo beyond the sea? Would these complaints even
so much as reach England? Clearly not.

In dealing with a man of this stamp, would it be wise
to take his own documents literally, garbled as they
were purposely later on by himself and his accomplices,
in order to justify an unjustifiable act? Have we not
at least the right of requiring from him well-proved
facts and not unsupported assertions? Now, as [ am
about to demonstrate, in all that part of the Archives

* See Appendix, Vol. II.

Se RN SR ae EE ee eC ee A ee Te Se eT eT Sie

ee ee oe oe a

LITIGIOUS ACADIANS. . _-~— 845

which refers to Lawrence’s administration, despite the
one-sidedness displayed in the compilation of that
volume, there is not one single instance, throughout the
whole extent of the peninsula, of resistance that can be

imputed to the Acadians, subjected mone they were to

intolerable provocation.

The better to set this forth, I will review the docu-
ments contained in the volume of the Archives, dwell-
ing especially on those which contain accusations or
complaints against the Acadians.

At first, while Hopson, absent on leave for his health,
was expected to return, Lawrence was merely Adminis-
trator pro tem. of the province with the title of Presi-
dent of the Council. By making himself measurably
agreeable to the people under his care, and still more to
the Lords of Trade, he could reasonably hope, provided
his friends helped him at home and Hopson did not
return, to be soon appointed governor. ‘The nomination
was slow in coming, but it came at last in the November

of the following year. Up to this time his conduct

seems to have been more guarded and perhaps also less
harsh and more just.

On December 5th, 1753, shortly after Hopson’s depart-
ure, he wrote to the Lords of Trade:

‘7 take the earliest opportunity of doing myself the honour to
write to Your Lordships, though hardly anything worth your notice
has happened since Governor Hopson’s departure. .. .

“‘T come next to the Acadians who are tolerably quiet as to
government matters, but exceedingly litigious amongst them-
selves. As this spirit shows the value they set upon their posses-
sions, it is so far a favorable circumstance. But, as there is no
regular method of administering justice amongst them, they grow
very uneasy at the decision of their disputes having been so long
put off. To give thema hearing in our Courts of Law would be at-
tended with insuperable difficulties ; their not having taken the

346 LITIGIOUS ACADIANS.

oath of allegiance is an absolute bar in our law to their holding any
landed. possessions, and Your Lordships may imagine how difficult
it must be for the courts to give judgment in cases where the pro-
prietors’ claims are far from being ascertained, and where the dis-
putes commonly relate to the bounds of lands that have never as
yet been surveyed that I know of.

**The French emissaries still continue to perplex them with dif-
ficulties about their taking the oath of allegiance ; and though they
have not been in the least pressed to it of late, yet they seem to
think we only wait a convenient opportunity to force it upon them,
as they every day magnify to themselves the difficulties they should
lie under with the Indians if they take the oath, as well as the no-
tion that it would subject them to bear arms.”

From the foregoing it appears that the Acadians
were then “ pretty quiet as to government matters, but
exceedingly litigious amongst themselves.” There is
no reason to question this statement. Hopson had
given them satisfaction on many important points, and,
for a long time, there had been no talk of the oath;
this was all that was needed to ensure quiet. Nor
have we any motive for doubting that there must have
been difficulties among themselves anent the limits of
their lands. More than twelve years before, Mascarene,
in a letter I have produced elsewhere, had begged the
Lords of Trade to alter the regulations excluding Catho-
lics from Crown Land grants :

‘‘ They have,” said he, ‘‘ divided and subdivided amongst their
children the lands they were in possession of, as His Majesty’s in-
structions prescribe the grant of unappropriated lands to Protestant
subjects only. . . . If they are debarred from new possessions, they
must live here miserably and consequently be troublesome, or they:
must withdraw to French colonies. If we give occasion of disgust
to these people, the French in case of war will soon make an ad-
vantage of it.”

Now we gather from Lawrence's letter that nothing
had been done to right this crying wrong; and yet the

ee ee Tee

NO NEW GRANTS. 347

sinister forecasts of Mascarene had not been realized, in
other words, the Acadians had neither given trouble to
the government nor left the country because of a wrong
which was in itself so grievous. In spite of this “ occa-
sion of disgust,” and of Shirley’s plans more disgusting
yet, the French had failed, during the late war, toshake
their fidelity. How grave soever was this question of
land grants, it was after all a matter of secondary im-
portance to the Acadians in comparison to the oath and
its consequences, and therefore was not made the subject
of complaint to the authorities. Still it stands to reason
that lands which had never been surveyed, and which
had been divided and subdivided into small parcels
during forty years, must have given rise to many dis-
putes. And, as if to perpetuate this state of affairs, the
settlement of the difficulty was indefinitely postponed
and evaded, for the unavowed reason that the non-
acceptance of the oath “ was a bar in our law to their
holding any landed possessions.” This really meant,
according to Lawrence’s contention, that the Acadians
had no legal right to the property which they enjoyed in
virtue of the treaty of Utrecht.

Up to 1730, in spite of the growth of the ropabnat
the Acadians did not address themselves to occupying
new land nor to fixing the limits of the old, nor to
making improvements, for the very obvious reason that
their stay in the country was uncertain. After the
agreement with Philipps, exempting them from military
service, they thought their status was definitely settled,
and then only did the land question assume importance
in their eyes. As new grants were refused to them,
they were forced to subdivide their old farms, and as
these had never been properly surveyed, difficulties

348 POSSESSION DECLARED UNLAWFUL.

arose. Their disputes were submitted to the governor
as early as 1731, when Armstrong said of them that
they were litigious. The only way to settle the rival
claims was to have the land surveyed; but, in Law-
rence’s time, ten, fifteen, twenty and more years had
elapsed since the disputed claims had been filed and
placed in the governor’s hands, and as yet nothing had
been settled. No wonder Lawrence could say: ‘“ They
grow uneasy at the decision of their disputes having
been so long put off.” Surely there was more than
enough to make them uneasy. Lawrence lets out the
secret of these endless delays when he says: ‘ Their not
having taken the oath of allegiance is an absolute bar
in our law to their holding any landed possessions.”
This amounts to an avowal that, since 1730, the delay
of surveys and settlement of claims was intentional, and
was owing to the restrictive clause contained in the oath
accepted by Governor Philipps. But, then, it becomes
evident that the acceptance of this oath was only a
deception, since it did not give the Acadians any right
to their land. If, however, I should happen to have
mistaken the drift of Lawrence’s letter, there is at
least this other inference to be drawn, that the gover-
nors were but very little concerned to end the bickerings
of the Acadians, or they might have readily done so by
ordering the necessary surveys.

To deprive them of new grants called for by the in-
crease in their numbers was not enough of an injustice ;
they must, furthermore, be refused all right to the par-
cels of land which they held in virtue ofa treaty. They
were ordered to take an unrestricted oath, which would
not even have given them any claim to new grants of
land, these grants being reserved, by regulation, “ to

‘\

i, Mahe Pee ee ree he Pepe ee

& ” * an
ee ee Ee eed en a ae en an re

nies
a ~

Pre
a iis hors

ACADIANS COMPARED TO AMERICANS. 349

Protestant subjects only.’ Thus was being secretly
prepared for them the fate of outcasts and pariahs.
Perhaps their only resource now was to buy land from
those Englishmen who had taken up, as I mentioned
elsewhere, 100,000 acres: around the settlements of
Mines and Beaubassin. But it is easy to understand
that the precariousness of their position was apt to make
them mistrust such purchases.. Besides, was there any
security against future annulment of all their title-
deeds in virtue of Lawrence’s contention as to their
being barred out by the law ?

These few considerations give an inkling of Law- _
rence’s deep-laid schemes. The sequel will show that
it is well nigh impossible to find one of his state papers
- that is not a fresh masterpiece of duplicity.

The Acadians must, forsooth, have been the most
submissive and peace-loving people under the sun.
* The lenity and the sweet of English rule,” on which
Parkman dilates, may apply reasonably enough to the
Home Government, but assuredly not to the provincial
administration. Had the New England colonists been
in the same situation, they would long ago have raised
the standard of revolt and broken every trammel, as in-
deed they did afew years later to destroy abuses that
were far less blameworthy and affirm rights that were
far less important, for the sake of stamps and tea, when

their language, their religion, their feelings, their lands
were in no way threatened. Because the Acadians
scorned rebellion, because they were too nobly obedient,
they were deported like cattle, they were hunted like
wild beasts, while statues were raised in honor of suc-
cessful rebels ; and, to crown their misfortune, they have
to-day to bear the humiliation of the dying lion kicked

350 LORDS OF TRADE PERPLEXED.

by the ass from one who—be it said without blame—
bends low before the heroes of the revolution. To the
vulgar mind success is the proof of merit, and the old
saying, ;

Donec eris felix, multos numerabis amicos,

is accepted as an exhortation to the worship of success.
Had England quelled the revolt, as she very probably
would have done without the timely succor the French
gave Washington, and had she deported the American
rebels, true rebels these with far less grievances than
the Acadians, how would Parkman have attuned his
lyre?

It is strange that Mascarene’s equitable suggestions
were not acted upon by the Lords of Trade. Their
conduct in this matter contrasts with their usual equity.
Had the grantees of the 100,000 acres—amongst whom
were a Secretary of State, his brother and a future
Secretary of State—enough influence successfully to
plead in bar of Mascarene’s request? I cannot say.

Lawrence’s letter threw the Lords of Trade into
great perplexity, as may be seen by the following
extract from their answer of March 4th, 1754:

“The more we consider this point, the more nice and difficult it
appears to us ; for, as on the one hand great caution ought to be
used to avoid giving any alarm and creating such a diffidence in

their minds as might induce them to quit the Province, and by their
~ numbers add strength to the French settlements, so, on the other
hand, we should be equally cautious of creating an improper and
false confidence in them, that by a perseverance in refusing to take
the oath of allegiance, they may gradually work out in their own
way a right tc their lands.”

To a manof Lawrence’s character this was tantamount
to saying: Deceive them if necessary, give them

REVOLT OF GERMAN SETTLERS. 301

vaguely to understand that titles will be granted to
them, taking great care, however, not to commit your-
self to any formal promise. Nevertheless, do all that is
needed to prevent them from leaving.

And yet this much must be said in palliation of the
Lords of Trade: from their point of view, they were
imparting counsels of prudence and moderation that

mi r 1ce’s impetuous anc
ght serve as a check on Lawrence’s impet i

perverse nature. Of course there is no denying the
trickery implied in this letter; but we should bear
in mind that, for the last forty years, trickery had
become so interwoven with the traditional policy that
it was impossible for the best of well-meaning men
entirely to free themselves from its meshes. Moreover,
this letter was written at a time when the Lords of
Trade hardly knew what decision to take on the matter
at issue ; and, in order to be perfectly fair towards them,
this letter should be collated with another dated on the
29th of the ensuing October, which may be mense as
completing and greatly modifying it.*

In the letter cited above from Lawrenice, there is a
long account of an insurrection of German Protestant
settlers at Lunenburg, who belonged to Cornwallis’s
colony. Before becoming president of the council,
Lawrence had been commandant at that place, and his
presence had been marked by troubles and by many
desertions doubtless due to the severity of his rule.
Directly after his departure the discontent broke out,
men rushed to arms, and to avert the actual shedding of
blood nothing less was needed than the presence of
troops from Halifax, and as Murdoch says: *“ Monckton
advised that, as the people there were so generally im-

* This letter is inserted further on.

BOQ: REVOLT OF GERMAN SETTLERS.

plicated, the better course would be to grant a general:

forgiveness, but Lawrence desired to punish the ring-
leaders... .” _

According to his invariable habit the Compiler has
mutilated Lawrence’s letter, leaving out all that relates
to the insurrection of the Lunenburg colonists. As we
know the Compiler’s purpose, we quite understand that it
would have been impolitic for him to bring to light such
facts, for they constitute a glaring contrast to the
obedience of the Acadians, albeit the latter must have
been still worse treated than those Protestant colonists
who had been brought out and established at the
expense of the government.

Now that we know the effect of Lawrence’s adminis-.

tration among the English and German colonists, and
what they thought of him at the outset of his career,

we are in a position to judge of the reputation he had.

left behind him among the Acadians according to a
letter from Captain Murray, commander of Fort Edward
(Pigiguit) to Lawrence himself, wherein he reports to

him what they had said of him: “That he was a man |

they personally hated, and dislike his government so
much they would never be easy under it, he having treated
them so harshly when amongst them.” However, he
had never been able to provoke the least resistance,
whereas the Germans had no intention of so meekly
enduring oppression. |

On June 21st, 1754, Lawrence “ informed the Council
that he had received a letter from Captain Scott, com-
mandant at Fort Lawrence, acquainting him that on
the 14th of June instant, the deserted inhabitants of
‘ Beaubassin District who had petitioned for leave to
return to their lands, came and brought him their

Feo

BEAUBASSIN REFUGEES. 353

answer in relation to the resolution of Couhoil of 27th
September last, which was that, unless the President of
the Council would assure them, from under his hand,
that they should remain neuter and be exempt from taking
up arms against any person whatsoever, it would be
impossible for them even to think of returning, as they
would every day run the risk of having their throats cut
and their cattle destroyed by the savages, and this they
gave as their last answer.” |

“ Wherein it was resolved that nothing further would
be done than as resolved by the Council on the said 27th
of September.”

This resolution of September 27th had been passed
under Hopson’s administration, and the communication
of the Acadians mentioned above was the answer there-
to; but, since that time, Lawrence himself had made
proposals to them inducing them to return to their
lands. He had declared to them that it was not his
intention at present to oblige them to military service ;
which meant that he bound himself to nothing. Such
an offer coming from Hopson would have deserved con-
sideration ; coming from Lawrence, it was worthless.
Some more formal engagement was needed, with his
signature into the bargain; else it were impossible
“even to think of returning.”

Their motives for mistrusting Lawrence were too
numerous to admit of their falling into the snare, and
they had been too often deceived to be satisfied with
vague promises. But, why was Lawrence so anxious
for their return? For we must not forget that the

deportation is now less than a twelvemonth ahead.

Had the Acadian voluntary exiles been turbulent, sedi-
tious, dangerous, it would have been the acme of im-
23

354 BEAUBASSIN REFUGEES.

prudence to receive a hostile element in the very heart
of the province, and worse still to invite them to come.
Now, contemptible as Lawrence was, he was no fool.
Therefore, we may safely say, the presence of this new
Acadian element was desirable, useful, almost or quite
free from danger; therefore their behavior had been
hitherto submissive enough to warrant Lawrence’s press-
ing invitations; therefore, in fine, to justify the deporta-
tion, motives must be sought in the twelvemonth that
followed. In point of fact no valid reason exists any-
where, not more and perhaps less during this twelve-
month than before it.

wee vy
Te.

GENERAL CHARGES. 355

CHAPTER XXII.

Lawrence becomes Lieutenant-Governor—His accusations against
the Acadians—Project of expulsion—The Lords of Trade.

My aim has been to pick out by preference and relate
the facts supposed to tell against the Acadians, as they
are to be found in the volume of the Archives. This
I have faithfully done hitherto and will continue to do.
The following letter from Lawrence to the Lords of
Trade, dated August Ist, 1754, is clearly the document
that contains the gravest accusations against them. I
produce it almost entire despite its length :

‘Your Lordships well know, that the Acadians have always
affected a neutrality, and as it has been generally imagined here,

. that the mildness of an English Government would by degrees have
_ fixed them in our interest, no violent measures have ever been

taken withthem. But I must observe to Your Lordships, that this
lenity has not had the least good effect ; on the contrary, I believe
they have at present laid aside all thought of taking the oath vol-
untarily, and great numbers of them are at present gone to Beau-
séjour to work for the French, in order to dyke out the water at
the settlement I informed Your Lordships they were going to make
on the north side of the Bay of Fundy, notwithstanding they were
refused passes which they applied for to go thither. And upon
their complaining that they could get no employment with the
English, they were acquainted that as many as would come to

_ Halifax should be employed, tho’ in reality, I had no employ-

ment for them, but I proposed to order them to widen the road to
Shubenecadie, as I very well knew if I could get them once here,
it would put off their journey to Beauséjour, and would be no ex-
pense to the Government, as I was sure they would refuse the work

356 DEPORTATION FORESHADOWED.

for fear of disobliging the Indians. But, as they did not come, I
have issued a Proclamation, ordering them to return forthwith to
their lands, as they should answer the contrary to their peril.

‘“They have not for a long time brought anything to our mar-
kets, but on the other hand have carried everything to the French
and Indians whom they have always assisted with provisions,
' quarters and intelligence, and, indeed, while they remain without
taking the oath to His Majesty—which they never will do till they
are forced—and have incendiary French priests among them, there
are no hopes of their amendment.

‘* As they possess the best and largest tracts of land in this Prov-
ince, it cannot be settled with any effect while they remain in this
situation, and, though I would be very far from attempting such a
step without Your Lordships’ approbation, yet I cannot help
being of opinion that it would be much better, if they refuse the
oath, that they were away.”

Why this change of tone from the pressing invitation
to return which he sent to the emigrated Acadians a
few weeks ago? ‘The reason is very plain: Lawrence
had just made up his mind to deport the Acadians, nor
does he scruple to let his intention be known. Up to
this time he had been only president of the Council
awaiting Hopson’s return. Now he must be aware that
Hopson is not to return and that his own appointment
as lieutenant-governor is sure; it was, indeed, officially
announced a few weeks later.*

The better to prepare the Lords of Trade for his per-
fidious designs, he had to depict the conduct of the
Acadians in the most sombre colors. The above letter
is the result of his efforts in that direction. As the
correspondence and the official acts of the governors

* Philip H. Smith, who, in his “ Acadia ; a Lost Chapter in American
History,” shows so much fairness and perspicacity, says of this letter and
the following ones: “‘ The reader cannot fail to note the change in the tone
of the letters sent to the Home Government relative to the French Neutrals;
Lawrence proved himself the sort of ruler that was needed to carry out
the harsh measure of the deportation.” 3

ai a ee

TRADING WITH THE FRENCH. | 357

for the past four years did not hint at the slightest in-
fringement of orders throughout the entire peninsula,,
it behooved Lawrence to pave the way for specific alle--
gations by general complaints, so that his change of
tone might seem to be supported by facts. This is the
only explanation that can be offered of the general ac-
cusations contained in the above letter, which are either
false or greatly exaggerated.

My purpose being to reply to each and every one of
Lawrence’s accusations, I now take up those which are
contained in the foregoing letter. He accuses the
Acadians of intercourse with the French and of having
assisted the latter by selling them their produce. This
must have been true in Mascarene’s time, and before,
when there was only one fort at the extremity of the
province, and when there was practically no protection
of the frontier line. But no government has a right to
complain of such infractions, when it neglects the
necessary precautions against them. Experience proves
that, when breaches of a law are easy and unaccom-
panied by risk of punishment, the most virtuous and
loyal people will wink at them. Loyalty and obedience
offer no remedy to the greed of gain. Surely, the
Acadians would need to have been endowed with super-
human perfection, if they had not sometimes taken
advantage of a situation that enabled them to do a good
stroke of business without let or hindrance. Moreover,
Mascarene never complained of these business relations
with the French in time of peace; on the contrary, in
one of his letters he very wisely remarks that this traffic
should be ignored, because the Annapolis ‘garrison
could not consume all the produce of the farmers, and
therefore, to stop that traffic was to paralyze farming,

358 TRIFLES.

interests ; besides, he adds, it is a source of profit to

everybody because it brings into the country French —

money, which otherwise would go to Canada or else-
where. When war broke out in 1744, the Acadians, as
we have seen, whether at the Governor’s suggestion or

perhaps of their own accord, formed an association to:

prevent all such business relations. They themselves
undertook police duty for the Government against their
fellow-countrymen, and, after the war, those of them
who were suspected of infringing the prohibitory decree
were arrested on complaint of the members of this
association. The most loyal of subjects could have
_ done no more and would have been justified in doing
less.

Since the foundation of Halifax and the building of
forts at Grand Pré, Pigiguit and Beaubassin, the

- English Government had the means of preventing all

commercial or other relations between the French and
the Acadians ; and, in point of fact, such misdemeanors
in this line as eluded the vigilance of the English must
have been few and far between, as the Archives do not
mention one single complaint before the courts. Had
there been any complaints, Lawrence would not have
been slow to order an investigation and severely to
punish the guilty. \

Granting, however, that there may have been some
breaches of law on this score, they would be but the
veriest trifles, occurring in all times and places and
among all nations, subject to the cognizance of law-
courts, and at any rate quite too unimportant to figure
as an argument in a tragic event like the deportation.

“ They have not for a long time brought anything to
our markets,” was Lawrence’s perfidious assertion, I say

ee rare ee

ner

¢ a mee ee ye eee y

LOCAL CONDITIONS OF SALE. 359

perfidious, because he wrote these words to the Lords of
Trade on the Ist of August. At that date it could not
well be otherwise: the preceding harvest must have
been sold or consumed long before, and the ¢oming har-
vest was still standing. Probably Lawrence’s implied
accusation had no other ground than this ; but this was
a plausible ground for a man that was on the look-out
for pretexts to make his point. He relied upon the
Lords of Trade not noticing that the beginning of
August was a date far removed from the usual time for
the sale of last year’s crops. There were also other
local conditions which would no doubt escape their
notice. For instance, it cannot be supposed that the
Acadians went one by one to sell their produce at Hali-
fax, which was so far off, and the road to which was
almost impassable on foot. They must have employed
agents to carry their produce by water. Now the only
commercial agents in Acadian centres were English:
Blin, Donnell, Winniet, Jr., at Annapolis; Rogers at.
Cobequid; Arbuckle at Fort Lawrence; Dyson and
Mauger at Pigiguit and Grand Pré. Mauger had
another store at Halifax, and, if I mistake not, Blin,
Donnell and Winniet had other stores either at Grand
Pré or Fort Lawrence.* To these men, therefore, must
the Acadians have sold their produce, and through them
must all purchases have been made. As in Lawrence’s
mind the smallest things easily usurped the proportions
of great ones, or took their place when the latter could
not be found, he has taken the trouble to enter the
following item in his official papers: “ Their desiring—

* Alain, Nicholas Gauthier and Joseph Le Blanc had closed their stores
during the war, and, as far as I can ascertain, there was not at this time
one Acadian merchant in the whole peninsula.

360 LOCAL CONDITIONS OF SALE.

the Acadians—to sell their grain to Mr. Dyson and re-
fusing it to Mr. Mauger for the same money appears
very extraordinary.”

While the public documents do not contain, to the
best of my knowledge, one single specific case of com-
mercial relations between the Acadians and the French,
attributed by name to one in particular or to several collec-
tively, they do contain many cases of business trans-
actions between the French and some English merchants,
particularly Arbuckle and that very Mauger whom Law-
rence seems to have taken under his protection.* And
as to general charges against Englishmen, many will be
found at pages 630, 638, 646 of the Archives. I will
quote one only. Writing to the Lords of Trade, Novem-
ber 27th, 1750, Cornwallis said: ‘I am. assured the
New England people have this year carried numbers of
dollars to Louisburg. . . . They supply Louisburg with
every necessary, and the advantage upon this traffic
is so great, that they go sooner there than to this Port.”

I am almost ashamed to have to weary the reader with
these trifles ; but, as the deportation has no more solid
basis than these, and as its justifiableness must stand or
fall with the accusations of its author, I am forced to
discuss these childish charges with becoming gravity.

In the letter of August 1st, 1754, Lawrence speaks but
tentatively and hesitatingly as yet of his deporting pian,
though this is clearly what he means in spite of the
care with which he veils his design. He is content with
humbly submitting to the Lords of Trade his opinion
that, if the Acadians, who have the finest farms of the

* Mauger became a member of the House of Commons in 1763. Mur-
doch mentions, as doing business at Louisburg with the French: W.

Blin, Barber, 8. Butler, Jenkins, Breed, Lord, Turner, Clarke, Aubin,
Green, Dyke, all from New England. .

SKILFUL SUGGESTION. 361

province, refuse to take the oath, “zt would be much
better that they were away, though” he “ would be very
far from attempting such a step without” their “ Lord-
ships’ approbation.” Doubtless the deportation is already
decided upon; the means thereto and the date alone
remain to be settled. Lawrence's only concern now is
to prepare the Lords of Trade for an approval of the
deed beforehand, if possible, or for an acceptance of
accomplished facts which is to be wrung from them by
dint of misrepresentations. This letter is the first step
in the course he has already planned. He cannot hope
to bring the Lords of Trade to approve so cruel a measure
as deportation would be ; so, as yet, he confines: himself
to an indefinite suggestion: ‘ ¢t would be better that they
were away ;”’ and he submits his will to theirs with the
most humble deference: “J would be very far from
attempting such a step without Your Lordships’ approba-
tion.” For the time being he intends merely to predis-
pose them against the Acadians. By a skilful renewal
of the dose he hopes to bring them gradually round to
his way of thinking. Besides, has he not full power in
his own hands? Can he not, by continued severity,
provoke the Acadians to some acts that will justify on
his part an increase of rigor ?

When Lawrence wrote that the Acadians had better
be away, his real intention cannot have been to let them
join the French at Beauséjour, since he had, precisely at

that time, issued a proclamation obliging, under severe
penalties, those who had just left the country to return
immediately. He knew of the pressing and reiterated
instructions of the Lords of Trade to his predecessors,
and to himself a few months ago, urging the governors
to avoid whatever might, by alarming the Acadians,

362 WHAT LAWRENCE MEANT.

lead to their departure. The consequences of their
voluntary departure must have seemed to him too dis-
astrous, or at any rate too threatening, to be thought of
for a moment. No; what he had in view was, mani-
festly, a forced departure to places chosen by himself,
that is to say, a deportation such as he accomplished
twelve months later.

_ For the past four years at least the only act of dis-

obedience specified in the volume of the Archives is

mentioned by. Lawrence in the letter I am now review-
ing. Three hundred Acadians had gone off to Beausé-
jour, as he tells us, to assist their emigrated countrymen
in the work of dike-building. Had they or had they not
left with the intention of returning no more? It would
be hard to say. What we know, through Lawrence
himself, is that they asked leave to go and were re-
fused. Nor should we forget that, five years before,
Cornwallis, driven to his wits’ end, had promised pass-
ports, as soon as the state of the country would allow,
to all who might wish to quit the province. If the three
hundred intended not to return, then, with or without
passports, it was high time to take advantage of the
promises of Cornwallis, whether these were sincere or

not. If, on the other hand, those absentees had left °

with a mind to come back, then Lawrence might be
justified in taking proper measures to enforee their
return and even to punish their disobedience. Very

likely some of them had left for good, while others in-.

tended to decide at Beauséjour whether or not they
would return. Lawrence’s increasing severity was al-
ready making people anxious, as this unauthorized de-
parture shows.

The season for the building of dikes was a very short

x

ee gt ee eee ee

Reng ome. : " ie
oe ee ee,

WHAT LAWRENCE MEANT. 363

one, and the present undertaking at Beauséjour was the
first serious attempt to secure farms for those who had
emigrated in Cornwallis’s time. These refugees were
the relatives, the brothers of the Acadians, who naturally
wished to assist them in a labor that promised to lift
them out of poverty and furnish food for their fami-
lies. The helpers who had gone to Beauséjour were
themselves exposed, at any moment, to be expelled from
the province if the unrestricted oath were exacted. In
such a juncture they would be glad to find beyond the
frontier relatives and friends able to help them in their
turn. Thus in a way they were really working for
themselves.

They were ordered to return directly. In all likeli-

hood the order was promptly obeyed by those who, in-
tending to return, had left their families behind; else
the Archives would certainly mention severe measures
against the disobedient, their families or their property.
When Lawrence gave an order, he was not to be trifled
with, as the Acadians knew to their cost.
. That Lawrence had by this time determined on the
deportation is, I think, clear enough. True, the evi-
dence is still vague and indefinite, though convincing
as far as it goes. Patience will be needed by those who
follow my line of proof: for the chain of evidence is a
long one. But every link is there. The last letter I
have quoted from Lawrence i8, properly speaking, only
the ‘first link in the chain that constitutes the main
strength of this Lost Chapter. The entire evidence,
strong in induction and analysis, will be equally strong
in official documents of undoubted authenticity.

However, before proceeding further, let me anticipate
an objection which doubtless is already taking shape in

864 HIS SECRET PURPOSE.

the reader’s mind: viz., the improbability of such an in-.

human purpose based on no grave cause and born of
sheer cruelty. Right here, then, let me affirm that the
deportation, in the mind of its chief authors, was nei-

ther a justifiable act nor a deed of cruelty pure and sim-.

ple, but a means of acquiring wealth by despoiling the
Acadians of their cattle and their lands. On this point
I entertain the hope that, long before the reader has

finished the book, he will be fully convinced that I am.

indulging in no historical fiction. |
Forestalling somewhat the strict chronological

sequence of events, I will now give the answer of the |

Lords of Trade to Lawrence’s insidious letter:

‘* We cannot form a proper judgment or give a final opinion of
what measures may be necessary to be taken with regard to those

inhabitants, wntil we have laid the whole state of the case before

His Majesty and receive his instructions upon it.

‘* We were in hopes that the lenity which had been shown to
those people by indulging them in the free exercise of their relig-
ion, and the quiet possession of their lands, would by degrees have
gained their friendship and assistance and weaned their affections
from the French, and we are sorry to hear that this lenity has had
so little effect.

‘“It is certain that by the Treaty of Utrecht their becoming sub-
jects to Great Britain (which we apprehend they cannot be but by
taking the oath required of subjects) is made an express condition
of their continuance, after the expiration of a year, and therefore
it may be a question well worth considering how far they can be
treated as subjects without taking such oaths, and whether their
refusal to take them will not operate to invalidate the titles to their
lands ; it is a question, however, which we will not take wpon our-
selves absolutely to determine, but could wish that you would
consult the Chief Justice upon this point and take his opinion,
which may serve as a foundation for any future measure it may be
thought advisable to pursue.

‘* As to those of the District of Beaubassin who are actually gone
over to the French at Beauséjour, if the Chief Justice should be

ee ee ee Se aaa ee eee ae ree

“UNSATISFACTORY REPLY. . ~— 365

of opinion that by refusing to take oaths without a reserve or by
deserting their settlements to join the French, they have forfeited
their title to their lands, we could wish that proper measures were
‘pursued for carrying such forfeiture into execution by legal pro-

ORE ra ts. ae

Lawrence must have expected something better. Of
course he had gained his point in that he had indis-
posed the Lords of Trade and prejudiced their minds ;
but he may have hoped that their reply would contain
some declaration that should be a more definite step
toward his chosen goal. Unfortunately for him his
proposal, “it would be better that they were away,”
was merely referred to His Majesty or rather eluded.
Politeness forbade the Lords of Trade expressing doubts
about Lawrence’s accusations; but the difference of
tone between him and Hopson in so short an interval
must have struck them, as the tenor of their letter
seems to show. However, they in no way depart from
their habitual wisdom and serenity. They seem to
fear that he may act arbitrarily; they strongly advise
him to keep to the rules and traditions of his office, to
consult the Chief Justice as to whether the refusal to
take the oath will invalidate the title-deeds of those
who remain in the province, and even to ask his opin-
ion on this matter with respect to those who have quit-
ted the province. Should the Chief Justice decide that
these latter have by their departure forfeited their
titles, resort should be had to legal process of confis-
cation. |
_ This letter is a fair average specimen of all those
addressed to the governors of Acadia; and from one
who, like myself, seeks nothing but historic truth, dis-
tributing praise or blame irrespective of persons, though

366 FAIRNESS OF THE LORDS.

always finding it more agreeable to praise than to blame,
this letter naturally elicits the remark that the Lords
of Trade hardly ever swerved from this wise and
prudent course. If we take into account the circum-
stances of time and place, the pressure exercised upon
them, the misrepresentations made to them, their con-
duct, viewed as a whole, certainly deserves no very severe
censure and is often praiseworthy. I have not the
slightest doubt that they would have treated the Aca-
dians very differently in the matter of the oath, had
they. been aware of all the facts I have recorded about
the hindering of their departure by Nicholson, Vetch,
~ Armstrong, Philipps, and Cornwallis. These hindrances
are, for obvious reasons, not mentioned in the letters of
these governors; they could not mention them without
condemning themselves. This important fact must not
be overlooked by those who wish to be just to the Lords
of Trade.

Furthermore, this letter seems to prove conclusively
that, when Cornwallis placed the Acadians in the cruel
dilemma of taking the oath or of leaving without their
movables, he must have been going beyond his orders,
since the Lords of Trade here show that they are
doubtful even as to the Government’s right to confiscate
the immovables of those who had left the province.

a ee ee ee a+ a ee ee Oe, le ee, re

ey

Pe rt eee

DATE OF LAWRENCE’S DECISION. 367

CHAPTER XXIII.

a

Lawrence’s persecution—Its effect—Complaints to justify the
deportation collected in the Archives—Order not to quit the
province under pain of military execution for the families of
delinquents.

Ir was all the easier for Lawrence to be tyrannical
and cruel because he was naturally so violently prone
to such behavior that he persecuted his fellow-coun-
trymen of Halifax and his German co-religionists
of Lunenburg, when it was his interest to stand well
with them. From the Acadians, on the other hand, he
had nothing to fear; and if, as seems likely, he had
already planned their deportation, it became his-interest
to drive them to acts of insubordination in order to give
a semblance of justice to the execution of his project.

Nor is it at all difficult to follow every step Lawrence
took as he matured his decision. This decision was
come to in or about July, 1754, when it was known that
Hopson was not to return and that he, Lawrence, was
to succeed him. Hitherto he had laid no charges
against the Acadians ; he had even gone the length of
begging those who had emigrated to return; and, to
all appearances, he had not indulged in excessive rigor.
Now, however, comes a complete change. On the Ist
of August he addresses to the Lords of Trade a letter
filled with accusations, concluding thus: “they have
the best lands in the Province, it would be better that

SHB ok . REVOKING HOPSON’S ORDER.

they were away.” His resolution is taken. Persecu.
tion begins. Hopson, as we have seen, had ordered the
officers to treat Acadians in all cases exactly like the
other subjects of His Majesty, and not to take anything

‘from them by force or without a voluntary agreement.

on their part as to prices. Lawrence’s first act after his
letter of August 1st was to revoke the just and humane
orders of Hopson, and—a circumstance worth noting
—this iniquity was consummated on August the 5th, four
days after the letter just referred to. Here is the order,
bearing the above date, addressed by him to Captain
Murray, Commandant of Fort Edward, at Pigiguit.
Similar orders were sent elsewhere: a

‘“* You are not to bargain with the Acadians for their payment;

but, as they bring in what is wanted, you willefurnish them with cer-
tificates, which will entitle them to such payments at Halifax as shall

be thought reasonable. If they should immediately fail to comply,

you will assure them that the next courier will bring an order for
military execution upon the delinquents.” —

In another letter to the same, dated Ist of September
following, we find this: “ Wo excuse will be taken for not
fetching in firewood, and if they do not do it in proper
time, the soldiers shall absolutely take their houses for
fuel.” This was over and above the military execution.

As always happens when the documents have not the
desired tendency, these letters are not to be found in
the volume of the Archives. Haliburton, who repro:
duces them, adds: :

‘““The requisitions which were occasionally made of them were
conveyed in a manner not much calculated to conciliate affection,
and when they were informed by Captain Murray, that unless they
supplied his detachment with fuel military execution would follow,
they were not slow to notice the difference between the contracts of

Government with the English and the compulsory method adopted

towards them.”’

2,

RESPECTFUL DEMURRER. 309

With reference to the same orders Philip H. Smith
Says:

‘* Murray was in command ofa handful of men at Fort Edward
(now Windsor), and like other upstart despots, laboring under an
abiding sense of his own importance, clothed with absolute authority
over life and property, and secure in the fact that French evidence

would not be received against him, he was not likely to be at a loss
for a pretext to display his authority.”’

These orders, as may be readily supposed, provoked
discontent; but they were obeyed everywhere except
at Pigiguit, and even in this case there was no refusal,
merely delay until the inhabitants should receive an an-
swer to their representations addressed to the Governor.

“This incident would seem unimportant, since the
people declared that, if their demurrer were not favor-
ably received, they would obey. This is what Murray
himself wrote to Lawrence :

** All the affair of the Indians or inhabitants taking up arms is
false, for M. Deschamps * told me this morning that, in conversation
with some of the Acadians, he told them what Daudin (the priest)
had said, they were astonished and declared that they had no inten-
tion ever to take up arms, for, if at the return of the party from

_ Halifax, they were ordered to bring in the fuel, notwithstanding their

representations, they were resolved to obey.”’

A great fuss was made about this disobedience, which
in reality was no disobedience at all, since the Acadians
made the execution of these orders depend on the Gov-
ernor’s answer. At most it was ashort delay. Was
the right of complaint by petition, one of the basic
rights of British freedom, non-existent for them? In
the name of the most elementary common sense, was it
not fitting to grant them the slender satisfaction of

* Deschamps, later a judge of the province, was then a clerk at Mauger’s
store yh Pigiguit (Windsor)

370 ORDERED TO HALIFAX.

waiting till the answer came? Surely, any man with
the faintest spark of kindliness would have done this;
nay, I feel confident that Lawrence himself, in spite of
his ferocity, would have waited, had he not intended to
exasperate them by his severity, to make trouble and
thus create pretexts for deporting them.

But he would brook no delay. The following order-
in-council, refusing to entertain their petition, left them
no time to obey and summoned to Halifax five of the
principal citizens together with Abbé Daudin their mis-
sionary.

‘‘ The Council having taken the same into consideration, were of
_ Opinion and did advise that the commanding officer should be in-
structed to repeat his orders to bring in the firewood upon pain of
military execution. And it was likewise resolved that Mr. Daudin

and five of the principal of the said inhabitants should be ordered to
repair immediately to Halifax to give an account of their conduct.”’

Captain Murray ordered five of the principal inhab-
itants to appear before him, viz., Claude Brassard,
Charles Le Blanc, Baptiste Galerne, Jacques Forét and
Joseph Hébert. “As they had the impudence,” said
Murray to Lawrence, “to ask me to show them your
instructions, I turned them out of the house.” Daudin
and these five inhabitants were taken to Halifax, es-
corted by Captain Cox, Lieutenant Mercer, Ensign
Peach, and a strong detachment of soldiers.

After a week’s detention the laymen were released;
but Daudin was kept prisoner till an occasion should
offer for sending him out of the province. The. docu-
ments here given by the Compiler are not sufficient to
afford a clear notion of Daudin’s part in this affair.
The charge was that he had used disrespectful language
towards the authorities, that the insubordination of the

om,»
iyi

te
ey Sete ick Th ona
ee ee ae an ee ee ee, a) oe ee ee

oy
a ae

DAUDIN. 371

inhabitants dated from his return from Annapolis.
Daudin produced a written defence which was not.
deemed satisfactory. It does not appear in the volume
of the Archives.

Murray, reporting to Lawrence his conversation with
Daudin, said: |

‘“Daudin said to me that he was ignorant of the representation
_ made by the inhabitants until Monday morning. That I had taken
' avery wrong step in not consulting him before I acquainted you of
the affair, which, if I had, he would have brought the inhabitants
in a very submissive manner to me, but, instead of that, I had sent a
Detachment to you who was a man the inhabitants personally hated,
and disliked your Government so much, they could never be easy
under it, having treated them so harshly when amongst them.”

This would seem to show that Daudin had known
nothing of the resolution of the inhabitants till after
they had formed it; that, on the contrary, he would
have been ready to use his influence in bringing them
to obey the Government’s orders; and that he merely
objected to Murray’s proceedings. The last part of the
above quotation is probably what constituted the “ dis-
respectful language toward the authorities.” Lawrence
was not likely to forgive so personal an offence.

I gather, moreover, from all the foregoing incidents,
that the Acadians expected Murray would present
their petition to the Governor in the usual way, without
attaching to this step nor to their momentary suspension
of work more importance than was proper; that, instead
of doing so, Murray confided the petition to a detach-
ment of troops, thus giving an exaggerated idea of the
affair and exposing the Acadians to fresh severity from
Lawrence: and they were evidently in mortal terror of
this despot.

at SUPPOSED FRENCH DESERTERS.

Such is the conclusion deduced from the sole testi-
mony of the accuser. This is one of those rare cases in
which we might have been allowed to study both sides
of the Daudin incident, since Daudin produced a written
defence; but this defence is wanting in the volume of
the Archives, which also omits the petition of the Aca-
dians. - With such one-sided testimony it is impossible
either to exonerate or to condemn Daudin. We must,
however, bear in mind that in Captain Murray, as will
be proved later, we have the most inhuman of all the
officers in Lawrence’s clique. Murray was a great hand
at making much ado about nothing, and this seems to
have been a case in point. 3

Another incident that occurred eight months after
the one I have just related is inserted here, in spite of
its futility, because it will serve to show that, in culling
from the volume of the Archives, I neglect none of
those documents that might militate against the Aca-
dians and their submissive spirit. Under date of the
27th of the following May, 1755, Lawrence wrote to
Murray informing him that he had been advised by
Major Handfield of Annapolis that three French sol-
diers from Beauséjour were in the Mines district, osten-
sibly as deserters, in reality to seduce the inhabitants
and urge them either to take up arms or to leave the
province:

‘* T would have you issue a Proclamation offering a reward of
twenty pounds sterling to whomsoever shall discover when any one
or more of these pretended deserters may be apprehended. You will
publish this Proclamation by means of the Acadian Deputies, and you
must assemble them for that purpose and inform them... that if
any inhabitant either old or young should offer to go to Beauséjour,
or to take arms, or induce others to commit any act of hostility upon
the English, or make any declaration in favor of the French, they

SUPPOSED FRENCH DESERTERS. 373

will be'treated as rebels, their estates. confiscated, and their families
undergo immediate military execution.

‘“‘T desire also that you will immediately publish a Proclamation
offering a reward of twenty pounds sterling to any person that will
apprehend and bring Joseph Dugas of Cobequid, or any or more of
the couriers who arrived at Beauséjour on the 5th May instant with
letters for Le Loutre, also the same reward for apprehending the
couriers who arrived at Beauséjour the evening of the said 5th May _
with letters for said Le Loutre from Mines and Pigiguit.”

‘The information Lawrence had received might be
true or false, we have no means of knowing which;
but, as the volume of the Archives reports no later pro-
ceedings with regard to these proclamations and the
possible results thereof, I am inclined to think that the
whole story was a groundless rumor. Nor is there any-
thing surprising in that, since the events that led Law-
rence to write were supposed to have occurred in the
immediate neighborhood and in the jurisdiction of
Captain Murray himself, whereas the information came
from Annapolis at the other end of the province. At
any rate these events are of no real importance, except
inasmuch as they prove that Lawrence’s rule had become
so oppressive and so odious that the French were re-
newing their attempts to make the Acadians emigrate.

And yet the above facts must have been the gravest
that could be trumped up, since they are the only ones
that occasioned governmental interference, or at least
the only ones that figure in the volume of the Archives.
Thus—incredible as it may seem—these are the only
facts on which the reader can base his judgment as to
whether or not the deportation was justifiable. Barring
the refusal to take an unrestricted oath, there is not, up
to the very deportation itself, one single other incident
that might, by any constructive process, be twisted into

574 INSIGNIFICANT PRETEXTS.

a pretext therefor. Would any man in his senses main-
tain that such petty incidents, trifling in themselves
and devoid of all general significance, could constitute
adequate motives for inflicting upon a whole people a
chastisement that implied the accumulation of all
human ills? In the Pigiguit incident the only culprit
was Lawrence himself. His orders upsetting the equi-
table regulations of Hopson were unjust and barbarous.
He ought at least to have allowed them the right to
make respectful remonstrance, especially when they
had declared that they would obey directly if their
petition was rejected, and when Lawrence was informed
of this by Murray himself. In the case of the French
soldiers coming to seduce them, the Acadians could not
be blamed unless they listened to their proposals.
Seductions of this kind, but much more serious, were not
lacking during the war from 1744 to 1748, and we know
how inoperative they were. If such motives could
justify Lawrence’s conduct, he might have found still
stronger ones against the Germans of Lunenburg, and
perhaps against the colonists of Halifax, though in both
these instances his government was far more equitable.
The* fact is, a despot can always find means to justify
any act otf cruelty; and we read of no other people
who, if situated as the Acadians were, would have
borne such injustice and so much provocation with so
little unruliness.

It will be remembered that Cornwallis, after exhaust-
ing many subterfuges to prevent the departure of the
Acadians, finally took refuge in the passport ruse.
Events are there to prove that his promise was nothing
but a subterfuge, and now we have Lawrence carrying
ferociousness to the extent of threatening with military

ELEVEN SUBTERFUGES. | 375

execution the families of those who should leave the

country.

As the list of subterfuges is a one one, I may be
allonp?d to summarize them thus :

lat subterfuge (Vetcu)—You shall not depart before Nichol-

2nd

3rd
4th
5th

6th
7th

Sth

9th
10th

1ith

“ec

son’s return.
(NicHoLson)—You shall not depart till after such
and such points shall have been
decided by the Queen.

_ (VercH)—You shall not depart in English vessels.

(VETCH)— 4c se 6é 4c “ce French 66
(VeETCH)—You cannot procure rigging at Louis-
burg.

(VeTCH)—You cannot procure rigging at Boston.
(VetcH)—You shall not depart in your own
vessels.
(PuHiLipps)—You shall not make roads to depart ©
by.

1730—Restricted oath accepted.

1749—Your oath was worthless.
(CORNWALLIs)—Yo0u shall not depart this autumn.
(CORNWALLIS)—You ‘ ‘% ‘* till after you

have sown your fields.
(CORNWALLIS)—You shall not depart without
passports.

After this last subterfuge, they now were prisoners,
kept in their country in spite of themselves, herded like
a lot of cattle awaiting the butcher’s pleasure. Does
not this afford strong presumption that, when Lawrence
wrote the Lords of Trade, “it would be better that they

were away,”

he had not in view a free exodus but a

deportation such as really took place?

376 ' FRENCH MISRULE.

CHAPTER XXIV.

Situation of the Acadians at Beauséjour—Venality of Vergor
and the French officers—Le Loutre.

THE time has now come to review briefly the prin-
cipal events that had occurred within the last few years
at Beauséjour on French territory. I have already
spoken of the efforts Le Loutre had made to force the
Beaubassin Acadians to cross the frontier. He then
had a promise from the Governor of Canada that those
who should emigrate from English territory would
receive compensation for their losses. A line of dikes
was to be constructed that would provide for the
majority of them excellent farms ready for tillage.
Unfortunately Le Loutre’s efforts seem to have been,
for a long time, frustrated by the extortions and venality
of the French officers. France was then traversing one
of the most shameful epochs of her history. She was
taking all available roads to ruin. Every incentive to
great movements and noble undertakings, whatever had
hitherto commanded respect and provoked enthusiasm
was fast disappearing under the polished irony of gentle-
manly scamps whose wit amused France and stood to
her instead of glory. There was pulling down without
building up. All that had been the strength of France
was wasting away before this destructive blast, and
nothing remained but the wilderness it created. Pleas-
ure was the standard of all things. The example was

LE LOUTRE’S DIKE-BUILDING. 37T

set by the throne and imitated in the higher classes of
society. In this madcap race after sensual delights the
treasury, carelessly guarded, became a prey to favorites
and venal hangers-on.

In Canada Intendant Bigot was the vampire which,
sucking the life-blood of France, was rapidly hurrying
her to ruin and dishonor. Not content with his personal
delinquencies, he incited his friends to similar pecu-
lations. Thus he wrote to Vergor, commandant at
Beauséjour: ‘* Make the best of your position, my dear
Vergor ; shear and pare to your heart’s content, so as to
join me one day in France and buy yourself a mansion
near mine.” As might well be supposed this invitation
to pillage was sure to find a response in that venal
wretch, and so the promise of assistance to the emigrated
Acadians was made void. In the face of all these
obstacles Le Loutre went to France for the help he so
much needed. A sum of fifty thousand francs was
confided to him, and on his return dike-building was
vigorously pushed. To protect himself against the
venality of middlemen, he personally procured the
necessary provisions and distributed them to the Acadian
workers. This is, I believe, what afforded a pretext for
the charge that Le Loutre was engaging in commercial
transactions on his own account. The officers, whom
he was thus balking in their attempts to defraud the
treasury, were naturally very jealous of his great
influence. They must have dreaded and hated him.
This being the case, one understands Pichon’s saying:
“He had so ingratiated himself with the Marquis de la
Galissionniére that it became a crime to write against
him.” |

Oddly enough, Parkman has failed to give publicity

878 BEAUSEJOUR ACADIANS.

to this charge of unpriestly traffic. Perhaps he was not
aware of it, for Pichon, I think, does not mention it.
Or perhaps Parkman’s silence may be due to the fact
that he had found means to implicate him in a murder,
compared to which the peddling of wares by a priest
became a mere. peccadillo.

The funds did not arrive till the autumn of 1753, too
late to begin operations that year. So far, little had been
done to allay the distress of the emigrated Acadians.
They led a rather miserable existence, working some-
times for the French of Beauséjour, sometimes for the
English of Fort Lawrence, in full view of the fields
they had watered with their sweat and where they had
spent happy years in plentyand peace. Their lot would
have been more endurable had there been any prospect
of stability in the future; but the part of the country
offered them was disputed territory. The Commission
appointed to settle the frontier line was then sitting; it
might decide that their new lands belonged to England ;
in which case they would have either to go into exile
once more and face its concomitant tribulations and dis-
tress or to accept conditions they had just refused at the
costof the greatest sacrifices. The circumstances of their
departure, their forced expatriation after the destruction
of their dwellings, were so many overwhelming memo-
ries. The storm which Cornwallis had raised about the
oath had long since been lulled. Their relatives, their
brothers, their friends of Grand Pré, Pigiguit and
Annapolis were no longer molested. They dwelt in
tranquillity and abundance as in the happy days before
the foundation of Halifax. They were once more
beginning to hope that the question of the oath would
never again be raised. To Cornwallis, himself consider-

BEAUSEJOUR ACADIANS. 379

ably humanized during the last two years of his adminis-
tration, had succeeded a kindly and sympathetic man,
the praise of whose intentions and actions was in every
mouth. The combined result of all their surroundings
was an increase of fear on the one hand and of regret on
the other. Many crossed over with their families and
their cattle to Ile Saint-Jean (Prince Edward Island).
There at least, if they took up land, they ran no risk of
relapsing into the state of affairs which had brought
about their departure; for the island was incontestably
French soil and not disputed. But there also they
would havea precarious and dangerous situation. This
island, being long and narrow, left them ever exposed,
in case of war, to the depredations of corsairs and to
the horrors of an invasion. However no choice was
left to them, and so most of them preferred this alter-
native.

As we have seen, those who remained at Beauséjour
had addressed a petition to Governor Hopson, express-
ing their desire to return to their farms, provided they
were exempt from bearing arms. This proposal had
been rejected. In the first months of his administra-
tion, when Lawrence had not as yet conceived his sinis-
ter design, he had made overtures to them through the
commandant of Fort Lawrence. He had authorized
him to declare that he had no intention, at present, of
obliging them to bear arms. His guarantees were
deemed insufficient. 3

In making a report to the Lords of Trade of these
negotiations, Lawrence said: “ I was privately informed
that at their return, they were in a very ill humor with
Le Loutre and with the French commandant; and that
they represented to them the hardships they labored

380° PICHON ON LE LOUTRE.

under in: not being suffered to accept the proposals of:
the English in a remonstrance that I am told was very’
little short of a mutiny.” This information was fur-’
nished by Pichon.

Some months later, when Abbé Daudin was arrested,
Pichon, writing to Captain Scott, told him “that the
affair of Abbé Daudin was making a great stir at Beau-
séjour; that Le Loutre had preached a very violent
sermon, in which he abused the English, and showed
the Acadians what they could expect from a treacher-
ous nation which thus expelled a holy priest; that the
same fate was in store for the other priests, and that, if
they recrossed the frontier, they would perish miserably,
deprived of the sacraments and of the helps of their re-
ligion.” He requested them—this is the substance of
Pichon’s further statements—to meet at the Comman-
dant’s after Mass, saying that he had to read to them a
letter from the Governor of Canada. But the refugees
did not come. M. de Vergor twice sent a sergeant to
notify them. Only about twenty came. As they
seemed loath to enter the house, the Commandant got
angry and ordered them to enter under pain of being
putin irons. The letter of the Governor of Canada,
which Pichon said was a forgery, was then read to them.
It promised various kinds of assistance. ‘“ You must
know,” continues Pichon, “ that, last month, eighty-three
of the Acadian refugees sent two of their number with
a petition to the Governor of Canada, in which they
requested to be allowed to return to their farms, seeing
that we could not give them suitable ones, those which
we offered them being claimed by the English Govern-
ment. They further said that they did not deem them-
selves released from the obligations of their oath of

PROPHETIC ALARM. 381

fidelity to the King of Great Britain, and that they
were threatened with the punishment of rebels should
they be taken among the French.”
_. Jt is impossible for me either to contradict or to con-
firm these assertions of Pichon. I quote him because
what he relates is not unlikely; on the contrary, his
story is quite in keeping with the idea I have formed of
the situation and of Le Loutre’s motives. There is this
contrast between Pichon’s accusations anent the Howe
murder and his present testimony that he is now on the
spot at Beauséjour, and therefore able to be thoroughly
_ well-informed. In this case he seems to have had no
motive for lying.

After the excitement caused by Cornwallis’s conduct
on his landing at Halifax, Le Loutre had considerably
cooled down, most probably because the danger he had
foreseen had, for the time being, disappeared. But when
he saw that Hopson was not coming back, and that
Lawrence, whom he had had occasion to know, became
titular governor and was already yielding to his cruel
instincts, he once more took alarm. And when his
colleague Daudin was dragged to Halifax and con-
demned to quit the country, no doubt his impetuous zeal
found in this incident all that was needed to set it
aflame. From his point of view, and I am inclined to
think it was the right one, Daudin was a victim of per-
secution. This was, as Pichon makes him say, the
beginning of a régime which would soon deprive the
Acadians of their priests and of the free exercise of
their religion. Was he mistaken? Certainly not, and
this certainty increases in the light of subsequent events.
He knew enough of Lawrence’s character to suppose
him capable of any crime. Of course Le Loutre’s im-

382 PROPHETIC ALARM.

pulsiveness, his religious enthusiasm—some would say,
his fanaticism—might cloud his better judgment and
make him see intentions that did not exist, or at least
exaggerate them; but I am convinced that, Cassandra-
like, he saw clearly the woes that were to whelm the
Acadian people, if the French were dislodged from their
hold on the Bay of Fundy. Abbé Le Guerne, who was
also a missionary near Beauséjour on the French side,
without sharing Le Loutre’s ardor and vehemence,
thoroughly shared his fears. He himself tells us that
Le Loutre, after the taking of Beauséjour, and on leav-
ing the country, strongly urged the Acadians to be
submissive towards the English, in order, if possible, to
avert the misfortunes which he saw threatening them.

A FORGED LETTER. 383

CHAPTER XXV.

Pichon’s letter provokes an expedition against Beauséjour—Prep-
arations in New England—Monkton, assisted by Lieutenant-
Colonels Winslow and Scott, arrives at Fort Lawrence with
2,000 men, June 2nd, 1755—Consternation of the French and
weakness of the garrison—Assistance impossible—Siege of Beau-
séjour—The Acadians refuse help—Three hundred are forced
to take up arms—Capitulation—Le Loutre’s flight—Pichon
claims his reward—What England owes to the Acadians.

DuRING the autumn preceding the capture of Beau-
séjour, Pichon communicated to Captain Hussey, then
commanding at Fort Lawrence, a letter supposed to
have been addressed to Le Loutre by Duquesne, Gov-
ernor of Canada, in which was the following: “J invite
you and M. de Vergor to seek a plausible pretext for a
vigorous attack on the English.” Hussey, when trans-
mitting this letter to Captain Scott, enumerated at
some length the reasons for which he believed that it
must have been fabricated by Pichon himself.* Yet,
three weeks later, Lawrence wrote to Shirley :

** Being well informed that the French have designs of encroaching
still farther upon His Majesty’s right in this Province, and that they
propose, the moment they have repaired the fortifications of Louis-
burg, to attack our Fort at Chignecto (Fort Lawrence), I think it
high time to make some effort to drive them from the north side oF
the Bay of Fundy.”’

* See Chapter XVI.

384 A COMPLETE SURPRISE.

Under other circumstances Lawrence would have
hesitated to base an important decision upon a letter the
spuriousness of which was demonstrated to him by solid
arguments ; but, in view of the projects he entertained,
he now thought it advisable to seize the opportunity and
to act as if there were no doubt as to the contents of
that letter. Hesaid he was “ well informed,” for he knew
that this would be quite enough to make Shirley, whose
ardent nature was cousin-german to his own, chime in
with him and help him with all his might. Nor was he
mistaken. Shirley immediately resolved to levy 2,000
men in New England for an expedition destined to dis-
lodge the French from their strongholds on the isthmus
the following spring. Preparations were pushed on
with vigor, and the fleet, comprising thirty-three vessels
under the orders of Colonel Monkton, assisted by
Lieutenant-colonels Winslow and Scott, appeared before
Fort Lawrence on the 2nd of June, 1755.

There is reason to believe that the letter sent by
Pichon to Hussey as if it came from Duquesne, was.
really, as Hussey thought, “of Pichon’s own composing ;”’
for, since the preceding autumn, the French had done
nothing to give a color of likelihood to this letter. The
Indians were quieter than they had been for a long
time. The garrison of Beauséjour had not been rein-
forced and numbered hardly 160 soldiers ; the fortifica-
tions had not been improved. At the very moment
when the fleet appeared at the entrance of the Bay,
Le Loutre was busily engaged in the building of those
dikes that were to ensure farms to the Acadians. So
skilfully and secretly had this expedition been organized
and conducted that its appearance before the fort was
the first intimation of the danger that threatened the

DE VERGOR’S VAIN THREATS. 389

French. Although the two nations were, ostensibly at
least, on terms of peace, there was no mistaking the
purpose of this display of force; and great was the
consternation at Beauséjour, which became greater still,
a few days afterwards, when it was realized that no
assistance could be hoped for from Cape Breton; for
English vessels were cruising before Louisburg, and to
force the blockade in order to assist Beauséjour would
expose Louisburg to be taken by surprise. There, were,
it is true, on the French side of the frontier, from twelve
to fifteen hundred Acadians able to bear arms, and this
was quite enough to hold the besiegers in check and
perhaps to make the expedition a failure ; but for many
reasons De Vergor could not count upon them.* Those
who had always lived in this part of the country, and
they were the majority, were undoubtedly French sub-
jects. So were also those who, in Cornwallis’s time or
later, had chosen to emigrate ; on their arrival they had
taken the oath to the French government; but Law-
rence, knowing their dispositions, had shrewdly played
» upon their feelings by signifying to them that they
still remained British subjects, and that, should they
ever be taken in arms against England, they would be
treated as rebels. He knew that this declaration, how
absurd soever it was from a legal point of view, would
trouble their consciences and give them scruples of
which he would take advantage. These scruples coupled
with his threats would produce the desired effect.
De Vergor issued severe orders, commanding all able-
bodied Acadians to repair without delay to the fort for

-

* De Vergor, in a letter to M. de Drucourt the preceding year, said that -
in case of attack he could not rely on the assistance of the Acadians, whom —
* the English intimidated by their threats.

79

386 “Te SIEGE DE VELOURS.”

enlistment; but, though his orders were repeated and
accompanied by threats, they remained deaf to his com-
mands: ‘ He sent them orders upon orders,” says Mur-
doch; ‘they answered that he should have used them
better when they were in his power.” De Vergor could
get together only about three hundred of those who,
having no homestead, lived in Fort Beauséjour, and,
receiving rations from the Government, were under its
control. But even they, in the straits to which they
were reduced, witha view to protect themselves against
disaster, stipulated that the orders should be repeated in
writing. This force was insufficient for a long resist-
ance, especially as two thirds of it were men who had
never done military duty, and, what is worse, were
fighting unwillingly under compulsion of the most ter-
rible threats. ‘* Many of the Acadians,” Murdoch adds,
“escaped from the Fort, but seventeen of them were
caught and brought back.”

Nevertheless, had the chief been brave and deter-
mined, it would have still been possible to make a fine
stand and save the honor of France ; but the defence was _
most miserable: nothing that I know of in the military |
annals of that nation approaches, in point of stupidity
and cowardice, the conduct of this siege, which the
French themselves derisively nicknamed “the velvet
siege.” With Vergor and his kinsman and accomplice
De Vannes, the greed of gold had stifled every feeling”
of honor and patriotism. Their only care seems to have
been to save their ill-gotten gains and their precious
persons. Without waiting for the investment of the
fort, without any deadly fight, despite the protests of
Le Loutre and some officers, De Vergor made overtures
to Colonel Monkton, and on June 16th, only fourteen ,

THE FRENCH WITHDRAW. 387

days after the arrival of the expedition, Beauséjour
capitulated on the following terms : *

‘*“ist. The commandant, officers, staff and others, employed for the
King, and the garrison of Beausejour, shall go out with arms and
baggage, drums beating. 2nd. The garrison shall be sent direct by sea
_ to Louisburg, at the expense of the King of Great Britain. 3rd.
The garrison shall have provisions sufficient to last until they get to
Louisburg. 4th. As to the Acadians, as they were forced to bear
arms under pain of death, they shall be pardoned. 5th. The garri-
son shall not bear arms in America for the space of six months.t

** ROBERT MONKTON.

‘* AT THE CAMP BEFORE BEAUSEJOUR.

‘16th June, 1755.”’

This capitulation involved at the same time that of
Fort Gaspereau on Bay Verte. This latter was <de-
fended by a mere handful of soldiers and was, strictly
speaking, only a storehouse for provisions and ammuni-
tion. Vergor ordered M. de Villerai, the commandant,
to surrender his fort; which he did a few days later.
Beauséjour was immediately occupied by the English
troops and its name changed to that of Cumberland. In
the course of the ten days that followed the capitulation,
all the Acadians came one by one to surrender their arms
to Colonel Monkton. Not long afterwards the French
also evacuated the fort of the River St. John; thus there
remained no vestige of French domination north of
the Bay of Fundy, except the trading posts at Mirami-
chi and on the Gulf coast in the neighborhood of Bay
des Chaleurs. Le Loutre had prudently slipped off

* Before the overtures for a surrender a bomb thrown by the besiegers
fell on one of the casemates that was used as a prison, and killed four
Frenchmen and Mr. Hay,an English officer who was a prisoner. This
officer had been captured some days before by the Indians, who were get-
ting ready to scalp him when he was snatched from their hands by an
Acadian named Brassard and led to the Fort, where he ‘was very kindly
treated.

+ Document omitted in the volume of the Archives.

388 PICHON PLEADS FOR PAY.

before the occupation of Fort Beauséjour, and on his
way to Quebec, through the solitudes of the St. John
River, he had leisure to meditate on the instability of
human affairs. From Quebec he embarked for France
in the following August; but another misfortune awaited
him: the ship he was on was taken at sea by the Eng-
~ lish, and he was imprisoned in Elizabeth Castle in the
Isle of Jersey, whence he did not recover his freedom
till eight years later on the conclusion of the peace.
The capture of Beauséjour was really Pichon’s work.
Tt was the letter of Duquesne, whether true or forged,
that gave rise to the expedition. According toa pre-
_ vious agreement between him and Captain Scott, instead
of accompanying the French garrison to Louisburg, he
was held prisoner for some time at Beauséjour, then
sent to Fort Edward at Pigiguit, and finally to Halifax,
where he remained apparently a prisoner, in order that
he might mingle with the French officers who were
already there or who would be brought thither, and learn
the secret plans of the French.
_ It was time for him to claim the full price of his serv-
ices. The memorial he addressed on this subject to
the Governor’s secretary bears, as may well be supposed,
the stamp of his baseness and cupidity. Men of this
kind can hardly possess aught else than second-rate
skill, ingenious enough, perhaps, in the playing of their
vile parts, but puerile and lame when they have to seek
their own interest, for then all the vileness in their
make-up oozes at every pore. Pichon’s memorial con-
tains, together with much sycophancy, a long enumera-
tion of his serwices and losses: “I have lost,” he says,
‘a fine future with my countrymen, in order to attach
myself to the fortune of a nation which I loved, and which

PICHON PLEADS FOR PAY. 389

I know to be the most reasonable and the most generous of
allthose that exist in both hemispheres... .. Mx. Scott
had promised that he would surround me with comfort
and ease. Am I not now warranted in desiring the
fulfilment of these promises, by securing for myself a
solid and advantageous position? ... Kindly bear in
mind that I had a good social status in France, where I
still own property. The Court had charged mewith....
These posts would have been very profitable; I have —
had to give them up, as well as all I have in France,
whither I must never think of returning: I have lost
the extensive property I had bought near Fort Beau-
séjour, moreover two houses and gardens on a very fine
site. By the taking of this fort I have lost two valuable
horses, a quantity of provisions, furniture, linen, clothes,
books and @ thousand guineas stolen from me. ... .

“There are circumstances when a man should be
allowed to speak in praise of himself, and when it is his
interest to make himself known and to direct attention
to the services he has rendered.

“JT am well aware of all the power the Admiral wields
and of the advantages I may hope for from his illustrious
patronage and from that of His Excellency the Gover-
nor. May I not request the honor of a recommendation
from them to General Shirley, as well as to the other
governors of the English provinces, in order to invite
them to exercise their generosity by doing good to the
most devoted of men in the service of the wisest of na-
tions? The main point would be to beg their Excel-
lencies to grant me their powerful patronage at the Court
of England and with.the Prime Minister, in order to
obtain special favors for me. I am pretty well stricken

390 SURRENDER DUE TO ARCADIANS.

in years and have reached an ae when one’s needs become
generally greater.”

Among services rendered, Pichon mentioned his having
brought about the surrender of Beauséjour, by persuad-
ing the Acadians that were in the fort to refuse to
fight at all and to insist on immediate surrender.
Although any assertion of Pichon’s carries very little
weight, especially when, as in this instance, it was his
interest to make the most of his services, still, with due
allowance for his bragging about his influence in the
matter, his affirmation may well be true as to the
Acadians refusing to fight, a fact which could easily be
verified at the time and which is sustained by much
other evidence. If so, as we already have proof that
the great majority of-the Acadians refused to bear
arms, we may also rest assured that those who, under
pressure of cruel threats when they were absolutely at
the mercy of the authorities, consented to enlist, did,
by refusing to fight at the critical moment, bring about
the surrender of Beauséjour. As to the Acadians, said
that article of the capitulation which concerned them,
as they were forced to bear arms under pain of death, they
are pardoned. |

All this proves that Lawrence was not mistaken when,
at the beginning of his administration, he wrote to the
Lords of Trade concerning the Acadians who had emi-
grated: “I believe that a very large part of them would
submit to any terms rather than take up arms on either
side.”” Lawrence knew them well and could make correct
forecasts with respect to their future conduct. And yet
this opinion of Lawrence seems strange. Why should
they not have taken up arms for the French? Were
they not subjects of France and as such had they not

LAWRENCE'S CORRECT FORECAST. 391

the right to serve her cause? Undoubtedly. The
greater part of them had dwelt for generations in this
part of the country ; the remainder were those to whom
Cornwallis, revoking the compromise of 1830, had given
the choice between.an unrestricted oath and departure,
that is, the choice between English and French alle-
giance. ‘My friends,” he had said, “ the moment that
you have declared your desire to leave and submit your-
self to another Government, our determination was to
hinder nobody.” Even had he not made this declaration,
it is evident that, by revoking the condition of their
stay, he set them free to depart, and, once gone, as soon
as they dwelt on French territory, they became French
subjects. It mattered little that the part of the country
where they took refuge was then disputed by the two
crowns. The telling fact was that it was then occupied
by France; this was enough to settle the question of
their French citizenship in virtue of the most elementary
principles of the law of nations and especially of the
diplomatic formula uti possidetis. How, then, could
Lawrence, in the teeth of this evident right, believe that
they would not take up arms against him? Simply
because he knew that a question of this sort, clear
enough in itself, would not appear to them clear enough
to satisfy their conscience; that the scruples that would
beset them would suffice to keep them from acting ;
that the oath they had formerly taken and the habit of
looking upon themselves as British subjects would be a
powerful deterrent; that long years of peace had made
them lose the taste for fighting ; and that, by taking up
arms, they would provoke their tyrannic oppressor to
wreak his fury on their brothers of the Peninsula. To
make his belief a certainty, Lawrence had taken care to

392 ACADIANS DESERVE GRATITUDE.

issue a proclamation in which he warned them that they

still remained British subjects, that they were not re-

leased from their oath of fidelity, and that, should they

_ be taken armed, they would be treated as rebels.

- Lawrence’s forecast was fully confirmed. Despite’
the efforts and threats of the French, out of fifteen hun-
dred Acadians only three hundred took up arms, and,
even of these, several deserted ; finally those who re-
mained refused to fight, and Beauséjour had to capitu-
late.* To an impartial observer these Acadians would
‘seem to have won for themselves, not merely the par-
don which the capitulation granted them, but the eter-
nal gratitude of England for the territory, the prestige
and the glory they had brought her. At any rate the

official pardon in the deed of surrender should have im-

plied perfect immunity from annoyance for anything
that might have happened in the past. We shall see
that it was not so, and that, for want of valid motives,
Lawrence made the events just related serve as pre-
texts for the deportation of the Acadians of the Penin-
sula.. Hence the importance, on the reader’s part, of
deeply fixing these events in his memory; they will
help him to understand stbsequent developments.
Meanwhile, the conduct of the Acadians on either side
of the frontier should be separately examined. I will
first take up the case of the Acadians who remained on
English territory.

* De Vergor and De Villeray were brought before a council of war at
Quebec, three years later, on account of their cowardice at the siege of
Beauséjour and Gaspereau. “De Vergor and De Villeray,” says Les
Mémoires sur le Canada, ‘‘ were discharged ; the first explained his feeble
defence by the fact that the Acadians refused to assist them and raised a
mutiny.”

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